Glass, S. v. Glass, D.

J-A23004-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
SHELLIE GLASS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
DEMETRIUS GLASS : No. 108 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered November 16, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Domestic Relations at
No(s): 2010 DR 12,
PACSES No. 344113675
BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 2, 2022
Shellie Glass (“Wife”) appeals from the order that denied her request
for a hearing on her petition for contempt upon determining that
Demetrius Glass (“Husband”) had paid Wife all the sums due to her under the
controlling support order.1 We vacate the order and remand for further
proceedings.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 Husband argues that we should quash this appeal because the trial court’s
order “simply den[ied] an evidentiary hearing” and did not actually dispose of
Mother’s contempt petition. See Husband’s brief at 10. We disagree. The
November 16, 2021 order does not merely deny a hearing, but also indicates
that all reimbursable expenses have been paid by Husband. Hence, the order
implicitly denies Mother’s petition on the merits and leaves nothing pending
before the trial court concerning Husband’s compliance with the support order.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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By way of background, Wife and Husband married in 1981. Husband
filed a complaint in divorce in 2012, which Wife did not oppose. Litigation of
the economic issues ultimately resulted in the entry of an equitable
distribution order in April 2020. In the meantime, a 2013 support order had
required Husband to pay 55% of Wife’s annual out-of-pocket medical
expenses. Wife has maintained that Husband has failed to fulfill this support
obligation, an issue that this Court declined to address in affirming the
equitable distribution order on April 1, 2021. See D.D.G. v. S.R.G., 253 A.3d
254 (Pa.Super. 2021) (non-precedential decision) (reviewing challenges to the
trial court’s resolution of the economic issues but not addressing Husband’s
failure to pay medical expenses, stating “[c]ompliance with this order relates
to the support action, not the equitable distribution order, which is the order
on appeal”).
On August 21, 2021, Wife filed a petition for contempt, alleging that
Husband failed to reimburse her for any of her medical expenses despite her
providing Husband with a detailed list of such expenses each year since 2013.
See Petition for Contempt, 8/21/21, at 2. According to Wife, Husband
therefore owed her in excess of $21,000. Id. In his answer to the petition,
Husband admitted that Wife had made the demands for expenses but denied
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Therefore, the instant order is appealable as a final order. See Schultz v.
Schultz, 70 A.3d 826, 828 (Pa.Super. 2013) (explaining that an order denying
a contempt petition is final and appealable when it denies a party relief to
which it claims entitlement pursuant to a prior final order).
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that the demands were always timely or that he was responsible for all the
items included therein. See Answer to Petition for Contempt, 10/5/20, at ¶ 5.
The trial court offered the following summary of the subsequent proceedings:
Upon consideration of the petition, an order was issued
directing [Wife] to provide all relevant documentation of the
alleged reimbursed services to counsel for [Husband] and the
Dauphin County Domestic Relations office within thirty days.
[Wife] was also directed to show proof that said reimbursement
documentation was provided to [Husband] by March 31st of the
year following the year in which the costs were incurred.
[Husband] was also directed to provide proof of payments made
to [Wife] for unreimbursed medical expenses. Upon receipt of
information, a domestic relations conference was to be
schedule[d] to address the information provided and make a
determination as to the status of any unreimbursed medical
expenses owed to [Wife]. [Wife] subsequently requested an
extension of time to provide the documentation requested, which
was granted.
A hearing was scheduled for April 1, 2021, during which a
discussion was held with counsel for both parties and the
determination was made that a status conference should be
scheduled regarding the outstanding unreimbursed medical bills.
A status conference was held on May 10, 2021. An order was
subsequently issued on November 16, 2021 denying [Wife]’s
request for a hearing, noting that information provided by the
domestic relations office showed that the information provided
by the parties revealed that any alleged unreimbursed medical
expenses from 2013 and onward were not properly submitted.
The information further provided that any reimbursable medical
expenses incurred by [Wife] from 2014 and onward, that were
properly submitted, were paid by [Husband].
Trial Court Opinion, 3/22/22, at unnumbered 1-2 (cleaned up, emphasis
added).
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Wife filed a timely notice of appeal, and both she and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Mother presents the following issue for our
determination:
Was the trial court correct, contrary to its prior [o]rders, to deny
a conference or hearing to [Wife] regarding enforcement of
[Husband’s] obligation to reimburse her for out-of-pocket medical
expenses from 2013 through the [s]pring of 2021, and to
ultimately and impliedly deny any sort of enforcement, when
[Wife] produced copies of all notices provided to [Husband] (all of
which were timely and valid) regarding reimbursement and was
never given an opportunity through either sworn testimony or
through a conference with Domestic Relations, to describe her
methodology in notification, thereby rebutting apparently
incorrect information given to the trial court by the Dauphin
County Domestic Relations Section?
Wife’s brief at 3.
We begin with a review of the applicable law. This Court applies an
abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing contempt orders. See Zabrosky
v. Smithbower-Zabrosky, 273 A.3d 1108, 1114 (Pa.Super. 2022). As we
have explained:
The court abuses its discretion if it misapplies the law or exercises
its discretion in a manner lacking reason. Each court is the
exclusive judge of contempts against its process. The contempt
power is essential to the preservation of the court’s authority and
prevents the administration of justice from falling into disrepute.
Absent an error of law or an abuse of discretion, we will not disrupt
a finding of civil contempt if the record supports the court’s
findings.
Thomas v. Thomas, 194 A.3d 220, 225-26 (Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up).
“We have found a clear abuse of discretion when the trial court makes a
determination based on a record where no testimony was taken and no
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evidence entered.” Wood v. Geisenhemer-Shaulis, 827 A.2d 1204, 1208
(Pa.Super. 2003) (cleaned up).
The payment of unreimbursed medical expenses as an item of support
is governed by Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6, which provides as follows in relevant
part:
(c) Unreimbursed Medical Expenses. The trier-of-fact shall
allocate the obligee’s or child’s unreimbursed medical expenses.
However, the trier-of-fact shall not allocate unreimbursed medical
expenses incurred by a party who is not owed a statutory duty of
support by the other party. The trier-of-fact may require that the
obligor’s expense share be included in the basic support
obligation, paid directly to the health care provider, or paid
directly to the obligee.
(1) Medical Expenses.
(i) For purposes of this subdivision, medical expenses are
annual unreimbursed medical expenses in excess of $250
per person.
(ii) Medical expenses include insurance co-payments and
deductibles and all expenses incurred for reasonably
necessary medical services and supplies, including but not
limited to surgical, dental and optical services, and
orthodontia.
(iii) Medical expenses do not include cosmetic, chiropractic,
psychiatric, psychological, or other services unless
specifically directed in the order of court.
Note: While cosmetic, chiropractic, psychiatric,
psychological, or other expenses are not required to
be apportioned between the parties, the trier-of-fact
may apportion such expenses that it determines to be
reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances.
(2) The trier-of-fact may impose an annual limitation when the
burden on the obligor would otherwise be excessive.
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(3) Annual expenses shall be calculated on a calendar year basis.
(i) In the year in which the initial support order is entered,
or in any period in which support is being paid that is less
than a full year, the $250 threshold shall be pro-rated.
(ii) The party seeking allocation for an unreimbursed
medical expense shall provide to the other party the
expense’s documentation, such as a receipt or an invoice,
promptly upon receipt, but not later than March 31st of the
year following the calendar year in which the final bill was
received by the party seeking allocation.
(iii) For purposes of subsequent enforcement, unreimbursed
medical bills need not be submitted to the domestic relations
section prior to March 31st.
(iv) The trier-of-fact shall have the discretion to not allocate
an expense if documentation is not timely provided to the
other party.
(4) If the trier-of-fact determines that out-of-network medical
expenses were not obtained due to medical emergency or other
compelling factors, the trier-of-fact may decline to assess the
expenses against the other party.
Note: If the trier-of-fact determines that the obligee
acted reasonably in obtaining services that were not
specifically set forth in the order of support, payment
for such services may be ordered retroactively.
Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(c).
The trial court explained its decision to deny Wife’s request for a hearing,
and its determination that Husband had paid all that was due, as follows:
The court allowed [Wife] an opportunity to submit
documentation regarding bills she believed were reimbursable and
not paid, [Wife] acknowledges in her [Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)]
statement that e-mails were exchanged with the domestic
relations office regarding said documentation. Nevertheless, the
court’s review of Domestic Relations records in this matter reveals
that from 2014 and onward, any reimbursable medical bills that
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were properly submitted by [Wife] were paid by [Husband].
Accordingly, the court denied Appellant's request to hold a
conference or hearing. Because it was within the court’s discretion
to determine the timeliness of [Wife’s] submission of alleged
unpaid medical bills, no error was made.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/22/22, at unnumbered 3 (cleaned up).
Wife argues that the trial court violated basic due process principles in
making its merits determination without affording her a hearing. She
complains that she never failed to give Husband the required annual notice of
expenses but was not given “an opportunity to refute that incorrect finding”
apparently reached by the Domestic Relations office. Wife’s brief at 8 n.3, 9.
Wife further asserts that, as she was not given copies of the documents that
Husband submitted to the Domestic Relations office and no such documents
were included in the official record maintained by the court’s prothonotary,
“we are left to speculate” what informed the trial court’s conclusion that Father
paid all that was due. Id. at 6.
We agree with Wife that the trial court’s ruling is unsound. The trial
court certainly is correct that it has discretion pursuant to Rule 1910.16-6(c)
in how to enforce its support order. By the plain language of Rule 1910.16-
6(c), the time requirements for submitting documentation for unreimbursed
medical expenses are not absolute, and untimeliness may be excused by the
trial court in its sound discretion. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(c)(3)(iv).
Likewise, the trial court possesses discretion to require payment of expenses
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that may not have been strictly necessary. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-
6(c)(1)(Note), (c)(4).
However, the trial court must base its decision upon record evidence
that this Court is able to review, and it must afford Wife the opportunity to
create that record, to examine that record, and to advocate for her position
as to the proper application of Rule 1910.16-6(c) to the evidence of record.
The trial court stated that it reviewed “domestic relations records in this
matter” to inform its decision but does not identify them. A Post-It note
affixed to the trial court’s November 16, 2021 order contains the hand-written
notation: “Emails that were attached are in the working file[.]” Order,
11/16/21. There is no indication who wrote the note, when it was affixed to
the order, who created this “working file,” where the “working file” is
maintained, or precisely what it contains. Importantly, the docket does not
denote that this “working file” or anything in it was filed of record.
Hence, the certified record contains no evidence to support the trial
court’s conclusions that Husband paid all that was owed, that Mother made
untimely demands, or that that untimeliness warranted absolving Husband of
any duty to pay. We have no idea what documents the trial court examined
in making its determinations, or whether its exercise of discretion rested upon
a proper foundation. As such, we are unable to determine whether the trial
court’s rulings were the product of a valid exercise of discretion.
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Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s November 16, 2021 order and
remand for the court to have a hearing to allow the parties to present
testimony and evidence in support of their respective positions concerning
Husband’s compliance with the 2013 support order. Accord Wood, supra at
1208; Chrysczanavicz v. Chrysczanavicz, 796 A.2d 366, 369 (Pa.Super.
2002) (“Because we find the record insufficient to support the court’s order,
we vacate that order and remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing on the
contempt petition.”).
Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/2/2022
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