The Pennsylvania State Univ. v. Elansari, A.

J-S28028-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
UNIVERSITY : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
v. :
:
:
AMRO ELANSARI :
: No. 163 MDA 2022
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Entered December 23, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Civil Division at No(s):
2015-0900
BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 07, 2022
Amro Elansari appeals pro se from the order denying his motion to
vacate judgment. Elansari challenges a 2015 injunction excluding him from
the premises of the Pennsylvania State University’s School of Law (“Law
School”). We affirm.
The underlying facts and procedural history of the instant matter was
aptly set forth by the trial court:
[O]n January 27, 201[5], [the Law School] issued an
Administrative Directive instructing [Elansari] to have no contact
with a particular female student. The Administrative Directive
informed [Elansari] that violation of the directive would be
considered a violation of the Student Code of Conduct and would
subject him to disciplinary action. Despite the directive, [Elansari]
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contacted the female student on January 31, 2015.[1] On February
3, 2015, [the Law School] informed [Elansari] that the [L]aw
[S]chool's Honor Code Board was reviewing his conduct. That
same day, a Notice of Exclusion was issued, notifying [Elansari]
he was not permitted on the [L]aw [S]chool premises until further
notice. The notice further advised [Elansari] that entering the
premises could result in his arrest for trespass. On February 11,
2015, at [Elansari’s] request, the Honor Code Board held a
hearing. Following the hearing, the Honor Code Board determined
[Elansari] knowingly violated the Administrative Directive by
contacting the female student and therefore violated the Honor
Code. As a result, the Honor Code Board sanctioned [Elansari] by
suspending him from the [L]aw [S]chool for two (2) years, or until
the academic semester commencing January 2017. [Elansari]
appealed.
On February 22, 2015, Interim Dean James W. Houck issued
the Final Adjudication of Honor Board Appeal, which affirmed the
decision and sanctions imposed by the Honor Code Board. On
February 26, 2015, despite the Administrative Directive and the
Notice of Exclusion, [Elansari] went to the [L]aw [S]chool and
entered a classroom where the female student was. [Elansari]
refused to leave the premises and had to be escorted out of the
building by police. Approximately thirty (30) minutes later,
[Elansari] returned to the building and again refused to leave.
After discussion with [L]aw [S]chool administration, [Elansari]
agreed to leave the premises. However, [Elansari] stated he had
no intention of abiding by the suspension and sanctions issued by
the Honor Code Board and planned to return to the law school
premises the following Monday to attend class. As a result of
[Elansari’s] disruptive and threatening behavior, [the Law School]
commenced the [instant] matter.
On February 27, 2015, the [trial court] granted the [Law
School’s] Emergency Petition for Ex-Parte Preliminary Injunction
and issued an Order enjoining [Elansari] from, among other
things, entering the premises of the [L]aw [S]chool. On March 2,
2015, the [trial court] amended the Order to authorize local law
enforcement to use any power vested in them to ensure
[Elansari’s] full compliance with the Order. A hearing was held on
____________________________________________
1 The contact referred to is Elansari’s Facebook post to the female student
wishing her a “happy birthday” and attaching a music video, which he
allegedly authored entitled “Can’t Get Enough (of You).”
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March 6, 2015, at which time both parties appeared and presented
their respective cases. Following said hearing, the [trial court]
granted the [Law School’s] Petition and entered an Order
excluding [Elansari] from the premises of the [L]aw [S]chool. On
March 23, 2015, [the trial court] issued an Amended Order setting
forth specific parameters of the permanent injunction [“2015
Permanent Injunction”]. [Elansari] did not appeal the March 23,
2015 Amended Order. On October 13, 2017, approximately two
(2) years later, [Elansari] filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment which
was denied by [the trial court] on December 11, 2017. [Elansari]
filed a Notice of Appeal on December 22, 2017. However,
[Elansari’s] appeal was quashed by the Pennsylvania Superior
Court on May 2, 2018 due to his failure to file a brief.
On September 10, 2021, approximately six (6) years after
the entry of the Amended Order, [Elansari] filed the following
items: ( 1) a Second Motion to Vacate Judgment; (2) a Third Party
Complaint purporting to join individual additional defendants; and
(3) an Answer with New Matter and Counterclaim to the [Law
School’s] Complaint in Equity. All three documents were filed as a
single entry identified as “Plaintiffs Second Motion to Vacate
Judgment.” On September 30, 2021, the [Law School] filed a
Motion to Strike [Elansari’s] Third Party Complaint and Answer
with New Matter and Counterclaim to [Elansari’s] Complaint in
Equity as untimely. A hearing on the [Law School’s] Motion was
held on December 7, 2021. Pursuant to this Court's Opinion and
Order, filed December 22, 2021, [Elansari’s] Motion to Vacate
Judgment was denied and the [Law School’s] Motion to Strike was
granted.
Tr. Ct. Op., 1/13/22, at 1-3.
On January 6, 2022, Elansari filed a petition for reconsideration, motions
to vacate and expedite, and an application for nunc pro tunc relief. The trial
court denied each of Elansari’s filings in an opinion and order dated January
13, 2022. The instant appeal followed and both the court and Elansari
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Elansari raises the following issues:
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1. Is the refusal to vacate the injunction resulting in the instant
matter an error of law for failure to conform to the principles
of equity under Pennsylvania law?
2. Is the suspension of [Elansari] from law school at Penn State
Law for over seven years inequitable and unlawful?
Elansari’s Br. at 5.
In his first issue, Elansari argues that the trial court erred by declining
to dissolve the 2015 Permanent Injunction against him. To that end, Elansari
presents a circuitous argument with little citation to legal authority. From what
we can discern, Elansari attempts to challenge the underlying merits of the
2015 Permanent Injunction. He seems to allege that the female student at
issue had “unclean hands” because she invited him to wish her a happy
birthday via an automated Facebook notification. Further, in apparent
reference to his past arrest/cannabis use, he seems to allude to the changing
landscape of cannabis legislation in Pennsylvania.
Our standard of review of an order granting or denying a permanent
injunction is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Liberty Place Retail
Assocs., L.P. v. Israelite Sch. of Univ. Practical Knowledge, 102 A.3d
501, 506 (Pa.Super. 2014). “[W]e must accept the trial court’s factual findings
and give them the weight of a jury verdict where they are supported by
competent evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).
“To be entitled to a permanent injunction, a party must establish a clear
right to relief, and must have no adequate remedy at law, i.e., damages will
not compensate for the injury.” Id. at 505-06 (citing J.C. Ehrlich Co. v.
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Martin, 979 A.2d 862, 864 (Pa.Super. 2009). “Unlike a preliminary injunction,
a permanent injunction does not require proof of immediate irreparable
harm.” Id.Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1531(c) permits any party to move
for the dissolution of an injunction. See Pa.R.C.P. 1531(c). However,
injunctions may only be vacated “where the situation and circumstances
of the parties or the law are shown to have so changed as to make it
just and equitable to do so.” Soja v. Factoryville Sportsmen’s Club, 610
A.2d 491, 493 (Pa.Super. 1992) (emphasis added, citation omitted).
In this case, Elansari has failed to show any change of circumstances or
change in the law warranting the dissolution of the 2015 Permanent
Injunction. See id. The trial court points out that Elansari’s lone argument
regarding a change in circumstances or the law concerns cannabis legislation
in Pennsylvania and is of no moment. This is because, as the trial court already
concluded in Elansari’s previous bid to vacate the 2015 Permanent Injunction,
there is no connection between cannabis legislation and Elansari’s failure to
cease contact with the female student. We discern no error in the trial court’s
determination.2 Elansari’s first issue lacks merit.
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2 Elansari attempts to present an argument regarding “a change of
circumstance” in a “Motion for Extraordinary Relief” filed with this Court, on
October 27, 2022, well after he commenced this appeal. He argues that his
suspension should now be considered expired and the Law School is
erroneously failing to conduct a hearing about the same. However, this
argument is premature, and this Court will not consider it because, among
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In his second issue, Elansari appears to claim that the Law School’s
underlying decision to suspend him was erroneous. However, he fails to
properly develop a legally cognizable argument and provides not a single
citation to legal authority. Accordingly, Elansari’s second issue is waived as
undeveloped. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (stating that if the defects an appellate brief
are “substantial,” the court may “quash or dismiss” the appeal); Norman for
Estate of Shearlds v. Temple Univ. Health Sys., 208 A.3d 1115, 1119
(Pa.Super. 2019).3
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/07/2022
____________________________________________
other things, Elansari failed to present it to the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P.
302(a) (issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal).
3 We recognize Elansari’s pro se status. However, “[a]lthough this Court is
willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status
confers no special benefit upon the appellant.” Commonwealth v. Adams,
882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa.Super. 2005). “[I]t is an appellant’s duty to present
arguments that are sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must
support the claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record and
with citations to legal authorities.” Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766,
771 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
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