DocketNumber: 3190-3192
Judges: Rowley, McEwen, Sole, Beck, Tamilia, Popovich, Johnson, Hudock, Elliott, Hu-Dock
Filed Date: 5/17/1994
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
The consolidated appeals presented before us for review are taken from a judgment entered against Eastern Engineering and Elevator Company (Eastern).
Eastern was a named defendant in an action brought by William and Paula Curran for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of a fall Mr. Curran sustained when a moving escalator on which he was riding in the Sands Hotel and Casino (Sands) came to a sudden stop. The Sands was also named as a defendant with Eastern, who was responsible for maintaining the escalator. A five day jury trial was held after which the jury returned a verdict. The trial court’s interpretation of the jury’s verdict forms the basis for issues presented in the appeals filed in this case.
The verdict slip had been prepared with special interrogatories for the jury to consider and answer. The jury responded and found, in answer to questions numbered one and two, that Sands was negligent, but that the negligence of Sands was not a substantial factor in causing harm to plaintiffs. In answering questions numbered three and four, the jury determined that Eastern negligently breached its duties under the maintenance contract, and that Eastern’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs’ harm. The jury next found that William Curran was not negligent. When asked what percentage of plaintiffs damages should be attributed to the causal negligence of each of the parties, the jury responded by attributing 30% to Sands, and 70% to Eastern. William Curran was assigned a zero percentage figure by the jury. The final question asked “[wjhat damages, if any, do you award plaintiffs?” Appearing next to William Curran’s name was the amount of $301,000.00. A zero was written in the line next to Paula Curran’s name. The trial court subsequently molded the verdict and entered judgment solely against East
On appeal Eastern sets forth five issues questioning the sufficiency and weight of evidence to support the verdict, the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and the need for a new trial due to inconsistency in the jury verdict. The Currans, in addition to refuting these claims, have filed their own appeal alleging that the trial court erred in molding the verdict thereby precluding them from receiving the entire $301,000.00 verdict award, and that the court erred by failing to make an additur for Paula Curran’s damage claim based on loss of consortium.
After reviewing the record in light of the issues presented, we conclude that all of the issues with the exception of those questions concerning the jury verdict, and the court’s action with respect to that verdict, can be readily dismissed. The trial court, in its opinion written in response to the parties’ post-trial motions, has thoroughly discussed these matters and, for the reasons provided therein, we conclude that the trial court correctly found the issues to be without merit. We turn now to the remaining matter of the jury verdict.
Eastern argues that the court’s decision with respect to the verdict should be reversed and a new trial ordered because the answers given by the jury to the specific interrogatories were inconsistent. Eastern maintains that these inconsistencies are irreconcilable, and demonstrate jury confusion on the issue of causation, thus necessitating a new trial. In response, the Currans and Sands argue that this claim was waived by Eastern when it failed to object at the time the jury rendered its verdict. While disputing Eastern’s contention that a new trial is warranted, the Currans nevertheless urge us to disturb the trial court’s decision which molded the verdict and allowed William Curran to recover only 70% of the $301,000.00 jury award. The Currans suggest that a decision which precludes William Curran from recovering the entire jury verdict is in error.
In Goldmas the jury determined that the defendant was negligent and that the defendant’s negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiffs harm. It further found that the .plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, but attributed defendant with 75%, rather than 100% of the causal negligence. The plaintiff was not assigned any percentage figure for causal negligence. The court found certain consistencies in the jury’s verdict. It ruled that there was “no question as to the jury’s finding that [the defendant] was negligent, and that the negligence of [the defendant] was a proximate cause of [the plaintiffs] damages.” Goldmas, at 252, 574 A.2d at 104. It further found that there was “no confusion” concerning the jury’s finding that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent. Because the jury consistently rejected the defense of contributory negligence, the Goldmas court concluded that the 75% figure was “mere surplusage” which had “no effect on the valid verdict rendered by the jury.” Id. The court thus permitted plaintiff to recover the entire award from the defendant.
In the instant case certain inconsistencies are apparent when reading the jury’s responses to the interrogatories; however, it is equally apparent that other matters have been clearly determined by the jury. We can begin by noting that the jury found that Mr. Curran was not contributorily negli
The jury also specified the damages which Mr. Curran was entitled to recover. It found that he should be awarded $301,000.00 plus delay damages for his injuries. This factual finding cannot be disputed since it has been clearly set forth in the verdict rendered by the jury. A decision to alter this award, such as was made by the trial court when it reduced this figure, cannot be upheld because there is no confusion in the jury’s determination that Mr. Curran was entitled to recover the specific sum of $301,000.00 plus delay damages for the injuries he suffered as a result of the accident.
Finally, it is also evident that the jury found Eastern liable for Mr. Curran’s injuries. The jury was instructed in this case that the Currans had to establish both negligence and causation in order to recover from the defendants. The court’s charge specifically advised the jurors:
Now, in order for William Curran and Paula Curran to recover in this case they must show that the defendants’ negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and that is what the law recognized as a legal cause.
N.T. 1/27/92 at 135.
In accordance with this instruction the jury reviewed the evidence and specifically found that Eastern breached its duties under the maintenance contract and that this negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to Mr. Curran. These answers provided by the jury to the interrogatories submitted to them undisputably establish that the jury concluded that William Curran is entitled to recover from Eastern for his damages.
What is unclear from the jury’s verdict is the liability of Sands. Although the jury determined that Sands’ was negligent, unlike Eastern, it was found that Sand’s negligence was not a substantial factor in causing Mr. Curran’s harm. Despite this statement that Sand’s negligence was not the legal cause for Mr. Curran’s injuries, the jury found that 30%
A similar situation existed in the case of Ferrick Excavating v. Senger Trucking, 506 Pa. 181, 484 A.2d 744 (1984). The jury in that case when responding to interrogatories found that the defendant was negligent and that its negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs damages. The plaintiff was found to be contributorily negligent, but its negligence was not found to be the proximate cause for the injuries. As in the instant case, despite a finding that a party’s negligence was not the legal cause of damages, that party was found to be responsible for a percentage of the damages. In the Ferriek case, the plaintiffs proximate negligence was found to be 20%. The defendant was assigned an 80% figure for responsibility. When reviewing this verdict, our Supreme Court determined that the answers to the interrogatories “set up an irreconcilable inconsistency between the finding in 4 that Ferrick’s negligence was not a proximate cause of the injury and the finding in 5 that Ferrick’s proximate negligence was 20%.” Ferriek, at 187, 484 A.2d at 747.
Like in Ferriek we must find the jury’s answers to interrogatories to be irreconcilably inconsistent. We cannot explain how the jury could apportion damages between Sands and Eastern after determining that Sands negligence was not the legal cause for Mr. Curran’s injuries, and that only Eastern’s negligence was the substantial factor in causing harm to Mr. Curran. Under such circumstances, where we could do no more than guess at the jury’s thinking, we would ordinarily order a new trial to determine these unanswered questions of responsibility. However, in this case, there is a question of waiver.
In the instant case the jury returned its verdict, was polled and then dismissed. The jury was dismissed before
Our Supreme Court in, City of Philadelphia v. Gray and Williams v. SEPTA 534 Pa. 467, 633 A.2d 1090 (1993) (“Williams”) recently considered the question of waiver in similar circumstances.
In Williams the plaintiff claimed that the trial court should have molded the jury verdict to enter judgment against SEPTA or, in the alternative, granted a new trial due to the inconsistency of the jury’s answers to interrogatories. The jury’s response to these interrogatories found the SEPTA driver to be negligent, but his negligence was not found to be a substantial factor in plaintiffs accident. Another defendant, a city police officer, was found to be negligent in the operation of his vehicle, and his negligence was found to be a substantial factor in plaintiffs accident. The jury then indicated the percentage of causal*negligence of both defendants assigning SEPTA a 25% figure and the city a 75% figure. The jury then went on to conclude that the plaintiff did not suffer a permanent loss of a bodily function and awarded her $20,-000. 00 in damages of which $18,000.00 was found to be for pain and suffering. The trial court rejected plaintiffs post-trial motions requesting judgment in favor of SEPTA or, in the alternative, a new trial. The trial court found that the jury made consistent findings with regard to SEPTA’s negligence and entered judgment in favor of plaintiff against the city,
In the instant case, as in the Supreme Court’s recent decision, the party seeking a new trial failed to request a correction of the verdict before the jury was discharged. Despite the obvious problem with the jury verdict, Eastern did not seek to have the inconsistencies resolved until it filed post trial motions.
The jury clearly determined that Eastern was responsible for Mr. Curran’s injuries, that the injuries totaled $301,000.00, and that Mr. Curran was not contributorily negligent. The jury did not find that Sands’ negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to Mr. Curran, and in view of the fact that Eastern waived any objections to any inconsistencies which appear to question this specific finding, we find, in accordance with Williams, that they have been waived.
Accordingly we reverse the judgment entered by the trial court and remand for the entry of judgment in favor of William Curran and against Eastern in the amount of $301,-000.00, plus delay damages and interest.
. Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff and against the City of Philadelphia in the amount of $2,000.00 based upon 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8553(c)(2), which allows damages to be recoverable for pain and suffering only where there is a permanent loss of bodily function, permanent disfigurement or permanent dismemberment and the medical and dental expenses exceed $1,500.00.
. We note that the trial court was apparently well aware of the problems presented in the jury's answers to the interrogatories. Immediately after discharging the jury the court asked counsel to offer their opinions interpreting the verdict. While we reiterate that the type of inconsistency which resulted in this case demonstrates the "impracticability of interrogatories,” Ferrick v. Senger, supra, we caution trial courts not to discharge juries where there are obvious problems with a jury verdict which might be resolved with more instruction and further deliberations. Had such occurred in the instant case, the problems which necessitated this appeal may well have been avoided.