DocketNumber: 3087
Judges: Cavanaugh, Wieand, Olszewski
Filed Date: 7/27/1994
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
This is an appeal from a trial court order, entered August 17, 1993, by which an action was terminated for inactivity pursuant to Berks County Rule of Judicial Administration 1901 and Pa.R.J.A. 1901.
The order from which the instant appeal was filed did not enter a judgment of non pros. The order terminated the action for lack of activity pursuant to Pa.R.J.A. 1901. Although the effect of a judgment of non pros and an order terminating the action are virtually identical, each serves a slightly different purpose and entails a different procedure.
Pa.R.J.A. 1901(a) establishes policy in this Commonwealth and provides that “[wjhere a matter has been inactive for an unreasonable period of time, the [court], on its own motion,
Pursuant to Pa.R.J.A. 1901, the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County adopted a rule which requires the prothonotary, where there has been no docket activity for two years, to give notice to the parties that the action will be terminated without further notice unless the court, after hearing or stipulation, shall permit the case to remain active. The local rule, B.R.J.A. 1901, then provides as follows:
(d) Termination of a case under this rule shall be final and shall bar any further action thereon, except that if a party was served with the notice required by section (a) by publication, the party served by publication may petition the court to reactivate the case for good cause shown.
The Berks County Rule complies with the minimum standards adopted by the Supreme Court rule.
In the instant case, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and thereafter entered an order terminating the action for inactivity. The order by the trial court was a final order which terminated the action. Such an order was immediately appealable. Neither a petition for post-trial relief nor a motion to remove the termination order was a condition precedent to the right of appeal. The local rule specifically provided that there should be no further action thereon in the trial court. This rule was consistent with Pa.R.J.A. 1901 and complied with the minimum standards established thereby. Pa.R.C.P. 3051 is inapplicable; it applies only to orders entering judgments of non pros. This court, therefore, will not burden the right of appeal from an order terminating the action by adding an unnecessary step in the trial court.
The facts, which are accurately summarized by the trial court, are as follows:
[Appellants] apparently leased trailer lots in the Woodland Mobile Home Park from former [appellee] Lawrence J.*232 Patterson. [Appellants] retained counsel to file the instant lawsuit seeking damages for alleged property damage and personal injury to [appellants].
[Appellee] Harry G. Crossley answered the Complaint and initiated discovery from [appellants]. On October 4, 1989, Crossley’s first request for production of documents was served on [appellants’] counsel. It requested, among other things, evidence of the alleged medical problems, evidence of any expenses incurred by [appellants], any evidence of physical injuries, loss of use of the leased properties, and evidence that there had in fact been illegal disposal activities. Those activities were alleged in the Complaint to have occurred in the years from 1950 to 1975 — from eighteen to forty-three years ago. Those activities were alleged to have been done by' Gus Bales and the then operator of the farm, John Crossley. Both those individuals are deceased.
In the response to the discovery request dated December 4, 1989, [appellants] produced, among other things, their counsel’s letters to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) dated April 18, 1989 and July 11, 1989 and a letter to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (“DER”) dated November 20, 1989. No documents were produced identifying any injuries, expenses, losses or claims by any [appellant], and none have been produced as of this day.
The last specifically identified communication between [appellants’] counsel and the EPA, a non-party, is alleged in the motion to have occurred on January 2, 1990. No evidence of that alleged contact, or any subsequent contact with EPA or DER has been produced by [appellants] despite the outstanding discovery requests.
The last alleged contact in the motion initiated by counsel for [appellants] and between him and counsel for any party in this case was December 6, 1989.
Thereafter, on January 12,1993, the deputy prothonotary sent a Notice of Termination to all counsel since there had been no record activity in this case for over three years. On March 12,
Appellants contend the trial court abused its discretion by terminating the action in light of its character and the compelling reasons for the delay. These alleged compelling reasons included: the fact that the EPA had conducted an ongoing investigation of the relevant site, referring it for governmental enforcement action in 1992; appellant’s activities prior to the onset of delay; and finally, the pendency of several relevant statutes of limitations.
In cases such as this, an order terminating an action will not be reversed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Cf. Gates v. Servicemaster Com. Service, 428 Pa.Super. 568, 570-72, 631 A.2d 677, 678 (1993). An abuse of discretion is not merely an error in judgment; rather it occurs when the law is overridden or misapplied, or when the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. Stock v. Amott, 415 Pa.Super. 113, 118, 608 A.2d 552, 554 (1992).
The law is settled that it is plaintiff, not defendant, who bears the risk of not acting within a reasonable time to move a case along. Pennridge Elec. v. Souderton School, 419 Pa.Super. 201, 209, 615 A.2d 95, 99 (1992). “If plaintiffs counsel finds [himself] faced with delays created by others, [he] must take action to move the case forward, such as filing praecipes for argument on undecided motions, moving to compel [his] opponent to file a certificate of readiness, or requesting a conference with the judge as provided by local rule to have the case put on the trial list.” Id.
The actions of the EPA and/or DER on the neighboring farm after the date of suit are irrelevant at best. Whatever these agencies do with respect to that farm in terms of cleanup has no bearing on [appellants’] causes of action or their alleged injuries or damages. The fact that [appellants’] counsel may have had unspecified and undocumented contacts with regulatory agencies with respect to a nearby property is no basis for concluding that [appellants] have proceeded with reasonable promptitude.
The mere fact that the EPA and the DER had an alleged ongoing investigation of the premises, moreover, was no excuse for failing to produce any evidence of appellánts’ alleged injuries. Presumably, if appellants had, in fact, suffered any personal or property injuries, they would have presented such evidence during the discovery process. However, in response to appellees’ request for production of documents requesting, inter alia, evidence of the alleged medical problems, evidence of any expenses incurred by appellants and any evidence of physical injuries, appellants produced no documentation whatsoever concerning the same. Appellants merely produced their counsel’s letters to the EPA and the DER. Given appellants’ lack of evidence, along with their irrelevant contention that the EPA and the DER were involved in an alleged ongoing investigation, the trial court could properly conclude that they failed to present any compelling reason for failing to move the case forward.
Appellants next contend that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider their activities prior to the
Finally, appellants maintain, the court abused its discretion by failing to consider several relevant statutes of limitations. However, it was inactivity and not any statute of limitations which caused the court to terminate this action. Whether the action was or was not otherwise barred by a statute of limitations, therefore, was not controlling of the court’s decision to terminate.
Appellants finally contend the trial court erroneously misconstrued the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act (“HSCA”), and misunderstood its applicability to this case. Appellants premise this final contention on the court’s refusal to consider the statute of limitations applicable to the case under the HSCA. However, appellants assumptions are unfounded. Whether or not other courts have held that the HSCA provides a private cause of action for “response costs” and whether such an action requires prior notice under the “citizen suit” provision of the HSCA is irrelevant to whether the trial court abused its discretion by terminating this action for lack of activity. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion, its order will be affirmed.
Order affirmed.
. A judgment of non pros, for example, should not be entered unless delay has caused prejudice. See: Abraham Zion Corp. v. After Six, Inc., 414 Pa.Super. 611, 615, 607 A.2d 1105, 1107 (1992), allocatur denied, 533 Pa. 628, 621 A.2d 576 (1993); Neshaminy Constructors, Inc. v. Plymouth Township, 132 Pa.Commw. 229, 234, 572 A.2d 814, 817 (1990). An order terminating an action for inactivity, however, is intended to permit a trial court to rid its docket of stale cases. Such an order may be entered by a court sua sponte after an unreasonable period of inactivity even though there may be no prejudice to the defendant.
. Appellants suggest that after a careful analysis of the reasoning and holding in Penn Piping, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of North Amer., 529 Pa. 350, 603 A.2d 1006 (1992), any presumption of prejudice should be framed within the parameters of the applicable statute of limitations.