Claudio v. Dean MacHine Co., Inc.

JOHNSON, J.,

Dissenting:

¶ 1 I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the trial court acted beyond the permissible scope of its discretion in convening an evidentiary hearing after entry of the verdict without an offer of proof based on legally cognizable after-discovered evidence. When the court recorded the verdict, the record was closed and should have remained so unless the plaintiffs could demonstrate that evidence they sought to admit post trial could not have been discovered prior to trial through the exercise of due diligence. The Majority’s disposition effectively dispenses with this procedural safeguard, allowing trial courts virtually unfettered discretion under Rules of Civil Procedure 227.1 and 1033 to admit new evidence after delivery of the verdict. Because I conclude that the trial court’s action in convening an evidentiary hearing under the guise of these rules is inconsistent with law, I would vacate the judgment as molded by the trial court and enter judgment on the verdict as delivered by the jury.

¶2 In this appeal, Dean Machine, Inc. (DMI), states six questions involved. In support of its first and second questions, respectively (as renumbered by the Majority), DMI argues that the court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment, and in denying its motion in limine to exclude evidence at trial against DMI. The Majority has determined that DMI failed to provide a record sufficient to enable our review and so has waived these assertions. I agree with.the Majority in its disposition of these two questions.

¶ 3 I disagree, however, with the Majority’s disposition of DMI’s third, fourth, and fifth questions. DMI argues, in support of its third question, that the trial court erred in receiving new testimonial evidence after entry of the jury’s verdict in order to amend the caption, and in its fourth question, that evidence was legally insufficient to support the court’s determination that DMI is the successor in interest to DMC. Because I conclude, in response to DMI’s third question, that the trial court exceeded the permissible scope of its discretion in admitting evidence post trial, I would find no occasion to consider the sufficiency of that evidence and so would not reach DMI’s fourth question. In its fifth question, DMI asserts that the trial court erred in molding the verdict to impose liability on DMI and should instead have granted DMI judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, a new trial. The Majority determines, and I agree, that “the court erroneously molded the verdict against DMI when [DMI] had no opportunity to present a defense at trial.” Majority Opinion at 231. Unlike the Majority, however, I cannot conclude that the trial court’s error is rectified by the grant of new trial. In my opinion, a retrial of this case merely compounds the underlying error, allowing the plaintiffs an unwarranted chance to lodge a verdict against another defendant on the basis of evidence that is not properly before the court.

¶ 4 In reaching its decision to grant a new trial, the Majority reasons:

We see no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether DMI was the successor corporation to DMC. This hearing served the goals of correcting pretrial errors and allowing liberal amendment to the pleadings in order to ensure that the case proceeds against the proper party. Thus, the problem lies not in the hearing itself....

Majority Opinion at 232. The Majority appears to buttress this conclusion with an exceptionally broad interpretation of Pa. R.C.P. 227.1, and an absence of authority to the contrary. See id. at 230-231 (“Like the trial court, we have discovered no authority prohibiting a court from conducting a post-trial evidentiary hearing to dispose of issues that have been raised before or during trial.... [A] trial court may believe that it acted hastily or improperly by denying a party the opportunity to develop an important legal issue through an evi-dentiary hearing. Given the broad scope of Rule 227.1(a), we decline to announce a general rule prohibiting trial courts from taking appropriate steps to correct this class of error.”).

¶ 5 In my opinion, the Majority construes Rule 227.1 much too broadly, applying the rule to a “class of error” that, on the facts of this case, is beyond its proper purview. Rule 227.1 provides, in pertinent part:

Rule 227.1. Post-Trial Relief

(a) After trial and upon the written Motion for Posh-Trial Relief filed by any party, the court may

(1) order a new trial as to all or any of the issues; or

(2) direct the entry of judgment in favor of any party; or

(3) remove a nonsuit; or

(4) affirm, modify or change the decision or decree nisi, or

(5) enter any other appropriate order.

(b) Post-trial relief may not be granted unless the grounds therefor,

(1) if then available, were raised in pre-trial proceedings or by motion, objection, point for charge, request for findings of fact or conclusions of law, offer of proof or other appropriate method at trial [.]

Pa.R.C.P. 227.1.

¶ 6 We have recognized in the past, and the Majority recognizes here, that “[t]he purpose of [Rule 227.1] is to provide the trial court with an opportunity to review and reconsider its earlier rulings and correct its own error.” Soderberg v. Weisel, 455 Pa.Super. 158, 687 A.2d 839, 845 (1997) (emphasis added). In this case, the trial court’s reasoning in support of its decision to grant the plaintiffs’ port-trial motion does not suggest judicial error. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/21/00, at 2 (“If the court had the benefit of the depositions of Albert Saunders and David Maynard before trial, it may have allowed the amendment at that time.”). Indeed, the court’s discussion establishes not that it misconstrued the evidence adduced in support of the plaintiffs’ request to amend the caption, but that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence sufficient to support a decision in their favor. In view of the trial court’s discussion, I can conclude only that the “class of error” at issue in this case is that of the plaintiffs in failing to provide the Saunders and Maynard depositions in a timely fashion to support their request for relief. Error of a party is simply not cognizable as a basis for relief under Rule 227.1, and the trial court is not empowered to use the Rule for that purpose.

¶ 7 I conclude that the Majority errs as well in creating from Rule 227.1 a remedy in the form of the post-trial evidentiary hearing that the rule, of itself, does not provide. In support of its determination, the Majority appears to rely heavily on the rule’s subsection (a), which allows a trial court, on post-trial motion, to enter enumerated forms of relief as well as “any other appropriate order.” Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(a)(5). See also Majority Opinion at 8 (quoting rule with added emphasis on subsection (a)(5)). The Majority does not, however, consider the “appropriateness” of the admission of new evidence after entry of the verdict in light of controlling law on this issue.

' ¶ 8 As a general matter, a trial court has broad discretion to allow a party’s introduction of new evidence before the case is submitted to the jury but after that party has rested. See Beaumont v. ETL Services, Inc., 761 A.2d 166, 168 (Pa.Super.2000). While the court may reopen the record for admission of new evidence after a case is submitted to the jury, its discretion to do so is substantially curtailed, subject to principles of law governing the grant of a new trial on the basis of after-discovered evidence. See Hydro-Flex, Inc. v. Alter Bolt Co., Inc., 223 Pa.Super. 228, 296 A.2d 874, 877 (1972); Koch v. Ziegler, 130 Pa.Super. 158, 196 A. 562, 563 (1938); Township of Perkiomen v. Mest, 92 Pa.Cmwlth. 307, 499 A.2d 706, 709 (1985) rev’d on other grounds, 513 Pa. 598, 522 A.2d 516, 519 (1987).

¶ 9 A request to reopen a case for admission of new evidence or to grant a new trial on the basis of such evidence “should be granted only where that evidence^] 1) is new; 2) could not have been obtained at trial in the exercise of due diligence; 3) is relevant and non-cumulative; 4) is not for the purpose of impeachment; 5) and must be likely to compel a different result.” Hydro-Flex, 296 A.2d at 877. In this matter, the plaintiffs have failed to establish, or even to argue, that the evidence they sought to introduce could not have been obtained at trial or prior to trial through the exercise of due diligence. Additionally, the record does not reflect that they ever offered such a showing of proof to the trial court. Although the plaintiffs argue that the evidence, in the form of the post-trial depositions of Saunders and Maynard, was necessary to expose false answers given by DMC in its answers to interrogatories, they fail to demonstrate why they could not have deposed those two witnesses prior to trial. Indeed, the interrogatories in response to which the plaintiffs claim DMC provided false responses, were served and answered months before trial. Had the plaintiffs wished to make further inquiry about the particular answers provided, they had more than ample notice upon which to do so. Because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the necessity of the evidence they sought to introduce in accordance with the law of after-discovered evidence, I am compelled to conclude that the trial court erred in reopening the record and allowing the introduction of that evidence at a post-trial evidentiary hearing. See Hydro-Flex, 296 A.2d at 877. I am convinced also that because the law of after-discovered evidence constrains award of a new trial, the Majority errs in providing one. In the absence of a demonstration by the plaintiffs that they could not have obtained the evidence in question at trial or prior thereto, they should not be accorded a new forum in which to correct a mistake that was theirs alone.

¶ 10 Thus, in accordance with the request of DMI, I would vacate the judgment of the trial court and reinstate the verdict of the jury subject to application of the pro rata release executed by the plaintiffs.