Reinoso, G. v. Heritage Warminster SPE

J-E02003-14
2015 Pa. Super. 8
GUADALUPE REINOSO & EDMUNDO IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
DOMINGUEZ, H/W PENNSYLVANIA
Appellants
v.
HERITAGE WARMINSTER SPE LLC
v.
KOHL'S DEPARTMENT STORES, INC. T/A
KOHL'S AND LOTS & US, INC.
No. 3174 EDA 2012
Appeal from the Order Dated October 10, 2012
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Civil Division at No: 2010-07483
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, SHOGAN, ALLEN,
OTT, WECHT, STABILE, and JENKINS, JJ.
OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED JANUARY 14, 2015
Guadalupe Reinoso (“Reinoso”) and her husband, Edmundo
Dominguez (collectively “Appellants”), appeal from the October 10, 2012
order entered in the Court of Common Plea of Bucks County, granting
summary judgment in favor of Appellee, Heritage Warminster SPE, LLC
(“Heritage”).1 Reinoso claims the trial court erred in determining that a
____________________________________________
1
Heritage joined Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc. (“Kohl’s”) and Lots & Us,
Inc. (“Lots & Us”) as additional defendants. In granting summary judgment
in favor of Heritage, the trial court ordered dismissal of Reinoso’s complaint
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-E02003-14
sidewalk defect on Heritage’s property was trivial as a matter of law,
warranting summary judgment and dismissal of Reinoso’s claim of injury
resulting from Heritage’s negligence. Because we find the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment constitutes an error of law, we reverse and remand.
On May 15, 2009, sixty-year old Reinoso and her five-year old
granddaughter were walking hand-in-hand on a sidewalk at Warminster
Towne Center, a/k/a Heritage Towne Center, a property owned by Heritage,
when they both tripped and fell on a raised section of sidewalk. 2 Heritage
leased retail stores to tenants in Warminster Towne Center, including Kohl’s
Department Store. Answer to Complaint, 10/8/10, at ¶ 5. Heritage
admitted its responsibility for maintaining the exterior areas outside Kohl’s,
including the sidewalks. Id. at ¶ 4.
Reinoso fell as she was walking toward Kohl’s at the end of a charity
event sponsored by Kohl’s and other stores in the shopping center. Reinoso,
a Kohl’s employee, but not on duty at that time, served as a volunteer for
the event, which took place in a parking lot behind the Kohl’s store.
Although she was a Kohl’s employee, Reinoso did not park or enter the store
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
and also dismissed as moot all claims and cross-claims involving Kohl’s and
Lots & Us. Trial Court Order, 7/2/14, at 2.
2
Reinoso explained that the granddaughter was to Reinoso’s right, that the
granddaughter tripped first, and that Reinoso tripped when the toe of her
right shoe caught the elevated part of the sidewalk, causing them to fall
together. Reinoso Deposition, 11/1/11, at 33-40.
-2-
J-E02003-14
in the area where the event was held. Prior to the day she fell, Reinoso had
never walked on the sidewalk in question. As a result of her fall, Reinoso
sustained a broken left hand and fractured ribs. Reinoso Deposition,
11/1/11, at 20-24, 29-30.
Reinoso’s expert engineer/architect inspected the site in February
2012 and took measurements of the sidewalk that revealed a height
difference of 5/8 of an inch between sections of the sidewalk in the location
where Reinoso fell.3
Heritage filed a motion for summary judgment asserting any defect in
the sidewalk was, at most, trivial or de minimus. The trial court agreed the
defect was de minimus and granted summary judgment. In its opinion, the
trial court stated:
As a general rule, an owner or occupier of premises must
exercise reasonable care not to endanger the safety of others
lawfully using abutting sidewalks. However, such owner is not
an insurer of the safety of those using sidewalks in a business
invitee commercial context. An owner is not liable for injuries
just because someone using the sidewalk, trips, falls, and
sustains an injury. As with any negligence claim against the
land owner, there must be a failure of duty to maintain its
premises in a reasonably safe condition, and liability will arise
only where the owner created or permitted to persist, a condition
that raises an unreasonably unsafe condition. Cline v. Statler,
____________________________________________
3
The height differential on the right side of the sidewalk, as measured by
Reinoso’s expert, was 1-1/8 inches. At her deposition, Reinoso drew a circle
on a photograph that was taken in the months following the incident,
indicating she fell in the middle of the sidewalk, where the height differential
was measured as 5/8 of an inch. Heritage’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
5/18/2012, Exhibit C (Reinoso Deposition, 11/1/11, at 39-40 and Exhibit 1).
-3-
J-E02003-14
726 A.2d 1073 (Pa. Super. 1998); Breskin v. 535 Fifth
Avenue, [113 A.2d 316, 318 (Pa. 1955)]; Bullick v. Scranton,
[302 A.2d 849 (Pa. Super. 1973)]. Where the defect is so
obviously trivial, its gravity should be a fact determined in light
of the circumstances of the particular case.
There is no issue of material fact that the alleged defect in the
sidewalk was at its highest point 1-1/8th inches on the far right
side of the sidewalk and 5/8ths of an inch in the middle of the
sidewalk, where [Reinoso] was walking. The landowner is not
required to maintain the sidewalk to perfection, but only to the
extent that unreasonably unsafe conditions are removed. The
facts of this case are not in dispute and the material facts lead
inexorably to the conclusion that Heritage was not negligent in
permitting the subject condition to exist. There being no
negligence, it would be a waste of judicial resources to allow this
case to go to trial.
Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 12/17/12, at 3.4
____________________________________________
4
Regarding the three cases cited by the trial court, we note that the trial
court’s citation to Cline suggests that this Court issued a published opinion.
That is not the case. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment in a non-precedential decision, as reflected in the Table
at 726 A.2d 1073. In accordance with § 65.37 of the Superior Court’s
Internal Operating Procedures, an unpublished memorandum decision of this
Court is not to be relied upon or cited by a court or a party in any
proceeding, except under limited circumstances that do not exist here. Also,
with respect to Breskin, which we will address in more detail herein, our
Supreme Court reversed the compulsory nonsuit entered in favor of the
premises owner, finding that the question of liability was for the jury.
Finally, Bullick was a street defect case in which the trial court granted
judgment n.o.v. in favor of the City of Scranton after a jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff. An en banc panel of this Court affirmed per
curiam.
We note Reinoso’s status as an invitee is not challenged. As defined by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332, “which is utilized by this Court to
determine the status of a plaintiff,”
(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-4-
J-E02003-14
Reinoso filed a timely appeal to this Court. A divided panel affirmed
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Following the grant of
reargument, the case now comes before this Court en banc.
In this appeal, Reinoso contends the trial court erred by finding, as a
matter of law, that the defect on the Heritage property was a trivial defect
warranting summary judgment in favor of Heritage. Specifically, Reinoso
presents the following question for our consideration:
I. Did the Trial Court err in finding that as a matter of law that
the defect on [Heritage’s] property was a “trivial defect” and
[Heritage was] entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law where
the undisputed facts are:
(a) At the time of [Reinoso’s] accident, [Heritage] owned
and maintained the sidewalk where [Reinoso] fell
which was on Heritage’s premises located at 918 West
Street Road, Warminster, PA, 18974;
(b) [Heritage] undertook the duty to maintain the
sidewalk at the shopping center where [Reinoso] fell;
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain
on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which the
land is held open to the public.
(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or
remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with
business dealings with the possessor of the land.
Gillingham v. Consol Energy, Inc., 51 A.3d 841, 849-50 (Pa. Super.
2012) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332).
-5-
J-E02003-14
(c) [Reinoso] testified in her deposition that she tripped
and fell on the sidewalk due to a height discrepancy of
adjoining slabs of the sidewalk;
(d) There was over 1 inch height differential between the
sidewalk slabs at the location where [Reinoso] fell, as
measured by [Reinoso’s] expert architect/engineer;
(e) Anthony Hargaden, the owner of [Lots & Us], and the
maintainer of the parking lot and sidewalks of
[Heritage’s] property, expressed his concern to the
agent of [Heritage] prior to the happening of
[Reinoso’s] accident, that the defective condition of
the sidewalk (where [Reinoso] fell) was a tripping
hazard;
(f) [Reinoso’s] architect/engineer expert expressed the
opinion based on a reasonable degree of engineering,
architectural, and human factors certainty that:
“The subject sidewalk contained a defect at
the incident location. Specifically, the
abrupt change in level of the walkway
surface that measured over 1 inch high was
seriously in excess of the 1/4 inch standard
for a tripping danger and constituted a
walkway safety hazard. [Reinoso’s] trip and
fall was caused by this hazard.” And
(g) As a result of the fall [Reinoso] suffered physical
injuries including but not limited to a fractured left
hand.
Appellants’ Brief at 4-5.
When reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, our
standard and scope of review are as follows:
[O]ur scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review is
the same as that applied by the trial court. Our Supreme Court
has stated the applicable standard of review as follows: [A]n
appellate court may reverse the entry of a summary judgment
only where it finds that the lower court erred in concluding that
-6-
J-E02003-14
the matter presented no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that it is clear that the moving party was entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. In making this assessment, we
view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact must be resolved against the moving party. As our
inquiry involves solely questions of law, our review is de novo.
Thus, our responsibility as an appellate court is to determine
whether the record either establishes that the material facts are
undisputed or contains insufficient evidence of facts to make out
a prima facie cause of action, such that there is no issue to be
decided by the fact-finder. If there is evidence that would allow
a fact-finder to render a verdict in favor of the non-moving
party, then summary judgment should be denied.
Mull v. Ickes, 994 A.2d 1137, 1139-40 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting Jones
v. Levin, 940 A.2d 451, 453-54 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal citations
omitted)).
In its opinion, the trial court discussed a land owner’s duty to a
business invitee to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition.
T.C.O., 12/17/12, at 3. Before addressing the specific issue of whether the
trial court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment based on
a “trivial defect,” it is instructive to consider the duty owed by Heritage to
Reinoso as a business invitee that, if breached, could support a finding of
negligence.
Pennsylvania courts long have recognized that a land owner owes a
duty to business invitees to keep premises safe. See Kulka v.
Nemirovsky, 170 A. 261, 262 (Pa. 1934). “The standard of care a
possessor of land owes to one who enters upon the land depends upon
-7-
J-E02003-14
whether the person entering is a trespassor, licensee, or invitee.”
Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120, 123 (Pa. 1983). In Carrender, our
Supreme Court explained:
Possessors of land owe a duty to protect invitees from
foreseeable harm. Restatement [(Second) of Torts], §§ 341A,
343 & 343A. With respect to conditions on the land which are
known to or discoverable by the possessor, the possessor is
subject to liability only if he,
“(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would
discover the condition, and should realize that it involves
an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitee, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize
the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them
against the danger.”
Restatement, supra, § 343. Thus, as is made clear by section
343A of the Restatement,
“[a] possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for
physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition
on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them,
unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite
such knowledge or obviousness.”
Restatement, supra, § 343A.
Id. For a danger to be “known,” it must “not only be known to exist, but
. . . also be recognized that it is dangerous and the probability and gravity
of the threatened harm must be appreciated.” Id. at 124 (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 343A, comment b).
More recently, this Court reiterated that “[t]he duty owed to a
business invitee is the highest owed to any entrant upon land. The
-8-
J-E02003-14
landowner is under an affirmative duty to protect a business visitor not only
against known dangers but also against those which might be discovered
with reasonable care.” Campisi v. Acme Markets, Inc., 915 A.2d 117,
119 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). Further:
An invitee is entitled to expect that the possessor will take
reasonable care to ascertain the actual condition of the premises
and, having discovered it, either to make it reasonably safe by
repair or to give warning of the actual condition and the risk
involved therein. Therefore an invitee is not required to be on
the alert to discover defects which, if he were a mere licensee,
entitled to expect nothing but notice of known defects, he might
be negligent in not discovering. This is of importance in
determining whether the visitor is or is not guilty of contributory
negligence in failing to discover a defect, as well as in
determining whether the defect is one which the possessor
should believe that his visitor would not discover, and as to
which, therefore, he must use reasonable care to warn the
visitor.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343, comment d.
Having determined the duty owed by Heritage to Reinoso as a
business invitee, we turn to whether the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment based on its conclusion that the sidewalk defect on
Heritage’s property was trivial as a matter of law. Again, as a challenge to a
grant of summary judgment, we review the record in the light most
favorable to Reinoso and resolve all doubts as to the existence of a material
fact against Heritage. “If there is evidence that would allow a fact-finder to
render a verdict in favor of the non-moving party, then summary judgment
should be denied.” Mull, 994 A.2d at 1139-40.
-9-
J-E02003-14
In its opinion, the trial court stated the facts of this case were not in
dispute and the material facts led to the conclusion that Heritage was not
negligent in permitting the alleged sidewalk defect to exist. T.C.O.,
12/17/12, at 3. The only fact considered by the trial court was that “the
alleged defect in the sidewalk was at its highest point 1-1/8th inches on the
far right side of the sidewalk and 5/8th of an inch in the middle of the
sidewalk, where [Reinoso] was walking.” Id. Viewing the record in the light
most favorable to Reinoso, we agree with the trial court’s determination that
there was no material fact at issue regarding the height difference between
the sections of sidewalk where Reinoso fell. However, Reinoso presented
additional facts that the trial court did not acknowledge in its opinion. In
particular, in the opinion of Reinoso’s expert, the defect in the sidewalk was
“seriously in excess of the 1/4 inch standard for a tripping danger and
constituted a walkway safety hazard.” Heritage’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, 5/18/12, Exhibit E at 12; Appellant’s Response to Heritage’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, 6/7/12, at 2. Also, “[t]he subject condition
violated applicable codes and standards.” Heritage’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, 5/18/12, Exhibit E at 12 (citing The BOCA National Building and
Property Maintenance Codes, the ICC Building and Property Maintenance
Codes, Title 34 – Labor and Industry of the Pennsylvania Code, the NFPA
101 Life Safety Code, NSI A117.1/ADAAG, and ASTM F 1637). In addition,
- 10 -
J-E02003-14
in his deposition, the owner of Lots & Us was shown a photograph of the
sidewalk where Reinoso fell and the following exchanges took place:
Q. Would you believe an uneven sidewalk is a maintenance
problem?
A. Sure.
***
Q. Looking at the photograph – I don’t know if you saw that,
but this was marked at Ms. Reinoso’s deposition today – in
looking at the circled part of the sidewalk, is that something, if
you had seen that, would that cause you concern as to a tripping
hazard?
(Counsel for Lots & Us registered an objection to the form of the
question. Before the question was rephrased, the witness
responded.)
A. If I saw it, I would bring it to the attention of the
management company, yes.
Q. Did you ever bring that to the attention of the management
company?
A. Yes.
Reinoso’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, 6/7/12, Exhibit C at
15, 19-20.
In their briefs, Reinoso and Heritage, as well as amicus curiae
Pennsylvania Association for Justice, cite our Supreme Court’s decision in
Breskin, as a seminal case involving sidewalk defects. In Breskin, the
Supreme Court announced:
What constitutes a defect sufficient to render the property owner
liable must be determined in the light of the circumstances of
the particular case, and ‘except where the defect is obviously
- 11 -
J-E02003-14
trivial, that question must be submitted to the jury’. Aloia v.
City of Washington, [65 A.2d 685, 686 (Pa. 1949)]. “An
elevation, depression or irregularity in a sidewalk may be so
trivial that the court, as a matter as law, is bound to hold that
there was no negligence in permitting it to exist’ * * *. But
‘there is a shadow zone where such question must be submitted
to a jury whose duty it is to take into account all the
circumstances. To hold otherwise would result in the court
ultimately fixing the dividing line to the fraction of an inch, a
result which is absurd”. Henn v. City of Pittsburgh, [22 A.2d
742, 743 (Pa. 1941)]. No definite or mathematical rule can be
laid down as to the depth or size of a sidewalk depression
necessary to convict an owner of premises of negligence in
permitting its continued existence: Emmey v. Stanley Co. of
America, 10 A.2d 795[, 797 (Pa. Super. 1940)].
Breskin, 113 A.2d at 318 (emphasis added). In Breskin, the appellant
concluded—through her own observation—that “a triangular break at the
point of occurrence was the cause [of the fall]. This break was
approximately four by five inches in size and was one to one and one-half
inches in depth.” Id. Reversing the compulsory nonsuit entered in favor of
owner of the premises, our Supreme Court determined:
It cannot be said as a matter of law that the defect in the instant
case was trivial, and the determination of liability should have
been left to the jury. In addition, consideration of the crowded
condition of the sidewalk at the time of the occurrence, and the
facts surrounding the actions of the men coming from
defendant's building, prevent a declaration as a matter of law
that the wife-plaintiff was contributorily negligent. Even though
the day was clear, the jury could rightfully determine that she
could not see the defect in time to avoid it. She was under a
duty to see where she was walking, but she can be charged only
with the use of ordinary care. The question was for the jury
under all the circumstances.
- 12 -
J-E02003-14
Id.5
Pennsylvania courts have largely avoided assigning any dividing line
between trivial and non-trivial defects, whether along the railways or on
streets or sidewalks, and whether on municipal or commercial properties. In
Bosack v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 189 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1963), our
Supreme Court considered whether loose cobblestones along railway tracks
constituted a trivial defect as a matter of law. The Supreme Court stated:
A railway company, not being an insurer, is required only to
exercise reasonable care in maintaining the street areas which it
has the duty of maintaining and repairing. The duty which the
law imposes upon a railway in such situation is not to keep the
streets or highways completely free of any defect or irregularity
but reasonably free of such irregularity or defect as would make
likely an injury to a pedestrian crossing said street or highway.
To hold otherwise would impose upon a railway an impossible,
impractical and unjustifiable burden: German v. McKeesport
City, [8 A.2d 437, 441 (Pa. Super. 1939)].
Id. at 880 (emphasis in original).
____________________________________________
5
The great majority of cases cited in the briefs, including Breskin, pre-date
1978 and involved the defense of contributory negligence. While
contributory negligence remains an affirmative defense in this
Commonwealth, contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery was
tempered with the 1978 enactment of the Comparative Negligence Act,
which provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]n all actions brought to recover
damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property,
the fact that plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall
not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where such
negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or
defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages sustained by
the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributed to the plaintiff.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(a).
- 13 -
J-E02003-14
In Massman v. City of Philadelphia, 241 A.2d 921 (Pa. 1968),6 the
City argued that, under Bosack, triviality of a defect is determined by the
precise measurements of the defect in question. Our Supreme Court
rejected that argument, holding that “[t]he thrust of [Bosack] is simply one
of economic and physical practicality balanced against the need to protect
against property damage and personal injury.” Id. at 923. “The test
established in Bosack is that a paving defect is trivial when ‘it would be
completely unreasonable, impractical and unjustifiable’ to hold defendant
liable for its existence.” Id. (quoting Bosack, 189 A.2d at 881).
In [Bosack], the irregularity was located five to eight feet away
from the ordinary pedestrian crossing, and consisted of several
cobblestones over a width of fifteen to eighteen inches which
had sunk one to two inches below an adjacent railroad track.
We readily agree that it would indeed be an unjustifiable burden
to hold a railroad liable for all minor cases of land subsidence not
squarely on a public thoroughfare.
However, in the instant case, the defect was a crack, jagged and
irregular and clearly discernible upon visual inspection. The crack
was one-half inch deep, six inches at its widest point, and
twenty-eight inches long. In addition, it is difficult to conceive of
a busier thoroughfare in Philadelphia than City Hall courtyard.
Shoppers, tourists, businessmen and laborers tread this walkway
at all hours of the day, and it is the focal point of the daily
weekday exodus from center city at evening rush hour. Under
____________________________________________
6
In Massman, a bench trial resulted in a verdict in favor of Massman.
Massman sought a new trial on damages and the City of Philadelphia sought
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court denied both motions.
On appeal from denial of the motions, our Supreme Court affirmed per
curiam on the opinion of the trial judge, the President Judge of the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
- 14 -
J-E02003-14
these circumstances, it was for the trier of fact to determine
whether or not defendant exercised reasonable care in
maintaining the premises in safe condition. We cannot say as a
matter of law that to require the City of Philadelphia to repair
cracks of this size in the walking lanes of City Hall courtyard
imposes an impractical and unjustifiable burden.
Id. (quoting Bosack, 189 A.2d at 880).
More recently, in Mull, this Court reversed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment based on a trivial defect. The Court acknowledged:
Although property owners have a duty to maintain their
sidewalks in a safe condition, property owners are not
responsible for trivial defects that exist in the sidewalk. Our
courts have held that an elevation, depression, or irregularity in
a sidewalk or in a street or highway may be so trivial that, as a
matter of law, courts are bound to hold that there was no
negligence in permitting such depression or irregularity to exist.
Davis v. Potter, [17 A.2d 338 (Pa. 1941)]; see Bosack[,
supra] (no liability where plaintiff tripped on depression or
irregularity outside normal pedestrian crossing); see also
Harrison v. City of Pittsburgh, [44 A.2d 273, 274 (Pa. 1945)]
(finding that property owners could not be negligent because
slightly elevated manhole cover in middle of sidewalk was slight
and trivial).
“No definite or mathematical rule can be laid down as to the
depth or size of a sidewalk depression” to determine whether the
defect is trivial as a matter of law. Breskin[, 113 A.2d at 318];
Emmey[, 10 A.2d at 797]. Thus, if the defect is not obviously
trivial, the question of negligence must be submitted to a jury.
Breskin, 113 A.2d at 318.
Mull, 994 A.2d at 1140.
Mull claimed she was injured when she stepped into a gap in the
sidewalk outside a building owned by an insurance agency. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance agency, finding the
defect in the sidewalk was trivial. This Court reversed, concluding:
- 15 -
J-E02003-14
In this case, the defect was not so obviously trivial as a matter
of law to authorize summary judgment. Mull’s fall occurred on a
winter afternoon, when there was snow on the sidewalk.
Pictures of the sidewalk taken that day reveal that, although
there was snow at some places, there was no accumulation at
the exact place Mull fell. She testified that she did not fall on
snow; rather, she fell when she stepped into an uneven gap on
the sidewalk and her ankle twisted. Photographs of the sidewalk
show that the gap measured approximately two inches, and that
there was a difference in height of approximately one-and-a-half
inches between the slabs of concrete that surrounded the gap.
The slab of concrete at issue sloped towards Appellees’ building.
The gap was in the direct line of travel of one entering the
building. [The insurance agency owner] acknowledged that he
had noticed the gap and slope of the sidewalk prior to Mull’s fall.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Appellants,
they have presented sufficient evidence to establish genuine
issues of material fact. In reaching this decision, we emphasize
that there is no definite or mathematical rule that determines
when a defect is trivial; instead, the case must be determined on
the individual facts.
Id.
A similar result was obtained in Shaw v. Thomas Jefferson
University, 80 A.3d 540 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).7 In Shaw, the
Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of the University, finding the trial court incorrectly determined that
an elevation change of two to two and one-half inches between sidewalk
panels was a trivial defect. The Commonwealth Court recognized our
____________________________________________
7
“Although decisions by the Commonwealth Court are not binding on this
Court, we may adopt their analysis.” Barren v. Commonwealth, 74 A.3d
250, 253, n.1 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Beaston v. Ebersole, 986 A.2d
876, 881 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc)).
- 16 -
J-E02003-14
Supreme Court’s pronouncements that “whether a sidewalk defect is trivial
and whether a defendant has been negligent in permitting the sidewalk
defect to exist should be submitted to the jury when there are genuine
issues of material fact based on the surrounding circumstances.” Shaw, 80
A.3d at 543 (citing Massman, Breskin, and Henn). The Commonwealth
Court concluded:
[A]fter review of the record and the surrounding circumstances,
we conclude that the sidewalk defect is not so obviously trivial
that summary judgment should have been granted to Appellees.
The sidewalk is located in Center City, Philadelphia, and is
heavily trafficked. Shaw also tripped on the defect in front of
the University’s hospital during lunchtime on a weekday, when
pedestrian traffic is particularly high. These conditions present
genuine issues of material fact that must be submitted to the
jury in order to determine whether Appellees negligently
permitted the sidewalk defect to remain. As the Supreme Court
stated in Breskin, “[e]ven though the day was clear, the jury
could rightfully determine that she could not see the defect in
time to avoid it. . . . The question was for the jury under all the
circumstances.” [Breskin, ]113 A.2d at 318.
Id. at 544-45.
As is evident from our Supreme Court’s decisions in Massman and
Breskin, and from the more recent decisions issued by this Court in Mull
and the Commonwealth Court in Shaw, whether a sidewalk defect is trivial
is not simply a matter of the size or measurement of the defect when there
are genuine issues of material fact based on the surrounding circumstances.
Here, the surrounding circumstances include not only a height
differential between sidewalk panels, but also a recognized heightened duty
to an individual as an invitee, expert testimony indicating that the height
- 17 -
J-E02003-14
differential exceeds safety standards, and testimony from the owner of the
company charged with maintenance of the sidewalk that he considered the
defect a tripping hazard and reported it to the land owner as such. Viewing
this evidence in the light most favorable to Reinoso, we find that she has
presented sufficient evidence to establish genuine issues of material fact.
Therefore, we reverse the order entering summary judgment in favor of
Heritage and remand for further proceedings.
Order granting summary judgment reversed and case remanded.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
P.J.E. Ford Elliott, Judge Bowes, Judge Allen, Judge Wecht, and Judge
Jenkins join the Opinion.
Judge Ott files a Dissenting Opinion in which P.J.E. Bender and Judge
Shogan join.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/14/2015
- 18 -