In Re: Hann, R.L.

J-A31029-14
2015 Pa. Super. 44
IN RE: HANN, RICKY LYNN IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: PAUL WEACHTER
No. 571 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered March 21, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fulton County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-29-MD-0000015-2011
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and STABILE, J.
OPINION BY OTT, J.: FILED MARCH 04, 2015
Paul Weachter, bail bondsman to Ricky Lynn Hann, appeals from the
order entered March 21, 2014, in the Fulton County Court of Common Pleas,
granting the Commonwealth’s petition for bail forfeiture.1 Weachter posted
a $100,000 bail bond for Hann’s release on February 19, 2011. The next
day, Hann killed his girlfriend and himself. On appeal, Weachter argues the
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1
This is the second time the trial court has granted the Commonwealth’s
petition for bail forfeiture in this case. As we will discuss in more detail
infra, the trial court initially granted the petition, following a hearing, in
2011. Weachter appealed to this Court, which reversed the trial court’s
order. However, the Commonwealth then appealed to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, which vacated this Court’s decision, adopted a new test for
determining whether justice requires full forfeiture of a bail bond, and
remanded the case to the trial court for a new forfeiture hearing. See
Commonwealth v. Hann, 46 A.3d 803 (unpublished memorandum) (Pa.
Super. 2012), rev’d, 81 A.3d 57 (Pa. 2013). The order sub judice was
issued following the second hearing.
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trial court abused its discretion when it ordered full forfeiture of the bail
bond because (1) all of the other parties involved had the same information
as Weachter regarding Hann’s potential dangerousness, and (2) a surety
should not be held responsible for the post-bail criminal conduct of a
defendant. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The relevant facts were summarized by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in a prior appeal as follows:
In September of 2010, Pennsylvania State Police arrested Ricky
Lynn Hann for assaulting his then-girlfriend, Lisa Souders.
Following an initial bail hearing, he was released on his own
recognizance. Contemporaneous to Hann's arrest and release,
Souders obtained a protection from abuse (PFA) order against
him.
In November of 2010, police again arrested Hann and
charged him with indirect criminal contempt for violating the PFA
order. He was subsequently found guilty, but apparently
remained free. Then, on February 19, 2011, Souders reported
to State Police that the previous day Hann had kidnapped her,
and kept her against her will for approximately 24 hours before
she was able to escape. Based upon Souders’[s] statement,
Trooper Gary Ford filed a criminal complaint against Hann,[2] and
received and executed an arrest warrant against him. Hann was
arraigned and bail was set at $100,000.
Following the arraignment, arrangements were made with
… Paul Weachter, a professional and licensed bail bondsman, for
bail to be posted to secure Hann’s release. As part of his
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2
The criminal complaint included the following charges: kidnapping,
burglary, unlawful restraint, terroristic threats, recklessly endangering
another person, and simple assault. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2901(a)(3),
3502(a), 2902(a)(1), 2706(a)(1), 2705(a)(2), and 2701(a)(3), respectively.
The complaint specifically alleged that Hann threatened Souders with a
loaded shotgun. See Criminal Complaint, 2/18/2011, at 4.
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agreement leading to his release, Hann agreed to the following
conditions, relevant to this appeal:
1. The defendant must appear at all times required until
full and final disposition of the case.
2. The defendant must obey all further orders of the bail
authority.
***
4. The defendant must neither do, nor cause to be done,
nor permit to be done on his/her behalf, any act as
proscribed by Section 4952 of the Crimes Code (relating to
intimidation of witnesses or victims) or by Section 4953
(relating to retaliation against witnesses or victims), 18
Pa.C.S. §§ 4952, 4953.
5. The defendant must refrain from criminal activity.
***
By signing the bail bond, Hann agreed to “appear at all
subsequent proceedings as required and comply with all the
conditions of the bail bond.”
For his part, [Weachter] executed a surety agreement,
whereby he acknowledged that he or his heirs and assigns could
be responsible for forfeiting the $100,000 bail should Hann fail to
appear for a court proceeding or “comply with the conditions of
the bail bond.” [Weachter] also signed the bail bond. Hann was
accordingly released from the Franklin County Prison.
The following day, Trooper Ford was dispatched to
Souders’[s] residence, after receiving a report that Hann had
accosted Souders and taken her to a wooded area behind her
house. Upon his arrival, Trooper Ford heard three gunshots
from the area behind the home. Trooper Ford carefully
investigated the area and discovered the bodies of Souders and
Hann, each dead of apparent shotgun wounds. The county
coroner would determine that Souders died of wounds to her
abdomen, which caused extensive damage to her liver, lungs,
and aorta. Hann succumbed to a shotgun wound to the face.
The coroner determined the manners of death of Souders and
Hann to be homicide and suicide, respectively. While no inquest
was held into the incident, no one disputes the causes or
manners of death.
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Commonwealth v. Hann, 81 A.3d 57, 60-61 (Pa. 2013) (record citations
omitted).
On March 1, 2011, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(A)(2)(a), the
Commonwealth filed a petition for forfeiture of the $100,000 bail bond
Weachter posted for Hann.3 Following a hearing, on May 2, 2011, the trial
court granted the Commonwealth’s petition for bail forfeiture. Thereafter,
Weachter filed a timely appeal.
On appeal, a panel of this Court reversed the trial court’s order based
upon its determination that “the Commonwealth ha[d] failed to establish any
legally cognizable financial prejudice related to the breach to justify
forfeiture.”4 Commonwealth v. Hann, 46 A.3d 803 (unpublished
memorandum at 7) (Pa. Super. 2012). The Commonwealth then filed an
appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which reversed the order of the
Superior Court and remanded the case to the trial court for a new forfeiture
hearing. The trial court conducted the second forfeiture hearing, and on
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3
The Rule provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen a monetary condition of
release has been imposed and the defendant has violated a condition of the
bail bond, the bail authority may order the cash or other security
forfeited[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(A)(2)(a).
4
The panel found particularly relevant the fact that the Commonwealth
admitted, during the forfeiture hearing, “Ricky Hann killing Tina Souders was
the cheapest thing that could happen for the Commonwealth in this case. …
The Commonwealth is better off financially by this murder/suicide.” Hann,
supra, 46 A.3d 803 (unpublished memorandum at 6) (citing N.T.,
4/19/2011, at 61-62).
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March 20, 2014, entered an order directing Weachter to forfeit the $100,000
bail bond in full. This timely appeal follows.5
Our well-established standard of review in bail forfeiture appeals is as
follows:
“[T]he decision to allow or deny a remission of bail forfeiture lies
with the sound discretion of the trial court.” Commonwealth v.
Chopak, 532 Pa. 227, 615 A.2d 696, 701 (1992). Trial courts
unquestionably have the authority to order the forfeiture of bail
upon the breach or violation of any condition of the bail bond.
Id. at 701–02. In bond forfeiture cases, an abuse of that
discretion or authority will only be found if the aggrieved party
demonstrates that the trial court misapplied the law, exercised
its judgment in a manifestly unreasonable manner, or acted on
the basis of bias, partiality, or ill-will. [Commonwealth v.
]Culver, 46 A.3d [786,] 790 [(Pa. Super. 2012)]. To the extent
the aggrieved party alleges an error of law, this Court will
correct that error, and our scope of review in doing so is plenary.
Id.
Hann, supra, 81 A.3d at 65.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 536 provides two sanctions
when a defendant violates a condition of his bail – revocation of the
defendant’s release or forfeiture of the posted bail bond. Pa.R.Crim.P.
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5
On April 1, 2014, the trial court ordered Weachter to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Weachter complied with the court’s directive and filed a concise statement
on May 15, 2014.
The trial court filed two opinions in this case. The first, dated March
20, 2014, accompanied the trial court’s order directing forfeiture of the bail
bond. We will refer to this as the “Remand Opinion.” The second, dated
May 15, 2014, was filed in response to Weachter’s concise statement. We
will refer to this as the “Rule 1925 Opinion.”
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536(A)(1)-(2). Here, there is no dispute Hann violated the conditions of his
bail. Moreover, because Hann killed himself after murdering Souders, the
revocation of his release was clearly not a sanction available under the facts
of this case. Therefore, the Commonwealth only petitioned for forfeiture of
the $100,000 bail bond Weachter posted upon Hann’s release. However, the
Rule further provides that “[t]he bail authority may direct that a forfeiture be
set aside or remitted if justice does not require the full enforcement of
the forfeiture order.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 536(A)(2)(d) (emphasis supplied).
Previously, when considering whether justice requires full forfeiture of
a bail bond, this Court has deliberated three factors, outlined by the federal
district court in United States v. Ciotti, 579 F. Supp. 276 (W.D. Pa. 1984):
1) the willfulness of the defendant’s breach of the bond, 2) the
cost, inconvenience and prejudice suffered by the government,
and 3) any explanation or mitigating factors.
Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 827 A.2d 462, 468 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Indeed, the panel of this Court that considered Weachter’s original appeal,
reversed the trial court’s original order of forfeiture because it concluded
“the Commonwealth [] failed to establish any legally cognizable financial
prejudice related to the breach to justify forfeiture.” Hann, supra, 46 A.3d
803 (unpublished memorandum at 7).
However, when reviewing the initial appeal in this case, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court found “a strict reading of the Ciotti/ Mayfield
construct” was inconsistent with law and justice, and stated that while the
cost and inconvenience to the Commonwealth are “significant factors …
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neither the lack of pecuniary loss or monetary prejudice should outweigh the
totality of other concerns presented by an individual case.” Hann, supra,
81 A.3d at 66, 69. Rather, the Court emphasized that “the decision to order
forfeiture in the first instance belongs solely to the discretion of the trial
court,” and adopted the following multi-factor test, set forth by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Korecky, 777 A.2d 927, 934 (N.J. 2001),
“for determining whether justice required full enforcement of a forfeiture
order”:
1) whether the applicant is a commercial bondsman; (2) the
extent of the bondsman’s supervision of the defendant; (3)
whether the defendant’s breach of the recognizance of bail
conditions was willful; (4) any explanation or mitigating factors
presented by the defendant; (5) the deterrence value of
forfeiture; (6) the seriousness of the condition violated; (7)
whether forfeiture will vindicate the injury to public interest
suffered as a result of the breach; (8) the appropriateness of the
amount of the recognizance of bail; and (9) the cost,
inconvenience, prejudice or potential prejudice suffered by the
State as a result of the breach.
Id. at 67-68. The Court noted the “list is not exhaustive, and trial courts
may consider other factors as interests of justice require.” Id. at 68.
As this was the Supreme Court’s first decision interpreting Rule 536,
the Hann Court also provided guidance concerning the burden of proof in
forfeiture cases. The Court stated:
[I]n a case where the Commonwealth has sought forfeiture, and
the defendant or his surety opposes it, a hearing should be held.
At that hearing, the Commonwealth has the burden of proving
the conditions to bail forfeiture as aforesaid, upon which the
burden will shift to the defendant or his surety to justify full or
partial remission of bail forfeiture.
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Id. at 71-72. Because a forfeiture proceeding is collateral to a criminal
prosecution and civil in nature, the Court further determined the proper
burden should be by a preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. at 72.
Accordingly, recognizing that the decision whether to grant bail
forfeiture is within the trial court’s discretion, and “should be exercised on a
case-by-case basis under the analysis given [therein],” the Hann Court
remanded the case to the trial court for a new forfeiture hearing. Id. As
noted above, on remand, the trial court conducted a hearing, and ultimately
determined “justice demands forfeiture of the bail bond posted by
Weachter.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/20/2014, at 17.
In his first issue on appeal, Weachter contends the trial court
misapplied the law and abused its discretion when it disregarded the fact
that the other parties involved, i.e., the police, the district attorney and the
magisterial district justice, had the same information regarding Hann’s
potential dangerousness as Weachter, and improperly focused on
“Weachter’s lack of due diligence in failing to thoroughly investigate Hann’s
background before bailing him out of jail.” Weachter’s Brief at 11-12. He
notes that at the second forfeiture hearing, the arresting state trooper
testified that he requested Hann’s bail be set at $500,000, but the
magisterial district justice set bail at only $100,000. See N.T., 1/23/2014,
at 51-52. Moreover, Weachter points out that the trooper stated he had
attempted to contact the district attorney before bail was set but was unable
to reach him, and acknowledged that his failure to charge Hann with
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additional crimes, such as witness intimidation and illegal possession of a
firearm, “might have been an oversight at that point.” Id. at 53-54, 56.
Weachter argues the trial court “established a double standard whereby a
surety is held to a much higher level of scrutiny than the police, the district
attorney, and the court system itself.” Weachter’s Brief at 14. Further, he
asserts “the systematic breakdown within the criminal justice system, which
failed to further detain Hann, and/or the failure to impose additional bail
restrictions, weighs heavily as an ‘explanation or mitigating factor’
contemplated by [the Supreme Court in] Hann.” Id. at 15-16.
The trial court, however, concluded that “neither the Supreme Court in
Hann nor Pa.R.Crim.P. 536 permit the blame-sharing result Weachter
seeks.” Rule 1925 Opinion at 6. We agree.
It is clear the focus of the multi-factor test outlined in Hann is on the
actions of the defendant and the surety. Although Weachter suggests
the inaction of the police, the district attorney and the magisterial district
justice, are relevant mitigating factors under the facts of this case, we
disagree. Indeed, the Supreme Court explained in Hann:
Instantly, there is little dispute that Hann’s breach of his bail
bond conditions was willful, and that there can be no explanation
of mitigating factors presented by a representative of Hann or
[Weachter]; thus, the evidence in this case clearly weighs in
favor of forfeiture. Indeed, for purposes of the whole of
Pennsylvania law, these two factors need not be extensively
examined, as any evidence of willful misconduct or mitigation by
either a defendant or his surety, and whether that evidence
militates in favor of or against forfeiture, should be self-
explanatory.
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Hann, supra, 81 A.3d at 68.
When read in context, it is evident that “mitigating factors” refer to
any explanation for the defendant’s conduct in violating the terms of his bail
bond, i.e., the defendant failed to appear for a court date because he was
caring for his sick child. There is no support for Weachter’s claim that the
Commonwealth’s failure to file additional charges against a defendant, or the
court’s failure to impose a higher bail, mitigates a surety’s duty to fully
investigate a defendant’s background before issuing a bail bond.
Moreover, the Hann Court emphasized the financial aspects of a
commercial surety’s relationship with a defendant:
Courts have uniformly held that a surety’s status as a bondsman
tends to lean in favor of forfeiture. “The driving force behind a
surety’s provision of a bond is the profit motive.” In making
the business decision of whether to take a bail bond, “it is
not unreasonable to conclude that [a bondsman] should
have been fully cognizant of his responsibilities and the
consequences of [a defendant’s] breach of the conditions
of the bond.” Indeed, such calculation involves “a known
business risk ... for economic gain-the premium paid for the
bond.”
Id. at 69 (citations omitted and emphasis supplied). Weachter, as a
commercial surety, took a calculated business risk when he agreed to post
bail for Hann, who was charged with kidnapping his ex-girlfriend and
threatening her at gunpoint.6 See Criminal Complaint, 2/18/2011, at 4.
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6
During the second forfeiture hearing, Weachter testified that he saw the
criminal complaint and probable cause affidavit issued against Hann on the
night he posted the bail bond securing Hann’s release. N.T., 1/23/2014, at
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Accordingly, the fact that the state trooper did not file additional charges
against Hann, and that the magisterial district justice declined to set bail at
$500,000 as requested by the trooper, is not relevant to the question of
whether the trial court should have ordered the forfeiture of the $100,000
bond that was posted.7 Therefore, Weachter is entitled to no relief on this
claim.
Next, Weachter contends the trial court abused its discretion when it
held a surety responsible for the post-bail criminal conduct of the defendant.
He asserts that while the extent of a surety’s supervision of the defendant is
a relevant factor in Hann, in this case, the trial court acted unreasonably
when it “criticize[d] Weachter for having no contact with Hann in the very
brief window of time after Hann’s release from jail.” Weachter’s Brief at 17.
Furthermore, Weachter argues that since a surety has no power to arrest or
otherwise prevent a defendant from engaging in post-bail criminal activity,
“[i]t is completely inconsistent to require a surety to forfeit a bail, on the
grounds that the defendant failed to refrain from criminal activity[.]” Id. at
18.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
42-43. Specifically, he acknowledged that he knew Hann had “[h]eld
[Souders] with a gun for a day[.]” Id. at 43.
7
We note Weachter does not allege that the Commonwealth intentionally hid
information concerning Hann’s potential dangerousness from the surety. If
that had been the case, we would be inclined to find that a relevant factor in
evaluating the surety’s decision to post bond for the defendant.
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However, the Hann Court made clear that a surety may be held
responsible for the post-bail criminal conduct of a defendant. The Court
opined:
Deterring defendants in general from breaching bail bond
conditions, and the seriousness of the condition breached, are
equally important considerations. “If a violation of a condition of
release is more than technical, the court may require a
substantial forfeiture to deter not only the defendant but others
from future violations.” The instant case provides a stark
example of a violation that “is more than technical”: where the
defendant willfully murdered the victim of a prior crime, and
accordingly, the government’s lone witness in a prosecution, and
then turned the gun on himself, preventing any further
prosecution. Indeed, even if Hann had not committed suicide,
his murder of Souders would have destroyed the
Commonwealth’s case. “It undercut what trial courts seek to
prevent here and in future cases-obstruction of justice.”
Further, it is self-evident that violating no-contact orders,
intimidating or physically harming witnesses, or
committing other crimes while free on bail all constitute
serious bail bond breaches, to which courts may be
inclined to respond with forfeiture orders in order to deter
future misconduct.
****
We do not portend to render bail bondsmen, or any surety for
that matter, the guarantors of a defendant’s conduct while the
defendant is released on bail. However, the express language of
the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure concerning bail,
bail bonds, and forfeiture do not limit the availability of forfeiture
exclusively to abscondment cases; indeed, the rules permit
forfeiture for any breach of a bail condition.
Hann, supra, 81 A.3d at 70, 72 (footnotes and citations omitted; emphasis
supplied). Accordingly, in balancing all the relevant considerations, the trial
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court may conclude, as it did here, that justice requires full forfeiture of a
bail bond when a defendant commits a serious crime while on bail.
Furthermore, while the trial court acknowledged Weachter “had little
opportunity to supervise Hann,” it noted that Weachter “did not attempt to
contact Hann” in any manner, after his release. Remand Opinion, at 12.
We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in considering
Weachter’s lack of any supervision of Hann in determining that forfeiture
of the bail bond was warranted. Moreover, with respect to Weachter’s
contention that a “surety has no power under the law to intervene” when a
defendant engages in post-bail criminal conduct, other than to file for a bail
piece,8 we find this claim specious. Although Weachter had no power to
arrest Hann if he was aware Hann was contacting Souders, the victim of the
criminal charges, he certainly could have alerted the police. Accordingly,
this claim also fails.
While Weachter only challenged two of the Hann factors on appeal, a
review of the trial court’s remand opinion reveals that the court considered
each of the nine factors outlined by the Supreme Court in Hann,9 before
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8
Weachter’s Brief at 18.
9
Specifically, the trial court determined: (1) Weachter is a licensed bail
bondsmen who made a business decision to bond Hann; (2) Weachter made
no attempt to contact Hann after his release from prison; (3) Hann’s actions,
in violating the terms of his bond, were willful; (4) “no evidence of
explanation of Hann’s breach or of mitigation was offered by Weachter[;]”
(5) “[t]o the extent that forfeiture is a deterrent to future violation,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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concluding that “forfeiture [was] warranted based on Hann’s violation of the
conditions of bail,” and that Weachter failed to demonstrate “by a
preponderance of the evidence that full or partial remission [was] required
by the interests of justice.” Remand Opinion, at 17. Because we detect no
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we affirm the order
granting the Commonwealth’s petition for forfeiture.10
Order affirmed.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
substantial forfeiture is warranted by the facts of this case[;]” (6) “the bail
condition violated was extremely serious, as [the victim] lost her life and the
Commonwealth lost the ability to prosecute Hann for his alleged crimes[;]”
(7) because the breach was serious, forfeiture of the bond will vindicate the
public interest in the “orderly, effective administration of justice[;]” (8) the
bail amount set by the court was not excessive, and Hann’s actions may
have justified an even higher bail amount; and (9) while the Commonwealth
did not suffer a monetary loss as a result of Hann’s actions, “the ultimate
‘costs’ to Fulton County are an inability to prosecute Hann for his alleged
criminal activity and the loss of Souder’s life, costs which cannot be
quantitatively measured.” Remand Opinion, at 10-17.
10
We note that the trial court, in its Rule 1925 Opinion, asked this Court for
guidance and direction if we determined that a partial remission of the
$100,000 bail bond was warranted. See Rule 1925 Opinion, at 10 n.5.
However, because Weachter did not provide any argument to justify a
partial remission of the bail bond, or any proposed calculation method, we
need not address this issue further at this time.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/4/2015
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