Turner Construction v. Plumbers Local 690

J-A09034-15
2015 Pa. Super. 257
TURNER CONSTRUCTION, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
PLUMBERS LOCAL 690 AND MICHAEL
BRADLEY AND STEAMFITTERS LOCAL
420 AND ANTHONY GALLAGHER AND
SPRINKLER FITTERS LOCAL 692 AND
WAYNE MILLER AND INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF HEAT AND FROST
INSULATORS AND ALLIED WORKERS
LOCAL 14 AND STEPHEN F. PETTIT AND
JOHN DOE
APPEAL OF: PLUMBERS LOCAL 690 AND
MICHAEL BRADLEY,
Appellants No. 2421 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No(s): 2014-08797
TURNER CONSTRUCTION, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
PLUMBERS LOCAL 690 AND MICHAEL
BRADLEY AND STEAMFITTERS LOCAL
420 AND ANTHONY GALLAGHER AND
SPRINKLER FITTERS LOCAL 692 AND
WAYNE MILLER AND INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF HEAT AND FROST
INSULATORS AND ALLIED WORKERS
LOCAL 14 AND STEPHEN F. PETTIT AND
JOHN DOE,
APPEAL OF: SPRINKLER FITTERS LOCAL
692 AND WAYNE MILLER,
J-A09034-15
Appellants No. 2422 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No(s): 2014-08797
TURNER CONSTRUCTION, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
PLUMBERS LOCAL 690 AND MICHAEL
BRADLEY AND STEAMFITTERS LOCAL
420 AND ANTHONY GALLAGHER AND
SPRINKLER FITTERS LOCAL 692 AND
WAYNE MILLER AND INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF HEAT AND FROST
INSULATORS AND ALLIED WORKERS
LOCAL 14 AND STEPHEN F. PETTIT AND
JOHN DOE,
APPEAL OF: INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF HEAT AND FROST
INSULATORS AND ALLIED WORKERS,
LOCAL 14 AND STEPHEN F. PETIT,
Appellants No. 2574 EDA 2014
Appeal from the Order Entered July 18, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No(s): 2014-08797
BEFORE: BOWES, DONOHUE, AND LAZARUS, JJ.
OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED DECEMBER 14, 2015
Plumbers Local 690, Michael Bradley, Sprinkler Fitters Local 692,
Wayne Miller, International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators and
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Allied Workers Local 14, and Stephen F. Pettit1 (unless otherwise noted,
hereinafter referred to collectively as “Appellants”) appeal from the July 18,
2014 preliminary injunction that restricted their picketing activity at a
construction site managed by Turner Construction Co. (“Turner”).2
Appellants, members of a Philadelphia-area trades association,3 share the
legal position that the preliminary injunction violates the Labor Anti-
Injunction Act, 43 P.S. §§ 206a-206r (sometimes referred to herein as the
“Act”). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
proceedings.
The following facts are relevant to our review. Turner is managing the
construction of a medical facility operated by Children’s Hospital of
Philadelphia (“CHOP”) and located at 401 North Gulph Road in Upper Merion
____________________________________________
1
Michael Bradley, Anthony Gallagher, Wayne Miller, and Stephen F. Pettit
were the respective business managers for the trade unions listed in the
caption when the injunction was issued. Unless specifically identified in the
body of this writing, our references to each union subsumes the business
manager who is associated with that organization.
2
Although listed in the caption, Steamfitters Local 420 and Anthony
Gallagher did not appeal the July 18, 2014 preliminary injunction.
3
Appellants are among several unions that comprise the Philadelphia
Building & Construction Trades Council. According to that association’s
website, “The [council] provides essential coordination and support to the
work of its affiliated local unions in order that, through inter-trade solidarity,
organized construction workers achieve a powerful voice in government, in
bargaining, and in their communities.” See
http://philadelphiabuildingtrades.com/about/.
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J-A09034-15
Township, Pennsylvania. Throughout the project, Turner engaged both
union and nonunion contractors to perform various construction work. No
labor dispute existed between Turner and any of its employees or
contractors.4 Instead, the instant dispute arose between Turner and
Plumbers Local 690 due to the company’s decision to utilize a non-union
plumbing contractor, Worth & Company (“Worth”), on the CHOP construction
project. Specifically, on April 21, 2014, in response to Turner’s subcontract
with Worth, members of Plumbers Local 690 and other unidentified
individuals initiated picket lines at the CHOP construction site. 5 The trial
court described the April 21, 2014 rally as follows:
The picketers engaged in a variety of activities in protest
of Worth & Company’s employment by Turner. Some of the
____________________________________________
4
In pertinent part, the Labor Anti-Injunction Act defines a “labor dispute” as
“any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
employment or concerning employment relations or any other controversy
arising out of the respective interests of employer and employe, regardless
of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employe, and regardless of whether or not the employes are on strike
with the employer.” 43 P.S. § 206c(c) (emphases added).
5
The esteemed dissent would find that the purpose of the April 21 rally was
to assert Plumbers Local 690’s objections to Worth’s failure to abide by wage
and labor standards rather than the contractor’s use of nonunion workers.
See Dissenting Opinion at 3. For the reasons explained in footnote thirteen
on page seventeen, we do not believe that the dissent’s narrow
interpretation of Plumbers Local 690’s objective accurately represents the
nature of the protest at the CHOP construction site.
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amassed picketers wore signs [that acknowledged Plumbers
Union Local 690.] Others, about thirty individuals from the mass
of picketers, assembled in front of the Construction Site’s two
entrances. The two groups stationed at the gates prevented
workers, vehicles, and equipment from entering the Construction
Site. Other picketers stood against the fence on the
Construction Site, trespassing on the property. Protesters also
inflated a union rat [(a symbol used to draw attention to a labor
dispute)] near Gate B on the Construction Site itself, again,
trespassing on the Construction Site.
The Turner management personnel on-site called the
Upper Merion Township Police Department, which dispatched
officers to the scene. Police requested that the picketers move to
Gate B, and the picketers complied. Nevertheless, thirty
picketers remained on the Construction Site and continued to
mass in front of Gate B, blocking ingress and egress. Despite
the presence of police officers, members of Local 690 and others
continued trespassing on the Construction Site and blockading
Gate B.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/9/14, 2-3 (footnote and citations to affidavits
omitted).
Turner immediately filed a complaint in equity against Plumbers Local
690 and its business manager, Mr. Bradley, and the following day it
petitioned for special relief seeking to enjoin Plumbers Local 690 from
continuing to disrupt construction. The petition for special relief included a
proposed order that established several restrictions on the picketing
activities at the CHOP construction site. Asserting that aspects of the
picketing, such as blocking ingress and egress to the site, amounted to a
seizure, Turner explicitly invoked § 206d of the Act, set forth infra, as a
basis to avoid the Act’s prohibition on restraining orders and injunctions in
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Township, Pennsylvania. Throughout the project, Turner engaged both
union and nonunion contractors to perform various construction work. No
labor dispute existed between Turner and any of its employees or
contractors.4 Instead, the instant dispute arose between Turner and
Plumbers Local 690 due to the company’s decision to utilize a non-union
plumbing contractor, Worth & Company (“Worth”), on the CHOP construction
project. Specifically, on April 21, 2014, in response to Turner’s subcontract
with Worth, members of Plumbers Local 690 and other unidentified
individuals initiated picket lines at the CHOP construction site. 5 The trial
court described the April 21, 2014 rally as follows:
The picketers engaged in a variety of activities in protest
of Worth & Company’s employment by Turner. Some of the
____________________________________________
4
In pertinent part, the Labor Anti-Injunction Act defines a “labor dispute” as
“any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating,
fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
employment or concerning employment relations or any other controversy
arising out of the respective interests of employer and employe, regardless
of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employe, and regardless of whether or not the employes are on strike
with the employer.” 43 P.S. § 206c(c) (emphases added).
5
The esteemed dissent would find that the purpose of the April 21 rally was
to assert Plumbers Local 690’s objections to Worth’s failure to abide by wage
and labor standards rather than the contractor’s use of nonunion workers.
See Dissenting Opinion at 3. For the reasons explained in footnote thirteen
on page seventeen, we do not believe that the dissent’s narrow
interpretation of Plumbers Local 690’s objective accurately represents the
nature of the protest at the CHOP construction site.
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J-A09034-15
amassed picketers wore signs [that acknowledged Plumbers
Union Local 690.] Others, about thirty individuals from the mass
of picketers, assembled in front of the Construction Site’s two
entrances. The two groups stationed at the gates prevented
workers, vehicles, and equipment from entering the Construction
Site. Other picketers stood against the fence on the
Construction Site, trespassing on the property. Protesters also
inflated a union rat [(a symbol used to draw attention to a labor
dispute)] near Gate B on the Construction Site itself, again,
trespassing on the Construction Site.
The Turner management personnel on-site called the
Upper Merion Township Police Department, which dispatched
officers to the scene. Police requested that the picketers move to
Gate B, and the picketers complied. Nevertheless, thirty
picketers remained on the Construction Site and continued to
mass in front of Gate B, blocking ingress and egress. Despite
the presence of police officers, members of Local 690 and others
continued trespassing on the Construction Site and blockading
Gate B.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/9/14, 2-3 (footnote and citations to affidavits
omitted).
Turner immediately filed a complaint in equity against Plumbers Local
690 and its business manager, Mr. Bradley, and the following day it
petitioned for special relief seeking to enjoin Plumbers Local 690 from
continuing to disrupt construction. The petition for special relief included a
proposed order that established several restrictions on the picketing
activities at the CHOP construction site. Asserting that aspects of the
picketing, such as blocking ingress and egress to the site, amounted to a
seizure, Turner explicitly invoked § 206d of the Act, set forth infra, as a
basis to avoid the Act’s prohibition on restraining orders and injunctions in
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blocking access to the site, and preventing other contractors from
performing their work on the project by obstruction, mass picketing, or
coercion. Unlimited picketing was restricted to areas beyond eight feet from
the curb and twenty-five feet from either of the two gates. Plumbers Local
690 and persons working in concert with it could have a maximum of five
people at the construction gates. The special injunction also enjoined
Plumbers Local 690, and “all others acting on their behalf or in concert
with them [from blocking] any persons from entering onto or performing
their work at the construction site[.]” Special Injunction, 4/22/14, at 2
(emphasis added). The plumbers union and other individuals acting in
concert with it were enjoined from “[p]icketing on CHOP property, which
mean[t] using pickets . . . more than eight (8) feet in from the curb around
401 North Gulph Road[.]” Id.
Additionally, the special injunction enjoined “all picketing at or within
twenty-five (25) feet of any of the means of ingress or egress . . . or other
means of access to the Construction Site [and] otherwise unlawfully
interfering, either directly or indirectly, with any person, employee of vehicle
entering or leaving the Construction Site[.]” Id. Plumbers Local 690 was
also enjoined from “assisting, aiding or abetting any person or persons who
violate or attempt to violate this Order[.]” Id. To protect against potential
damages in the event Plumbers Local 690 was wrongfully enjoined, Turner
submitted a $5,000 bond as security. Finally, the stipulated special
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injunction stated that no hearing would be scheduled absent written request
of either party.
The picketing on behalf of Plumbers Local 690 at the CHOP
construction site continued without interruption throughout May and June
2014. N.T., 7/14/14, at 33. The composition of the picketers changed at
different times and included members of Appellant labor unions involved
herein, specifically Steamfitters Local 420, Sprinkler Fitters Local 692, and
Heat and Frost Insulators Local 14. Id. at 26, 28. At times, the number of
picketers exceeded the five-person limits at the gates outlined in the special
injunction and the protestors engaged in prohibited activities such as
harassing workers attempting to enter the site and impeding deliveries. Id.
at 26, 33-34. Thus, notwithstanding its agreement, Plumbers Local 690
failed to ensure that others acting in concert with it complied with the
dictates of the special injunction. Eventually, the Montgomery County
Sheriff’s Department read the April 2014 order to the picketers and posted a
copy of the order on the perimeter fence surrounding the construction site.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/9/14, at 4; Ricketts Aff. ¶ 9.
On July 9, 2014, a large-scale rally occurred at the CHOP construction
site and is the genesis of the present appeal. Between 5:45 a.m. and 11:55
a.m. on that date, picketers amassed at the site, erected a tent within the
eight-foot perimeter established in the special injunction, and gathered
inside each of the two construction gates. The participants varied in
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labor disputes. Plumbers Local 690 and its business manager, the only
parties involved at that stage of the dispute, conferred and settled the
matter without a hearing and stipulated to a special injunction6 that adopted
the terms of Turner’s proposed preliminary injunction, with some
modifications that are not relevant herein.7
____________________________________________
6
While Pa.R.C.P. 1531 expressly recognizes special injunctions, the rule
does not define the term or differentiate it from a preliminary injunction.
Our Supreme Court has described a special injunction as one that “grants
relief which is auxiliary to the main relief requested in the complaint.”
Matter of Franklin Twp. Bd. of Sup'rs, 379 A.2d 874, 879 (Pa. 1977).
See also, 15 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d § 83:11 (footnoted omitted
(“A special injunction, like a preliminary injunction, is commonly sought to
preserve the status quo until the final hearing. A special injunction may be
asked for during the pendency of an equity action, and it may be granted at
any stage of the proceedings, whenever it is necessary to preserve the
status quo.”).
7
The special injunction provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
[I]t is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED as follows:
1. A Special Injunction be and hereby is issued without
hearing, as provided under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil
Procedure.
2. Defendants, together with their members,
representatives, agents, servants, sympathizers,
members and all others acting on their behalf or in
concert with them, be and hereby are ENJOINED and
RESTRAINED FROM:
A. Preventing or attempting to prevent by blocking,
obstructing, mass picketing, or coercion in any form any
persons from entering onto or performing their work at
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The resultant special injunction was entered on April 22, 2014. That
order enjoined Plumbers Local 690 from trespassing on the construction site,
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
the construction site at 401 North Gulph Road in Upper
Merion Township (Construction Site or "CHOP Property);
B. Picketing on CHOP Property, which means using
pickets, inflatable equipment, or other equipment or
property, more than eight (8) feet in from the curb
around 401 North Gulph Road in Upper Merion Township;
C. Except as provided below, all picketing at or
within twenty-five (25) feet of any of the means of
ingress or egress, gates, driveways, entrances, exits, or
other means of access to the Construction Site;
D. Any assisting, aiding or abetting any person or
persons who violate or attempt to violate this Order
E. Threatening, harassing, intimidating, following, or
otherwise unlawfully interfering, either directly or
indirectly, with any person, employee or vehicle entering
or leaving the Construction Site;
3. Pickets, including relief pickets, and any other persons
acting on behalf of or in concert with defendants, shall be
limited in number to 5 at any one time at the driveways to the
Construction Site, provided said pickets shall conduct their
activities consistently with Paragraph 2 above of this Order.
4. Defendants and their officers shall make every reasonable
effort to communicate the dictates of this Order to their
representatives, agents; pickets, sympathizers, and members
engaging in picketing and other activity at the Construction Site
and shall make every reasonable effort to cause their
agents, representatives, members and those acting in concert
with them, to comply with the dictates of this Order.
Special Injunction, 4/22/14, at 2-3 (emphases added).
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blocking access to the site, and preventing other contractors from
performing their work on the project by obstruction, mass picketing, or
coercion. Unlimited picketing was restricted to areas beyond eight feet from
the curb and twenty-five feet from either of the two gates. Plumbers Local
690 and persons working in concert with it could have a maximum of five
people at the construction gates. The special injunction also enjoined
Plumbers Local 690, and “all others acting on their behalf or in concert
with them [from blocking] any persons from entering onto or performing
their work at the construction site[.]” Special Injunction, 4/22/14, at 2
(emphasis added). The plumbers union and other individuals acting in
concert with it were enjoined from “[p]icketing on CHOP property, which
mean[t] using pickets . . . more than eight (8) feet in from the curb around
401 North Gulph Road[.]” Id.
Additionally, the special injunction enjoined “all picketing at or within
twenty-five (25) feet of any of the means of ingress or egress . . . or other
means of access to the Construction Site [and] otherwise unlawfully
interfering, either directly or indirectly, with any person, employee of vehicle
entering or leaving the Construction Site[.]” Id. Plumbers Local 690 was
also enjoined from “assisting, aiding or abetting any person or persons who
violate or attempt to violate this Order[.]” Id. To protect against potential
damages in the event Plumbers Local 690 was wrongfully enjoined, Turner
submitted a $5,000 bond as security. Finally, the stipulated special
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injunction stated that no hearing would be scheduled absent written request
of either party.
The picketing on behalf of Plumbers Local 690 at the CHOP
construction site continued without interruption throughout May and June
2014. N.T., 7/14/14, at 33. The composition of the picketers changed at
different times and included members of Appellant labor unions involved
herein, specifically Steamfitters Local 420, Sprinkler Fitters Local 692, and
Heat and Frost Insulators Local 14. Id. at 26, 28. At times, the number of
picketers exceeded the five-person limits at the gates outlined in the special
injunction and the protestors engaged in prohibited activities such as
harassing workers attempting to enter the site and impeding deliveries. Id.
at 26, 33-34. Thus, notwithstanding its agreement, Plumbers Local 690
failed to ensure that others acting in concert with it complied with the
dictates of the special injunction. Eventually, the Montgomery County
Sheriff’s Department read the April 2014 order to the picketers and posted a
copy of the order on the perimeter fence surrounding the construction site.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/9/14, at 4; Ricketts Aff. ¶ 9.
On July 9, 2014, a large-scale rally occurred at the CHOP construction
site and is the genesis of the present appeal. Between 5:45 a.m. and 11:55
a.m. on that date, picketers amassed at the site, erected a tent within the
eight-foot perimeter established in the special injunction, and gathered
inside each of the two construction gates. The participants varied in
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numbers during the course of the morning but, at its height, the rally
included 181 people. The only two gates to the site were blocked. The
Upper Merion Police Department and Montgomery County Sheriff’s
Department responded to the demonstration, but did not stop the picketers
from continuing to block the ingress and egress at the two construction
gates. The picketers prevented the delivery of materials and impeded the
arrival of contractors scheduled to work that day. Hence, the blockade
disrupted Turner’s ability to perform work at the site until the demonstration
ended.
On that same day, Turner received permission to file an amended
complaint in equity at the original action number. It joined Sheet Metal
Workers Local 19, Steamfitters Local 420, Sprinkler Fitters Local 692, the
International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators Local 14, and each
organization’s respective business manager. The memorandum in support
of its motion to amend the equity complaint and join the additional
defendants asserted that:
Plaintiff seeks to add these parties because they are now or have
in the recent past engaged in the same illegal conduct as
Defendant Plumbers Local 690 at the same construction site
already at issue in this litigation. The addition of these parties to
this case will permit efficient adjudication of all parties’ rights.
Plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint to aver occurrences
relating to the additional parties that has [sic] happened after
the filing of the original pleading.
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Memorandum in Support of Motion For Leave of Court to Add Additional
Parties and to Amend the Complaint, 7/9/14/ at 1-2.8
Turner also filed a second petition for special injunction that, again,
invoked § 206d as a basis to avoid the application of the Act’s preclusion of
restraining orders and injunctions in labor disputes. Turner supported the
petition for special injunction with (1) the affidavit of John D. Ricketts, Jr.,
project manager for the CHOP construction project, and (2) photographs
illustrating the use of a blockade to impede the ingress and egress of traffic
at the construction site.
During the ensuing evidentiary hearing, Mr. Ricketts described the
events that he witnessed on the morning of July 9, 2014. He stated that
picketers started to arrive at the construction site at approximately 5:30
a.m., totaled 181 at the zenith of the rally, and dispersed around noon
following an address by Anthony Gallagher, the business manager for
Steamfitters Local 420. N.T., 7/14/14, at 10-11, 26. He reported that large
collections of picketers formed circles in each of the two twenty-five-feet-
wide construction entrances. Id. at 11-12. The formation at Gate A, which
Mr. Ricketts identified as the main construction gate, marched continually
and refused to yield to vehicles attempting to enter. Id. at 12. Other
____________________________________________
8
Turner subsequently modified the complaint to withdraw the claims against
Sheet Metal Workers Local 19 and the organization’s business manager,
Gary Masino. See N.T., 7/14/14, at 4-5.
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picketers converged in the area along North Gulph Road located between the
two entrances. Id. at 12. They erected tents, unloaded coolers, and
blocked a lane of traffic. Id. at 10, 16.
Mr. Ricketts further testified that he witnessed protesters turn away
vehicles from the construction gates. Id. at 12-13. Additionally, he
identified several photographs, which were subsequently entered into
evidence, that depicted the picket line blocking the ingress of vehicles at the
construction site. Mr. Ricketts stated, “[T]he picketers did not move out of
the way to allow the car[s] to enter. They would continue to walk in front of
the vehicles as the cars would try to inch closer, but didn’t break stride or
move out of the way to allow vehicles to pass through.” Id. at 18. He
continued that the picketing activity prevented some tradesmen from getting
to the construction site to perform their work. He explained, “Gate A is our
union gate. We only had two . . . union contractors have manpower on-site
that day[.]” Id. at 19. He specifically identified four contractors that had
insufficient manpower and recounted that the foreman for a plaster
contractor called him on the telephone to alert him to the fact that the
picketers had blocked a delivery truck from the site and that the material
had to be returned. Id. Mr. Ricketts noted that the picketing activity on
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July 9, 2014, impacted Turner’s productivity and limited the tasks that it
could accomplish over a six-hour period that morning.9
In addition to the testimony regarding the blockade of the two
construction entrances, Mr. Ricketts identified specific individuals associated
with the respective trade unions who participated in the demonstration. In
addition to Anthony Gallagher, Mr. Ricketts recognized Pat Doyle, who sits
on the executive board of Sprinkler Fitters Local 692, from prior construction
projects. Id. at 27. Similarly, he identified Steve Pettit, the business
manager for the Heat and Frost Insulators Local 14, whom he had observed
during the unions’ prior onsite activities. These events included an episode
where demonstrators blocked a delivery truck and harassed the driver. Id.
at 28. Mr. Ricketts did not identify Michael Bradley or Wayne Miller as
participants in the rally.
After hearing the foregoing evidence and listening to the parties’
respective legal arguments, on July 18, 2014, the trial court issued a
preliminary injunction. Significantly, as it relates to the instant appeal, the
preliminary injunction extended the stipulated restrictions outlined in the
____________________________________________
9
Approximately fifteen minutes before the rally subsided, the blockade
prevented a pump truck from a union concrete contractor from accessing the
site through the proper gate. N.T., 7/14/14, at 42-43. While the truck
eventually gained access to the construction site, it was forced to enter
through the non-union gate. Id. at 43. Later that afternoon, after the
participants disbursed, five more trucks entered the site and delivered
concrete without incident. Id.
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April 2014 order to the additional defendants who had not been parties to
the original stipulation. The preliminary injunction also limited the
aggregate number of picketers from all of the Appellant labor organizations
to five individuals at any one time and removed the provision that permitted
five pickets at the construction gates.
Appellants filed timely appeals, which this Court consolidated for
argument and disposition. The trial court did not direct Appellants to file
concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b); however, it authored a Rule 1925(a) opinion explaining its reasons
for issuing the preliminary injunction.
Plumbers Local 690, Michael Bradley, Sprinkler Fitters Local 692, and
Wayne Miller share legal representation and assert the following claims:
A. Whether the Appellee presented sufficient evidence
demonstrating the necessity of injunctive relief against the
Appellant[s].
B. Whether 43 [P.S.] § 206i required the lower court to issue
findings of fact before granting the Appellee’s request for a
preliminary injunction.
C. Whether the lower court's Order granting overly broad
injunctive relief violates Section 206f of the Labor Anti-Injunction
Act, 43 [P.S.] 206a et seq.
D. Whether the count violated [s]ection 206h of the Labor Anti-
Injunction Act, 43 [P.S.] 206a et seq., by granting a preliminary
injunction against certain individual union officers.
Briefs of Plumbers Local 690 at 2 and Sprinkler Fitters Local 692 at 2.
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defendants from violating the terms of special injunction, which was posted
at the site. As noted supra, approximately 181 people donned identical t-
shirts, separated into groups, and seized the construction site by blocking
the construction gates. The people who did not man the picket lines
congregated near a tent stocked with coolers which the demonstrators had
erected at the onset of the rally. The demonstration continued for six hours
and the participants did not disband until the business manager for
Steamfitters Local 420 addressed the rally collectively.
As the foregoing facts reveal a high degree of planning and
coordination among various unions during the labor demonstration, logical
inferences require that we view the rally for what it was: a public display of
support for Plumbers Local 690 by its sympathizers. The opposite
perspective leads to the absurd situation where the additional defendants,
which Turner joined in order to prevent them from engaging in conduct
which Plumbers Local 690 specifically agreed to forego, would have to abide
by the preliminary injunction while Plumbers Local 690 would not be
sanctioned for any illegal conduct defined by the special injunction. That
result contradicts the intent of the special injunction’s terms, which was to
prevent Plumbers Local 690 and its sympathizers acting in concert from
obstructing the construction process. Accordingly, we find sufficient grounds
exist to conclude that Plumbers Local 690 aided, abetted, or failed to
prevent in some manner the events that constituted a seizure of the CHOP
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construction site on July 9, 2014. Had the trial court failed to include
Plumbers Local 690 in the preliminary injunction, it would have created an
untenable situation where all Plumbers Local 690 had to do in order to be
absolved from responsibility for any illegal conduct was to absent itself from
the construction site when such conduct occurred. Hence, the trial court did
not err in imposing the terms of the preliminary injunction against Plumbers
Local 690 and its officer. See Summit Towne Centre, supra at 1000
(“Only if it is plain that no grounds exist to support the decree . . . will we
interfere with the decision of the trial court [to grant or deny a preliminary
injunction].”) (emphasis added).
Similarly, we reject Sprinkler Fitters Local 692’s assertion that Turner
did not establish its involvement in the rally. Notwithstanding its arguments
to the contrary, the certified record in this case confirms that union local’s
direct involvement in the rally through the actions of Pat Doyle, whom Mr.
Ricketts identified as a member of the Sprinkler Fitters Local 692 executive
board. Mr. Ricketts observed Mr. Doyle greeting other picketers at Gate B.
See N.T., 7/14/14, at 27-28. Thus, its participation was established.14
Next, we address Appellants’ arguments concerning the application of
the Labor Anti-Injunction Act, which generally restricts a trial court’s
____________________________________________
14
Heat and Frost Insulators Local 14 does not challenge Turner’s evidence
regarding its participation in the rally.
- 20 -
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jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief during labor disputes unless a specific
exception to the prohibitions apply. This argument, which we address in two
parts, subsumes the issues identified as “B” in the briefs submitted by
Plumbers Local 690 and Sprinkler Fitter Local 692 and the first and third
issues presented by Heat and Frost Workers Local 14. The relevant
statutory provisions state,
No court of this Commonwealth shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a
case included within this act, except in strict conformity with the
provisions of this act, nor shall any such restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the
public policy declared in this act. Exclusive jurisdiction and power
to hear and determine all actions and suits coming under the
provisions of this act, shall be vested in the courts of common
pleas of the several counties of this Commonwealth: Provided,
however, That this act shall not apply in any case—
....
(d) Where in the course of a labor dispute as herein defined,
an employe, or employes acting in concert, or a labor
organization, or the members, officers, agents, or
representatives of a labor organization or anyone acting for
such organization, seize, hold, damage, or destroy the
plant, equipment, machinery, or other property of the
employer with the intention of compelling the employer to
accede to any demands, conditions, or terms of
employment, or for collective bargaining.
43 P.S. § 206d(d) (emphasis added). Thus, where, during the course of a
labor dispute, a labor organization seizes an employer’s property with the
intention of compelling the employer to accede to its demands, § 206d(d)
- 21 -
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permits a trial court to issue an injunction, notwithstanding the Act’s
restrictions and preclusions.
Accordingly, the threshold issue in this case concerns whether
Appellants’ activities on July 9, 2014, constituted a seizure for the purpose
of § 206d(d). Collectively, Appellants assert that, since Turner failed to
demonstrate that any of the organizations or officers seized the CHOP
construction site, the Act barred the trial court from issuing the special
injunction. Turner counters that it did, in fact, present sufficient evidence
for the trial court to find that Appellants seized the CHOP construction site
“with the effect and intention of denying Turner, its agents and employees
free access to the [s]ite.” Turner’s brief at 18. For the following reasons,
we find that the record sustains the trial court’s finding that a seizure
occurred.
A trial court’s decision that a seizure occurred must be upheld if that
decision rests upon reasonable grounds. Giant Eagle Markets Co. v.
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 23, 652 A.2d
1286, 1293 (Pa. 1995) (“The Superior Court improperly reweighed the
evidence de novo and reversed the trial court’s decision.”). Pennsylvania
law has long held that “[f]orcibly to deny an owner of property or his agents
and employees access to that property . . . is in practical and legal effect a
seizure or holding of that property.”); Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation
v. United Steel Workers of America, 45 A.2d 857, 861 (Pa. 1946)
- 22 -
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defendants from violating the terms of special injunction, which was posted
at the site. As noted supra, approximately 181 people donned identical t-
shirts, separated into groups, and seized the construction site by blocking
the construction gates. The people who did not man the picket lines
congregated near a tent stocked with coolers which the demonstrators had
erected at the onset of the rally. The demonstration continued for six hours
and the participants did not disband until the business manager for
Steamfitters Local 420 addressed the rally collectively.
As the foregoing facts reveal a high degree of planning and
coordination among various unions during the labor demonstration, logical
inferences require that we view the rally for what it was: a public display of
support for Plumbers Local 690 by its sympathizers. The opposite
perspective leads to the absurd situation where the additional defendants,
which Turner joined in order to prevent them from engaging in conduct
which Plumbers Local 690 specifically agreed to forego, would have to abide
by the preliminary injunction while Plumbers Local 690 would not be
sanctioned for any illegal conduct defined by the special injunction. That
result contradicts the intent of the special injunction’s terms, which was to
prevent Plumbers Local 690 and its sympathizers acting in concert from
obstructing the construction process. Accordingly, we find sufficient grounds
exist to conclude that Plumbers Local 690 aided, abetted, or failed to
prevent in some manner the events that constituted a seizure of the CHOP
- 19 -
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construction site on July 9, 2014. Had the trial court failed to include
Plumbers Local 690 in the preliminary injunction, it would have created an
untenable situation where all Plumbers Local 690 had to do in order to be
absolved from responsibility for any illegal conduct was to absent itself from
the construction site when such conduct occurred. Hence, the trial court did
not err in imposing the terms of the preliminary injunction against Plumbers
Local 690 and its officer. See Summit Towne Centre, supra at 1000
(“Only if it is plain that no grounds exist to support the decree . . . will we
interfere with the decision of the trial court [to grant or deny a preliminary
injunction].”) (emphasis added).
Similarly, we reject Sprinkler Fitters Local 692’s assertion that Turner
did not establish its involvement in the rally. Notwithstanding its arguments
to the contrary, the certified record in this case confirms that union local’s
direct involvement in the rally through the actions of Pat Doyle, whom Mr.
Ricketts identified as a member of the Sprinkler Fitters Local 692 executive
board. Mr. Ricketts observed Mr. Doyle greeting other picketers at Gate B.
See N.T., 7/14/14, at 27-28. Thus, its participation was established.14
Next, we address Appellants’ arguments concerning the application of
the Labor Anti-Injunction Act, which generally restricts a trial court’s
____________________________________________
14
Heat and Frost Insulators Local 14 does not challenge Turner’s evidence
regarding its participation in the rally.
- 20 -
J-A09034-15
jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief during labor disputes unless a specific
exception to the prohibitions apply. This argument, which we address in two
parts, subsumes the issues identified as “B” in the briefs submitted by
Plumbers Local 690 and Sprinkler Fitter Local 692 and the first and third
issues presented by Heat and Frost Workers Local 14. The relevant
statutory provisions state,
No court of this Commonwealth shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a
case included within this act, except in strict conformity with the
provisions of this act, nor shall any such restraining order or
temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the
public policy declared in this act. Exclusive jurisdiction and power
to hear and determine all actions and suits coming under the
provisions of this act, shall be vested in the courts of common
pleas of the several counties of this Commonwealth: Provided,
however, That this act shall not apply in any case—
....
(d) Where in the course of a labor dispute as herein defined,
an employe, or employes acting in concert, or a labor
organization, or the members, officers, agents, or
representatives of a labor organization or anyone acting for
such organization, seize, hold, damage, or destroy the
plant, equipment, machinery, or other property of the
employer with the intention of compelling the employer to
accede to any demands, conditions, or terms of
employment, or for collective bargaining.
43 P.S. § 206d(d) (emphasis added). Thus, where, during the course of a
labor dispute, a labor organization seizes an employer’s property with the
intention of compelling the employer to accede to its demands, § 206d(d)
- 21 -
J-A09034-15
permits a trial court to issue an injunction, notwithstanding the Act’s
restrictions and preclusions.
Accordingly, the threshold issue in this case concerns whether
Appellants’ activities on July 9, 2014, constituted a seizure for the purpose
of § 206d(d). Collectively, Appellants assert that, since Turner failed to
demonstrate that any of the organizations or officers seized the CHOP
construction site, the Act barred the trial court from issuing the special
injunction. Turner counters that it did, in fact, present sufficient evidence
for the trial court to find that Appellants seized the CHOP construction site
“with the effect and intention of denying Turner, its agents and employees
free access to the [s]ite.” Turner’s brief at 18. For the following reasons,
we find that the record sustains the trial court’s finding that a seizure
occurred.
A trial court’s decision that a seizure occurred must be upheld if that
decision rests upon reasonable grounds. Giant Eagle Markets Co. v.
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local No. 23, 652 A.2d
1286, 1293 (Pa. 1995) (“The Superior Court improperly reweighed the
evidence de novo and reversed the trial court’s decision.”). Pennsylvania
law has long held that “[f]orcibly to deny an owner of property or his agents
and employees access to that property . . . is in practical and legal effect a
seizure or holding of that property.”); Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation
v. United Steel Workers of America, 45 A.2d 857, 861 (Pa. 1946)
- 22 -
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(finding that a seizure occurred during a labor dispute when picketers
severely restricted or interfered with the ingress and egress of the plant’s
employees or agents). We look first to a well-regarded and oft-cited opinion
by our Supreme Court for succinct guidance:
If the owner be deprived of the use and enjoyment of the
property so that it becomes utterly valueless to him it is
effectively seized and held whether the force employed for that
purpose be exerted within the building or immediately without.
The control of the entrances is control of the plant.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of
Am. (CIO) Local 601, 46 A.2d 16, 20 (Pa. 1946). The Westinghouse
Court notably held that an injunction against protests by union
demonstrators was proper when plaintiff Westinghouse “produced convincing
evidence of irreparable damage, not because of any destruction of, or injury
to, its plants, but because of the interruption of vital activities necessary by
way of preparation for future business and production.” Id. at 21.
This Court and our High Court have consistently recognized that a
seizure occurs when demonstrators interfere with the ingress and egress of
visitors to the building or site. See Neshaminy Constructors, Inc. v.
Philadelphia, Pa. Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, AFL-CIO, 449 A.2d
1389 (Pa.Super. 1982); Wilkes-Barre Independent Co. v. Newspaper
Guild Local No. 120, 314 A.2d 251 (Pa. 1974); Carnegie-Illinois Steel
Corporation, supra. Demonstrators need not become violent or in any
way dangerous in such interference; instead, “[w]hether accompanied by
- 23 -
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violence or not, picketing which denies access to an employer’s plant or
property constitutes a seizure thereof and cannot be permitted.”
Neshaminy Contractors, Inc., supra at 424. Further, demonstrators
blocking “even one gateway to the plant entitle[s] the plaintiff to the
protection of a court of equity just as fully as would the seizure of the entire
plant. When a ‘picket line’ becomes a picket fence it is time for government
to act.” Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., supra at 861. Neither this Court
nor the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has imposed evaluative criteria
relating to the duration of an apparent seizure.
As our Supreme Court explained in Giant Eagle Markets Co., supra
at 1292, “mass picketing constitutes a seizure for the purposes of Section
206d when it forcibly denies an owner of property or his agents and
employees free access to that property.” The High Court further elucidated,
“the standard enunciated above . . . focuses on the effect of mass picketing
in order to determine whether a seizure has occurred, not whether the
picketing was carried out with the express intent of bringing about the
seizure.” Id. It continued, “isolated instances of the application of force or
intimidation do not constitute a seizure. This, however, is due to their
sporadic nature rather than to the lack of sanction by the pickets’ labor
union.” Id. The Court clarified, “[h]owever, when pickets begin a consistent
pattern of subjecting customers and employees to such acts, a seizure
occurs regardless of whether the acts are committed in furtherance of an
- 24 -
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express union policy or, indeed, even if they are committed against the
orders of the union representatives.” Id.
Instantly, Turner adduced testimonial, video, and photographic
evidence that Appellants, members and officers of associated building trades
in the greater Philadelphia area, coordinated a mass demonstration of up to
181 people over a six-hour period on July 9, 2014. N.T., 7/14/14, at 10-11,
26. The respective business managers for Steamfitters Local 420 and Heat
and Frost Insulators Local 14 and a member of the Sprinkler Fitters Local
692 executive board were identified among the participants at the rally. Id.
at 25-28. The demonstrators donned t-shirts emblazoned on the front with
the statement “#1 Ranked Hospital, #1 Ranked Building Trades.” The back
of the t-shirts depicted the word “Turner” behind a circle-backslash—the
universal symbol for “no.” Id. at 12. The marchers formed picket lines in
each of the two construction gates, circled within the construction gates, and
refused to yield to several vehicles that attempted to gain ingress. Id. at
11-13, 18, 21-22. The blockade also prevented tradesmen that were not
involved in the labor dispute from getting to the construction site to perform
their work. Id. at 19. Indeed, only two of the six union contractors that
were scheduled to perform at the site had sufficient manpower that morning.
Id. Additionally, the picketers blocked the delivery of drywall products. Id.
Thus, mindful of our Supreme Court’s framework concerning when a
mass picketing constitutes a seizure for the purposes of § 206d(d), we find
- 25 -
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that Turner adduced sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court’s
determination that the sum of Appellants’ activities in blocking the ingress of
vehicles, deliveries, and contractors to the construction site for
approximately six hours was tantamount to a seizure under the Act. See
Wilkes-Barre Indep. Co., supra (section 206d(d) applied where large
numbers of pickets blocked two of eight entrances for fifteen minutes in the
morning and thirty minutes in the evening even though the number of
picketers at the two entrances never exceeded six at all other times of day);
Neshaminy Constructors, supra at 1390-91 (seizure occurred within
meaning of § 206d(d) where pickets blocked construction entrance
designated for use by employees and subcontractors, even though it was
one of several entrances to the site); Philadelphia Minit-Man Car Wash v.
Building and Const. Trades Council of Philadelphia and Vicinity, AFL-
CIO, 192 A.2d 378, 380 (Pa. 1963) (allegations of repeated and frequent
mass picketing of entrances to job site as to render ingress and egress
impossible were “sufficient to bring this controversy within the exclusionary
provisions of the Labor Anti-Injunction Act”).
The crux of Appellants’ contention is that Turner’s evidence did not
confirm that the vehicles turned away were agents or employees of Turner.
Additionally, Plumbers Local 690 and Sprinkler Fitters Local 692 speculate
that the drivers of the vehicles blocked by the protesters were union workers
who invoked their right to decline to cross the picket line. The latter claim
- 26 -
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necessarily ignores the testimony concerning the failed drywall delivery.
Moreover, it was within the purview of the trial court to weigh the evidence
as it deemed appropriate and either accept or reject Mr. Rickett’s testimony.
Stated simply, Appellants’ challenge to the sufficiency of Appellee’s evidence
and the veracity of Mr. Rickett’s testimony fails. It is beyond peradventure
that the trial court is empowered to weigh the evidence and to resolve
matters of credibility. This Court will not disturb findings that the certified
record supports. See Giant Eagle, supra at 1293 (admonishing Superior
Court for overstepping its standard of review where testimony provided
ample evidence for trial court to rely upon in issuing a preliminary
injunction). Since the certified record in the present case supports the trial
court’s determination that the picket lines Appellants formed in the two
construction gates constituted a seizure pursuant to § 206d(d), we do not
disturb that finding or the attendant conclusion that the Labor Anti-
Injunction Act is inapplicable.
The learned dissent accurately notes that the trial court neglected to
specifically identify pursuant to § 206d(d) the conditions or demands that
Appellants sought to impose upon Turner as a result of the July 9 seizure.
However, since Appellants failed to challenge this aspect of the trial court’s
decision, we do not address it sua sponte. In The York Group, Inc. v.
Yorktowne Caskets, Inc., 924 A.2d 1234 (Pa.Super. 2007), this Court
discussed the effect of an appellant’s failure to assert a ground for reversal.
- 27 -
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and listed the factors enumerated in § 206i, albeit without any reference to
the Act.
For two reasons, we reject Appellants’ argument in favor of utilizing
Overnight Transportation in order to construe the July injunction as being
issued pursuant to the Labor Anti-Injunction Act. First, since our Supreme
Court reversed our decision in Overnight Transportation due to a lack of
jurisdiction to address the precise issues that we purported to confront, we
are not bound by the holdings espoused therein. Our High Court’s reversal
for lack of jurisdiction rendered our decision in Overnight Transportation
a legal nullity. See In re Patterson's Estate, 19 A.2d 165, 166 (Pa. 1941)
(reiterating, “An adjudication of a court without jurisdiction is ‘void and of no
legal effect.’”); McCutcheon v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 788 A.2d 345, 346
(Pa. 2002) (absent a final order, “the Superior Court did not have appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 742, and the order it issued is void.”).
Thus, this Court’s discussion in Overnight Transportation has no legal
effect. At most, the discussion in that case provides insight into how that
particular three-judge panel perceived the matter before it.
Second, and more importantly, we are unconvinced that the rationale
this Court expressed in Overnight Transportation is appropriate herein.
The record confirms that the party seeking injunctive relief, Turner,
unquestionably invoked § 206d at the inception of the proceedings, it
presented evidence to establish a seizure during the ensuing evidentiary
- 32 -
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hearing, and the trial court made a specific finding in its Rule 1925(a)
opinion that a seizure, in fact, occurred.
The April 2014 petition for a special injunction explicitly invoked §
206d as a basis to avoid the Act’s prohibition on restraining orders and
injunctions in labor disputes. Significantly, that petition and the supporting
memoranda unmistakably asserted that aspects of the labor demonstration
at the CHOP construction site were tantamount to a seizure. See
Memorandum in Support of Petition for a Special Injunction and Preliminary
Injunction, 3/21/14, at 4-5. The ensuing special injunction order did not
refer to any factors that could be confused with § 206i.
Thereafter, following additional unrest at the CHOP construction site,
Turner filed a second petition for special injunction and an amended
complaint in equity joining the remaining defendants. Again, Turner
unambiguously invoked § 206d as its basis to avoid application of the Act.
To support its request for relief, Turner submitted Mr. Ricketts’s affidavit and
photographic evidence of the impediments to ingress and egress. Likewise,
the amended complaint specifically averred that Appellants’ collective
picketing activities blocked the egress and ingress of Turner’s “employees,
subcontractors, vendors . . . and equipment[.]” Amended Verified Complaint
in Equity, 7/25/14, at 6. During the ensuing evidentiary hearing, Turner
adduced forty-five pages of testimony regarding the size, scope, and effect
of Appellants’ activities at the CHOP construction site on July 9, 2014, and
- 33 -
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introduced additional photographic and video exhibits that showed picketers
refusing to yield to vehicles attempting to enter through at least one of the
construction gates.
In contrast to the state of the record in Overnight Transportation,
our review of the instant case is not reduced to the singular attempt to
reconcile a perceived conflict between an order and an ensuing trial court
opinion. Herein, we have the benefit of a complete certified record that
confirms that the issue regarding the applicability of § 206d was at the heart
of this case from its inception. While we cannot purport to explain why the
July 2014 preliminary injunction listed, without citation, considerations
enumerated in § 206i, unlike the Court in Overnight Transportation, we
do not rely upon that single fact as a basis to ignore the trial court’s explicit
finding that a seizure occurred pursuant to § 206d. Thus, despite
Appellants’ protestations to the contrary, we find that the trial court did not
err in issuing the preliminary injunction outside of the exacting parameters
of § 206i.16
____________________________________________
16
The Labor Anti-Injunction Act does not mandate that injunctions and
restraining orders refer to § 206d specifically when applying the statutory
exception under that section and, for what it is worth, our rationale in
Overnight Transportation failed to identify any benefit that would inure to
either party as a result of requiring an explicit reference to that section in
the injunction. We simply invoked the legislature’s statement of public
policy, which at most can be construed as implying that the § 206d(d)
exception should be strictly construed. Instantly, however, our legislature’s
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
- 34 -
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Having determined that the trial court ruled in accordance with § 206d
of the Act, we now address whether the certified record supports the trial
court’s decision to issue the preliminary injunction. In doing so, we are
reminded that the review of a trial court’s decision to grant or deny
preliminary injunctive relief is “highly deferential.” Synthes USA Sales,
LLC v. Harrison, 83 A.3d 242, 248-49 (Pa.Super. 2013). “[I]n reviewing
the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction, an appellate court is directed
to examine the record to determine if there were any apparently reasonable
grounds for the action of the court below.” Id. “It is well established that
the standard of review for granting or denying a preliminary injunction
requires an appellate court only to determine if there were any apparently
reasonable grounds for the lower court's action.” Giant Eagle Markets
Co., supra at 1291-92 (citing Valley Forge Historical Society v.
Washington Memorial Chapel, 426 A.2d 1123, 1128 (Pa. 1981)).
Examination of the record below contains sufficient evidence that the trial
court had apparently reasonable grounds to issue the July 18, 2014 special
injunction. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed infra, the trial court’s
order in this regard must be affirmed.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
stated policy preferences do not obscure the reality that the facts and
procedural history of the instant case fall squarely within the purview of §
206d(d).
- 35 -
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and listed the factors enumerated in § 206i, albeit without any reference to
the Act.
For two reasons, we reject Appellants’ argument in favor of utilizing
Overnight Transportation in order to construe the July injunction as being
issued pursuant to the Labor Anti-Injunction Act. First, since our Supreme
Court reversed our decision in Overnight Transportation due to a lack of
jurisdiction to address the precise issues that we purported to confront, we
are not bound by the holdings espoused therein. Our High Court’s reversal
for lack of jurisdiction rendered our decision in Overnight Transportation
a legal nullity. See In re Patterson's Estate, 19 A.2d 165, 166 (Pa. 1941)
(reiterating, “An adjudication of a court without jurisdiction is ‘void and of no
legal effect.’”); McCutcheon v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 788 A.2d 345, 346
(Pa. 2002) (absent a final order, “the Superior Court did not have appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 742, and the order it issued is void.”).
Thus, this Court’s discussion in Overnight Transportation has no legal
effect. At most, the discussion in that case provides insight into how that
particular three-judge panel perceived the matter before it.
Second, and more importantly, we are unconvinced that the rationale
this Court expressed in Overnight Transportation is appropriate herein.
The record confirms that the party seeking injunctive relief, Turner,
unquestionably invoked § 206d at the inception of the proceedings, it
presented evidence to establish a seizure during the ensuing evidentiary
- 32 -
J-A09034-15
hearing, and the trial court made a specific finding in its Rule 1925(a)
opinion that a seizure, in fact, occurred.
The April 2014 petition for a special injunction explicitly invoked §
206d as a basis to avoid the Act’s prohibition on restraining orders and
injunctions in labor disputes. Significantly, that petition and the supporting
memoranda unmistakably asserted that aspects of the labor demonstration
at the CHOP construction site were tantamount to a seizure. See
Memorandum in Support of Petition for a Special Injunction and Preliminary
Injunction, 3/21/14, at 4-5. The ensuing special injunction order did not
refer to any factors that could be confused with § 206i.
Thereafter, following additional unrest at the CHOP construction site,
Turner filed a second petition for special injunction and an amended
complaint in equity joining the remaining defendants. Again, Turner
unambiguously invoked § 206d as its basis to avoid application of the Act.
To support its request for relief, Turner submitted Mr. Ricketts’s affidavit and
photographic evidence of the impediments to ingress and egress. Likewise,
the amended complaint specifically averred that Appellants’ collective
picketing activities blocked the egress and ingress of Turner’s “employees,
subcontractors, vendors . . . and equipment[.]” Amended Verified Complaint
in Equity, 7/25/14, at 6. During the ensuing evidentiary hearing, Turner
adduced forty-five pages of testimony regarding the size, scope, and effect
of Appellants’ activities at the CHOP construction site on July 9, 2014, and
- 33 -
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introduced additional photographic and video exhibits that showed picketers
refusing to yield to vehicles attempting to enter through at least one of the
construction gates.
In contrast to the state of the record in Overnight Transportation,
our review of the instant case is not reduced to the singular attempt to
reconcile a perceived conflict between an order and an ensuing trial court
opinion. Herein, we have the benefit of a complete certified record that
confirms that the issue regarding the applicability of § 206d was at the heart
of this case from its inception. While we cannot purport to explain why the
July 2014 preliminary injunction listed, without citation, considerations
enumerated in § 206i, unlike the Court in Overnight Transportation, we
do not rely upon that single fact as a basis to ignore the trial court’s explicit
finding that a seizure occurred pursuant to § 206d. Thus, despite
Appellants’ protestations to the contrary, we find that the trial court did not
err in issuing the preliminary injunction outside of the exacting parameters
of § 206i.16
____________________________________________
16
The Labor Anti-Injunction Act does not mandate that injunctions and
restraining orders refer to § 206d specifically when applying the statutory
exception under that section and, for what it is worth, our rationale in
Overnight Transportation failed to identify any benefit that would inure to
either party as a result of requiring an explicit reference to that section in
the injunction. We simply invoked the legislature’s statement of public
policy, which at most can be construed as implying that the § 206d(d)
exception should be strictly construed. Instantly, however, our legislature’s
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
- 34 -
J-A09034-15
Having determined that the trial court ruled in accordance with § 206d
of the Act, we now address whether the certified record supports the trial
court’s decision to issue the preliminary injunction. In doing so, we are
reminded that the review of a trial court’s decision to grant or deny
preliminary injunctive relief is “highly deferential.” Synthes USA Sales,
LLC v. Harrison, 83 A.3d 242, 248-49 (Pa.Super. 2013). “[I]n reviewing
the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction, an appellate court is directed
to examine the record to determine if there were any apparently reasonable
grounds for the action of the court below.” Id. “It is well established that
the standard of review for granting or denying a preliminary injunction
requires an appellate court only to determine if there were any apparently
reasonable grounds for the lower court's action.” Giant Eagle Markets
Co., supra at 1291-92 (citing Valley Forge Historical Society v.
Washington Memorial Chapel, 426 A.2d 1123, 1128 (Pa. 1981)).
Examination of the record below contains sufficient evidence that the trial
court had apparently reasonable grounds to issue the July 18, 2014 special
injunction. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed infra, the trial court’s
order in this regard must be affirmed.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
stated policy preferences do not obscure the reality that the facts and
procedural history of the instant case fall squarely within the purview of §
206d(d).
- 35 -
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Since the restrictive terms of the Labor Anti-Injunction Act did not
apply in this case, the trial court issued the preliminary injunction in
accordance with the traditional rules of equity. Wilkes-Barre
Independent Co., supra at 253-254. In Synthes USA Sales, supra at
249, we reiterated the six traditional factors that a petitioner must establish
in order to obtain an injunction,
1) that the injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and
irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated by
damages; 2) that greater injury would result from refusing an
injunction than from granting it, and, concomitantly, that
issuance of an injunction will not substantially harm other
interested parties in the proceedings; 3) that a preliminary
injunction will properly restore the parties to their status as it
existed immediately prior to the alleged wrongful conduct; 4)
that the activity it seeks to restrain is actionable, that its right to
relief is clear, and that the wrong is manifest, or, in other words,
must show that it is likely to prevail on the merits; 5) that the
injunction it seeks is reasonably suited to abate the offending
activity; and, 6) that a preliminary injunction will not adversely
affect the public interest. . . .
Unlike § 206i, the traditional rules do not require the trial court to present a
factual finding as a prerequisite to issuing a preliminary injunction. In fact,
rather than require a contemporaneous recitation of the court’s findings,
Pa.R.C.P. 1531, relating to preliminary or special injunctions, mandates that
trial courts enter a written memorandum after issuing the final order in order
to ensure an appropriate record on appeal.
Instantly, the trial court entered a written opinion that applied the
appropriate factors and found that Turner satisfied its burden of proof.
- 36 -
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Succinctly, the court found that: (1) Turner would suffer irreparable harm
that could not be adequately compensated by money damages if Appellants
were permitted to continue to block the entrances to the CHOP construction
site; (2) the seizure impacted Turner’s financial productivity, which could
have continued unabated if the injunction was not issued and,
concomitantly, while the injunction prohibited Appellants from continuing to
block the construction entrances, it permitted the labor organizations to
picket near the construction site; (3) the desired scenario where Appellants
voiced their labor concerns without unlawfully interfering with the
construction of the medical facility restored the parties to their status as it
existed immediately prior to the seizures; (4) Appellants’ conduct was
actionable insofar as seizures of property are wrongful and actionable under
Pennsylvania law; (5) the injunction is reasonably related to preventing the
further obstruction of the gates at the CHOP construction site; and (6) while
Appellants’ blockade interfered with the construction of the health care
facility, requiring Appellants to picket twenty-five feet away from the
construction entrances does not adversely affect the public interest in
supporting workers’ rights. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/9/14, at 11-12. As
Appellants do not challenge the trial court’s consideration of any of the
enumerated factors that our case law deems essential to the entry of an
injunction or any comparable elements under § 206i, we do not review it.
Indeed, as we observed, supra, absent an assertion of error, it is improper
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to address an issue sua sponte. See Steiner, supra; The York Group,
supra.
Next, we address Appellants’ respective assertions that the preliminary
injunction was impermissibly overbroad. The issue is identified by Plumbers
Local 690 and Sprinkler Fitters Local 692 as “C” and by Heat and Frost
Insulators Local 14 as “Two.” Initially, we observe that the argument
leveled by Heat and Frost Insulators Local 14 relies entirely upon § 206f of
the Labor Anti-Injunction Act. Likewise, Plumbers Local 690 and Sprinkler
Fitters Local 692 invoke this section as alternative bases for finding the
preliminary injunction overbroad. In brief, § 206f limits the scope of a trial
court’s authority to issue injunctive relief and provides a litany of acts that
the court is prohibited from enjoining under the Act.17 As we discussed at
____________________________________________
17
Section 206f identifies fifteen specific actions that a trial court lacks
authority to prohibit during labor disputes. Those restrictions are as follows:
No court of this Commonwealth shall have jurisdiction or power
in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute to issue
any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction
which, in specific or general terms, restrains or prohibits any
person, association or corporation from doing, whether singly or
in concert with others, notwithstanding any promise,
undertaking, contract or agreement to the contrary, any of the
following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any
relation of employment.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization
or of any employer organization.
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person any
strike or unemployment benefits, or unemployment insurance, or
other moneys or things of value.
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person who is being
proceeded against in, or is prosecuting [FN1] any action or suit
involving, or arising out of, a labor dispute in any court of the
United States, or of this Commonwealth, or of any state.
(e) Giving publicity to, and obtaining or communicating
information regarding the existence of, or the facts or merits
involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking
or picketing or patrolling any public street or place where any
person or persons may lawfully be, or by any other method not
involving misrepresentation, fraud, duress, violence, breach of
the peace or threat thereof.
(f) Organizing themselves, forming, joining or assisting in labor
organizations bargaining collectively with an employer by
representatives freely chosen and controlled by themselves, or
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, or engaging in any concerted activities.
(g) Persuading by any lawful means other persons to cease
patronizing or contracting with or employing or leaving the
employ of any person or persons.
(h) Ceasing or refusing to work with any person or group of
persons.
(i) Ceasing or refusing to work on any goods, materials,
machines or other commodities.
(j) Assembling peaceably to do, or to organize to do, any of the
acts heretofore specified, or to promote their lawful interests.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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length supra, however, since the certified record supports the trial court’s
finding that a seizure occurred in this case pursuant to § 206d(d), the
remaining requirements and prohibitions imposed by the Act simply do not
apply. See 43 P.S. § 206d(d) (“this act shall not apply in any case-- . . .
Where in the course of a labor dispute as herein defined, . . . a labor
organization or anyone acting for such organization, seize . . . [the] property
of the employer with the intention of compelling the employer to accede to
any demands, conditions, or terms of employment, or for collective
bargaining.”) (emphasis added); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
International Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC,
396 A.2d 772 (Pa. Super. 1978) (declining to award fees because, following
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
(k) Advising or notifying any person or persons of an intention to
do or not to do any of the acts heretofore specified.
(l) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts
heretofore specified.
(m) Advising, urging or otherwise causing or inducing, without
misrepresentation, fraud or violence, others to do or not to do
the acts heretofore specified; and
(n) Doing in concert with others any or all of the acts heretofore
specified: Provided, That the specific enumeration in this section
of acts which may not be restrained or enjoined shall not be
construed to authorize the injunction or restraint of any act or
acts not heretofore enjoinable or restrainable.
43 P.S. § 206f.
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determination that seizure occurred, no part of Labor Anti-Injunction Act is
applicable); Wilkes-Barre Independent Co., supra at 254 (“since the
Anti-Labor Injunction Act did not apply, appellees were not entitled to costs
and expenses or counsel fees.”). Thus, Appellants’ invocation of § 206f is
misplaced.18
Plumbers Local 690 and Sprinkler Fitters Local 692 assert that the
preliminary injunction is overbroad insofar as it was not “couched in the
narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objectives permitted by
constitutional mandate and the essential needs of public order.” See
Plumbers Local 690’s brief at 12 (citing Altemose Construction Co. v.
Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Philadelphia, 296 A.2d 504, 506 (Pa.
1972) (plurality)); Sprinkler Fitter Local 692’s brief at 12 (same). The crux
of this argument is that the trial court’s prohibition on picketing within the
twenty-five foot zones surrounding the construction gates was not tailored to
the needs of the case. The unions’ shared position has three facets: (1) the
injunction prohibits all labor organizations from picketing in the prohibited
areas; (2) the restrictions impede the unions’ rights to place an observer at
Gate B, the neutral gate, to monitor whether it is being operated correctly;
____________________________________________
18
For identical reasons, we reject: (1) the references by Plumbers Local 690
and Sprinkler Fitters Local 692 to § 206h relating to liability of union
officers; and (2) Heat and Frost Insulators Local 14’s invocation of § 206q
concerning the imposition of attorneys’ fees.
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and (3) the injunction limits the unions involved in the July 2014 rally to a
total of five picketers in the non-restricted areas twenty-five feet away from
the both gates.19 In sum, the unions opine, “the Order effectively eliminates
the labor organization[s’] First Amendment right[s] to engage in lawful
picketing. Under these circumstances, the Preliminary Injunction does more
than accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional
mandate and the essential needs of public order.” See Plumbers Local 690’s
brief at 12 (quotations omitted); Sprinkler Fitter Local 692’s brief at 13
(same). For the following reasons, we agree with the shared assertion of
Plumbers Local 690 and Sprinkler Fitters Local 692 that the injunction
exceeded what was needed to protect against Appellants’ seizure of the
construction site during future labor rallies.
As the United States Supreme Court observed in Carroll v. President
and Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968), and
our High Court reiterated in Altemose, supra,20 “An order issued in the
____________________________________________
19
Since Appellants do not challenge the reasonableness of the trial court’s
imposition of an eight-foot barrier between picketers and the CHOP property
along North Gulph Road, we do not address that aspect of the injunction sua
sponte.
20
In Altemose Construction Co. v. Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of
Philadelphia, 296 A.2d 504 (Pa. 1972) (plurality with six participating
justices agreeing as to overbreadth of a preliminary injunction’s distance
restrictions), the Supreme Court unanimously held that the preliminary
injunction barring picketing within one mile of a construction site was too
broad, but the Court was equally divided as to the nature and extent of the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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area of First Amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that
will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional
mandate and the essential needs of the public order.” It continued by noting
that an injunction that restrains free speech “must be tailored as precisely as
possible to the exact needs of the case.” Id. at 184.
The trial court’s opinion did not confront the precise argument that the
Plumbers and Sprinkler Fitters level on appeal. Nevertheless, in addressing
the aforementioned traditional factors essential to issuing injunctive relief,
the trial court determined that the injunction was reasonably tailored to
abate Appellants’ offending conduct, i.e., the use of picket lines to obstruct
the ingress and egress of vehicles at the construction site. The court
stressed that the limitations on the number of participants permitted to
engage in picketing at the CHOP construction site and the prohibition of
pickets within twenty-five feet of the construction gates was fashioned to
halt Appellants’ illegal seizure of the construction site. See Trial Court
Opinion, 10/9/14, at 12.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
required modification. Justice Pomeroy authored the opinion in favor of
affirming the decree with a modification that reduced the distance restriction
from one mile to 200 yards. Justice Roberts authored an opinion supporting
an exclusion of all distance restrictions in that case. Significantly, both of
the learned justices’ opinions invoked the principles the United States
Supreme Court outlined in Carroll v. President and Commissioners, 393
U.S. 175 (1968).
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The propriety of an injunction depends upon the nature of the
evidence concerning misconduct, the terms of the order, and the type of
conduct being enjoined. Whether an injunction is appropriate in any given
case is extremely fact-sensitive. See Altemose Construction, supra.
The record reveals that the preliminary injunction is warranted in this
case to counter the unions’ repeated utilization of picket lines to block the
gates at the construction site. The special injunction entered during April
2014 permitted Plumbers Local 690 to utilize five pickets at the construction
gate so long as they did not obstruct traffic and the remaining
demonstrators stood at least twenty-five feet away from the entrances.
However, that injunction was utterly ineffectual. Accordingly, the trial court
entered a subsequent injunction during July 2014 that included the
additional defendants, removed the provision that permitted limited
picketing at the construction gates, and made clear that “Pickets . . . shall be
limited to no more than five (5) in total for, all labor organizations, at any
one time at the Construction Site[.]” Preliminary Injunction, 7/18/14, at 3-
4.
Our examination of the July 2014 preliminary injunction focuses upon
the location and number of pickets permitted at the construction site. First,
as it relates to the distance restriction, we observe that the injunction does
not enjoin Appellants from engaging in peaceful and lawful picketing near
the construction site or forbid all picketing near the premises. The exclusion
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of picketers within twenty-five feet of the construction gates was established
in the April 2014 injunction and that requirement is not so onerous as to
divest Appellants of their right to assemble in order to raise public
awareness of Plumber Local 690’s ongoing quarrel with Turner.
The injunction restrains Appellants from assembling in certain areas
near the construction gates, which picketers blocked during prior rallies.
Contrary to the plumbers’ and sprinkler fitters’ assertions, the injunction
does not bar any union representatives from being at the gates for a lawful
purpose unrelated to the labor dispute, such as monitoring gate procedures.
Furthermore, Appellants are permitted to assemble along North Gulph Road
so long as the picketers are twenty-five feet before or beyond either gate
and/or across the roadway directly opposite either of the gates. If
Appellants picket in those areas, their protests will be visible to all vehicles
entering and leaving the site and to traffic traveling in both directions along
North Gulph Road. Moreover, they remain free to disseminate information
at each of those locations, including the intersection opposite Gate A,
concerning the facts of the labor dispute between Plumbers Local 690 and
Turner. Accordingly, we reject the assertion that this aspect of the
preliminary injunction silenced Appellants’ voices or eliminated their right to
engage in lawful picketing. Mindful that Appellants previously abused their
rights to assemble by unlawfully blocking ingress to the construction site, we
find that the distance restrictions outlined in the July 2014 injunction are
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