Toner, C. v. The Travelers Home

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2016 PA Super 69CHRISTOPHER TONER IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
THE TRAVELERS HOME AND MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY
Appellee No. 53 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order December 12, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at No(s): GD 12-20308
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and STABILE, J.
OPINION BY OTT, J.: FILED MARCH 21, 2016
Christopher Toner appeals from the order entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Allegheny County, on December 12, 2014, denying his
motion for summary judgment and granting The Travelers Home and Marine
Insurance Company’s (The Travelers) motion for summary judgment. In the
underlying declaratory judgment action Toner sought a judicial
determination whether The Travelers was required to provide Toner’s mother
with a new waiver of stacking of uninsured/underinsured benefits (UM/UIM)
form after she added vehicles to her automobile insurance policy. The trial
court determined The Travelers was not required to provide the form and
Toner has filed this timely appeal. After a thorough review of the
submissions of the parties, relevant law, and the certified record, we affirm.
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Before we address the merits of this matter, we recite out standards of
review.
Our standard of review of an order granting summary judgment
requires us to determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion or committed an error of law[,] and our scope of
review is plenary. We view the record in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the
moving party. Only where there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment be entered.
Silvagni v. Shorr, 113 A.3d 810, 812 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
Our standard of review in a declaratory judgment action is
substantially similar.
Our standard of review in a declaratory judgment action is
limited to determining whether the trial court clearly abused its
discretion or committed an error of law. We may not substitute
our judgment for that of the trial court if the court's
determination is supported by the evidence.
Erie Ins. Group v. Catania, 95 A.3d 320, 322 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
omitted).
“Additionally, we note that interpretation of an insurance policy
presents a pure question of law, over which our standard of review is de
novo.” Rourke v. Pennsylvania Nat. Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 116 A.3d 87, 91
(Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
We adopt the underlying facts and circumstances of this matter as
related by the trial court in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, dated 2/9/2015.
The parties filed a Joint Statement of Stipulated Facts. Attached
thereto, as Exhibit A, is the insurance policy at issue. I adopt
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Stipulated Facts Nos. 2-16, 18-20, 22, 23 and 25.[1] Toner was
listed as a driver on a policy owned by his mother (“insured”).
The original policy covered only one vehicle. Insured waived
stacking, but subsequently added two additional vehicles, one at
a time. On neither occasion was she provided a new waiver
form. Toner was severely injured in an accident while he was
the passenger of an underinsured motorist. Travelers paid
Toner UIM benefits in the maximum amount for one vehicle.
Toner filed this Declaratory Judgment action contending insured
should have been given new waiver forms and that Traveler’s
[sic] failure to do so should result in the UIM benefits for each
vehicle being stacked.
It is uncontested two additional vehicles were added and each
time a vehicle was added insured received new “AUTOMOBILE
POLICY DECLARATIONS” pages. Both sets of new declaration
pages state, under paragraph 2, that “…Vehicle had been added,
coverage and vehicle/driver information have been changed.
These declarations replace all prior automobile policy
declarations on the date on which this change is effective.”
Paragraph 4, “Coverages, Limits of Liability and Premiums,”
clearly states the UM/UIM coverage was non-stacked and
referred to Endorsement A37021, which is the seven page
section of the insured’s policy addressing
Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Coverage, both Stacked and
Non-Stacked.
The after-acquired vehicle clause defines “Your covered auto” as
a vehicle acquired during the policy period which insured asks
Travelers to cover within thirty days after insured becomes the
owner. The issue before me was whether Travelers was required
to give insured a new waiver form (relating to stacking UM/UIM
benefits) when she added the vehicles to her policy.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/9/2015, at 1-2.
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1
The omitted numbers, 1, 17, 21 and 24, are not relevant to the disposition
of this matter.
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Ultimately, relying largely on the Sackett trilogy2 of cases, which will
be discussed, below, the trial court determined that The Travelers was not
required to provide Toner with a new waiver of stacking form when she
added cars to her single vehicle policy. The Sackett cases recognize that in
general, the addition of a vehicle to an existing automobile insurance policy
does not represent the purchase of new insurance, and so does not require
the insurer to provide the insured with new UM/UIM stacking waiver forms.
However, the courts must also look to the language of the “after acquired
vehicle” clause to determine if that clause is finite in scope. If the clause is
finite, the insurer will be required to provide the insured new UM/UIM waiver
forms.
Toner argues the trial court erred in conducting a Sackett analysis
and presents a straightforward, and in many ways inviting, argument based
largely on the statutory language found in 75 Pa.C.S. § 1738. Toner points
out that Section 1738 states:
(a) Limit for each vehicle.--When more than one vehicle
is insured under one or more policies providing
uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, the
stated limit for uninsured or underinsured coverage
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2
The three cases are Sackett v. Nationwide (Sackett I), 919 A.2d 194(Pa. 2007); Sackett v. Nationwide (Sackett II), 940 A.2d 329 (Pa.
2007); and Sackett v. Nationwide (Sackett III), 4 A.3d 637 (Pa. Super.
2010). Although these are often referred to as the Sackett trilogy, there
are, in fact, four appellate cases. Sackett I reversed a Superior Court
decision at Sackett v. Nationwide, 880 A.2d 1243 (Pa. Super. 2005). This
initial decision is not considered part of the trilogy because it was reversed.
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shall apply separately to each vehicle so insured. The
limits of coverages available under this subchapter for
an insured shall be the sum of the limits for each motor
vehicle as to which the injured person is an insured.
(b) Waiver.-- Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection
(a), a named insured may waive coverage providing
stacking of uninsured or underinsured coverages in
which case the limits of coverage available under the
policy for an insured shall be the stated limits for the
motor vehicle as to which the injured person is an
insured.
(c) More than one vehicle.--Each named insured
purchasing uninsured or underinsured motorist
coverage for more than one vehicle under a
policy shall be provided the opportunity to waive
the stacked limits of coverage and instead purchase
coverage as described in subsection (b). The premiums
for an insured who exercises such waiver shall be
reduced to reflect the different cost of such coverage.
[75 Pa.C.S. § 1738 (a)-(c) (emphasis by Toner).]
The statute makes it perfectly clear and it can only be read one
way:
(a) Whenever an insured purchases a multi-vehicle
policy, which provides UM/UIM coverage, she
automatically gets UM/UIM stacking;
(b) Subsection (a) notwithstanding, the insured can choose
to waive UM/UIM stacking; and
(c) Insurer must provide said insured with the opportunity
to waive UM/UIM stacking. If the insured chooses to sign
the waiver of stacking, the insurer must reduce the
insured’s UM/UIM premiums.
Toner’s Brief at 12-13 (emphasis in original).
Despite Toner’s assertion there is only one way to interpret the
statute, Toner’s interpretation was largely rejected by our Supreme Court in
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2006, in Craley v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 895 A.2d 530 (Pa.
2006). Toner’s interpretation is based upon the belief that waiver of
UM/UIM stacking is only effective in multi-vehicle policies. This
interpretation was espoused in earlier case law such as State Farm Mutual
Auto. Ins. Com. v. Rizzo, 835 A.2d 359 (Pa. Super. 2003); Nationwide
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Harris, 826 A.2d 880 (Pa. Super. 2003); and In re
Insurance Stacking Litigation, 754 A.2d 702 (Pa. Super. 2000). Craley,
however, abrogated that line of statutory interpretation.3 While we
recognize that the Craley decision did not directly address the instant issue
of when an insurer must provide UM/UIM stacking waivers, we cannot ignore
the fact that our Supreme Court has widened the scope of Section 1738 to
include single-vehicle insurance policies. Accordingly, we cannot accept
Toner’s interpretation that Section 1738, regarding providing insureds with
stacking waivers, only applies to multi-vehicle policies.
Our interpretation of Section 1738 is supported by dicta in Craley,
which states:
Moreover, the Commission addressed a booklet issued by the
Department and codified at 31 Pa.Code § 68.604, which some
litigants read as evidence of the Department's policy to limit
waiver to multiple-vehicle policies. Contrarily, the Commissioner
found the booklet did not limit waiver under subsection (b) to
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3
“Accordingly, we refuse to construe the interplay between subsections (b),
(c), and (d) to ban the waiver of stacking in single-vehicle policies and thus
inter-policy stacking.” Craley, 895 A.2d at 540.
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individual policies addressing two or more vehicles, but rather
merely addressed the application of the waiver form as related
to subsection (c) and (d). The Commissioner suggested that
the Department would “evaluate whether to issue a pre-
approved waiver form for single-vehicle policies in
addition to the present Department practice of approving
forms and rates of each insurer.” Id. at 14 n. 9. Thus, the
Commissioner concluded, “Section 1738 permits single vehicle
policy stacking and requires that insureds have the opportunity
to waive this coverage. Rates commensurate with the risks
assumed have been approved by the Department.” Id. at 15.
Craley, 895 A.2d at 537-38 (emphasis added).
31 Pa.Code § 68.604 is currently reserved; the Insurance
Commissioner’s booklet is no longer to be found there. We are unaware of
any amendment to the forms that specifically addresses waiver of UM/UIM
stacking for a single-vehicle policy. This fact supports our determination
that single and multi-vehicle policy stacking waivers are properly addressed
by the same form and in the same manner.
Based on the above analysis, we reject Toner’s interpretation of the
statutory requirements of Section 1738.
We now examine the trial court’s application of Sackett. Sackett
involved the addition of a vehicle to an existing multi-vehicle policy, not a
single-vehicle policy. As demonstrated above, however, we believe case law
requires us to examine the issue similarly.
Sackett II4 is the most relevant of the Sackett cases. This decision
was issued following reargument, at which the Insurance Commission
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4
Sackett v. Nationwide, 940 A.2d 329 (Pa. 2007).
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presented argument that the addition of a motor vehicle to an existing multi-
vehicle insurance policy via the after-acquired vehicle clause found in every
automobile insurance policy in the Commonwealth, did not represent the
purchase of new insurance such that new stacking waivers were required.
Despite accepting the Insurance Commission’s position regarding the after
acquired vehicle clause, our Supreme Court added a proviso. Specifically,
our Supreme Court stated:
We hold that the extension of coverage under an after-acquired-
vehicle provision to a vehicle added to a pre-existing multi-
vehicle policy is not a new purchase of coverage for purposes of
Section 1738(c), and thus, does not trigger an obligation on the
part of the insurer to obtain new or supplemental UM/UIM
stacking waivers. However, where coverage under an after-
acquired-vehicle clause is expressly made finite by the terms of
the policy, see, e.g., Bird [v. State Farm], 165 P.3d [343] at
346-47 [(N.M.Ct.App. 2007)], Sackett I, controls and requires
the execution of a new UM/UIM stacking waiver upon the
expiration of the automatic coverage in order for the unstacked
coverage option to continue in effect subsequent to such
expiration.
Sackett v. Nationwide, 940 A.2d at 334 (footnotes omitted). To
understand the Bird exception, one must understand the relevant term of
the policy.
Initially, an after-acquired-vehicle clause is essentially a contractual
grace period, during which the insurer will automatically provide coverage
for a newly acquired vehicle for a brief period, until either other insurance is
purchased or the insurer is informed of the new vehicle and the insured asks
to have the new vehicle put on the existing policy. This clause gives an
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insured the time to decide what insurance to ultimately purchase.
Otherwise, an insured would be required to purchase insurance
contemporaneously with the purchase of the car.5 This view of the purpose
of the after acquired vehicle clause is supported by Sackett II, which
stated:
The Commissioner observes that the Insurance Department
enforces the MVFRL's requirement that, as a precondition for
automobile insurers to issue policies with unstacked UM/UIM
coverage, the carriers must first obtain written waivers from the
policyholders. However, the Commissioner explains that,
throughout Section 1738’s seventeen-year history, once policies
have been put into place, the Department has not treated the
addition of a new vehicle, known in the industry as an “add-on,”
as a new purchase of coverage. Rather, the Department has
deemed this to be an extension of pre-existing coverage. Thus,
the Department has not required carriers to issue, or
policyholders to execute, serial waivers when vehicles are added
to multi-vehicle policies in order to reaffirm the continuation of
unstacked UM/UIM coverage.
The Commissioner explains that the mechanism by which
vehicles generally are added to existing policies is via “newly
acquired vehicle clauses,” which are made practically necessary
by the mandate of the MVFRL for financial responsibility as a
prerequisite to operation of a motor vehicle, see 75 Pa.C.S. §
1786, and are included universally within automobile insurance
policies issued in Pennsylvania. The clause explicitly permits
consumers to extend existing coverage, with the same applicable
types of coverage and limits, to new and/or substitute vehicles,
with coverage applying automatically upon acquisition, subject to
various conditions, including a requirement of timely subsequent
notice to the insurer. According to the Commissioner, this
procedure facilitates immediate consumer transactions and
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5
This might not be a hardship when purchasing a vehicle through a
dealership, but might prove burdensome when buying a car through a
person to person transaction.
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affords predictability and certainty in terms of the availability
and scope of coverage. The Commissioner argues that Sackett I
effectively nullifies the newly-acquired-vehicle clause in policies
and strips policyholders of the associated benefits.
Sackett II, 940 A.2d at 331.
In The Travelers policy at issue herein, Toner was given 30 days in
which to inform The Travelers of the purchase of the new vehicle and
thereby extend the existing coverage. It must be emphasized that the 30-
day grace period provided coverage to the newly acquired vehicle even
before The Travelers was informed of the existence of the new vehicle. It is
also important to note that our Supreme Court recognized that the after
acquired vehicle clause is “included universally within automobile insurance
policies issued in Pennsylvania,” Sackett II, id., all after acquired vehicle
clauses include a requirement for timely notification.
While the holding in Sackett II accepted the Insurance Commission’s
position regarding the application and effect of adding a vehicle to an
existing insurance policy through the after acquired vehicle clause, our
Supreme Court also included the Bird exception. Although the holding in
Bird is not relevant to the determination of the instant matter as Bird
expressly did not address UM/UIM stacking or waiver, we will examine the
facts and circumstances of Bird to provide context.
We quote the factual background of Bird as stated by the New Mexico
Court of Appeals:
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This case arises from a claim for benefits made by
Appellees/Cross–Appellants, Scott and Shana Bird (Parents),
after their son, David, was killed in an automobile accident. The
material facts are undisputed. The Bird family had four
automobile insurance policies with Appellant/Cross–Appellee,
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm),
at the time of the accident on May 12, 2004. Each policy carried
liability and UM coverage of $100,000 per person. Each policy
provided thirty-day coverage for a newly acquired car. Prior to
April 20, 2004, David drove a Jeep Cherokee (Jeep), which was
insured as a named vehicle on one of the four policies. On April
20, 2004, David informed his State Farm agent, Ron Goimarac,
that he had purchased a Subaru and that he was trying to sell
the Jeep. At that time, the Subaru became the named vehicle on
the policy that had originally named the Jeep. Mr. Goimarac
informed David that the Jeep would continue to be covered
under the terms of the Subaru policy for thirty days but that he
would need to obtain a new policy on the Jeep for coverage to
continue beyond the thirty-day period. During the thirty-day
period, David was riding as a passenger in the Subaru and was
killed in an automobile accident.
Parents made a demand for UM coverage on all five cars covered
by their State Farm policies. State Farm paid Parents a total of
$400,000, consisting of $100,000, based on the per person limit
of coverage under the Subaru policy for liability on the driver of
the Subaru, and $300,000 in stacked UM coverage under the
other three policies. The UM coverage for the Subaru was fully
offset by the payment of liability to the coverage limits on the
Subaru policy. Therefore, State Farm denied Parents' claim for
benefits due under the UM coverage on the Jeep.
Bird, 165 P.3d at 345.
Additionally, the New Mexico Court of Appeals recognized,
[W]e are not dealing with a limitation of stacking clause…Rather,
the issue at hand is whether the coverage that was extended to
the Jeep under the newly acquired car provision of the Subaru
policy constituted coverage separate and apart from the limits of
coverage on the Subaru.
Bird, 165 P.3d at 346.
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Importantly, Bird also provided the entire after acquired vehicle
clause.
Newly Acquired Car—means a replacement car or an additional
car.
Replacement Car—means a car purchased by or leased to you or
your spouse to replace your car. This policy will only provide
coverage for the replacement car if you or your spouse:
1. tell us about it within 30 days after its delivery to you or
your spouse; and
2. pay us any added amount due.
Additional Car—means an added car purchased by or leased to
you or your spouse. This policy will only provide coverage for the
additional car if:
1. it is a private passenger car and we insure all other
private passenger cars; or
2. it is other than a private passenger [car ] and we insure
all cars owned or leased by you or your spouse on the date
of its delivery to you or your spouse.
This policy provides coverage for the additional car only until the
earlier of:
1. 12:01 A.M. Standard Time at the address shown on the
declarations page on the 31st day after the delivery of the
car to you or your spouse; or
2. the effective date and time of a policy issued by us or
any other company that describes the car on its
declarations page.
You or your spouse may apply for a policy that will
provide coverage beyond the 30th day for the additional
car. Such policy will be issued only if both you and the
vehicle are eligible for coverage at the time of application.
Id. at 346-47 (emphasis added).
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Because the accident occurred within the 30-day period during which
both vehicles were covered by the existing policy, the question before the
New Mexico court was, while the two vehicles were simultaneously insured
under the same policy, did the policy provide separate coverage and limits
for the two vehicles or a single limit.6
In Bird, the after acquired vehicle clause required the insured to
“apply for a policy that will provide coverage beyond the 30 th day for the
additional car.” This clause requires the insured to obtain a different policy
to provide continuing insurance for the additional car. A close examination
of the Bird policy demonstrates there is no provision for extending coverage
upon the purchase of an additional car. The policy provides the insured with
a 30-day grace period of coverage, after which the insured must procure
new coverage. This interpretation of the Bird policy is supported by dicta
from both Bird and Sackett II. Specifically,
Moreover, a reasonable insured who is told that a different
policy must be obtained for the Jeep after thirty days, in order
to continue the coverage…
Bird, 165 P.3d at 350 (emphasis added).
Further,
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6
Both the trial court and appellate court in Bird determined the language of
the after acquired vehicle clause provided separate coverage for each
vehicle, thereby allowing Bird’s parents to obtain both liability and UM
coverage from the same policy.
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For example, in Bird v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, 142 N.M. 346, 165 P.3d. 343 (2007), the
court reviewed a policy containing an after-acquired vehicle
clause that extended coverage to new vehicles only until the
thirty-first day after acquisition, thus requiring insureds to
apply for a new policy to acquire coverage thereafter.
Sackett II, 940 A.2d at 333 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the finite nature of the Bird after acquired vehicle clause
is not the 30-day grace period, rather, it is the fact that under Bird, the
insured is required to purchase a different policy at the end of the 30-day
period.
This interpretation is also supported by the holding in Sackett II. Our
Supreme Court accepted the Insurance Commission’s position that adding a
vehicle pursuant to the after acquired vehicle clause does not represent the
purchase of new insurance. Our Supreme Court also recognized that a
timely notice requirement (the 30-day clause in the Toner policy) existed in
every Pennsylvania policy. If the finite nature of the after acquired vehicle
clause was determined solely by the existence of a 30-day clause, then
every automobile insurance policy would be finite. If every Pennsylvania
automobile insurance policy is finite, the first sentence of the holding in
Sackett II,
We hold that the extension of coverage under an after-acquired-
vehicle provision to a vehicle added to a pre-existing multi-
vehicle policy is not a new purchase of coverage for purposes of
Section 17378(c), and thus, does not trigger an obligation on the
part of an insurer to obtain new or supplemental UM/UIM
stacking waivers.
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Sackett II, 940 A.2d at 334, would be meaningless. A finite after acquired
vehicle clause is the exception to the general rule; therefore, there must be
an additional condition for the Bird exception to apply. That additional
condition is the requirement that at the end of the 30-day period, the
insured must purchase new coverage.
The relevant clause in The Travelers’ policy provides the definition of a
covered auto as, in relevant part of paragraph J:
2. Any of the following types of vehicle on the date you become
the owner:
a. a private passenger auto; or
b. a pickup or van.
This provision (J.2) applies only if:
a. you acquire the vehicle during the policy period,
b. you ask us to insure it within 30 days after you become
the owner.
The Travelers Policy, Definitions, J.2. This clause contains no requirement
the insured purchase a different policy. Rather, the 30-day limit is the
timely notice requirement our Supreme Court recognized existed in all
Pennsylvania automobile insurance policies. Because the Bird exception
does not apply, The Travelers was not required to provide Toner with either
new or supplemental waiver of UM/UIM stacking forms.
Although we have resolved this matter by examining the Bird
exception, Sackett II also references Satterfield v. Erie Insurance
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Property and Casualty, 618 S.E.2d 483 (W.Va. 2005). In the interest of
full analysis, we will discuss this case.
While Satterfield was referenced by our Supreme Court in Sackett
II, only Bird was part of the holding. Nonetheless, Satterfield provided
our Supreme Court with another form of after acquired vehicle clause,
namely continuous coverage, that was used to contrast the finite Bird
clause.
The Bird clause was not defined as finite solely by the 30-day timely
notice requirement. The Satterfield continuous coverage clause is not
defined by a lack of a timely notice requirement.7 Although Satterfield
does not mention the grace period, we must assume that such period was
contained in the policy. As noted in Sackett II, the timely notice
requirement is found in every Pennsylvania policy, and with good reason.
The after acquired vehicle clause provides initial coverage without notice. If
there were no timely notification requirements, the policy would provide
unlimited coverage for a newly acquired vehicle without being rated by the
insurer. Accordingly, we believe that the Satterfield policy contained some
form of timely notice requirement. We note that the accident in Satterfield
occurred within 30 days of acquiring the new car.
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7
To be clear, the grace period of coverage is defined by the timely notice
requirement. If the insurance policy gives the insured 30 days to notify the
carrier, the insured has a 30-day grace period.
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Rather, the continuous nature of the coverage addressed the existence
of other collectible insurance. In Satterfield, the Williamsons had both
family automobile insurance coverage and commercial automobile coverage.
The Williamsons purchased a new car, a Pontiac Grand Am. The car was
listed on the family automobile insurance policy. Nonetheless, the car still fit
the definition of an after acquired vehicle pursuant to the commercial
automobile insurance policy. Satterfield was a passenger in the Grand Am
when it was involved in a single vehicle accident, causing Satterfield serious
injury. While the family automobile insurance policy paid Satterfield the
liability limits of that policy, Satterfield sought additional liability coverage
from the commercial policy. The trial court denied Satterfield relief on the
basis that once the Grand Am was listed on the family policy, it was no
longer insured as an after acquired vehicle on the commercial policy. The
appellate court disagreed. The after acquired vehicle clause in the
commercial policy did not exclude coverage based on other collectible
insurance (the family policy). Because the car still fit the definition of an
after acquired vehicle, and no exclusion for other collectible insurance
existed, Satterfield was entitled to collect liability coverage for the Grand Am
from the commercial policy as well; the Erie commercial automobile
insurance policy provided continuous coverage in the face of other collectible
insurance. The Satterfield situation is not relevant to the instant analysis.
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The Sackett III decision was decided upon the fact that the newly
purchased vehicle was actually added to the existing policy by means of an
“corrected declarations/endorsement page”, see Sackett III, 4 A.3d at
638, and not via the after acquired vehicle clause. Instantly, the trial court
determined the after acquired vehicle clause was at issue, not an
endorsement. Accordingly, we need not analyze Sackett III.8
In light of the above discussion, we discern no error in the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of The Travelers.
Order affirmed.
Judge Stabile joins this opinion.
Judge Shogan files a dissenting opinion.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/21/2016
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8
The Sackett III decision did not define what it meant by adding the
vehicle to the existing policy via a “corrected declarations/endorsement
page.” We suspect endorsement versus after acquired vehicle clause may
be a difference without a distinction. If an insured obtains coverage
contemporaneously with the purchase of a vehicle, the after acquired vehicle
grace period is not implicated.
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