Com. v. Haslam, B., Jr.

J-S27035-16
2016 PA Super 97COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
BRADLEY JASON HASLAM, JR.,
Appellant No. 1694 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 18, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0001805-2014
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 09, 2016
This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court
of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County following Appellant’s conviction on the
charges of possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) (“PWID”), possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), possession of a small amount of marijuana, and
possession of drug paraphernalia.1 Appellant contends the Honorable Judge
John E. Domalakes erred in denying his pre-trial motion to suppress the
physical evidence seized by parole agents and state police officers. We
affirm.
____________________________________________
1
35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), (16), (31), and (32), respectively.
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: Following his
arrest, on January 19, 2015, Appellant filed a counseled pre-trial motion
seeking to suppress the physical evidence seized by parole agents and
police officers. On March 9, 2015, the matter proceeded to a suppression
hearing before Judge Domalakes.
At the hearing, Agent Erica Cola testified she supervised Appellant’s
father, who was on parole and living at a house on Chestnut Street in
Pottsville. N.T., 3/9/15, at 8-9. Agent Cola noted that, as a condition of
Appellant’s father’s parole, he was required to “submit to a search of [his]
person, property, residence or vehicle for violation of the conditions of [his]
probation and parole throughout the period of [his] supervision.” Id. at 11.
Moreover, as a condition of his parole, Appellant’s father was notified he
would “be subject to periodic visits by [his parole] [o]fficer at [his] residence
or place of employment and by law be subject to the search of [his] person,
property and residence without [a] warrant.” Id.
Agent Cola testified that, shortly after Appellant’s father commenced
his period of parole, she received complaints from his neighbors that there
was “a large amount of traffic in and out of the home. Drug activity,
possible firearms in the home.” Id. at 12. As a result of the complaints, on
August 5, 2014, Agent Cola went to the subject house in an effort to make
contact with Appellant’s father, however, he was not at home. Id. at 13.
After receiving additional complaints from neighbors, on August 12,
2014, at approximately 9:45 a.m., Agent Cola, along with other parole
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agents, went to the subject house with the intent of making contact with
Appellant’s father. Id. at 14. Upon arriving at the house, Agent Cola
noticed a hypodermic needle lying on the ground near the steps of the
house’s landing. Id. at 19. She also noticed the house had outside video
cameras positioned so that the occupants could view who was approaching
from the street and the front door. Id. at 15. Agent Cola, who could hear
noise coming from inside the house, knocked on the door. Id. She testified
it “took about 20 minutes for someone to even answer the door[,]” and
finally Appellant’s paramour, Jenna Morrow, opened the door with Appellant
standing behind her. Id. at 16.
Agent Cola asked Appellant and Ms. Morrow to sit at the kitchen table
while other parole agents entered the house. Id. at 16-17. She indicated
that, while she talked to Appellant and Ms. Morrow, other agents were
upstairs clearing the house, “maintaining safety at the scene[,]” and
attempting to locate Appellant’s father. Id. at 17-19. Agent Cola testified
she asked Appellant where his father was at that moment, and he replied he
did not know. Id. She asked Appellant if his father was in the house, and
he replied he did not know. Id. She then asked the pair if there was
anyone else in the house, and they responded negatively. Id. at 17.
However, shortly thereafter, three people came down the steps and into the
living room, where Agent Cola asked them to sit. Id. at 18. In identifying
the three individuals, Agent Cola discovered that two of the individuals were
wanted for probation and parole violations. Id.
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On cross-examination, Agent Cola indicated Appellant was free to
leave the house at any time; however, she admitted that, as long as he
remained in the house, Appellant was not free to roam around
unaccompanied by an agent as there had been a report of a firearm in the
house. Id. at 24-26. Accordingly, for the safety of the parole agents, she
asked Appellant and Ms. Morrow to sit at the kitchen table while the house
was being searched. Id. at 24. Agent Cola noted Appellant was not
handcuffed during the encounter. Id. at 26. She further testified, in
relevant part, as follows on cross-examination:
Q: Jenna Morrow answered the door. [Appellant] did not
answer the door with Miss Morrow? Can we agree on that?
A: He was behind her.
Q: He was behind her?
A: That’s how they ended up staying downstairs with me
as I took them into the kitchen.
Q: So it’s your statement that my client, [Appellant], never
had contact with any probation officer in his room that you know
of?
A: No. No, he was downstairs with me at the kitchen table.
He was not back upstairs.
Q: Okay. So did he ever, in your presence, tell anyone
from Probation, That’s my bedroom up there. This side of the
house is mine, that side of the house is my father’s?
A: No.
Q: Never made that statement?
A: No.
Q: Okay. Did you ask [Appellant] where his room was?
A: No, I did not.
Q: Okay. Did anyone in your presence from Probation ask
[Appellant] where his bedroom was?
A: No. Not to my knowledge.
Q: That’s okay. I’m just saying—
A: I don’t know. I was downstairs with him.
Q: All right.
A: He was not upstairs.
Q: I understand that. But did anybody come downstairs—
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A: No.
Q: --in your presence and ask [Appellant], where is your
bedroom?
A: No.
Q: Okay. Did anybody ask Miss Morrow in your presence,
when she was downstairs with you, where is your room?
A: No.
Id. at 22-24.
Agent Cola noted she did not search any portion of the house; but
rather, she supervised the five people who were at the house during the
search. Id. at 26.
Agent Brian Shannon testified the purpose of the agents’ visit was a
random field contact to check on Appellant’s father, who was a parolee, and
he searched the upstairs in an effort to locate Appellant’s father. Id. at 36.
He testified he had no contact with any individuals upstairs, but another
parole agent, Agent Michael Tomko, directed people, including Appellant, to
go downstairs prior to the search. Id. at 41-42. Agent Shannon looked for
Appellant’s father in a room, which he described as a “blacked out room”
resembling a common or party room with a television, futon, small
refrigerator, and a table with drawers. Id. at 36-37. While “search[ing]
around” in the room, Agent Shannon noticed drug paraphernalia lying on the
top of the table, and in the table’s top drawer, he found a handgun. Id. at
37, 41-42. He also discovered a firearm underneath the bed. Id. at 38.
On cross-examination, Agent Shannon denied observing Appellant in
the room at issue and clarified he had no contact with any of the occupants
while he was upstairs searching for Appellant’s father. Id. at 40-41. He
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further denied Appellant told him that the room he was searching was
Appellant’s bedroom. Id. at 42.
On redirect-examination, Agent Shannon clarified he could not recall
whether Appellant immediately came downstairs when Ms. Morrow opened
the door or whether he came downstairs after Agent Tomko found three
other individuals upstairs. Id. at 49.
Pennsylvania State Trooper Troy Greenawald testified that, at
approximately 12:40 p.m., he responded to the parole agents’ request for
assistance, and upon arrival at the house, after being briefed by Agent Cola,
he spoke with Appellant, who was not under arrest but was seated on a sofa
with Ms. Morrow. Id. at 53-54. Trooper Greenawald indicated he told
Appellant he was free to leave and he intended to secure a search warrant
for the residence based on the items that had been discovered by the parole
agents. Id. at 54. During the conversation, Appellant admitted narcotics in
the home belonged to him, as opposed to Ms. Morrow, and he consented to
having his person searched, as a result of which Corporal Michael Taylor
discovered $700.00 on Appellant’s person.
Later that day, Trooper Greenawald secured a search warrant to
search the entire residence, as well as a white pick-up truck parked in the
adjacent driveway to the residence. Id. at 56. A subsequent search of the
residence revealed ten re-sealable baggies of methamphetamine, marijuana,
unused baggies, a digital scale, tally sheets, a cellular telephone, three
firearms, and $1,523.00 in U.S. currency. Id. at 56-57. Trooper
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Greenawald opined Appellant possessed the methamphetamine with the
intent to deliver it.
On cross-examination, Trooper Greenawald admitted that, prior to
securing the search warrant, he entered the house and went to the top of
the stairs, where he observed leaning against and on a railing a glass vial of
marijuana and firearms, which had been discovered by the parole agents.
Id. at 63-64. Trooper Greenawald testified that, when he initially questioned
Appellant, he indicated that an upstairs bedroom was used by him and Ms.
Morrow. Id. at 68.
Ms. Morrow testified she and Appellant were asleep in the bedroom at
issue when they heard knocking on the door. Id. at 75. Ms. Morrow
indicated she answered the front door, while Appellant remained upstairs.
Id. at 76. She further indicated that, upon entry into the house, Agent Cola
instructed her to take the dogs outside and, when she returned from doing
so, the agents were located throughout the house and Appellant was walking
down the stairs. Id. at 76-77. Ms. Morrow testified she and Appellant sat in
the kitchen and, when Trooper Greenawald arrived, he asked her which
bedroom belonged to which occupants; however, he did not search the
house at this time but remained downstairs. Id. at 78-79. Ms. Morrow
indicated she and Appellant lived on one side of the house upstairs, while
Appellant’s father lived on the other side, and she and Appellant paid
Appellant’s father rent. Id. at 81.
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Appellant testified Ms. Morrow answered the front door while he
remained upstairs cleaning the bedroom and putting away any visible sign of
contraband. Id. at 87-91. Appellant testified that, four or five minutes after
Ms. Morrow answered the door, a male parole agent came upstairs and told
him to “get the fuck out of here.” Id. at 88. Appellant testified he told the
male agent that it was his room but the agent instructed him to go to the
kitchen. Id. at 89, 91.
Appellant indicated Agent Cola knew which bedroom belonged to him
as she was in the house previously with regard to approving the residence
for his father’s use. Id. at 93-94. Appellant further indicated that, while he
was in the kitchen, he asked to go outside to retrieve a cigarette from his
truck, and the agents refused to let him leave. Id. at 92. Additionally, he
indicated that, after Trooper Greenawald arrived, he questioned Appellant as
to whether he possessed “a big bag of methamphetamine” and one of the
officers instructed him to drop his pants and underwear in an effort to find
the drugs. Id. at 94-98.
On cross-examination, Appellant admitted that he was told he was free
to leave, he was never handcuffed, and he consented to the police officer’s
search of his person. Id. at 101.
At the conclusion of all testimony, by opinion and order entered on
April 9, 2015, Judge Domalakes denied Appellant’s pre-trial suppression
motion. Appellant proceeded to a bench trial, at the conclusion of which he
was convicted of the offenses indicated supra, and on September 18, 2015,
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he was sentenced to an aggregate of twenty-three months of supervisory
probation. This timely, counseled appeal followed. The trial court ordered
Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and Appellant timely
complied asserting: “The Learned Suppression Court Judge erred in failing to
suppress evidence seized as a result of an illegal search and seizure of
[Appellant’s] person and bedroom at [Appellant’s] residence.” Appellant’s
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, filed 10/14/15. The trial court filed a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion indicating it was relying upon the suppression
court judge’s previously filed opinion.
Appellant contends the suppression court erred in denying his pre-trial
motion to suppress the physical evidence seized by the parole agents, as
well as by the state police officers.
Our standard of review for challenges to the denial of a suppression
motion is as follows:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of
a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the
suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record
and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted. . . .Where the suppression court's
factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by
these findings and may reverse only if the court's legal
conclusions are erroneous. Where. . .the appeal of the
determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of
legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are not
binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if
the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to
our plenary review.
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Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 46 A.3d 781, 783–84 (Pa.Super. 2012)
(quotations omitted). See Commonwealth v. Benton, 655 A.2d 1030(Pa.Super. 1995) (indicating it is within the suppression court’s sole province
to make credibility determinations). Moreover, our scope of review from a
suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary record that was created at
the suppression hearing. In re L.J., 622 Pa. 126, 79 A.3d 1073, 1087
(2013).
The “crux” of Appellant’s argument is that, although the parole agents
were permitted to conduct a warrantless search of the areas of the home
occupied by Appellant’s father in an effort to locate him, the parole agents
were not permitted to search the bedroom at issue, which was exclusively
occupied and rented by Appellant and Ms. Morrow, without their consent.
Moreover, Appellant suggests the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden
of proof and failed to rebut Appellant’s and Ms. Morrow’s testimony that
Appellant was upstairs in the bedroom when a parole agent entered the
bedroom and Appellant affirmatively told the parole agent the bedroom
belonged to him. In this regard, Appellant points to the fact the
Commonwealth failed to present the testimony of the male parole agent who
allegedly ordered Appellant out of his bedroom.
Assuming, arguendo, Appellant’s legal premise is correct, we note his
argument is not supported by the factual findings of the suppression court.
The suppression court indicated that, based upon its credibility
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determinations, Appellant’s father owned the single family home; neither
Appellant nor Ms. Morrow informed the agents that one of the upstairs
rooms was utilized exclusively by them; the room at issue was more akin to
a common room or party room; Ms. Morrow’s testimony she and Appellant
rented the room from Appellant’s father was incredible in light of the fact
there was no evidence of rent receipts, no evidence of a lease agreement,
and no evidence presented as to the amount of the alleged rent; the room
searched was owned by Appellant’s father, who was on parole; and
Appellant, along with other individuals, stayed in the home only at times.
Suppression Court Opinion, filed 4/9/15, at 2-7. We may not overrule the
suppression court’s credibility determinations in this regard and note the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the evidentiary record
created at the suppression hearing. See In re L.J., supra. Thus, we find
no support for Appellant’s factual assertion that he and Ms. Morrow
exclusively occupied the room at issue.
Moreover, we find unavailing Appellant’s suggestion that, since the
Commonwealth did not introduce the testimony of the agent who allegedly
“cleared the upstairs and ordered [Appellant] to leave his room,” the
Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proof or successfully rebut
Appellant’s and Ms. Morrow’s testimony that Appellant was upstairs in the
bedroom when a parole agent entered the bedroom and Appellant told the
parole agent the bedroom belonged to him. The Commonwealth offered the
testimony of Agent Cola, who indicated that, when Ms. Morrow opened the
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door, Appellant was standing behind her, and the pair went into the kitchen
together. N.T., 3/9/15, at 22-24. Agent Cola denied Appellant or Ms.
Morrow indicated that one of the bedrooms belonged to them. Id. This
testimony discounts Appellant’s and Ms. Morrow’s assertions that Appellant
was upstairs when parole agents began searching the residence, that one of
the agents ordered Appellant to leave, or that they informed the parole
agents one of the bedrooms belonged to them. As indicated supra, the
suppression court was permitted to resolve the conflicts in the testimony,
and was free to believe all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony. See
Benton, supra.Finally, after recounting the evidence in the light most favorable to
him, Appellant presents an undeveloped argument suggesting he was
improperly held in the kitchen for several hours and was not permitted to
leave the residence until he was strip searched by the police. He, thus,
suggests his person was illegally searched and evidence seized from his
person by the state police officers should have been suppressed.
As in his previous issue, in applying the correct standard of review, we
conclude Appellant’s legal argument is based on an improper factual
premise. After resolving the conflicts in the testimony, the suppression
court concluded Appellant was not under arrest, was not handcuffed, and
was free to leave the premises at any time if he chose to do so. Suppression
Court Opinion, filed 4/9/15, at 3. The court noted that, upon the state police
officers’ arrival, Trooper Greenawald specifically told Appellant he was free
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to leave and he was going to secure a search warrant for the premises. Id.The suppression court found Appellant then admitted the drugs in the home
belonged to him and he consented to a search of his person. Id. at 4. The
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and we
decline to address Appellant’s undeveloped argument further.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
Affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/9/2016
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