Commonwealth v. Ovalles

J-A18045-16
2016 Pa. Super. 166
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JOSHUA CARLOS OVALLES,
Appellant No. 1585 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 13, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0002711-2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 25, 2016
This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence of life imprisonment
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County by the Honorable
Thomas J. Burke on August 13, 2015, following a bench trial and Appellant’s
conviction of first-degree murder.1 Upon our review of the record, we
affirm.
The trial court aptly set forth the relevant facts and procedural history
herein as follows:
On July 7, 2013 at approximately 1:20 a.m., Wilkes-Barre
City Police officers were dispatched to the area of 174 South
Grant Street, Wilkes-Barre, for a fight in progress with gunshots
fired. Officers on the scene discovered the victim, Vaughn Kemp
(“Kemp"), lying motionless in the backyard of 174 South Grant
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501.
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A18045-16
Street. Kemp had two gunshot wounds in his lower back area.
Kemp was transported to Geisinger Wyoming Valley Hospital for
treatment. On July 7, 2013, at approximately 2:05 a.m., Kemp
was pronounced dead. After a post mortem examination, the
cause of death was determined to be multiple gunshot wounds,
and the manner of death was ruled a homicide.
On July 9, 2013, a number of individuals who were at the
scene of the homicide were interviewed by police investigators.
One such individual was Erik Rodriguez ("Rodriguez "), a juvenile
at that time. Rodriguez identified the shooter as being
[Appellant], the defendant in the above-captioned case.
[Appellant] was arrested on July 9, 2013 and charged with
one count of Homicide, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2501(a). A preliminary
hearing was held on August 21, 2013, after which the charge of
Homicide was forwarded to the Court of Common Pleas of
Luzerne County. [Appellant] was formally arraigned on October
11, 2013. After multiple continuances and following an appeal of
a pretrial determination by the Court, a bench trial commenced
on Monday, August 10, 2015. Testimony and closing arguments
concluded on Wednesday, August 12, 2015. On Thursday,
August 13, 2015, the Court rendered a verdict of guilty of
Murder of the first degree, and immediately sentenced
[Appellant] to life in prison without parole. [Appellant] filed a
Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on August
28, 2015. As per the Court's direction, [Appellant] filed a Concise
Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal ("Concise
Statement") on October 9, 2015. This Opinion is submitted
pursuant to the Court's obligation set for in Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
***
At trial, Denzel Kemp-McCarthy ("Kemp-McCarthy"), the
brother of the victim Kemp, testified on behalf of the
Commonwealth. He stated that he attended a party at 174 South
Grant Street into the morning hours of July 7, 2013. (N.T. at
26). He noticed [Appellant], whom he knew as "Jay Crim", in the
backyard where the party was being held. (N.T[.] at 27 -28).
During the party, Kemp-McCarthy had a conversation with
Ramon Duval ("Duval"). (N.T. at 29). After the conversation,
Kemp-McCart[h]y drove home and picked up his brother, Kemp,
and his cousin, George Johnson, and brought them to the party.
(N.T. at 31). Upon returning to the party, Kemp, Duval and a
person named Moe (Maurice Richardson) had a brief exchange of
words in the middle of the street, resulting in Kemp attempting
to throw a punch at Moe, which Kemp-McCarthy prevented.
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(N.T. at 35). At that point, a crowd began to gather in the street
in front of the residence at 174 South Grant Street and gunshots
were fired. (N.T. at 36). After retreating back to the car, Kemp
realized his cousin George was still at the party; Kemp returned
to get him. (N.T, at 36-37). About ten minutes later, Kemp-
McCarthy heard a few more gunshots, and saw people running
away from the house. (N.T. at 37). Kemp-McCarthy returned to
the backyard where the party was being held, and found his
brother (Kemp) lying face down. He immediately realized
something was wrong, and called 911. (N.T. at 38).
Ramon Duval[2] testified on behalf of the Commonwealth.
He stated that he arrived to the party at 174 South Grant Street
between 11:00 and 12:00 on the night of July 6, 2013. (N.T. at
79). He noticed [Appellant], whom he knew as "Jay Crim", at the
party, sitting in the backyard on a sofa. (N.T. at 80 -81). Duval
also saw Moe on the couch, and approached him. They then
went to the front of the house to speak. (N.T. at 82). Kemp
approached them while they were at the front of the house, and
encouraged Duval to fight with Moe. (N.T. at 84 -85). Numerous
people started to fill the street, including [Appellant]. (N.T. at
86-87). Duval was very close to [Appellant] when he saw him
fire three or four gunshots toward the sky, causing Duval to run.
(N.T. at 87). He also testified that he did not see anyone else
with a gun when he was in the street. (N.T. at 87-88).
Rodriguez was called to testify on behalf of the
Commonwealth.[3] Rodriguez, who was sixteen in July of 2013,
remembered arriving early to the party at 174 South Grant
Street to help set up. (N.T. at 105). He testified that [he] saw
[Appellant] in the backyard talking with a small group of people.
(N.T. at 108). Rodriguez overheard [Appellant] state that he
wanted a gun prior to [Appellant] going to the front of the
house. (N.T. at 108). Rodriguez testified that he was
approximately twenty feet away from [Appellant] in the front of
the house when [Appellant] fired three gunshots in the air. (N.T.
at 109). Rodriguez testified that he then went to the porch of the
residence so that he could see better. (N.T. at 109). At that
point, he witnessed Kemp throw a bottle at [Appellant] that
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2
Duval, whose native language is Spanish, testified with the assistance of a
court-certified, Spanish-English interpreter. N.T., 8/10/15, at 77-103.
3
Rodriguez testified through the use of the same interpreter who assisted
Duval. N.T., 8/10/15, at 104-139.
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missed, hit a car and broke. (N.T. at 111-112). Kemp then ran
and tried to duck and hide behind other people. (N.T. at 112 -
113). [Appellant] then took aim at Kemp, and fired two gunshots
in the direction of Kemp. (N.T. at 113, 136). Kemp ran along the
side of the residence even after he was shot, and [Appellant]
fled in a car. (N.T. at 113). Rodriguez was subsequently
interviewed by police two days later, on July 9, 2013. (N.T. at
116). Rodriguez testified at trial that he had been untruthful with
the police, telling them that he was inside the residence during
the shooting. (N.T. at 116). Cross[-]examination of Rodriguez
revealed a number of other inconsistencies in his testimony,
including an inconsistent description of the clothing worn by
[Appellant] on the night of the shooting. (N.T. at 125, 273).
Upon being confronted with the inconsistencies in his testimony
regarding the clothing worn by the shooter, Rodriguez admitted
same, but immediately and confidently stated that it was
[Appellant] whom he saw with a gun. (N.T. at 127). He also
confirmed having heard "three (shots) up" and "two when he
([Appellant]) shot at him (Kemp) ". (N.T. at 128).
Dr. Gary Ross testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. He
was qualified as an expert in the field of forensic pathology,
which includes an expertise in bullet trajectory within the human
body. (NT. at 161-165). Dr. Ross testified that he conducted an
autopsy on the victim which revealed two gunshot wounds to his
right-lower back. (NJ. at 167). The bullet that was described as
gunshot wound number one was recovered beneath the skin
surface of the victim's right chest. (N.T. at 170).1 Dr. Ross
stated that this particular bullet was shot from a distance, and
"went from back to front upward through the abdomen and chest
of the decedent." (N.T. at 172). He further testified that this
particular gunshot wound was lethal, in that it traveled "through
his kidney, caused massive bleeding in the abdomen and the
peritoneum cavity and retroperitoneum and also went through
his lung which caused significant bleeding within the right chest
cavity." (N.T. at 173). Dr. Ross stated that gunshot number two
was also a distant gunshot wound, and was the lower of the two
wounds on the right-upper buttock or lower back. (N.T. at 174).
This bullet was removed from the subcutaneous tissue of the
victim's left shoulder. (N.T. at 176). This particular bullet went
from back to front, upward slightly towards the left. (N.T. at
178). Dr. Ross described it as a lethal gunshot wound which
"went through the soft tissue of the abdomen and chest,
penetrated the pulmonary artery, which is the main vessel
leaving the heart, and it also penetrated the right atrium of the
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heart, which is one of the four major chambers of the heart
itself, causing a massive amount of bleeding within the chest and
resulted in this decedent's death." (N.T. at 177). Dr. Ross
testified that based upon his examination, it was his opinion that
the assailant was behind the decedent when he fired the shots.
(N.T. at 178). He also testified that, based upon the steepness of
the trajectory of the bullet, the wounds were consistent with
someone who was ducking. (N.T. at 186). He determined that
Kemp's cause of the death of was multiple gunshot wounds and
that the manner of death was homicide. (N.T. at 178-179).
Corporal Joseph Gober of the Pennsylvania State Police
testified on behalf of the Commonwealth. Corporal Gober is a
member of the Bureau of Forensic Services, and is a firearm and
toolmark examiner with that unit. (N.T. at 188). He was
admitted as an expert in the field of firearm and toolmark
examination. (N.T. at 191). He testified that he conducted an
examination comparison of the two bullets that were recovered
from the victim's body, and concluded that the bullets were
discharged from the same unknown firearm. (N.T. at 193 -194).
Captain Mark Rockovich testified on behalf of the
Commonwealth. Captain Rockovich is employed as the Records
Captain of the Luzerne County Correctional Facility. (N.T. at
223). Part of his job duty is to keep the recordings of phone calls
between prisoners and visitors. (N.T. at 224). On July 13, 2013,
a recording was made between [Appellant] and a visitor. (N.T. at
225). That recording revealed [Appellant] stating to the effect
that he could not be charged with murder one, because "murder
one is when I planned it out in my head." [Appellant] could also
be heard saying, "... I caused the sixth murder in a year ". (see
Commonwealth Exhibit #19).
Detective Charles Jensen was called as on cross by the
Defendant. Detective Jensen interviewed both Rodriguez and
Duval on July 9, 2013 and prepared reports from the interviews.
Detective Jensen admitted that the report of the Rodriguez
interview made no mention of Rodriguez's use of alcohol and
marijuana on the night of the shooting, details that Rodriguez
testified to at trial. (N.T. at 267). Jensen's report also failed to
include other details that Rodriguez testified to at trial. For
instance, there was testimony that at or about the time the
initial shots were fired into the air, [Appellant] yelled "West
Side," whereupon one or more other individuals yelled "East Side
"; that information was not contained in the Jensen report. (N.T.
at 268). Also, as set forth above, Rodriguez told Jensen that he
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was inside the residence when the shooting took place, which
was inconsistent with his trial testimony. (N.T at 269). Detective
Jensen also admitted that the interviews of Rodriguez and Duval
contained inconsistent accounts as to the clothes being worn by
the shooter. (N.T. at 273-276). Detective Jensen also testified to
certain suggested deficiencies in his investigation, like a failure
to recover the weapon used, failure to find bullets or bullet
casings, a failure to search phone records of [Appellant], and a
failure to interview Moe until three days prior to trial. (N.T. at
278 -287).
_____
1
The testimony of Dr. Ross was clear that he could not
determine the order of the wounds, but that “forensic
pathologists label the wounds one through whatever beginning
from the top of the head to the bottom of the feet.” (N.T. at
168).
Trial Court Opinion, filed 11/19/15, at 1-7.
In his brief, Appellant presents the following Statement of Questions
Involved:
A. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in denying [Appellant’s]
Motion for a Brady4 violation in that the Commonwealth withheld
evidence that the alleged eyewitness to the crime had admitted
to them prior to his testimony that he committed perjury at the
[p]reliminary [h]earing?
B. The Commonwealth committed prosecutorial misconduct in
intentionally withholding evidence from the [Appellant] that the
alleged eyewitness to the crime had admitted to them prior to
his testimony that he committed perjury at the Preliminary
Hearing and had intentionally not taken notes or made any
written reports of the witness’ admissions and change of
statement?
____________________________________________
4
Appellant is referencing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194,
10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963) (hereinafter “Brady”).
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C. Whether the evidence was insufficient to convict
[Appellant] of First Degree Murder?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Appellant initially avers the Commonwealth violated Brady by failing
to disclose that prior to his testifying at trial, Rodriguez essentially admitted
to police he had committed perjury at the preliminary hearing. Specifically
Appellant contends Rodriguez “indicated prior to trial that he would
materially testify completely different from his prior testimony at the
[p]reliminary [h]earing and his statement to the police two days after the
shooting of Vaughn Kemp.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. Appellant further
maintains this evidence was material to his case since Rodriguez’s statement
he “witnessed [Appellant] taking two shots at the victim in the pathway and
that his description of the shooter’s clothing was completely different were
material facts that [Appellant] needed in order to investigate Rodriguez’ [sic]
completely different story.” Id. Appellant avers the Commonwealth’s failure
to disclose this evidence and Rodriguez’s admission he had been smoking
marijuana and had drunk five or six beers, which were exculpatory
statements, entitles him to a new trial. Id. at 16, 29. We disagree.
The law governing Brady violations is well-settled:
Under Brady and subsequent decisional law, a prosecutor
has an obligation to disclose all exculpatory information material
to the guilt or punishment of an accused, including evidence of
an impeachment nature. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Hutchinson, 611 Pa. 280, 25 A.3d 277, 310 (2011). To
establish a Brady violation, an appellant must prove three
elements: (1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the
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accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it
impeaches; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution,
either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued.
Hutchinson, supra (citation omitted). The burden rests with
the appellant to “prove, by reference to the record, that
evidence was withheld or suppressed by the prosecution.” Id.
(citation omitted). The evidence at issue must have been
“material evidence that deprived the defendant of a fair trial.”
Id. (citation and emphasis omitted). “Favorable evidence is
material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by
the government, if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Commonwealth v. Paddy, 609 Pa. 272, 15 A.3d
431, 450 (2011) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433,
115 S. Ct. 1555, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1995)).
Brady does not require the disclosure of information “that
is not exculpatory but might merely form the groundwork for
possible arguments or defenses,” nor does Brady require the
prosecution to disclose “every fruitless lead” considered during a
criminal investigation. Id. (citation omitted). The duty to
disclose is limited to information in the possession of the
government bringing the prosecution, and the duty does extend
to exculpatory evidence in the files of police agencies of the
government bringing the prosecution. Commonwealth v.
Puksar, 597 Pa. 240, 951 A.2d 267, 283 (2008);
Commonwealth v. Lesko, 609 Pa. 128, 15 A.3d 345, 370
(2011) (applying Kyles, supra at 438, 115 S. Ct. 1555). Brady
is not violated when the appellant knew or, with reasonable
diligence, could have uncovered the evidence in question, or
when the evidence was available to the defense from other
sources. Commonwealth v. Smith, 609 Pa. 605, 17 A.3d 873,
902–03 (2011); Paddy, supra at 451. Brady sets forth a
limited duty, not a general rule of discovery for criminal cases.
Paddy, supra at 451 (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S.
545, 559, 97 S. Ct. 837, 51 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1977) for the proposition
that “there is no generalized constitutional right to discovery in a
criminal case, and Brady did not create one”).
Commonwealth v. Roney, 622 Pa. 1, 22-24, 79 A.3d 595, 607-08 (2013)
(emphasis in original).
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In addition, “for a defendant to be entitled to a new trial based on the
prosecution's failure to disclose information relating to a witness's credibility,
the defendant must ‘demonstrate that the reliability of the witness may well
be determinative of his guilt or innocence.’” Commonwealth v. Simpson,
620 Pa. 60, 82, 66 A.3d 253, 266 (2013) (citations omitted).
Herein, Appellant made an oral motion for a mid-trial Brady hearing to
determine “whether or not there [had] been any interviews, notes,
recordings, transcriptions of interviews with any witnesses pertaining to
exculpatory evidence, which [Appellant] should have been made aware of
prior to trial referencing the testimony of Erik Rodriguez but, obviously, not
limited to him.” N.T., 8/11/15, at 140. At that time, the prosecutor
represented the Commonwealth had turned over all documents in its
possession, including a report authored by Captain of Detectives Joseph
Coffay which it discovered the prior evening had not been provided to the
defense after a conversation with Detective Blitzer, who had been reviewing
the case file. Id. at 140-41. In response, Appellant maintained that he
should have received any notes taken when investigators in the District
Attorney’s Office spoke to Rodriguez in preparation for trial. Id. at 142-43.
The prosecutor represented that she questioned Mr. Rodriguez in the
presence of Detectives Blitzer and Jensen the day before he testified, and
the only information that was elicited from Rodriguez was his responses to
the questions the prosecutor posed. The prosecutor further stated she
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heard Rodriguez say for the first time on cross-examination at trial that
Appellant had been wearing a red and gold jacket at the time of the
shooting. The Commonwealth had no information in this regard other than
the report prepared by Detective Jensen on July 9th and Rodriguez’s
testimony at the preliminary hearing to the contrary, and Appellant
possessed that evidence. Id. at 143-44. Further argument centered around
the possible existence of additional written notes ensued, after which the
trial court permitted Appellant to proceed with a Brady hearing. Id. at 145-
151. Defense counsel clarified that the reason for the hearing “is just to
ask the affiants on the case and the Detectives if they prepared a report
subsequent to the July 9th report and subsequent to the August preliminary
hearing that differed in any way from the materials we received.” Id. at
150. (emphasis added).
Detectives testified that no written notes or audio recordings were
prepared pertaining to Rodriguez’s anticipated trial testimony following July
9, 2013. Id. at 152-158. Detective Jenson explained that he typed an
official report based upon his handwritten notes following the initial interview
with Rodriguez on July 9, 2013, but did not take notes or prepare a
supplemental report after speaking with him on Friday August 7, 2015. Id.
at 152-154. On cross-examination, Detective Jenson acknowledged he and
the prosecutor met with Rodriguez during a lunch break on August 10, 2015,
the first day of trial, and no written notes or audio recording were prepared
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at that time. Id. at 154-55. Detective Noone informed the trial court his
presence during Rodriguez’s trial preparation was only intermittent, and he
did not prepare any notes at that time, nor was he aware that anyone else
did. In fact, he was not in possession of any supplemental report regarding
Rodriguez’s testimony that may have been prepared after July 9, 2013. Id.
at 157. Similarly, Detective Bitzer explained that while he had been present
for Rodriguez’s interview on August 7, 2015, he neither took notes nor
prepared a report memorializing the same and was not in possession of any
reports subsequent to that prepared on July 9, 2013. Id. at 158-59.
Following the Brady hearing, the trial court found no violation had occurred
and in doing so stated the following on the record:
THE COURT: On the basis of the testimony presented today, it
appears to be confirmatory of the Commonwealth’s assertion
that there were no additional reports compiled, nor any
additional notes taken beyond those previously furnished to the
Defense Counsel; and, moreover, the [c]ourt notes that it
specifically continued to hold the witness in question, Mr. Erik
Rodriguez, subject to the arrangements under which he was
subpoenaed and presented for trial, such that [Appellant] will
have the opportunity to pursue that further as it sees fit.
Moreover, clearly, [Appellant] had an opportunity to
cross[-]examine the witness during the course of the
Commonwealth having called Mr. Rodriguez.
N.T., 8/11/15, at 159-160.
In light of the foregoing, we agree with the trial court’s finding that
Appellant failed to establish the Commonwealth withheld any exculpatory
information with respect to Rodriguez. The Commonwealth represented and
the Detectives testified that other than the report prepared on July 9, 2013,
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of which Appellant had possession, no subsequent written or oral recording
memorialized Rodriguez’s responses to the prosecution’s queries posed in
preparation for trial. The prosecutor herself learned for the first time on
cross-examination of Rodriguez’s inconsistent description of the clothing
Appellant wore on the night of the shooting; indeed, the Commonwealth
could not have been sure of Rodriguez’s trial testimony until he took the
witness stand. Importantly, defense counsel admitted he could have
interviewed Rodriguez in preparation for trial. N.T., 8/11/15, at 150.
Even assuming, arguendo, the Commonwealth did not disclose
information that Rodriguez’s testimony at trial would likely vary from his
representation of what he initially said he had observed on the night of the
shooting, Appellant is not entitled to relief. Appellant has not established he
was prejudiced by any nondisclosure in this regard and, thus, Appellant has
not met his burden for relief under Brady. Arguably, such testimony was
not exculpatory for the inconsistencies in Rodriguez’s account of the
shooting, which the trial court acknowledged and discussed in its Opinion
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), called into question the veracity of the
Commonwealth’s only eyewitness to the crime, and Appellant took
advantage of the opportunity to illuminate this fact through his cross-
examination of Rodriguez. Moreover, despite Appellant’s bald assertions to
the contrary, Rodriguez’s verbal responses to the Commonwealth’s queries
in preparation for trial could not have led to the uncovering of any additional
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evidence or potential witnesses other than those of which Appellant had
been aware since July of 2013 and whose testimony he would have been
free to present at trial. Significantly, despite inconsistencies in his
description of Appellant’s clothing and his vantage point at the time of the
shooting, Rodriguez never wavered in his identification of Appellant as the
only individual brandishing and shooting a firearm before Kemp was fatally
shot, and the defense presented no contradictory testimony in this regard.
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in finding the
Commonwealth did not violate Brady, for Appellant has failed to
demonstrate that the alleged Brady violation so undermined the truth
determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could
have occurred. See Commonwealth v. Cam Ly, 602 Pa. 268, 298, 980
A.2d 61, 78 (2009).
Appellant admits his second claim of prosecutorial misconduct
coalesces with his Brady claim. Nevertheless, he avers the Commonwealth
committed prosecutorial misconduct for its intentional withholding of
evidence that Rodriguez admitted prior to testifying that he had committed
perjury at the preliminary hearing and for failing to take notes or prepare a
written report of Rodriguez’s admissions and inconsistent statements.
Appellant’s Brief at 20-21. Appellant maintains that while Brady relates to
the failure of the Commonwealth to provide the defense with exculpatory
evidence, the Commonwealth also is required to disclose any oral inculpatory
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statements under Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(1)(b).5 He further suggests, without
citation to any authority in support of his claim, that district attorneys and
members of law enforcement are under an affirmative duty to memorialize
in statements a witness makes in preparation for trial in either written
notations or reports. In support of this position, Appellant speculates in his
two-paragraph argument that on August 7, 2015, that:
Rodriguez now told the Commonwealth that he had lied
when he said he ran upstairs after he heard the first shots made
by [Appellant] up in the air and did not see [Appellant] shooting
at Kemp if his trial testimony is to be believed. His trial
testimony that he only ran to the front porch and saw
[Appellant] point his gun at Kemp and shoot is highly inculpatory
in that it is the only evidence of anyone seeing [Appellant] shoot
at Kemp. Lastly, the Commonwealth was clearly in possession
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5
This statute provides:
(B) Disclosure by the Commonwealth.
(1) Mandatory. In all court cases, on request by the defendant,
and subject to any protective order which the Commonwealth
might obtain under this rule, the Commonwealth shall disclose to
the defendant's attorney all of the following requested items or
information, provided they are material to the instant case. The
Commonwealth shall, when applicable, permit the defendant's
attorney to inspect and copy or photograph such items.
***
(b) any written confession or inculpatory statement, or the
substance of any oral confession or inculpatory statement, and
the identity of the person to whom the confession or inculpatory
statement was made that is in the possession or control of the
attorney for the Commonwealth;
Pa. R. Crim. P. 573(b)(1)(b).
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of the oral statement, though, apparently, no one deemed it
relevant to take notes regarding the new statement that
Rodriguez had made.
Appellant’s Brief at 21-22.
As was discussed supra, contrary to Appellant’s claims, the prosecutor
indicated that prior to cross-examination, she was unaware Rodriguez was to
offer a different description of the clothing Appellant wore at the time of the
murder than that which he had provided at the preliminary hearing, and no
documents were prepared thereafter concerning Rodriguez’s trial
preparation. The prosecutor’s representations were corroborated by the
testimony of three detectives during a mid-trial Brady hearing. In addition,
the trial court, as the fact-finder, was well aware of the inconsistences in
Rodriguez’s preliminary hearing and trial testimony, and Appellant
thoroughly questioned him on cross-examination. As such, this claim merits
no relief.
Finally, Appellant asserts the evidence was insufficient to convict him
of first-degree murder. In this regard, Appellant reasons that only
Rodriguez’s previously undisclosed testimony at trial was presented that he
shot the victim, and that “the only uncontradicted evidence was that
[Appellant] shot a gun in the air three times at the location where Kemp and
Richardson were arguing.” Appellant’s Brief at 25-26.
The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial
in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is
sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
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element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying
the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the
facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need
not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts
regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder
unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in
applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and
all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and
the weight of the evidence produced is free to believe all, part or
none of the evidence. Furthermore, when reviewing a
sufficiency claim, our Court is required to give the prosecution
the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence.
However, the inferences must flow from facts and
circumstances proven in the record, and must be of such volume
and quality as to overcome the presumption of innocence and
satisfy the jury of an accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trier of fact cannot base a conviction on conjecture and
speculation and a verdict which is premised on suspicion will fail
even under the limited scrutiny of appellate review.
Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d 272, 275-76 (Pa.Super. 2014)
(quotation and citations omitted).
Section 2502 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502, defines murder
of the first degree as follows: (a) Murder of the first degree.--A criminal
homicide constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an
intentional killing. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502 (a). As such, to obtain a conviction
of first-degree murder, the Commonwealth must have demonstrated that:
a human being was unlawfully killed, the defendant perpetrated
the killing, and the defendant acted with malice and a specific
intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Montalvo, M., 604 Pa. 386,
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986 A.2d 84, 92 (2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Kennedy,
598 Pa. 621, 959 A.2d 916, 921 (2008)); accord 18 Pa.C.S. §
2502(a) & (d) (defining first degree murder as an “intentional
killing,” which is further defined as a “[k]illing by means of
poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful,
deliberate and premeditated killing.”). The Commonwealth may
prove the specific intent to kill necessary for first[-]degree
murder wholly through circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Rega, 593 Pa. 659, 933 A.2d 997, 1009–10
(2007).
Commonwealth v. Murray, 623 Pa. 506, 528-29, 83 A.3d 137, 151
(2013).
As indicated supra, Appellant’s argument is specific in nature. Rather
than challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support any of the
applicable elements of the offense, Appellant contends the evidence was
insufficient to prove that he was the shooter. As such, we need not conduct
a thorough review of the evidence to determine whether it can support a
finding that all of the elements of the offense have been met. Rather, we
will focus on the specific sufficiency issue raised by Appellant: whether the
evidence was sufficient to establish that Appellant was the perpetrator.
This Court has recognized that:
[E]vidence of identification need not be positive and certain to
sustain a conviction. Commonwealth v. S. Jones, 954 A.2d
1194, 1197 (Pa.Super. 2008)[.] Although common items of
clothing and general physical characteristics are usually
insufficient to support a conviction, such evidence can be used
as other circumstances to establish the identity of a perpetrator.
Commonwealth v. Minnis, 458 A.2d 231, 233–34 (Pa.Super.
1983). Out-of-court identifications are relevant to our review of
sufficiency of the evidence claims, particularly when they are
given without hesitation shortly after the crime while memories
were fresh. Id. at 234. Given additional evidentiary
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circumstances, “any indefiniteness and uncertainty in the
identification testimony goes to its weight.” Id. at 233.
Commonwealth v. Orr, 38 A.3d 868, 874 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc)
(quotation marks omitted).
In finding no merit to Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim in
its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court reasoned as follows:
Viewing the totality of the evidence presented in light of
the sufficiency standard set forth above, the [c]ourt holds that
the Commonwealth put forth sufficient evidence to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that Kemp was unlawfully killed by
[Appellant] and that the killing was intentional based upon his
use of a gun on a vital part of the victim’s body. The Court
specifically points to the testimony of witnesses Kemp-McCarthy
and Duval, who place [Appellant] at the scene, Duval who
observed [Appellant] fire gunshots toward the sky, Rodriguez
who both witnessed [Appellant] shoot toward the sky and
thereafter shoot toward the victim, Dr. Ross who testified that
each shot was lethal unto itself, Corporal Gober who testified
that both bullets came from the same gun, and [Appellant’s]
self[-]incriminating statements uttered during a phone
conversation as referenced in Commonwealth Exhibit #19.
Trial Court Opinion, filed 11/19/15, at 7-8. Upon our review of the record,
we agree with the trial court’s reasoning and find no error in this regard;
therefore, this claim merits no relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/25/2016
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