Wakeley, K. v. M.J. Brunner

J-A04023-16
2016 PA Super 88KATIE WAKELEY, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
M.J. BRUNNER, INC.,
Appellee No. 392 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered February 18, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at No(s): GD 14-009877
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., and SHOGAN, J.
OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 19, 2016
In this employment dispute, Katie Wakeley appeals from the order
entered February 18, 2015, granting M.J. Brunner, Inc. (“Brunner”)
judgment on the pleadings. We affirm.
In 2011, Appellant worked as a project manager for an advertising
agency in Dallas, Texas, earning $80,000 annually.1 Appellant and her
family, a husband and child, were settled in Dallas with no intention of
leaving. Appellant’s husband worked as a recruiter; their daughter was four-
years-old.
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1
We derive the background for this case from the pleadings.
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In March 2012, a recruiter approached Appellant about a position with
Brunner as a digital account director. The position was located in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. Appellant indicated that she was not interested unless the
position paid more than her current position and offered opportunity for
advancement. Following a series of interviews, Brunner offered Appellant
the position at $90,000 per year, plus benefits and a $4,000 relocation
allowance. In April 2012, Appellant accepted Brunner’s offer and gave her
Dallas-employer notice. However, five days later, Brunner rescinded its
offer, citing an unexpected change in its business. Appellant was able to
keep her job in Dallas.
In May 2012, the same recruiter again approached Appellant about
another opening at Brunner, this time as an account director. This position
offered the same salary and benefits as the previous one offered her.
During her interview, Brunner executives disclosed that the position was
available because the incumbent was taking maternity leave. However,
Brunner assured Appellant that she would be assigned another, permanent
position when the incumbent returned from leave. Brunner also promised
Appellant that she would receive extensive training and work closely under a
supervisor as she learned her new job responsibilities. Following her
interview, Brunner increased the relocation allowance to $9,000.
In June 2012, Appellant accepted Brunner’s offer of employment, and
her family relocated from Dallas to Pittsburgh. However, Appellant received
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little training and little guidance from her supervisor. Her only assistance
came from an inexperienced subordinate. Following two mishaps - the first
involving an unsuccessful conference call with a client, the second an email
exchange with another client provider – Brunner executives were critical of
Appellant’s work performance. Shortly thereafter in September 2012, and
only four days before the previous incumbent returned from maternity leave,
Brunner fired Appellant.
In August 2014, Appellant commenced this action by filing a complaint
asserting three counts: (1) breach of implied contract, (2) breach of express
contract, and (3) fraudulent inducement. According to Appellant, she left a
secure job, relocated her family, and assumed a 30-year home mortgage –
and this additional consideration entitled her to employment with Brunner
for a reasonable period. See Complaint at 9-10. Moreover, according to
Appellant, Brunner breached an express promise to provide her with proper
training, an experienced supervisor, and a comparable, permanent position.
Id. at 10. Finally, based upon these express promises, Appellant asserted
that Brunner knowingly and falsely induced Appellant to accept its offer of
employment. Id. at 11.
Brunner filed an answer and new matter to which it attached two
documents executed by Appellant: (1) an Application for Employment and
(2) a Confirmation of Employment. See Answer and New Matter, Exhibits A
(“Application for Employment,” 04/02/2012) and B (“Confirmation of
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Employment,” 06/06/2012) (collectively, “pre-hire documents”). Also
attached was an introductory statement purported to be from Brunner’s
employee handbook. See Answer and New Matter, Exhibit C (“I.
Introductory Statement”).
The application was completed by Appellant when she applied for the
digital account director position with Brunner in April 2012. It included the
following statements, acknowledged and accepted by Appellant:
I understand that this application remains current for only 30
days. At the conclusion of that time, if I have not heard from
the employer and still wish to be considered for employment, it
will be necessary for me to reapply and fill out a new application.
If I am hired, I understand that I am free to resign at any time,
with or without cause and with or without prior notice, and the
employer reserves the same right to terminate my employment
at any time, with or without cause and with or without prior
notice, except as may be required by law. This application does
not constitute an agreement or contract for employment for any
specified period or definite duration. I understand that no
supervisor or representative of the employer is authorized to
make any assurances to the contrary and that no implied oral or
written agreements contrary to the foregoing express language
are valid unless they are in writing and signed by the employer’s
president.
Answer and New Matter, Exhibit A, at 2 (thereafter signed and dated by
Appellant).
The confirmation, completed by Appellant just prior to commencing
employment with Brunner as an account director, set forth the following, in
relevant part:
This confirmation is intended to convey, for our mutual
understanding, your title, salary, start date and benefits with M.
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J. Brunner, Inc. This is not a contractual agreement between
you and M. J. Brunner, Inc. and we want to point out your
employment with M. J. Brunner is on an at-will basis. No M. J.
Brunner, Inc. representative has the authority to make any
contrary agreement.
Answer and New Matter, Exhibit B, at 1 (also providing details of Appellant’s
employment; thereafter signed and dated by Appellant). Appellant
acknowledged her execution of the confirmation. See Answer to New Matter
at ¶ 109.
Sometime in late 2014, Brunner filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings.2 Referencing and attaching the pre-hire documents to its motion,
Brunner asserted that Appellant’s employment was at-will, that she could
not establish her claims, and that her complaint should be dismissed.
Following argument in February 2015, the trial court granted Brunner’s
motion and dismissed Appellant’s complaint with prejudice. Appellant timely
appealed and filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial
court issued a responsive opinion, concluding that the pre-hire documents
introduced by Brunner established explicitly that Appellant’s employment
was at-will. See Trial Court Opinion, 04/28/2015, at 3. The court further
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2
Brunner’s motion is not included in the certified record, nor does it appear
in the trial court’s docket. Nevertheless, Appellant responded to Brunner’s
motion. See Response, 12/24/2014. The docket reflects that the trial court
scheduled argument on Brunner’s motion for February 17, 2015. Moreover,
Brunner filed a brief in response to Appellant’s opposition to the motion.
See Brief, 02/10/2015.
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opined that Appellant could not establish that Brunner knowingly or
recklessly made false representations that induced Appellant to accept
employment. See id. at 3-4.
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
1. [Whether] [Appellant] allege[d] sufficient facts to enable a
reasonable jury to find that she provided her employer with
additional consideration sufficient to rebut the presumption of
employment at-will[;]
2. [Whether] [Appellant] allege[d] that she and [Brunner]
entered into a specific agreement for employment at-will[;]
3. [Whether] [Appellant] allege[d] sufficient facts to enable a
reasonable jury to find that [Brunner] breached the employment
contract by failing to provide her: (1) with extensive training in
her new position; (2) the assistance of an experienced
supervisor; and (3) to find her a new position when the
incumbent returned from leave[; and]
4. [Whether] [Appellant] allege[d] sufficient facts to enable a
reasonable jury to find that [Brunner] fraudulently induced her
to accept employment[.]
Appellant’s Brief at 2.
Essentially, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it granted
Brunner judgment on the pleadings and dismissed her complaint with
prejudice. In so doing, she renews arguments raised below. According to
Appellant, the pre-hire documents do not establish that she agreed to at-will
employment with Brunner. Regarding the application, Appellant notes that it
was completed when she applied for a different position with Brunner and
asserts that it is irrelevant to the position she eventually secured with
Brunner. See Appellant’s Brief at 10, 14-15. As for the confirmation,
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Appellant suggests that language contained therein negates any
contractually binding significance of the document. See Appellant’s Brief at
10, 15-16. Thus, according to Appellant, by their plain terms, these
documents do not impact her case. See Appellant’s Brief at 10, 16.
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1034 governs motions for
judgment on the pleadings and provides that “[a]fter the relevant pleadings
are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay the trial, any
party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Pa.R.C.P. 1034(a). We
review a trial court’s decision to grant judgment on the pleadings in the
following manner:
Appellate review of an order granting a motion for judgment on
the pleadings is plenary. The appellate court will apply the same
standard employed by the trial court. A trial court must confine
its consideration to the pleadings and relevant documents. The
court must accept as true all well pleaded statements of fact,
admissions, and any documents properly attached to the
pleadings presented by the party against whom the motion is
filed, considering only those facts which were specifically
admitted.
We will affirm the grant of such a motion only when the moving
party's right to succeed is certain and the case is so free from
doubt that the trial would clearly be a fruitless exercise. In other
words, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is similar to a
demurrer. It may be entered when there are no disputed issues
of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Ferretti, 935 A.2d 565, 570 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(internal citations omitted; formatting and punctuation modified). Further, it
is well settled that if the court’s decision is correct, we may affirm on any
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ground. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Domtar Paper Co., 77 A.3d
1282, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2013).
In Pennsylvania, employment is presumed to be at-will, unless there is
an agreement otherwise. Cashdollar v. Mercy Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 595
A.2d 70, 72 (Pa. Super. 1991). Thus, “an employment relationship … may
be terminated by either party at any time, for any reason or for no reason.”
Id. A plaintiff may overcome the presumption if she can demonstrate
additional consideration beyond the services for which she was hired. Id.However, where the plaintiff has clearly acknowledged the at-will nature of
her employment, the presumption must prevail. See, e.g., Walden v.
Saint Gobain Corp., 323 F.Supp.2d 637, 646-47 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (applying
Pennsylvania law).
Here, Appellant pleaded additional consideration potentially sufficient
to overcome the presumption that her Brunner employment was at-will. For
example, Appellant pleaded that she left a stable job and home in Dallas,
uprooted her family and moved to Pittsburgh, thereafter purchasing a home
financed by a 30-year mortgage. See Cashdollar, 595 A.2d at 73-74(affirming the trial court’s denial of judgment notwithstanding the verdict
where a jury concluded that similar evidence was sufficient to overcome the
presumption of at-will employment).
In its motion for judgment on the pleadings, Brunner presented the
two, pre-hire documents suggesting that Appellant acknowledged expressly
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that her new employment was at-will. The trial court deemed these
documents dispositive, concluding as follows:
The documents executed by the parties govern[]. Those
documents explicitly reflect an at-will employment relationship.
[Appellant’s] attempt to circumvent these documents must fail.
Trial Court Opinion at 3.
We agree with the trial court’s conclusion. However, mindful of the
appropriate standards that govern review of a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, we are constrained to distinguish between the pre-hire
documents. In our view, the trial court could not properly consider the
application as indicative of Appellant’s at-will employment. As pleaded by
Appellant in her response to Brunner’s new matter, the application was
completed when she applied for a different position with Brunner and was
unrelated to the position eventually secured. See Answer to New Matter,
11/05/2014, at ¶¶ 106-08. The trial court was obligated to view these
pleadings, as well as the document itself, against Brunner and in the light
most favorable to Appellant. See Wachovia Bank, N.A., 935 A.2d at 570.
Appellant continues to maintain that this document is unrelated to the job
she eventually secured with Brunner, and we agree. Moreover, not only
does it relate to a different job opportunity, but also by its terms the
document remained valid for only 30 days. See Answer and New Matter,
Exhibit A, at 2. Appellant signed the application document on April 2, 2012.
The recruiter approached Appellant about a second employment opportunity
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at Brunner on May 14, 2012. See Complaint at ¶ 26. Thus, the application
was no longer valid. For these reasons, the application does not clearly
establish the at-will nature of Appellant’s employment and cannot support
Brunner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Nevertheless, the confirmation, signed by Appellant just prior to
commencing her Brunner employment, is clear and dispositive. It provides
specifically that her employment was at-will. See Answer and New Matter,
Exhibit B, at 1. By signing this document, Appellant was properly notified
and acknowledged the nature of her employment. In our view, this
acknowledgment defeats Appellant’s “additional consideration” claim as a
matter of law.
In an effort to avoid this conclusion, Appellant suggests that other
language included in the confirmation negates any adverse impact on her
claim. See Appellant’s Brief at 15-16 (suggesting that the statement, “This
is not a contractual agreement …,” renders her acknowledgment
ambiguous). We discern no ambiguity. Appellant’s position is hyper-
technical and does nothing to undermine the clear acknowledgment that her
employment was at-will.
The notice and acknowledgment of Appellant’s at-will status effectively
eliminates each of her claims, and we need not address in detail Appellant’s
arguments to the contrary. Appellant’s claim for breach of implied contract
relies upon her theory of additional consideration. However, the
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confirmation of at-will employment signed by Appellant precludes this claim.
See, e.g., Walden, 323 F.Supp.2d at 646-47. Appellant’s claim for breach
of express contract relies upon alleged promises that Brunner would provide
her with proper training, an experienced supervisor, and a comparable,
permanent position. However, this claim too is defeated by Appellant’s
confirmation of employment, which in addition to stating the at-will nature of
employment, provided additional express terms, including a statement of
salary and benefits, and clear notice that “[n]o [Brunner] representative has
the authority to make any contrary agreement.” Answer and New Matter,
Exhibit B, at 1; see also, e.g., Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications,
Inc., 559 A.2d 917, 918 (Pa. 1989) (“[A]s a general rule, there is no
common law cause of action against an employer for termination of an at-
will employment relationship.”). Finally, notice and acknowledgment of
these terms – specifically disclaiming any terms or promises to the contrary
- precludes Appellant from stating a claim for fraud, which would require her
to establish justifiable reliance upon the aforementioned alleged promises.
See, e.g., Martin v. Hale Prods., Inc., 699 A.2d 1283, 1288 (Pa. Super.
1997).3 For these reasons, Appellant is entitled to no relief.
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3
We observe that the trial court determined that Appellant’s fraud claim
must fail because she could not establish that Brunner knowingly or
recklessly made false representations to Appellant. Trial Court Opinion at 3.
This was erroneous in light of the procedural posture of this case. Appellant
pleaded that Brunner promised to provide her with proper training, an
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/19/2016
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
experienced supervisor, and a comparable, permanent position, and that
Brunner made these representations knowing they were false. See
Complaint at ¶¶ 91-92. This error, however, does not entitle Appellant to
relief. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 77 A.3d at 1286.
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