In the Int. of: A.A., a Minor Appeal of: A.A.

J-A18004-16
2016 Pa. Super. 225
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.A., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: A.A.
No. 1931 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered September 28, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-22-JV-0000144-2015
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 18, 2016
Appellant, A.A. (a minor), appeals from the dispositional order entered
following her adjudication of delinquency on charges of driving under the
influence (DUI), possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and a traffic violation (disregarding traffic lanes). On appeal,
Appellant solely challenges the juvenile court’s denial of her motion to
suppress evidence. After careful review, we affirm.
The juvenile court summarized the facts and procedural history of
Appellant’s case, as follows:
On January 9, 2015, Sergeant Christopher Still (hereinafter
“Sergeant Still”) of the Halifax Area Regional Police Department
was on routine traffic patrol in the area of Market and North
Second Streets. Sergeant Still observed a black sedan
straddling the center yellow lines and decided to follow the
vehicle. While following the vehicle, he conducted a check on
the registration and found that it was expired. Sergeant Still
then conducted a traffic stop on the vehicle based on the expired
registration.
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Sergeant Still testified that at the time of the traffic stop,
he identified the driver as Appellant, and a passenger … as Kyle
Lewis (hereinafter “Mr. Lewis”).1 When Sergeant Still requested
the vehicle information, he observed Appellant to be confused
and her movements to be sluggish. Appellant provided Sergeant
Still with a driver’s license and an expired registration card, but
failed to provide proof of financial responsibility. While
completing a citation for the expired registration and a warning
for the failure to provide proof of financial responsibility,
Sergeant Still observed Mr. Lewis making furtive movements
around the passenger area. He also observed Mr. Lewis briefly
open the passenger door and re-close it. Sergeant Still returned
to the vehicle and issued Appellant the citation and warning. At
that time, Sergeant Still testified that he smelled an odor of
marijuana coming from the interior of the vehicle. After
returning Appellant’s documents, Sergeant Still bid Appellant
goodnight and broke contact.
Sergeant Still subsequently re-engaged Appellant and
began to ask if there was anything illegal in the car that he
should know about. Appellant cut him off and said “no” and then
asked if Sergeant Still wanted to search the vehicle. Sergeant
Still responded that he would like to search the vehicle. He
testified that Mr. Lewis then voluntarily stated that there was a
marijuana pipe in the car and that the two of them had smoked
marijuana prior to driving.
At this point, Sergeant Still had Appellant step out of the
vehicle. Upon [her] exiting, Sergeant Still observed a light green
pill lying on the driver’s seat. Appellant was directed to wait
near the rear of the vehicle until back-up arrived. Mr. Lewis was
then asked to step out of the vehicle. In conducting a pat-down
for officer safety, Sergeant Still discovered a BB gun in Mr.
Lewis’ waistband. Mr. Lewis was subsequently handcuffed and
the BB gun [was] removed.
Once Appellant and Mr. Lewis were out of the vehicle,
Sergeant Still conducted a search of the vehicle. He recovered a
small pill bottle in the center of the door on the passenger side
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1
Sergeant Still testified that Appellant’s driver’s license informed him that
she was 17 years old at the time of the traffic stop. N.T. Suppression
Hearing, 8/6/15, at 21.
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that contained some marijuana residue, the pill from the driver’s
seat, and a marijuana pipe in a leopard-print case in Appellant’s
handbag. When asked what the pill was, Appellant responded
that it was Klonopin, and admitted to taking at least one that
night as well. Mr. Lewis claimed that the pill bottle was his.
Following the search of the vehicle, Sergeant Still
administered two tasks of the field sobriety test on Appellant,
the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus and the one-legged stand.
Appellant failed the one-legged stand, and provided six clues to
impairment through the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test.
Appellant was subsequently placed under arrest. While at the
Dauphin County Booking Center, a blood test was administered
on Appellant.
…
On April 29, 2015, a delinquency petition was filed alleging
that [Appellant] committed the delinquent acts of DUI - Impaired
Ability1, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance2,
Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia3, Disregard of Traffic
Lanes4, and Driving Unregistered Vehicle5. [Appellant] filed an
Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion to Suppress Evidence on July 20,
2015. A suppression hearing was held before this [c]ourt on
August 6, 2015. At the conclusion of the hearing, the [c]ourt
directed the parties to file briefs in support of their position
within two (2) weeks. On August 24, 2015, this [c]ourt issued
an Order denying [Appellant’s] Motion to Suppress.
1
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(2).
2
35 [P.S.] § 780-113(a)(16).
3
35 [P.S.] § 780-113(a)(32).
4
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309(1).
5
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1301(a).
An Adjudication and Disposition Hearing was held on
September 28, 2015. At the conclusion of the adjudication
hearing, the [c]ourt found that Count 1 (DUI - Impaired Ability),
Count 2 (Possession of a Controlled Substance), Count 3
(Possession of Drug Paraphernalia), and Count 4 (Disregard
Traffic Lanes) were substantiated. Count 4 (Driving
Unregistered Vehicle) was changed to DUI - Controlled
Substance or Metabolite6. [Appellant] was adjudicated
delinquent and found in need of treatment, supervision, or
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rehabilitation. She was placed on probation and her driver’s
license was suspended for one (1) year.
6
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(d)(1).
[Appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal of the Order of
September 28, 2015 adjudicating [her] delinquent…. On
October 29, 2015, this [c]ourt directed [Appellant] to file a
[Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)] Concise Statement of [Errors] Complained of
on Appeal….
Juvenile Court Opinion (JCO), 12/29/15, at 1-4 (unnumbered).
Appellant timely complied with the court’s order to file a Rule 1925(b)
statement, and the court subsequently issued a responsive opinion. Herein,
Appellant presents one question for our review:
Whether the [juvenile] court erred in failing to suppress evidence
obtained as the result of an illegal detention unsupported by
probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or any articulable basis in
violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, and Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution?
Appellant’s Brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization and emphasis omitted).
We begin by noting our standard of review:
When reviewing the propriety of a suppression order, an
appellate court is required to determine whether the record
supports the suppression court's factual findings and whether
the inferences and legal conclusions drawn by the suppression
court from those findings are appropriate. Where the record
supports the factual findings of the suppression court, we are
bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal
conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. However, where the
appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on
allegations of legal error, the suppression court's conclusions of
law are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to
determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to
the facts.
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Commonwealth v. Kemp, 961 A.2d 1247, 1252–53 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en
banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Mistler, 912 A.2d 1265, 1269–70 (Pa.
2006)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
In this case, Appellant does not contest the validity of Sergeant Still’s
initial traffic stop of her vehicle. Rather, she presents two distinct claims
related to the sergeant’s questioning of her after he ‘broke contact’ and then
re-engaged her in questioning. First, Appellant argues that Sergeant Still
terminated the initial traffic stop, and that his re-initiating contact with her
amounted to a second investigative detention. Second, Appellant contends
that Sergeant Still lacked reasonable suspicion to justify that second
detention. We will address each of these claims in turn.
We begin by recognizing that the Commonwealth does not dispute that
Appellant was detained when Sergeant Still re-initiated contact with her.
See Commonwealth’s Brief at 9. The juvenile court also agrees that
Appellant was detained throughout her interaction with Sergeant Still,
including when she gave him consent to search her vehicle. See JCO at 6
(unnumbered).
We ascertain no legal error in the court’s conclusion that Appellant was
subjected to a second investigative detention. Sergeant Still testified at the
suppression hearing that he “issued [Appellant] [a] citation and briefly broke
contact with [her] by bidding her a good night.” N.T. Suppression Hearing
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at 7.2 Sergeant Still then “reengaged [her] in conversation and asked her …
if there was anything illegal in the car that [he] should know about.” Id.
Sergeant Still also testified that the lights on his police cruiser were
activated throughout the entirety of his interaction with Appellant. Id. at
21. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person in Appellant’s position
would not have believed that she was free to leave. Therefore, we conclude
that Appellant was subjected to a second investigative detention. See
Commonwealth v. Moyer, 954 A.2d 659, 665 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc)
(“[W]hen an individual has been subjected to a valid detention and the
police continue to engage that person in conversation, the citizen, having
been in an official detention, is less likely to understand that he has the right
to refuse to answer questions or a search.”) (emphasis omitted);
Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 116 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“[W]here
the purpose of an initial traffic stop has ended and a reasonable person
would not have believed that he was free to leave, the law characterizes a
subsequent round of questioning by the police as an investigative detention
or arrest.”).
We must next assess whether Sergeant Still possessed reasonable
suspicion to conduct that second detention of Appellant.
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2
The sergeant also stated at one point during the hearing that he told
Appellant “she was free to go[.]” N.T. Suppression Hearing at 22.
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A police officer may detain an individual in order to conduct an
investigation if that officer reasonably suspects that the
individual is engaging in criminal conduct. Commonwealth v.
Cook, 558 Pa. 50, 735 A.2d 673, 676 (1999). “This standard,
less stringent than probable cause, is commonly known as
reasonable suspicion.” Id. In order to determine whether the
police officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of the
circumstances must be considered. In re D.M., 566 Pa. 445,
781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (2001). In making this determination, we
must give “due weight ... to the specific reasonable inferences
[the police officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of
his experience.” Cook, 735 A.2d at 676 (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)). Also, the
totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an
examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal
conduct. Rather, “even a combination of innocent facts, when
taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police
officer.” Cook, 735 A.2d at 676.
Kemp, 961 A.2d at 1255 (quoting Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849 A.2d
1185, 1189 (Pa. 2004)).
Here, in contending that Sergeant Still lacked reasonable suspicion to
justify her second detention, Appellant relies on our decision in
Commonwealth v. Nguyen, 116 A.3d 657 (Pa. Super. 2015). In that
case, a three-judge panel of this Court stated that “[w]here the investigative
detention at issue follows a lawful traffic stop, the officer must demonstrate
cause for suspicion after the end of the initial stop, and independent of any
basis on which he conducted the prior stop.” Id. at 668 (quoting Jones,
874 A.2d at 117). Appellant avers that under this rule, Sergeant Still was
required to formulate new reasonable suspicion - based on facts and
circumstances wholly separate from anything that he observed during the
traffic stop - to justify her second detention. Because Sergeant Still did not
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articulate any new facts learned, or observations made, in the time-period
between when he terminated the traffic stop and when he re-engaged
Appellant, she maintains that he lacked reasonable suspicion to support the
second detention.
In response, the Commonwealth argues that our reasonable suspicion
assessment must include all of the facts and circumstances known to
Sergeant Still, including his observations made before he terminated the
traffic stop. In support of its position, the Commonwealth relies on this
Court’s en banc decision in Kemp. Briefly, in that case, a state trooper
stopped a vehicle driven by Kandice Kyles, and in which Kemp was a
passenger. Kemp, 961 A.2d at 1250. During the course of the stop, the
trooper made various observations that, based on his experience, led him to
suspect that Kemp and Kyles were trafficking narcotics.3 Id. at 1251. At
several points throughout the interaction, the trooper told Kyles and/or
Kemp that they were free to leave, but then re-initiated contact and
questioned them. Id. at 1251-52. Ultimately, after one such re-
engagement, Kemp gave the trooper consent to search the car, which
revealed a large quantity of marijuana in the trunk. Id. at 1252.
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3
For instance, the trooper observed that the vehicle contained numerous
“masking agents” like air fresheners; Kemp and Kyles exhibited “evasive”
behavior; and the trooper smelled an “odor of marijuana” emanating from
inside the car. Kemp, 961 A.2d at 1251.
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On appeal from the suppression court’s denial of Kemp’s motion to
suppress, this Court first concluded that Kemp had been subjected to an
investigative detention prior to providing consent to search the vehicle. Id.
at 1254. We then addressed Kemp’s argument “that once [the trooper] told
Kyles and [Kemp] that they were free to leave, any facts garnered during
the course of the valid vehicular stop could not be used to justify the
continued detention.” Id. at 1255. We began our assessment of this claim
by acknowledging that Kemp’s argument was supported by our prior
decisions in Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 786 A.2d 261 (Pa. Super. 2001), and
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 833 A.2d 755 (Pa. Super. 2003), a case
which applied Ortiz. The Kemp panel summarized that, under Ortiz and
Johnson, “the current law in Pennsylvania provides that once a police
officer informs a defendant that he is free to leave after completing a valid
traffic stop, any facts ascertained during that initial traffic stop are nullified
and may not be utilized to support a continued detention, even if the facts
discovered during the processing of the traffic stop support the existence of
reasonable suspicion that the defendant is engaging in illegal activity.”
Kemp, 961 A.2d at 1257.
However, the en banc Kemp panel went on to expressly overrule
Ortiz and Johnson, concluding that the rule applied in those cases was
“improper for two distinct reasons.” Id. at 1258. We explained:
First, it is simply analytically inconsistent for a defendant
to argue that “free-to-go” language does not step down the
police interdiction from a seizure to a mere encounter, but that if
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an officer does utter those words, all facts ascertained lawfully
by the police officer during the traffic stop are erased for
purposes of analyzing whether the continued detention was
permissible. If the seizure achieved through the traffic stop
never ended, and if thereby the defendant remained subject to a
continuing detention when the traffic infraction was processed,
then there is no reason why the facts observed by the officer
during the constitutionally-proper traffic stop cannot be used to
justify the continuation of the detention. If it is a continuing
detention for the defendant, despite the free-to-go language,
then by the same logic, it is a continuing detention for purposes
of the police investigation.
Additionally, we believe that the approach adopted by
Ortiz conflicts with appropriate constitutional analysis. “When
discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-
suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that they
must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to
see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and
objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States
v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S. Ct. 744, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740
(2002)…. A totality-of-the-circumstances approach allows the
court to consider all facts at the officer’s disposal and does not
require the court to disregard those adduced during a valid
interdiction, which is, in the present case, the traffic stop.
Indeed, routine constitutional analysis requires courts to utilize
facts gathered during each escalating phase of a police
investigation in determining whether police acted properly as the
interaction between police and citizen proceeded towards an
arrest.
Kemp, 961 A.2d at 1258-59 (some citations omitted).
We also noted in Kemp that “the Ortiz position has not been accepted
in the federal system.” Id. at 1260; see also id. at 1259-60 (discussing
three federal circuit court decisions that rejected the Ortiz rule).
Additionally, we stressed in Kemp that the Ortiz rule was not supported by
our Supreme Court’s reasoning in Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d
903 (Pa. 2000), the case on which Ortiz relied. The Kemp panel explained
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that “Freeman does not hold that facts garnered during a constitutionally-
proper traffic stop cannot be utilized in assessing whether reasonable
suspicion exists for a detention that continues after the reason for the traffic
stop has been resolved.” Kemp, 961 A.2d at 1257. Rather, we explained in
Kemp that,
[t]he Supreme Court in Freeman quite plainly stated that in
order to justify a continued detention beyond the initial valid
detention, which was the traffic stop, police needed reasonable
suspicion that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity
independent of that initial lawful detention. In other words, once
police process the traffic violation, they cannot rely upon the
traffic violation to prolong the detention; they need other
information supporting reasonable suspicion.
In Freeman, no facts were ascertained during the traffic
stop or thereafter to provide reasonable suspicion that the
defendant was involved in criminal activity. The Court did not
imply that anything discovered during the course of a traffic stop
could not be utilized to justify an ensuing investigatory
detention. Indeed, the Court actually analyzed what police were
told during the traffic stop, which would imply, contrary to the
holding in Ortiz, that those facts can be considered in
determining whether reasonable suspicion existed for an
investigatory detention initiated after a vehicular violation has
been processed.
Kemp, 961 A.2d at 1258 (emphasis in original).
For all of these reasons, the Kemp panel “overrule[d] Ortiz and
Johnson to the extent that they hold that facts gathered during a valid
traffic stop cannot be utilized to justify an investigatory detention occurring
after a police officer has indicated that a defendant is free to leave.” Id. at
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1260. Thus, Kemp explicitly precludes this Court from applying the type of
limited reasonable suspicion analysis that Appellant advocates. 4 Instead, in
situations where an officer ends a lawful traffic stop, but then re-initiates an
investigative detention of an occupant of that vehicle, we apply the ‘totality
of the circumstances’ test to assess whether the officer possessed
reasonable suspicion. See Kemp, 961 A.2d at 1260. Under that test, the
officer’s reasonable suspicion to conduct the subsequent detention may be
premised on facts gathered during the valid traffic stop, id. at 1258,
although the officer cannot solely rely “upon the initial traffic violation to
prolong the detention; they need other information supporting reasonable
suspicion.” Id. at 1260 (clarifying our Supreme Court’s holding in
Freeman).
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4
To the extent that the case on which Appellant relies, Nguyen, can be
interpreted as applying the type of limited reasonable suspicion assessment
struck down in Kemp, we are clearly bound to follow the en banc decision in
Kemp, rather than the three-judge panel decision in Nguyen. We also note
that the Nguyen panel did not distinguish Kemp, or cite any decision by the
United States Supreme Court, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or an en
banc panel of this Court that could be interpreted as overruling or abrogating
Kemp. Rather, the only decision relied upon by the Nguyen panel was this
Court’s three-judge panel decision in Jones. See Nguyen, 116 A.3d at 668
(quoting Jones, 874 A.2d at 117). However, Jones was decided prior to
Kemp, and also applied an interpretation of Freeman that was expressly
renounced by the Kemp panel. Accordingly, Appellant’s reliance on Nguyen
is misplaced and we are bound to follow Kemp.
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Applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test in the present case, we
conclude that Sergeant Still possessed reasonable suspicion to conduct the
second detention of Appellant. Aside from the traffic violations that
compelled Sergeant Still to conduct the traffic stop, the sergeant observed,
during the course of the stop, that Appellant appeared “confused and her
movements were sluggish.” N.T. Suppression Hearing at 5. When Sergeant
Still returned to his vehicle to process the paperwork supplied by Appellant,
he “noticed that the passenger, Mr. Lewis, was making furtive movements
around the passenger area compartment of the vehicle and [Mr. Lewis] also
had opened up the passenger door briefly and re-closed it.” Id. at 6. When
the sergeant returned to the driver’s side window of Appellant’s car, he
“smelled an odor of marijuana coming from the interior of the vehicle.” Id.
at 7. Upon smelling the marijuana, Sergeant Still suspected that Appellant
and Mr. Lewis may have been “smoking marijuana in the vehicle and
driving[,]” which constituted the criminal offense of “impairment behind the
wheel” or, in other words, DUI. Id. at 14. Based on these facts, it was
reasonable for Sergeant Still to suspect that Appellant was engaged in
criminal activity.5 Therefore, Appellant’s detention was legal.6
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5
Appellant does not argue that these facts failed to provide Sergeant Still
with reasonable suspicion; rather, she only contends that Nguyen limits the
facts we may consider in assessing whether reasonable suspicion existed.
6
Appellant does not challenge the voluntariness of her consent to search her
vehicle, other than to claim that her consent was given during an illegal
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Dispositional order affirmed.
President Judge Emeritus Ford Elliott joins this opinion.
President Judge Emeritus Stevens files a concurring opinion.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/18/2016
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
detention. Because that claim is meritless, we need not assess the validity
of her consent to search.
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