Commonwealth v. Olds

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2018 PA Super 197COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RICKY L. OLDS :
:
Appellant : No. 1772 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 21, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0006857-1979,
CP-02-CR-0007090-1979
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON and KUNSELMAN, JJ.
OPINION BY OLSON, J.: FILED JULY 3, 2018
In 1980, Appellant, Ricky L. Olds, was convicted of second-degree
murder and subsequently sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”). During the incident in question,
Appellant’s co-conspirator shot and fatally wounded a patron while robbing a
tobacco store. At that time, Appellant was 14 years old. After the Supreme
Court of the United States’ decisions in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460(2012)1 and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016),2 Appellant
1 In Miller, the Supreme Court of the United States held that sentencing
juvenile homicide offenders capable of rehabilitation to LWOP violates the
Eighth Amendment.
2In Montgomery, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the rule
announced in Miller applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.
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received a new sentencing hearing. At the new sentencing hearing on
November 21, 2016, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 20 years to life
imprisonment. Appellant appeals from that judgment of sentence arguing that
the maximum term of life imprisonment imposed upon a juvenile convicted of
second-degree murder violates the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution3 as interpreted by Miller and Montgomery.
We hold that a mandatory life maximum for a juvenile convicted of
second-degree murder is not cruel and unusual punishment. In so doing, we
explain why this Court’s interpretation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(b) in
Commonwealth v. Seskey, 170 A.3d 1105 (Pa. Super. 2017) was legally
correct and why it does not foreclose Appellant’s constitutional challenge.
Accordingly, we affirm.
The factual background of this case is as follows. In the early morning
hours of October 9, 1979, Appellant (who was 14 years old), Claude Bonner
(“Bonner”) (who was 18 years old), and Tommy Allen (“Allen”) (who was 16
years old) were driving around Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Allen suggested
3 “The Eighth Amendment [of the United States] Constitution[ is] applicable
to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment[.]” Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (Roberts, C.J., opinion
announcing the judgment of the court) (citation omitted). Although Appellant
does not raise a claim under Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, we note that “[t]he Pennsylvania prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment is coextensive with the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Bonner,
135 A.3d 592, 597 n.18 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, 145 A.3d 161 (Pa.
2016) (citation omitted).
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robbing Fort Wayne Cigar Store and Appellant agreed with this plan. When
they entered the store, Allen and Appellant witnessed Thomas Bietler
(“Bietler”) make a purchase and noticed that he possessed a significant
amount of United States currency. Allen followed Bietler from the store and
shot him three times. Bietler died as a result of the attack. Bonner, Allen,
and Appellant then fled the scene.
The procedural history of this case is as follows. On April 2, 1980,
Appellant was convicted of second-degree murder,4 robbery,5 and criminal
conspiracy.6 On April 28, 1981, the trial court reluctantly sentenced Appellant
to the then-mandatory term of LWOP for the second-degree murder
conviction.7 On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of
sentence. Commonwealth v. Olds, 469 A.2d 1072 (Pa. Super. 1983).
On August 24, 1984, Appellant filed a pro se petition pursuant to the
Post-Conviction Hearing Act (“PCHA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq. (West
1984).8 Counsel was appointed and filed an amended petition. On March 9,
1990, the PCHA court denied the petition. This Court vacated that decision
4 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(b) (West 1980).
5 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(i) (West 1980).
6 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903 (West 1980).
7 The trial court believed a LWOP sentence was unjust; however, it was
required to impose that sentence.
8 The PCHA was the predecessor to the Post-Conviction Relief Act.
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and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Commonwealth v. Olds, 589
A.2d 1176 (Pa. Super. 1991) (unpublished memorandum). Our Supreme
Court reversed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing and the dismissal of Appellant’s PCHA petition should be reinstated.
Commonwealth v. Olds, 606 A.2d 898 (Pa. 1992) (per curiam).
On July 13, 2010, Appellant filed a pro se petition pursuant to the Post-
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. On October 15,
2015, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. This Court affirmed and our
Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Olds, 32
A.3d 845 (Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 34
A.3d 828 (Pa. 2011). On August 20, 2012, Appellant filed a second pro se
PCRA petition. In it, Appellant alleged that his LWOP sentence was
unconstitutional in light of Miller. Counsel was appointed. However, after
our Supreme Court held that Miller did not apply retroactively,
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 9–11 (Pa. 2013), the PCRA
court dismissed the petition. This Court affirmed the denial of relief.
Commonwealth v. Olds, 134 A.3d 108, 2015 WL 6509158 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(unpublished memorandum). While Appellant’s petition for allowance of
appeal was pending, the Supreme Court of the United States issued
Montgomery. Therefore, our Supreme Court granted allowance of appeal
and vacated this Court’s order affirming the dismissal of Appellant’s petition.
Commonwealth v. Olds, 133 A.3d 3 (Pa. 2016) (per curiam). Subsequently,
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this Court reversed the PCRA court’s order dismissing Appellant’s petition and
remanded for resentencing. Commonwealth v. Olds, 145 A.3d 778, 2016
WL 1436935 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum).
On remand, the trial court resentenced Appellant to 20 years to life
imprisonment with credit for over 37 years of time served.9 Appellant did not
file a post-sentence motion. This timely appeal followed.10
Appellant presents one issue for our review:
Did the [trial] court err [in] holding that it was required to impose
a life maximum on an individual who did not kill or intend to kill?
Appellant’s Brief at 2.
Appellant’s lone appellate issue challenges the legality of his sentence.11
Challenges to the legality of a sentence present pure questions of law;
therefore, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
9 This made Appellant immediately eligible for parole and he has since been
granted parole.
10 On December 16, 2016, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal (“concise statement”). See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On January 4, 2017, Appellant filed his concise statement.
On April 19, 2017, the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Appellant’s
lone appellate issue was included in his submission.
11 Although Appellant included in his brief a statement of reasons for
permitting an appeal of the discretionary aspects of his sentence pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 2119(f), he did not challenge the
discretionary aspects of his sentence in a post-sentence motion or at the
sentencing hearing. Accordingly, any challenge to the discretionary aspects
of his sentence is waived. See Commonwealth v. Machicote, 172 A.3d
595, 602 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
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plenary. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 174 A.3d 1130, 1147 (Pa. Super.
2017) (citation omitted).
Appellant cites two reasons to support his claim that the trial court was
not required to impose life imprisonment as a maximum sentence. First, he
contends that the governing statutes do not mandate a maximum sentence of
life imprisonment because, in light of Miller, no valid sentencing scheme
exists for juveniles convicted of second-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012.
Second, he contends that, to the extent the statutes require such a sentence,
they are unconstitutional when applied to juveniles who did not kill or intend
to kill.12 The Commonwealth argues that the disposition of both of these
claims is controlled by Seskey.
We first address Appellant’s argument that the trial court was not
statutorily required to sentence him to a maximum term of life imprisonment.
We agree with the Commonwealth that our decision in Seskey controls this
question because it is almost on all fours with the present case. In Seskey,
12 Appellant’s conviction involved second-degree murder. In such cases,
intent to kill is inferred from the commission of a felony. Commonwealth v.
DeHart, 516 A.2d 656, 669 (Pa. 1986) (citation omitted). Appellant offers
no argument to alter the legal consequences, such as inferred intent to kill,
that flow from a second-degree murder conviction. Instead, Appellant
appears to argue, strictly for sentencing purposes, that intent to kill may not
be inferred for juveniles because they have diminished capacity to appreciate
outcomes. Appellant does not explain how or why when fixing a sentence trial
courts can set aside the legal consequences that flow from a second-degree
murder conviction. Thus, his assertion that he did not intend to kill seems
questionable, at best.
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the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012,
i.e., prior to the effective date of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1 (which sets forth the
mandatory minimum and maximum sentences for juveniles convicted of first
and second-degree murder). After Montgomery, Seskey was resentenced to
13 to 26 years’ imprisonment. The Commonwealth appealed and this Court
vacated the judgment of sentence and remanded for imposition of a sentence
which included a maximum term of life imprisonment. In so doing, this Court
held “that our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Batts,
163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (‘Batts II’) requires that an individual convicted of
first or second-degree murder for a crime committed as a minor be sentenced
to a maximum term of life imprisonment.” Seskey, 170 A.3d at 1105-1106
(footnote omitted).
In his brief, Appellant argues that this holding was too broad and that
the language regarding second-degree murder was dicta. In Seskey, this
Court quoted Batts II as follows:
For those defendants [convicted of first or second-degree murder
prior to June 25, 2012] for whom the sentencing court determines
a [LWOP] sentence is inappropriate, it is our determination here
that they are subject to a mandatory maximum sentence of life
imprisonment as required by section 1102(a), accompanied by a
minimum sentence determined by the common pleas court upon
resentencing[.]
Seskey, 170 A.3d at 1108 (internal alterations in original), quoting Batts II,
163 A.3d at 421.
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Appellant notes that Batts II was a case in which the defendant
received a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for first-degree murder.
Our Supreme Court, in Batts II, did not confront a situation in which a
juvenile had been convicted of second-degree murder. Thus, according to
Appellant, Batts II should not extend to juveniles convicted of second-degree
murder and Seskey’s statement incorrectly implies that it did. Appellant
therefore contends that the above quoted passage was not an accurate
representation of our Supreme Court’s Batts II decision.
We conclude that Seskey’s holding is a correct statement of the law
with respect to juveniles convicted of second-degree murder prior to June 25,
2012. To understand why, a brief review of sections 110213 and 1102.114 is
13Section 1102 mandates that any individual convicted of first-degree murder
prior to June 25, 2012 be sentenced to death or life imprisonment and any
individual convicted of second-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012 be
sentenced to life imprisonment. It further mandates that, after June 24, 2012,
any person 18 years of age or older convicted of first-degree murder be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment and any person 18 years of age or
older convicted of second-degree murder be sentenced to life imprisonment.
See 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 1102(a) and (b).
14 As this Court explained in Seskey:
Section 1102.1 provides that an individual between the ages of 15
and 17 years old convicted of first-degree murder after June 24,
2012 must be sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment.
The minimum term of imprisonment for such an offender can be
set anywhere from 35 years to life, i.e., LWOP. Section 1102.1
further provides that an individual under 15 years old convicted of
first-degree murder after June 24, 2012 must be sentenced to a
maximum term of life imprisonment. The minimum term of
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necessary. On June 24, 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States issued
Miller. Thereafter, our General Assembly enacted section 1102.1 and made
it retroactive for juveniles convicted of first or second-degree murder after
June 24, 2012. Moreover, our General Assembly amended section 1102 to
clarify that it does not apply to juveniles convicted of first or second-degree
murder after June 24, 2012. Section 1102, therefore, applies to adults
convicted of first or second-degree murder and juveniles convicted of first or
second-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012. Section 1102.1 applies to
juveniles convicted of first or second-degree murder after June 24, 2012.
Hence, sections 1102 and 1102.1 must be read in pari materia. See
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 169 A.3d 1092, 1102 (Pa. Super. 2017),
citing 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1932.
Although Batts II was a case governed by section 1102(a) (which
mandates a defendant convicted of first-degree murder be sentenced to life
imprisonment for such an offender can be set anywhere from 25
years to life, i.e., LWOP.
Section 1102.1 provides that an individual between the ages of 15
and 17 years old convicted of second-degree murder after June
24, 2012 must be sentenced to a maximum term of life
imprisonment. The minimum term of imprisonment for such an
offender [must be at least 30 years]. Section 1102.1 further
provides that an individual under 15 years old convicted of
second-degree murder after June 24, 2012 must be sentenced to
a maximum term of life imprisonment. The minimum term of
imprisonment for such an offender [must be at least 20 years].
Seskey, 170 A.3d at 1108 (internal citations omitted).
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imprisonment), the same statutory construction principles apply to section
1102(b) (which mandates a defendant convicted of second-degree murder be
sentenced to life imprisonment). First, the text of the two sections is almost
identical. Section 1102(a) provides that “a person who has been convicted of
a murder of the first degree or of murder of a law enforcement officer of the
first degree shall be sentenced to death or to a term of life imprisonment[.]”
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(a)(1). Section 1102(b) similarly provides that “a person
who has been convicted of murder of the second degree . . . or of second
degree murder of a law enforcement officer shall be sentenced to a term of
life imprisonment.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102(b). “Absent contrary indication,
words that have a clear meaning in one place are interpreted the same
throughout a statutory section.” Frank Burns, Inc. v. Interdigital
Commc’ns Corp., 704 A.2d 678, 681 (Pa. Super. 1997), appeal denied, 724
A.2d 935 (Pa. 1998) (citation omitted). In Batts II, our Supreme Court held
that the words in section 1102(a) have a clear meaning, i.e., a person
convicted of first-degree murder must be sentenced to a mandatory minimum
of life imprisonment. Because there is no indication that the words in
subsection (b) have a contrary meaning, section 1102(b) must be interpreted
to require a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for juveniles convicted
of second-degree murder.
Other tools of statutory interpretation produce the same result.
Subsequent to Miller, our General Assembly enacted 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1
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which governs the sentencing of juveniles convicted of first or second-degree
murder after June 24, 2012. In determining whether section 1102(a)
mandated a life maximum in Batts II, our Supreme Court found persuasive
the fact that section 1102.1(a) maintains a mandatory life maximum for
juveniles convicted of first-degree murder. See Batts II, 163 A.3d at 442-
443. Similarly, section 1102.1(c) maintains a mandatory life maximum for
juveniles convicted of second-degree murder. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(c).15
Section 1102.1(c) merely sets the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment
for juveniles convicted of second-degree murder lower than that for those
convicted of first-degree murder. Compare 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a) with 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(c). Hence, the General Assembly’s enactment of section
1102.1(c) also indicates that juveniles convicted of second-degree murder
must be sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment.
Throughout Batts II, our Supreme Court emphasized that section
1102(a) is constitutionally sound. Our Supreme Court held that it is the
interaction of section 1102(a) with 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6137(a)(3) (which bars
parole for individuals sentenced to life imprisonment) that causes
constitutional problems when applied to juvenile offenders. See Batts II,
163 A.3d at 439-441. Thus, our Supreme Court held that the appropriate
remedy is to exempt juveniles convicted of first-degree murder prior to June
15Section 1102.1(c) does not differentiate between those juveniles who killed
or intended to kill and those that were convicted under accomplice or co-
conspirator liability theories.
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25, 2012 from the mandates of section 6137(a)(3). See id. at 439. In other
words, the mandatory imposition of LWOP upon juveniles was deemed
unconstitutional. Batts II, however, kept in place the requirements of section
1102(a), i.e., that juveniles convicted of first-degree murder must be
sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment. See id. at 439-441.
Seskey implicitly held that there was no reason to follow a different
approach when assessing the constitutionality of section 1102(b). As our
Supreme Court did in Batts II with respect to section 1102(a), we hold that
it is not the term of life imprisonment that makes applying section 1102(b) to
juvenile offenders unconstitutional. Instead, it is the mandatory nature of
that punishment when section 6137(a)(3) (which prohibits parole) is applied
that raises constitutional concerns. Thus, section 6137(a)(3) cannot be
applied to juveniles convicted of second-degree murder prior to June 25,
2012. In other words, such juveniles must be sentenced to a maximum period
of life imprisonment; however, they are eligible for parole after a term-of-
years specified by the trial court.
Having set forth the correct statutory construction of section 1102(b),
we turn to Appellant’s argument that, with this construction, section 1102(b)
is unconstitutional when applied to juvenile offenders who did not kill or intend
to kill. Seskey did not address this constitutional challenge and, therefore,
we are not bound by Seskey when determining if section 1102(b) violates the
Eighth Amendment as interpreted by Miller. Thus, we next analyze whether
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application of section 1102(b), by itself and without resort to section
6137(a)(3), to juveniles convicted of second-degree murder prior to June 25,
2012, and who did not kill or intend to kill, constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.
Appellant’s argument is primarily based on Justice Breyer’s concurring
opinion in Miller. The Supreme Court of the United States’ opinion in Miller
not only disposed of Miller’s appeal but also disposed of Kuntrell Jackson’s
(“Jackson’s”) challenge to a LWOP sentence following his conviction for capital
murder. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 560. Jackson was convicted of capital
murder under a co-conspirator theory of liability for a murder committed
during the course of an enumerated felony. See id. at 567. Like
Pennsylvania, Arkansas law provides that intent is inferred when a defendant
commits a homicide under such circumstances. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-
101(a) (defining capital murder).
Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justice Sotomayor, opined that if
Arkansas
continues to seek a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole for [] Jackson, there will have to be a determination
whether Jackson killed or intended to kill the robbery victim. In
my view, without such a finding, the Eighth Amendment as
interpreted in Graham [v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010)16] forbids
sentencing Jackson to such a sentence, regardless of whether its
application is mandatory or discretionary under state law.
16 Graham prohibits sentencing juveniles to LWOP for nonhomicide offenses.
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Miller, 567 U.S. at 489-490 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation
marks, alterations, and citation omitted; emphasis added). According to
Appellant, this language indicates that a mandatory maximum sentence of life
imprisonment for juvenile homicide offenders who did not kill or intend to kill
violates the Eighth Amendment.
This argument is without merit. First, Justice Breyer authored a
concurring opinion, not the majority. Thus, it is not binding authority.
Moreover, the plain language of Justice Breyer’s concurrence only references
LWOP sentences. There is nothing in Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion, or
any other opinion in Graham, Miller, or Montgomery, indicating that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits sentencing a juvenile convicted of homicide to a
maximum term of life imprisonment if he or she has a meaningful opportunity
for release based upon demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.
In essence, Justice Breyer suggested that juveniles convicted of second-
degree murder under an accomplice or co-conspirator theory of liability for
murders committed during the course of an enumerated felony are subject to
the rule set forth in Graham, and not the rule set forth in Miller, if they did
not join the conspiracy or agree to become an accomplice with the intent to
murder the victim. Therefore, according to Justice Breyer, even if a state
labels a crime homicide (as Pennsylvania has done with second-degree
murder) that does not ipso facto permit the imposition of a discretionary LWOP
term. Instead, a juvenile must have killed or intended to kill to be eligible for
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a discretionary LWOP sentence under Miller. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 490(Breyer, J., concurring) (“Given Graham’s reasoning, the kinds of homicide
that can subject a juvenile offender to [LWOP] must exclude instances where
the juvenile himself neither kills nor intends to kill the victim.”).
Even assuming arguendo Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion is a correct
statement of the law,17 Appellant is not entitled to relief in this case. Graham
makes clear that “[a] State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom to
a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. What the State must
do, however, is give defendants . . . some meaningful opportunity to obtain
release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Graham, 560
U.S. at 75. In other words, consistent with the Eighth Amendment, a state
can set a mandatory maximum term of life imprisonment, even for
nonhomicide offenses, so long as it grants defendants the opportunity for
parole based upon demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. That is exactly
what occurred in this case. Specifically, the trial court made Appellant eligible
for parole after 20 years’ imprisonment and credited him with over 37 years
17We note that the Supreme Court of Wyoming has held that Justice Breyer’s
Miller concurrence is not an accurate statement of the law. See Bear Cloud
v. State, 334 P.3d 132, 146 (Wyo. 2014); see also Hernandez v.
McDonald, 2015 WL 164707, *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2015) (holding that Justice
Breyer’s statements in his Miller concurrence are not clearly established
federal law).
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for time served. Thereafter, Appellant was granted parole based upon his
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.
In reaching its conclusion that juveniles convicted of nonhomicide
offenses can be sentenced to life imprisonment, but not LWOP, the Supreme
Court of the United States explained that LWOP differs substantially from a
life sentence during which a defendant becomes eligible for parole. See id.
at 70, citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297 (1983). It concluded that
these significant differences meant that different rules should apply for
imposing LWOP sentences. Despite its adoption of such principles, the
Supreme Court of the United States has never placed mandatory life
maximums beyond the authority of a sentencing court to impose, even in
nonhomicide cases.
Nothing in Pennsylvania case law indicates that our Supreme Court (or
this Court) is prepared to expand Justice Breyer’s concurrence and prohibit
mandatory life maximums for juveniles who commit second-degree murder
but did not kill or intend to kill. The sole reference by our Supreme Court to
Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Miller was not an attempt to extend his
reasoning to life maximums. As noted above, in Commonwealth v. Batts,
66 A.3d 286 (Pa. 2013), our Supreme Court was presented with a first-degree
murder case that did not implicate the concerns expressed by Justice Breyer
in his Miller concurrence. Thus, our Supreme Court stated that
despite the broad framing of the questions at hand, [Batts]
confined his arguments to the context of first-degree murder;
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hence, the issues identified by Justice Breyer in
his Miller concurrence (discussing additional constitutional
concerns connected with the imposition of [LWOP] sentences on
juveniles convicted of murder as a result of participation in a
felony who have neither killed nor intended to kill), are not
implicated in the present matter.
Id. at 293-294 (internal citation omitted). Again, Justice Breyer’s concurrence
speaks only to LWOP sentences – not life maximums which allow for parole
eligibility based upon demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.
In the future, our nation’s standards of decency may evolve to the point
where sentencing a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder under an
accomplice or co-conspirator theory of liability is considered disproportionate
and, therefore, cruel and unusual punishment. Cf. Commonwealth v.
Foust, 2018 WL 9889042018, *4-7 (Pa. Super. Feb. 21, 2018) (setting forth
the evolving standards of decency relating to the sentencing of juvenile
offenders). Appellant does not cite a single appellate case,18 and we are
unaware of any, which have extended the Eighth Amendment this far.
Presently, mandatory life maximums for juveniles convicted of felony murder
represent conventional sentencing practices. E.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-
18 Appellant’s only citation to a case which has extended Miller in this regard
is Songster v. Beard, 201 F.Supp.3d 639 (E.D. Pa. 2016). We find Songster
unavailing. Songster does not directly cite to Graham a single time. As we
have set forth above, Graham addresses whether parole boards may make
the ultimate determination that an individual has demonstrated the requisite
maturity and rehabilitation to deserve release. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.
Hence, we do not agree with Songster and hold that it is not binding authority
in Pennsylvania. See Century Indem. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., 173
A.3d 784, 792 n.14 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted) (“decisions of the . . .
federal district courts . . . are not binding on this Court”).
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104(b); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-1(e)(1); Md. Code, Crim. Law, § 2-201(b)(1).
Our society deems the taking of a life, either directly or as an accomplice or
co-conspirator, sufficiently grievous as to require that the defendant not be
entitled to release without first going through the parole process. Accordingly,
we hold that the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of section 1102(b)’s
mandatory maximum term of life imprisonment for juveniles convicted of
second-degree murder, who did not kill or intend to kill. In this case, Appellant
was made eligible and received a meaningful opportunity for release as he
was paroled after resentencing. Accordingly, his sentence does not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.
In sum, we reaffirm that trial courts must sentence juveniles convicted
of second-degree murder prior to June 25, 2012 to a maximum term of life
imprisonment under section 1102(b). We hold that such mandatory
maximums do not violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishment. As such, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/3/2018
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