Com. v. Cool, D.

J-S04041-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DONALD M. COOL :
:
Appellant : No. 1826 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 10, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-45-CR-0001617-2021
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED MARCH 16, 2023
Donald M. Cool (Cool) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County (trial court) after he entered
an open guilty plea to four counts of possession of a firearm prohibited,1 that
after the trial court sentenced him, it then granted the Commonwealth’s
motion for reconsideration of sentence. He argues that the trial court was
presumptively vindictive when it resentenced him to a greater maximum term
of imprisonment because the new sentence was based on the same set of
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1). The Commonwealth nolle prossed five additional
counts of possession of a firearm prohibited and one count of possessing
unlawful body armor (bullet proof vest), 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(c), in exchange for
the plea.
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facts as the original sentence and that it relied on impermissible factors. We
affirm.
We take the following factual background and procedural history from
the trial court’s August 25, 2022 opinion and our independent review of the
record.
I.
On March 3, 2021, police responded to a call at a residence in Mount
Pocono, Pennsylvania. The caller advised that his roommate had allowed an
individual to spend the night and the caller became concerned when he saw
guns and a bullet proof vest that the individual had brought to the home.
On March 3, 2022, Cool pled guilty to four counts of possession of a
firearm prohibited, fugitive from justice. (See Written Guilty Plea Colloquy,
3/03/22, at ¶ 4). The trial court ordered the preparation of a presentence
investigation (PSI) report. On May 13, 2022, with the assistance of the PSI,
the trial court sentenced Cool to an aggregate term of imprisonment of not
less than twenty-four nor more than forty-eight months to be served
consecutively to a Luzerne County sentence imposed at docket number 1612
of 2019 for his guilty plea to statutory sexual assault.
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The Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence,2
arguing that the seriousness of the offenses and the disturbing circumstances
of the case required reconsideration. Specifically, the Commonwealth averred
that Cool had plead guilty to felony 2 statutory sexual assault in Luzerne
County for impregnating his fifteen-year-old cousin, was declared a sexually
violent predator (SVP), and failed to appear for sentencing, instead fleeing to
Mount Pocono Borough for another sexual encounter. (Commonwealth’s
Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence, 5/20/22, at ¶¶ 5-6, 9). According to
the Commonwealth, the PSI3 prepared in this case indicates Cool has a serious
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2 “Well-settled Pennsylvania law permits the Commonwealth to pursue a
correction, modification or increase in the originally imposed sentence because
no sentence is final until the right of appellate review has been exhausted or
waived.” Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 639 A.2d 1235, 1239 (Pa. Super.
1994) (citations omitted); see Pa.R.Crim.P. 721(A)(1), (B) (Commonwealth
may file motion to modify sentence within ten days after sentence’s
imposition).
3 Although Cool’s arguments involve the PSI and the claim that nothing new
was presented at the reconsideration hearing, the trial court record reflects
that he failed to ensure that the certified record provided to this Court contains
the PSI or to order a transcript of the original May 13, 2022 sentencing hearing
to enable us to compare it with the reconsideration hearing. It is well-settled
that “an appellate court is limited to considering only the materials in the
certified record when resolving an issue.” Commonwealth v. Preston, 904
A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 916 A.2d 632 (Pa. 2007) (citation
omitted). “Our law is unequivocal that the responsibility rests upon the
appellant to ensure that the record certified on appeal is complete in the sense
that it contains all of the materials necessary for the reviewing court to
perform its duty.” Id. (citation omitted); see id. at 7 (“any claims that cannot
be resolved in the absence of the necessary transcript or transcripts must be
deemed waived for the purpose of appellate review.”) (citation omitted);
Pa.R.A.P. 1911, 1931. Nor is it this Court’s responsibility to scour the trial
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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psychiatric issue that involves sexual abuse. (See id. at ¶ 10). When he was
arrested at the Mount Pocono home, he had nine firearms, some of them
loaded with a round in the chamber, ammunition, magazines for the guns and
a bullet proof vest. (See id. at ¶¶ 7-8). The grading of the offenses in this
case were only charged as misdemeanors because sentencing on the felony 2
sexual assault had not yet occurred due to Cool having absconded from
Luzerne County. (See id. at ¶ 11). The Commonwealth stated that, “given
the circumstances of this case, [Cool] poses a serious, grave danger to society
[because] he is psychologically unstable, on the run with an arsenal of
weapons and numerous magazine[s] of ammunition[,]” and the sentences he
received on each count below the middle of the standard range are not
appropriate in this case. (Id. at ¶ 12); (see id. at ¶¶ 13-14).
On June 10, 2022, the court held argument on the Commonwealth’s
motion at which it did not receive any new evidence. Although the court had
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court to unearth materials presented to the trial court but never made part of
the certified record. See Preston, 904 A.2d at 7-8.
However, Cool does not argue that the court misstates what the PSI contains,
and the court does not maintain that it relied on new information that was not
previously available to it. Although the PSI and May 13, 2022 sentencing
transcript would enable a more thorough review, we decline to find waiver in
the interest of judicial economy and rely on the representations of Cool and
the court about what they contain.
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the PSI and appended Sexual Offender Assessment Board (SOAB)4 report at
the time of the initial sentencing, in an effort to elucidate the court about
Cool’s character and need for increased supervision, the prosecutor argued
about their specific contents. The prosecutor noted that this case does not
involve any sexual offenses or sentences but stated that the SOAB report
contained information about Cool that raised concerns about his character and
circumstances for sentencing purposes in this matter. For example, the SOAB
report noted his deceptive character, his psychological diagnosis of anti-social
personality disorder, inconsistencies in his statement to probation officers in
this case and to officers in the Luzerne County case, and his history of
violence, including a previous conviction for terroristic threats and simple
assault for attacking his mother’s paramour and threatening to attack his
mother with a hatchet. Cool’s counsel objected to the prosecutor’s mention
of statements in the SOAB report made by Cool’s statutory sexual assault
victim about him threatening her with violence based on hearsay because he
denied the threats in the same report. The court overruled the objection,
stating that it regularly relies on such reports in sentencing. (See N.T.
Reconsideration, 6/10/22, at 4-8).
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4 The SOAB report was produced in Luzerne County and attached to the PSI
in this matter (that was not provided to this Court). We rely on the testimony
from the reconsideration hearing for what it contains because Cool does not
argue that its contents were misrepresented.
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According to the Commonwealth, the PSI reflected that Cool’s
statements to officers in this matter conflicted with those of his wife about
such things as how long they had been together, who owned the guns found
in his possession and why he was in the area, with her saying he was in Monroe
County to avoid serving his Luzerne County sentence and him saying it was
for a marital retreat. He lacked remorse for his past criminal actions with his
fifteen-year-old cousin. Finally, in addition to the number of guns in his
possession, the prosecutor mentioned that there was a “bulletproof vest with
a loaded gun with one in the chamber attached to the vest[,]” to which Cool’s
counsel did not object or argue that it was an impermissible consideration
where the related charge had been nolle prossed. (Id. at 11); (see id. at 10-
14).
Cool’s counsel argued that the court had the PSI and SOAB report at the
original sentencing, so there was no new information to justify modifying the
sentence. (See id. at 15-16).
When resentencing, while the court kept the minimum sentence on each
count the same (twenty-four months), it increased the back end from forty-
eight to ninety-six months. It explained that although it had the PSI at the
initial sentencing hearing, upon reconsideration, the four years of supervision
was inadequate based on all the circumstances that had been brought to its
attention. Instead, it believed that a longer period of parole supervision was
appropriate. (See id. at 16-18); (Trial Ct. Op., at 2-3) (pagination provided).
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After the court denied Cool’s motion for reconsideration, Cool timely
appealed and filed a court-ordered statement of errors complained of. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Cool raises four issues in which he alleges the trial court committed an
abuse of discretion5, 6 by: (1) reconsidering and increasing his sentence based
on the same facts and information available at the time of the original
sentence; (2) increasing his sentence based on current events; (3)
considering unreliable hearsay testimony; and (4) considering facts
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5 “Generally, a plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of all defects and defenses
excepting the voluntariness of the plea, the jurisdiction of the court and the
legality of the sentence.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 223 A.3d 715, 717 n.3
(Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). However, Cool can challenge the
discretionary aspects of his sentence because he entered an open plea
“without an agreement to the terms of the sentence.” Id. (citation omitted).
6Our standard of review of a discretionary aspects of sentence challenge is
well-settled:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal
denied, 95 A.3d 275 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
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underlying charges that had been nolle prossed in exchange for the plea
agreement. (See Cool’s Brief, at 13).7
II.
A challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not appealable
as of right and is more properly considered a request for permission to appeal.
Before [this Court may] reach the merits of [a challenge to the
discretionary aspects of a sentence], we must engage in a four
part analysis to determine: (1) whether the appeal is timely; (2)
whether Appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether Appellant’s
brief includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for
allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of
sentence [see Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)]; and (4) whether the concise
statement raises a substantial question that the sentence is
appropriate under the sentencing code.... [I]f the appeal satisfies
each of these four requirements we will then proceed to decide
the substantive merits of the case.
Antidormi, 84 A.3d at 759 (citation omitted) (brackets in original).
Cool has satisfied all the requirements for us to reach the substantive
merits of his claims where the appeal is timely; he filed a motion for
reconsideration of sentence, his brief includes a Rule 2119(f) statement with
the reasons relied upon for appeal and he raises a substantial question. See
Commonwealth v. Ali, 197 A.3d 742, 760 (Pa. Super. 2018), appeal denied,
207 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2019) (claim of vindictiveness in resentencing raises
substantial question); Commonwealth v. Bromley, 862 A.2d 598, 605 (Pa.
Super. 2004), appeal denied, 881 A.2d 818 (Pa. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S.
____________________________________________7 The Commonwealth failed to file a brief in this matter.
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1095 (2006) (claim that court relied on impermissible factors in sentencing
raises a substantial question). Accordingly, we proceed to the merits of Cool’s
claims.
A.
Cool argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it relied on
the same information available at the original sentencing hearing to
resentence him to an increased term of incarceration. (See Cool’s Brief, at
20-23). He maintains that this raises a presumption of vindictiveness that
cannot be overcome because the increase was not based on new information.
(See id.).
“The trial court, as a matter of law, has discretion to modify its own
sentence in response to a Commonwealth Motion for Reconsideration of
Sentence. However, any increase in sentence cannot be the result of judicial
vindictiveness.” Commonwealth v. Bullock, 170 A.3d 1109, 1125 (Pa.
Super. 2017), appeal denied, 184 A.3d 944 (Pa. 2018) (citations omitted).
“Generally, a presumption of vindictiveness arises if the court imposes a
harsher sentence upon resentencing.” Commonwealth v. Watson, 228
A.3d 928, 937 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). However, the
presumption of vindictiveness only arises “if a defendant establishes facts that
demonstrate a probability that an adverse action by the … court has been
motivated by vindictiveness in retaliation for successful exercise of a
defendant’s legal rights rather than for some other legitimate cause.”
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Commonwealth v. Kane, 188 A.3d 1217, 1229 (Pa. 2018), appeal denied,
197 A.3d 1180 (Pa. 2018) (citation omitted); see Commonwealth v.
Speight, 854 A.2d 450, 455 (Pa. 2004) (A trial court “may not punish an
appellant for exercising appellate rights.”). “The key to whether a
presumption of vindictiveness arises in a given case would be the factual
circumstance in which the challenged action occurred.” Kane, 188 A.3d at
1229 (citation omitted). A court can rebut any presumption if it places non-
vindictive reasons on the record such as identifiable conduct that occurred
after the original sentence or other “objective information or legitimate
sentencing concerns that were not … considered by the trial court at the
original sentencing hearing.” Id. (citation omitted).
The presumption of vindictiveness does not apply to the circumstances
of this matter. Although the court imposed a higher maximum sentence after
resentencing, it did not do so in response to Cool successfully appealing or
even after Cool successfully challenged the original judgment of sentence in a
post-sentence motion. Instead, it entered the new sentence after the
Commonwealth exercised its legal right to file a motion for reconsideration
of sentence, not in retaliation for Cool doing so. Therefore, the presumption
of vindictiveness is not applicable. See Kane, 188 A.3d at 1229.
Moreover, even assuming that it was, Cool would be due no relief on
this issue. As stated previously, the Commonwealth had the legal right to file
a motion for reconsideration of the sentence, and the court had the discretion
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to modify its sentence based on information it failed to consider at the original
sentencing hearing. See Kane, 188 A.3d at 1229; Bullock, 170 A.3d at 1125.
The court explained its reasons for increasing the maximum term of the
sentence at the June 10, 2022 reconsideration hearing and in its August 25,
2022 opinion.
At the hearing, the court explained that although it had the opportunity
to view the PSI before imposing the original sentence, upon reconsideration
of the PSI, this “is a disturbing case.” (N.T. Reconsideration, at 16). The
court noted the photographs attached to the PSI showing the number and
type of firearms, with many of them loaded with bullets in the chamber. It
drew attention to the fact that at the time he was arrested in this matter,
there was a bench warrant for his failure to appear for sentencing in a sexual
assault case in Luzerne County. (See N.T. Reconsideration, at 16-17). In its
opinion it again explains:
Instantly, we received the Commonwealth’s Motion and at hearing
determined that there were details in the [PSI] which we
reconsidered. We considered that [Cool] absconded from Luzerne
County where he was scheduled to be sentenced on serious sexual
offenses to which he plead guilty and failed to appear for
sentencing. After he fled from Luzerne County, he was located in
Monroe County with nine firearms, some of which were loaded and
he was in possession of a bullet proof vest. We considered [Cool]’s
plea in this case and upon reconsideration, we believe that the
sentence should be increased to an aggregate sentence of not less
than 24 months nor more than 96 months in a state correctional
institution. The sentences imposed were all within the standard
guideline range and ordered to be served consecutively. In
modifying the sentence, the [c]ourt felt a longer period of parole
supervision was warranted under the circumstances.
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(Trial Ct. Op., at 2-3) (pagination provided).
First, there is no evidence that the trial court was motivated by any
vindictiveness in resentencing Cool, only by a fuller understanding of the facts.
Moreover, even if the presumption of vindictiveness applied, the trial court
rebutted any presumption by putting non-vindictive reasons on the record to
support its modification of sentence. See Kane, 188 A.3d at 1229.
B.
Cool argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it relied on
current events of mass shootings to support vacating his original sentence and
imposing an increased one. (See Cool’s Brief, at 24-25). Because he was not
charged with any offenses related to the mass shootings, Cool maintains that
consideration of their prevalence was impermissible. (See id. at 24-25).
Cool relies on Commonwealth v. Sypin, 491 A.2d 1371, 1372 (Pa.
Super. 1985), in support of his argument. In Sypin, the defendant pled guilty
to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child and corruption of minors
for his sexual abuse of a nine-year-old boy. See Sypin, 491 A.2d at 1372.
In imposing sentence, the court stated: “As you know there are thousands of
kids, and I mean thousands of kids that disappear every year. … Youngsters
no one ever sees or hears from again. Sometimes they’re found dead;
sometimes they’re never found. … And their problems result from men like
you.” Id. A panel of this court vacated the judgment of sentence, concluding
the trial court relied on factors unrelated to the defendant’s case. See id.
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Here, Cool points to the trial court’s statement that:
I mean the way things are going in society today it’s not unusual
to hear stories about people involved in shooting in public places.
You know it’s happening all over the place and here Mr. Cool is
with an arsenal on a bench warrant for failure to appear for
sentencing.
(N.T. Reconsideration, at 17).
Although the trial court made the general comment about guns and
shootings, the court increased the back end of Cool’s sentence based on
considerations specific to him, including his absconding from justice, his
psychiatric diagnosis and violent history. See Commonwealth v. Walls, 926
A.2d 957, 966 (Pa. 2007) (affirming judgment of sentence where, despite
court’s general comments about people who victimize young children,
sentence was individualized to defendant). While the trial court mentioned
recent mass shootings, which would not be an appropriate basis for modifying
Cool’s sentence, it was harmless error since it was made in passing and Cool
was not prejudiced by it. See Commonwealth v. Holt, 273 A.3d 514, 540
(Pa. 2022).8
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8 The harmless error doctrine applies where the error “did not prejudice the
defendant or the prejudice was de minimis[.]” Holt, 273 A.3d at 540. “We
may sua sponte invoke the harmless error doctrine as it does nothing more
than affirm a valid judgment of sentence on an alternative basis.” Id. (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
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C.
Cool asserts that the trial court erred by admitting unreliable hearsay at
sentencing to prove his violent nature. Specifically, he notes that the
prosecutor mentioned an incident reported in his SOAB report in which the
victim alleged that he threatened her with a firearm. (See Cool’s Brief, at 27)
(citing N.T. Reconsideration, at 5). He maintains that since he denied pointing
a gun at the victim in the same assessment, the victim’s hearsay statement
should not have been considered since he had no opportunity to cross-
examine her. (See id. at 27-28).
[A] proceeding held to determine sentence is not a trial, and the
court is not bound by the restrictive rules of evidence properly
applicable to trials. Commonwealth v. Orsino, 197 Pa. Super.
306, 178 A.2d 843, 846 (Pa. Super. 1962) (sentencing court has
wide latitude in considering facts, regardless of whether such facts
are produced by witnesses who the court sees and hears). Rather,
the court may receive any relevant information for the purposes
of determining the proper penalty. … Although sentencing
proceedings must comport with due process, the convicted
defendant need not be accorded the entire panoply of criminal trial
procedural rights.
Commonwealth v. Medley, 725 A.2d 1225, 1229 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal
denied, 749 A.2d 468 (Pa. 2000) (quotation marks and most citations
omitted).
At the reconsideration hearing, to demonstrate Cool’s past violent acts
and threats, the prosecutor mentioned the fifteen-year-old Luzerne County
victim’s statements about Cool’s alleged threats involving weapons, which
were contained in the SOAB report. (See N.T. Reconsideration, at 5-6). The
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court overruled defense counsel’s hearsay objection because it regularly
considers such reports in sentencing. (See id. at 6).
First, given that he had been determined to be an SVP based on that
report, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
Commonwealth to argue about the victim’s statements. See Medley, 725
A.2d at 1229. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the court erred or
abused its discretion, Cool has not proved that he was prejudiced. There is
no evidence that the court considered the victim’s statements in imposing
Cool’s sentence. As stated previously, the court expressly explained the
reasons why it was increasing Cool’s period of supervision, and they involved
facts related to this case, not the Luzerne County victim’s statements in the
SOAB report.9
D.
Finally, relying on Commonwealth v. Stewart, 867 A.2d 589, 593 (Pa.
Super. 2005), Cool argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it
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9 Cool’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 990 A.2d 732 (Pa. Super.
2009) is wholly unpersuasive because it is distinguishable from the case at
bar. Rhodes involved, in pertinent part, a trial court’s express reliance on
police reports it received ex parte that were almost entirely comprised of
hearsay statements. The court “then drew factual inferences directly from
those reports on the basis of which [it] imposed a sentence almost five times
that recommended by the Commonwealth and only one to two years shy of
the statutory maximum[.]” Rhodes, 990 A.2d at 745. This is inapposite to
the facts herein where there is no evidence that the court considered the
victim’s statements at all to impose the standard range sentence and only
modified the back end of the sentence for supervision purposes.
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reconsidered and then increased his sentence based on the nolle prossed
unlawful body armor charge.
In Stewart, this Court considered the issue of whether a defendant
could be sentenced to an aggravated range sentence based on charges that
had been nolle prossed. Stewart, 867 A.2d at 591. In deciding the issue,
the Court considered the competing maxims that, “when a court imposes its
sentence, the court may consider a defendant’s previous arrests and
concurrent charges” and “a sentence cannot be enhanced for any offense
other than the one to which the defendant pled guilty.” Id. at 593. In
Stewart’s case, in imposing sentence, the court explained, in pertinent part,
that “[t]his sentence is in the aggravated range because two counts of IDSI,
which each [carries] a mandatory minimum of five years, have been nolle
prossed as well as another count of statutory sexual assault.” Id. (record
citation omitted). Based on the specific circumstances, this Court observed
that “a manifest abuse of discretion exists when a sentence is enhanced due
to charges that have been nolle prossed as part of a plea agreement, because
notions of fundamental fairness are violated.” Id. (citation omitted).
Cases since Stewart have restricted this observation to the specific
facts of that case. For example, in Commonwealth v. Tobin, 89 A.3d 663,
667 (Pa. Super. 2014), we concluded that a trial court’s reference to facts
underlying the nolle prossed charges did not indicate that it was expressly
considering the charges to formulate its sentence. Similarly in
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Commonwealth v. Turner, 58 A.3d 845, 847 (Pa. Super. 2012), the crime
of possession of a firearm was nolle prossed. At sentencing, the court made
a factual finding that Turner possessed a firearm at the time he committed
possession with intent to deliver, resulting in a mandatory term of
imprisonment. We held that the court did not err because it did not penalize
the defendant on the nolle prossed possession charge. See Turner, 58 A.3d
at 847.
At the reconsideration hearing in this case, in an effort to elucidate the
court about Cool’s character and need for increased supervision, the
prosecutor argued extensively about inconsistencies in Cool’s statement in this
case and in the Luzerne County litigation, his failure to appear at the Luzerne
County sentencing hearing, psychological and sexual offender diagnoses in
the SOAB report, his lack of remorse for the sexual relationship with his
fifteen-year-old cousin, his previous convictions for assault and terroristic
threats, the number of guns in his possession and mentioned that there was
a “bulletproof vest with a loaded gun with one in the chamber attached to the
vest.”10 (N.T. Reconsideration, at 11); (see id. at 3-14).
In imposing the new sentence, the court mentioned a laundry list of
what was discovered in Cool’s possession at the time of his arrest, including
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10 We again note that defense counsel did not object to the Commonwealth
mentioning the bullet proof vest or argue that it was an improper consideration
for the court. (See N.T. Reconsideration, at 15-16).
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the fact that “[t]here was a bulletproof vest.” (Id. at 16). However, there is
no indication that the court considered the charge of unlawful possession of
the bullet proof vest in fashioning its sentence. Contrary to Cool’s argument
that the court improperly considered this fact, there is absolutely no evidence
that the court considered the charge and enhanced his sentence on this basis.
See Commonwealth v. Miller, 965 A.2d 276, 280 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(concluding court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant where
it carefully reviewed the PSI and other evidence and mere reference to facts
underlying nolle prossed charge did not indicate that it specifically considered
the charge and enhanced his sentence based thereon); cf. Commonwealth
v. Stewart, 867 A.2d 589, 593 (Pa. Super. 2005) (trial court specifically
indicated that it was sentencing appellant in aggravated range because of
three counts that were nolle prossed).
In fact, as noted previously, the court only increased the back end of
Cool’s sentence to allow for increased supervision, which was not imposed for
the charge of possessing the bullet proof vest.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/16/2023
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