Com. v. Fuller, E.

J-S43044-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
ERIC MICHAEL FULLER :
:
Appellant : No. 388 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 13, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-42-CR-0000578-2018
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED JANUARY 28, 2021
Appellant, Eric Michael Fuller, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the McKean County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury trial
convictions for statutory sexual assault, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse
(“IDSI”), sexual assault, indecent assault, endangering welfare of children
(“EWOC”), and corruption of minors.1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
Appellant’s son, H.F. (“Child”), was born in 2012. On July 11, 2018, Child told
his maternal grandparents that Appellant had sexually molested him. Child’s
maternal grandparents informed law enforcement about the allegation. On
July 19, 2018, Child appeared at the McKean County Children’s Advocacy
____________________________________________
118 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3122.1(b), 3123(b), 3124.1, 3126(a)(7), 4304(a)(1), and
6301(a)(1)(i), respectively.
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Center for a forensic interview. At that time, Child reiterated the molestation
allegations against Appellant.
Smethport Borough Police Department Officer Shane Miller interviewed
Appellant on August 1, 2018 and September 26, 2018. During the first
interview, Appellant denied having any inappropriate contact with Child.
During the second interview, however, Appellant conceded “that there was
one particular incident” where “he accidentally touched his son’s penis.” (N.T.
Trial, 11/1/19, at 95). On January 2, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a criminal
information charging Appellant with multiple sex offenses.
On February 8, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a motion seeking a
hearing pursuant to the “tender years” hearsay statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
5985.1. The Commonwealth intended “to present [Child’s] out-of-court
statements as evidence through the witnesses the victim made the statements
to….” (Motion, filed 2/8/19, at ¶4). The Commonwealth requested that the
trial court “hold [an] in camera hearing to determine whether the hearsay
evidence is admissible in future proceedings and whether the child is
unavailable.” (Id. at ¶6).
The court conducted a hearing, which included an in camera interview
with Child, on May 15, 2019. By order and opinion entered June 4, 2019, the
court granted the Commonwealth’s motion in part. Specifically, the court
deemed Child competent to testify in the courtroom. The court determined
that Child’s July 2018 statements to his maternal grandparents and the video
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footage of the forensic interview were admissible, “provided that [Appellant]
has a proper opportunity to conduct cross-examination of Child after
presentation of said statements.” (Order, entered 6/4/19, at ¶3). The court
also declined to admit additional statements Child made to his mother and
maternal grandmother.
Appellant proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted him of statutory sexual
assault, IDSI, sexual assault, indecent assault, EWOC, and corruption of
minors. On February 13, 2020, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate
term of seventy-two (72) to one hundred eighty (180) months’ imprisonment.
Appellant did not file post-sentence motions.
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on March 6, 2020. On March
18, 2020, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant subsequently
complied.
Appellant now raises eight issues for our review:
Whether the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was
insufficient as a matter of law to establish Appellant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt as to each and every element of
count 1, statutory sexual assault. Specifically, was the
evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Appellant engaged in sexual intercourse with
penetration, however slight, of the complaining witness?
Whether the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was
insufficient as a matter of law to establish Appellant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt as to count 2, sexual assault?
Specifically, was the evidence insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant engaged in sexual
intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with the
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complaining witness?
Whether the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was
insufficient as a matter of law to establish Appellant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt as to count 3, indecent assault?
Specifically, was the evidence adduced at trial insufficient to
prove that Appellant had indecent contact with the
complaining witness for the purpose of arousing or
gratifying his own sexual desire?
With respect to count 3, was the evidence presented at trial
insufficient as a matter of law to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Appellant touched the sexual or intimate parts of
the complaining witness with Appellant’s sexual or intimate
parts.
Whether the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was
insufficient as a matter of law to establish Appellant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt as to count 4, [EWOC],
specifically whether Appellant knowingly endangered a child
by violating a duty of care or support.
Whether the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was
insufficient as a matter of law to establish Appellant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt as to count 5, corruption of
minors, as the evidence presented by the Commonwealth
was insufficient to prove each and every element of the
other crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt?
Whether the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was
insufficient as a matter of law to establish Appellant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt as to count 6, [IDSI], where
there was no evidence presented that Appellant penetrated
the mouth or anus of the complaining witness with his penis
or any physical object?
Whether the court erred in admitting out of court
statements of the child during a recorded interview and to
another person in violation of the prohibition against
hearsay?
(Appellant’s Brief at 8-10).
In his first seven issues, Appellant contends the Commonwealth’s
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primary evidence came in the form of Child’s testimony and out-of-court
statements.2 Appellant insists this evidence was insufficient to support his
statutory sexual assault conviction, because “there was virtually no evidence
offered by the Commonwealth that Appellant had engaged in any penetration
of” Child. (Id. at 18-19). Regarding IDSI, indecent assault, and sexual
assault, Appellant asserts Child’s statements did not demonstrate “the
performance of an act of sexual intercourse per os” or “that Appellant touched
the sexual or intimate parts” of Child. (Id. at 19). Appellant also claims the
Commonwealth failed to establish the element of “indecent contact,” where
there was no evidence that related to arousal or gratification.
Because the Commonwealth’s evidence did not establish the
commission of any sex offenses, Appellant posits that the Commonwealth also
failed to prove EWOC and corruption of minors. Further, Appellant emphasizes
that he “offered a reasonable and good faith explanation for how incidental
contact with his son’s penis may have occurred.” (Id. at 20-21). Appellant
maintains incidental contact with a child’s genitals does not constitute a crime.
Appellant concludes the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence for
the jury to find each element of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We
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2 Although Appellant’s statement of questions lists seven discrete challenges
to the sufficiency of the evidence, the argument section of his brief combines
these challenges into one analysis section. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (mandating
that argument section of brief shall be divided into as many parts as there are
questions to be argued). Thus, we address Appellant’s claims together.
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disagree.
Our standard of review for sufficiency claims is as follows:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition,
we note that the facts and circumstances established by the
Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may
be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means
of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the
above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
[trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe
all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal
denied, 641 Pa. 63, 165 A.3d 895 (2017) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super. 2011)).
The Crimes Code sets forth the elements of first-degree felony statutory
sexual assault as follows:
§ 3122.1. Statutory sexual assault
* * *
(b) Felony of the first degree.—A person commits a
felony of the first degree when that person engages in
sexual intercourse with a complainant under the age of 16
years and that person is 11 or more years older than the
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complainant and the complainant and the person are not
married to each other.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3122.1(b). The Crimes Code defines “sexual intercourse” as
follows: “In addition to its ordinary meaning, includes intercourse per os or
per anus, with some penetration however slight; emission is not required.”
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101.
The Crimes Code defines IDSI of a child as follows:
§ 3123. Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse
* * *
(b) Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a
child.—A person commits involuntary deviate sexual
intercourse with a child, a felony of the first degree, when
the person engages in deviate sexual intercourse with a
complainant who is less than 13 years of age.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3123(b).
[I]n order to sustain a conviction for [IDSI], the
Commonwealth must establish the perpetrator engaged in
acts of oral or anal intercourse, which involved penetration
however slight. In order to establish penetration, some oral
contact is required. See Commonwealth v. Trimble, [615
A.2d 48 (Pa.Super. 1992)] (finding actual penetration of the
vagina is not necessary; some form of oral contact with the
genitalia is all that is required). Moreover, a person can
penetrate by use of the mouth or the tongue.
Commonwealth v. L.N., 787 A.2d 1064, 1070 (Pa.Super. 2001), appeal
denied, 569 Pa. 680, 800 A.2d 931 (2002) (some internal citations omitted).
The Crimes Code defines sexual assault as follows:
§ 3124.1. Sexual assault
Except as provided in section 3121 (relating to rape) or
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3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse), a
person commits a felony of the second degree when that
person engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual
intercourse with a complainant without the complainant’s
consent.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.1.
The Crimes Code defines indecent assault of a person less than 13 years
of age, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 3126. Indecent assault
(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of indecent
assault if the person has indecent contact with the
complainant, causes the complainant to have indecent
contact with the person or intentionally causes the
complainant to come into contact with seminal fluid, urine
or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the
person or the complainant and:
* * *
(7) the complainant is less than 13 years of age[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(7). “Indecent contact” is “[a]ny touching of the sexual
or other intimate parts of the person for the purposes of arousing or gratifying
sexual desire, in any person.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101. Additionally, “the
uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness is sufficient to convict a
defendant of sexual offenses.” Commonwealth v. Castlehun, 889 A.2d
1228, 1232 (Pa.Super. 2005).
The Crimes Code defines EWOC, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 4304. Endangering welfare of children
(a) Offense defined.—
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(1) A parent, guardian or other person supervising
the welfare of a child under 18 years of age, or a
person that employs or supervises such a person,
commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the
welfare of the child by violating a duty of care,
protection or support.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1). The Commonwealth must prove the following to
sustain an EWOC conviction: (1) the accused was aware of his duty to protect
the child; (2) the accused was aware that the child was in circumstances that
could threaten the child’s physical or psychological welfare; and (3) the
accused has either failed to act or has taken action so lame or meager that
such actions cannot reasonably be expected to protect the child’s welfare.
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 57 A.3d 191, 197 (Pa.Super. 2012).
Finally, the Crimes Code defines corruption of minors as follows:
§ 6301. Corruption of minors
(a) Offense defined.—
(1)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii), whoever,
being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any act
corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less
than 18 years of age, or who aids, abets, entices or
encourages any such minor in the commission of any crime,
or who knowingly assists or encourages such minor in
violating his or her parole or any order of court, commits a
misdemeanor of the first degree.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(i).
Instantly, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Child, who was
seven years old at the time of trial. (See N.T. Trial, 11/1/19, at 50). After
questioning Child about his school and family members, the prosecutor asked,
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“[D]id something happen with daddy that you told Nana[3] about?” (Id. at
52). Child ultimately responded, “He put his mouth on my pee-pee.” (Id. at
53). Child indicated that the incident occurred at “home,” and Appellant “said
not to tell Nana.” (Id.)
On cross-examination, Child testified that his parents sometimes
argued, and his mother would yell at Appellant if he failed to do certain chores.
(Id. at 59-60). Child also admitted that his mother no longer liked Appellant.
(Id. at 63-64). Nevertheless, Child denied that Maternal Grandmother
harbored any animus toward Appellant. (Id. at 63). Child also denied that
Maternal Grandmother had told him what to say. (Id. at 65).
After presenting Child, the Commonwealth called Maternal
Grandmother. Maternal Grandmother described Child’s statements from July
11, 2018 as follows:
It was probably about 9:30, [Child] was going to go to
kindergarten that year and we were talking about stranger
danger and don’t ever let anyone touch you or do anything
to you, and he leaned back and he says, Nana—
* * *
And [Child] said, Nana, daddy put his mouth on my pee-
pee, and I just waited a couple seconds and asked if there
was anything else daddy did. Daddy hits me in the head
with his pee-pee and then he rubs it in my hair, and [Child]
said, and he leans back and his eyes go back in his head
and his mouth is like this.
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3 Child refers to Maternal Grandmother as “Nana.” (See N.T. Trial, 11/1/19,
at 51).
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And then I asked if daddy—did daddy ask you to do anything
to him? And he said, daddy wants me to kiss his pee-pee,
but I told him that was gross.
(Id. at 74). Maternal Grandmother confirmed that “pee-pee” is the word Child
uses to refer to his penis. (Id. at 75).
The Commonwealth also called Officer Miller, who testified about
Appellant’s two interviews with police. Although Appellant denied having any
inappropriate contact with Child during the first interview, he subsequently
conceded “that there was one particular incident” where “he accidentally
touched his son’s penis.” (Id. at 95). Appellant estimated that the incident
occurred in June 2018. (Id. at 99). Officer Miller read Appellant’s formal
statement into the record as follows:
In the month of June I was trying to get my son ready for a
bath downstairs in the basement where the garage and the
bathroom are. I got my son undressed and I was tickling
him and I picked him up to—I’m assuming that’s a—zerbert
him on his belly. He was moving around and I accidentally
hit his—I think, hit his pee-pee when I zerberted him and it
was only for a couple of seconds.
(Id. at 101). Finally, Officer Miller provided Appellant’s date of birth and
indicated that Appellant was forty years old at the time of the incident. (Id.
at 102).4
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4 The Commonwealth also presented testimony from Melinda Brown, the
forensic interviewer at the McKean County Children’s Advocacy Center. With
Ms. Brown on the witness stand, the Commonwealth played a recording of her
July 19, 2018 interview with Child. Although a copy of the recording was not
included with the certified record on appeal, the parties’ briefs summarize
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Here, the evidence adduced at trial established that Appellant made
contact with Child’s penis. To the extent Appellant insists the contact was
incidental, the jury rejected Appellant’s explanation, and we will not substitute
our judgment for the factfinder. See Tucker, supra. Regarding the elements
of the offenses at issue, Appellant’s oral contact with Child’s penis established
the elements of “sexual intercourse” and “penetration” necessary to support
the convictions for statutory sexual assault, IDSI, and sexual assault. See
L.N., supra; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101.
Further, viewing the evidence in the light most favor to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, Child’s statements to Maternal
Grandmother provided circumstantial evidence that the contact was for the
purpose of Appellant’s own arousal or gratification. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101;
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a). Because the Commonwealth presented sufficient
evidence to demonstrate the commission of the sex offenses, Appellant’s bald
assertion related to his EWOC and corruption of minors convictions also fails.
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(i). Therefore, Appellant
is not entitled to relief on his sufficiency challenges.
In his final issue, Appellant contends his own trial testimony established
that Maternal Grandmother interfered in his marriage and threatened to
withhold access to Child if Appellant left the marriage. In light of Maternal
____________________________________________
Child’s allegations from the interview. (See Appellant’s Brief at 13;
Commonwealth’s Brief at 4).
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Grandmother’s threat, Appellant claims “[t]he notion that the child initially
made the [accusatory] statement to Maternal Grandmother is highly suspect.”
(Appellant’s Brief at 24). Appellant emphasizes “[w]e do not know the context
in which [Child’s statement] was made, or whether it was prompted or elicited
in some way.” (Id.) Under these circumstances, Appellant argues that Child’s
July 2018 statements to the maternal grandparents do “not bear the indicia
of reliability to warrant being admitted as substantive evidence at trial.” (Id.)
Appellant concludes the trial court erred in admitting Child’s out-of-court
statements to his maternal grandparents.5 We disagree.
This Court’s standard of review for issues regarding the admissibility of
evidence is well settled:
Questions concerning the admissibility of evidence are
within the sound discretion of the trial court ... [and] we will
not reverse a trial court’s decision concerning admissibility
of evidence absent an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment,
but is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or
the exercise of judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or
the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as shown
by the evidence of record. [I]f in reaching a conclusion the
trial court [overrides] or misapplies the law, discretion is
then abused and it is the duty of the appellate court to
correct the error.
Commonwealth v. Belknap, 105 A.3d 7, 9-10 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal
denied, 632 Pa. 667, 117 A.3d 294 (2015) (internal citations and quotation
____________________________________________
5Appellant does not raise any argument regarding the admission of Child’s
out-of-court statements from the forensic interview.
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marks omitted).
“Relevance is the threshold for admissibility of evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 358 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc),
appeal denied, 633 Pa. 787, 128 A.3d 220 (2015).
Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a
material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more
or less probable, or tends to support a reasonable inference
or proposition regarding a material fact. Relevant evidence
may nevertheless be excluded if its probative value is
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Commonwealth v. Danzey, 210 A.3d 333, 342 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal
denied, ___ Pa. ___, 219 A.3d 597 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement made by a declarant, which a party
seeks to offer into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement. Pa.R.E. 801(c). Generally, hearsay is not admissible except as
provided by the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, by other rules prescribed by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, or by statute. Pa.R.E. 802. “The rationale
for the hearsay rule is that hearsay is too untrustworthy to be considered by
the trier of fact.” Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 A.2d 554, 559
(Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 590 Pa. 655, 911 A.2d 933 (2006).
“Exceptions have been fashioned to accommodate certain classes of
hearsay that are substantially more trustworthy than hearsay in general, and
thus merit exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. “The tender years exception
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allows for the admission of a child’s out-of-court statement due to the fragile
nature of young victims of sexual abuse.” Commonwealth v. Kriner, 915
A.2d 653, 657 (Pa.Super. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Fink, 791 A.2d
1235, 1248 (Pa.Super. 2002)). The statute governing the tender years
exception provides, in relevant part:
§ 5985.1. Admissibility of certain statements
(a) General rule.—
(1) An out-of-court statement made by a child victim or
witness, who at the time the statement was made was
12 years of age or younger, describing any of the
offenses enumerated in paragraph (2), not otherwise
admissible by statute or rule of evidence, is admissible in
evidence in any criminal or civil proceeding if:
(i) the court finds, in an in camera hearing, that
the evidence is relevant and that the time, content
and circumstances of the statement provide
sufficient indicia of reliability; and
(ii) the child either:
(A) testifies at the proceeding; or
(B) is unavailable as a witness.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5985.1(a)(1).
“Any statement admitted under [Section] 5985.1 must possess
sufficient indicia of reliability, as determined from the time, content, and
circumstances of its making.” Commonwealth v. O'Drain, 829 A.2d 316,
320 (Pa.Super. 2003). “The main consideration for determining when hearsay
statements made by a child witness are sufficiently reliable is whether the
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child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth when the
statement was made.” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 255
(Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 583 Pa. 695, 879 A.2d 782 (2005). Factors
the court may consider when determining reliability include, but are not
limited to, “the spontaneity of the statements, consistency in repetition, the
mental state of the declarant, use of terms unexpected in children of that age
and the lack of a motive to fabricate.” Commonwealth v. Delbridge, 578
Pa. 641, 675, 855 A.2d 27, 47 (2003).
Instantly, the trial court analyzed the reliability of Child’s July 2018
statements to the maternal grandparents as follows:
Child’s statements to [Maternal Grandmother] on July 11,
2018 were spontaneous. Child was not apparently
distressed at the time of disclosure. [Maternal
Grandmother] did not provoke Child’s response by asking
any questions. After Child’s statement, [Maternal
Grandmother] asked Child to show what had happened
between Child and [Appellant] using dolls. Child placed the
dolls into an oral sex position. Child’s statements to
[Maternal Grandfather] that same day were near identical,
showing a consistency in his repetition. The disclosure to
[Maternal Grandfather] was prompted by [Maternal
Grandmother] asking Child to repeat the story, but there
was no pressure put upon Child to do so. There was no
apparent motive to fabricate these allegations. Child used
the term “pee-pee” to describe [Appellant’s] penis, which is
not unexpected for a child of five (5) years of age. These
statements survive the analysis under the first prong of the
Tender Years Hearsay Act.
(Trial Court Opinion, filed April 22, 2020, at 7). Here, the court adequately
considered the relevant factors for determining the reliability of Child’s out-
of-court statements, the record supports its analysis, and we cannot say that
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it abused its discretion in admitting the statements. See Delbridge, supra;Belknap, supra. Thus, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his final claim.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/28/2021
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