PA Waste Transfer, LLC v. Evans Disposal, LLC

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
PA WASTE TRANSFER, LLC : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
EVANS DISPOSAL, LLC, DOUGLAS :
EVANS AND PATRICIA EVANS :
: No. 787 MDA 2019
Appellants :
Appeal from the Order Entered April 12, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County Civil Division at
No(s): CV-1845-2015
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KING, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 31, 2020
Appellants, Evans Disposal, LLC, Douglas Evans, and Patricia Evans,
appeal from the trial court’s April 12, 2019 order, which granted in part
Appellee’s, PA Waste Transfer, LLC (“PA Waste”), request for a preliminary
injunction. We affirm.
PA Waste states the facts underlying this matter as follows:1
The instant action began as a complaint by [PA Waste], a
Pennsylvania Limited Liability Corporation, against Evans Disposal
LLC (“Evans Disposal”), Douglas Evans and Patricia Evans
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1 We rely on PA Waste’s statement of the case because the trial court has not
provided us with a comprehensive case summary, and Appellants’ statement
of the case does not include citations to the record in contravention of
Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4). See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(a)(4) (stating that the statement
of the case shall contain “[a] closely condensed chronological statement, in
narrative form, of all the facts which are necessary to be known in order to
determine the points in controversy, with an appropriate reference in each
instance to the place in the record where the evidence substantiating the fact
relied on may be found”).
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(“Individual Defendants”), Appellants here. [PA Waste] filed the
complaint [at] docket CV-1845-2015 with the Northumberland
County Prothonotary on October 31, 2015. The Amended
Complaint avers counts of breach of contract, fraud, unjust
enrichment and piercing the corporate veil. After two rounds of
Preliminary Objections and Amended Complaints, [Appellants]
answered the Second Amended Complaint on May 30, 2016. The
answer contained no counterclaims. Discovery then commenced.
Three weeks later, [Appellants] untimely attempted to join a
different company, Disposal Management Services, Inc., a
Pennsylvania Business Corporation with an address of 154 Quarry
Road, Coal Township, Northumberland County, Pennsylvania, to
the instant action. Due to the untimely petition, the joinder
motion failed and Disposal Management Services was never joined
as a part[y] here.1
1Evans Disposal sued Disposal Management Services under
docket CV-2016-2252 in the Court of Common Pleas of
Northumberland County. That litigation remains pending.[2]
[PA Waste] deposed the [I]ndividual [D]efendants on May 30,
2017. To date, [Appellants] have not attempted to propound
interrogatories, requests for production of documents, requests
for admissions, requests for entry, depositions or any other
discovery.
Discovery was a tortious [sic] affair, with multiple motions to
compel and a vastly incomplete record being produced by
[Appellants]. After several discovery[-]related orders, [the trial
court] issued [its] October 4, 2017 [o]rder finding that [PA Waste]
could engage in discovery against the Individual Defendants and
that [PA Waste] had shown a prima facie case to pierce the Evans
Disposal corporate veil.
The Complaint contained copies [of] 32 dishonored checks[,]
which Evans Disposal had not redeemed. Patricia Evans admitted
at deposition that many expenditures made with Evans Disposal
funds were for personal purchases [for] herself and Douglas
Evans, where no records exist of reimbursement to Evans
Disposal, acceptance of draws from the company to the principals,
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2According to Appellants, Disposal Management Services is PA Waste’s “self-
described sister company….” Appellants’ Brief at 10-11. Appellants claim that
Evans Disposal seeks payment of $940,000.00 in damages from it. Id. at 11.
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or other appropriate tax treatment of these transactions valued at
tens of thousands of dollars. The trial court authorized [PA Waste]
to seek tax returns from all [Appellants] after motions practice.
The underlying contract required Evans Disposal, based in
Bloomsburg, Scott Township, Columbia County, to dispose of all
of its collected solid waste at [PA Waste’s] Coal Township,
Northumberland County waste transfer station. In exchange for
this exclusive arrangement, [PA Waste] provided Evans Disposal
with a beneficial disposal rate. However, Evans Disposal refused
to utilize [PA Waste] for much of its disposal needs after the March
11, 2013 contract was executed. [PA Waste] obtained records
from two landfills, Wayne Township Landfill in McElhattan,
Pennsylvania, and Lycoming County Resource Management
Services in Montgomery, Pennsylvania, showing that Evans
Disposal utilized both facilities for substantial waste disposal
activities during the contract term, in breach of the [PA Waste]
contract.
This refusal to use the transfer station was a breach of contract,
which triggered an over $300,000 liquidated damages claim.
Approximately $800,000 in unpaid disposal bills, as well as the
$46,000 in dishonored checks not redeemed, constitute direct
damages in this breach of contract matter. Interest continues to
accrue at 18% per annum, at a rate of $16,000 per month. The
nonpayment of tipping fees also constituted breach of the
underlying contract. [PA Waste], through counsel, notified Evans
Disposal of the breach, including Evans Disposal’s response to the
breach notice in the Complaint.
As part of [a] sale of the May 4, 2016 substantive Evans Disposal
assets to [Fought’s Disposal Service, Inc. (“Fought’s Disposal”)],
Fought[’s Disposal] entered into a $1 million promissory note to
the Individual Defendants, paying the Individual Defendants
approximately $4,300 per month for ten years.[3] Appellants paid
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3We believe this may be a misstatement, as PA Waste stated in its second
petition for injunction that “[o]n May 4, 2016, … Douglas and Patricia Evans
… entered into a contract with Fought’s Disposal…, where [they] were to be
paid payments of $4,306.92 per month over a period of thirty (30) years.”
PA Waste’s Second Petition for Injunction, 1/9/19, at ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
Appellants also acknowledge that Evans Disposal and Fought’s Disposal
executed a promissory note for the purchase price, stating that they agreed
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many vendors, but paid nothing towards the [PA Waste] liability
which was documented in the initial complaint filed eight months
before closing. The Individual Defendants own certain real estate
in Hemlock Township, Columbia County, Pennsylvania known as
17 Pony Trail Drive. Douglas Evans also owns a 1/3 interest in a
property known as 522 Scott, Daytona Beach, Volusia County,
Florida. The Individual Defendants have strived to relocate to
Florida, and were found to have taken tangible steps to relocate
to Daytona Beach. Specifically, the [Individual D]efendants
purchased 1656 Lawrence Circle, Daytona Beach, Florida[,] the
day the injunction now being appealed was signed by [the trial
court], having executed a balloon mortgage days earlier. The
Individual Defendants were served legal documents at their
Lawrence Circle address shortly after the injunction hearing.
In its October 2, 2017 Order, the trial court found that [PA Waste]
had proven a prima facie case to pierce the Evans Disposal
corporate veil concerning both Douglas and Patricia Evans. In that
Order, the trial court authorized limited discovery of personal
assets of both Douglas and Patricia Evans. In prior pleadings and
briefing leading up to this October 2017 Order, [PA Waste] showed
that the Individual Defendants used Evans Disposal as a personal
piggy bank, disregarded what few LLC formalities exist, breached
the exclusive disposal contract, substantially intermingled
personal and corporate funds, and perpetrated a fraud upon [PA
Waste].
In June 2018, [PA Waste] attempted to seek an injunction against
[Appellants] to preserve assets pending trial. [The trial court]
denied this request as not ripe. On April 6, 2019, [the trial court]
held argument on [PA Waste’s] second injunction request, which
[it] granted on April 12, 2019.
At the April injunction hearing, the [c]ourt, substantially relied
upon the existing record, showing a mastery of the prior record in
asking [PA Waste’s] counsel how [PA Waste] intended to show
breach of the contract, indications about the pending move to
Florida, and sale of personal assets.
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that “Fought’s Disposal would pay the sum of $4,306.82 monthly to [Evans
Disposal] at [2.5%] interest per anum for 360 months….” Appellants’ Brief
at 9 (emphasis added). Appellants also note that, “[a]s of the date of the
[h]earing [on the preliminary injunction], Fought’s Disposal was prepaying the
note in an amount of $10,000 per month.” Id. at 9-10.
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Appellants … requested reconsideration of the April 12 Order to
set a bond, and reconsideration was granted for this limited
question. The [c]ourt held its May 22, 2019 bond hearing, where
the trial court set a $300,000 bond. Bond was posted on June 21,
2019.
PA Waste’s Brief at 2-7 (internal citations omitted).
Specifically, in granting in part PA Waste’s request for a preliminary
injunction on April 12, 2019, the trial court ordered that (1) Appellants “are
enjoined from the expenditure of any accelerated payments made by Fought’s
Disposal … over and above the contracted monthly amount”; and that (2)
Appellants are “enjoined from selling, mortgaging, or otherwise encumbering
17 Pony Trail Drive, Bloomsburg, Hemlock Township, Columbia County,
Pennsylvania, except by leave of this [c]ourt.” Order, 4/12/19 (single page).
The trial court determined that this “limited protective order … was necessary
in view of the actions of [Appellants] to take steps to dissipate certain major
assets[,]” and noted that, “[a]t the hearing … on April 9, 2019, it was
established that [the Individual Defendants] were planning on moving to
Florida.” Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 7/29/19, at 3.
Subsequently, Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial
court’s order, and timely complied with the trial court’s instruction to file a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.4
Presently, they set forth the following issues for our review, which we produce
verbatim:
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4An appeal may be taken as of right from an order granting an injunction.
Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4).
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A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
FINDING THAT PA WASTE’S RIGHT TO RELIEF IS CLEAR,
THAT THE WRONG IS MANIFEST, OR IN OTHER WORDS,
THAT PA WASTE IS LIKELY TO PREVAIL ON THE MERITS OF
THE ACTION, AND AS SUCH, THE TRIAL COURT’S APRIL 12,
2019 ORDER SHOULD BE VACATED.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW OR IN
ITS DISCRETION IN ITS ORDER OF APRIL 12, 2019, AS PA
WASTE FAILED TO PROVE THAT GREATER INJURY WOULD
RESULT FROM REFUSING AN INJUNCTION THAN BY
GRANTING IT, AND CONCOMITANTLY, THE ISSUANCE OF
THE INJUNCTION WILL NOT SUBSTANTIALLY HARM OTHER
PARTIES IN THE PROCEEDING, AS THE TRIAL COURT
FAILED TO PROPERLY CONSIDER THE HARM TO EVANS AND
FOUGHT’S DISPOSAL/FOUGHTS AS A RESULT OF
RESTRAINING EVANS FROM RECEIVING PRE-PAYMENT ON
THE SUBJECT PROMISSORY NOTE AND EFFECTIVELY
PREVENTING FOUGHT FROM PRE-PAYING THE
PROMISSORY NOTE.
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW OR IN
ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT AN INJUNCTION WAS
NECESSARY TO PREVENT IMMEDIATE AND IRREPARABLE
HARM THAT COULD NOT ADEQUATELY COMPENSATED BY
DAMAGES, AS EVANS WERE NOT ACTIVELY MARKETING
THEIR HOME IN BLOOMSBURG, COLUMBIA COUNTY,
PENNSYLVANIA, AS OF THE DATE OF THE HEARING, AND
AS SUCH, A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WAS NOT
NECESSARY TO PREVENT IMMEDIATE HARM.
Appellants’ Brief at 6.5
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5 We note that PA Waste argues that Appellants have waived all of their issues
“when they failed to list any issues before the Court when filing their
designation of the contents of the reproduced record[,]” among other things.
PA Waste’s Brief at 10 (unnecessary capitalization and emphasis omitted).
Because our review has not been impeded, we decline to deem their issues
waived or dismiss their appeal. See, e.g., Morgan Guar. Trust Co. of New
York v. Mowl, 705 A.2d 923, 924 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1998) (“Since these
infractions of the rules of appellate procedure are minor in nature and in no
way affect our ability to engage in meaningful appellate review of the issues
involved, we decline to dismiss this appeal.”) (citation omitted).
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At the outset, we acknowledge:
[O]ur review of a trial court’s order granting or denying
preliminary injunctive relief is highly deferential. This highly
deferential standard of review states that in reviewing the grant
or denial of a preliminary injunction, an appellate court is directed
to examine the record to determine if there were any apparently
reasonable grounds for the action of the court below. We will find
that a trial court had apparently reasonable grounds for its denial
of injunctive relief where the trial court has properly found that
any one of the following essential prerequisites for a preliminary
injunction is not satisfied.
There are six essential prerequisites that a party must establish
prior to obtaining preliminary injunctive relief. The party must
show: 1) that the injunction is necessary to prevent immediate
and irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated by
damages; 2) that greater injury would result from refusing an
injunction than from granting it, and, concomitantly, that issuance
of an injunction will not substantially harm other interested parties
in the proceedings; 3) that a preliminary injunction will properly
restore the parties to their status as it existed immediately prior
to the alleged wrongful conduct; 4) that the activity it seeks to
restrain is actionable, that its right to relief is clear, and that the
wrong is manifest, or, in other words, must show that it is likely
to prevail on the merits; 5) that the injunction it seeks is
reasonably suited to abate the offending activity; and, 6) that a
preliminary injunction will not adversely affect the public interest.
The burden is on the party who requested preliminary injunctive
relief….
Warehime v. Warehime, 860 A.2d 41, 46-47 (Pa. 2004) (internal citations,
quotation marks, and footnotes omitted).
In Appellants’ first issue, they argue that PA Waste failed to satisfy the
fourth prerequisite set forth above, contending that “the trial court erred as a
matter of law in finding that PA Waste’s right to relief is clear, that the wrong
is manifest, or in other words, that PA Waste is likely to prevail on the merits
of the action, and as such, the trial court’s April 12, 2019 order should be
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vacated.” Appellants’ Brief at 16 (unnecessary capitalization and emphasis
omitted). Appellants claim that, at the April 9, 2019 hearing, PA Waste “did
not offer any testimony establishing the merits of its case against [them]. PA
Waste did not even make an offer-of-proof as to its proposed testimony on
the merits of its claims when the [t]rial [c]ourt narrowly defined the issue.”
Id. at 17-18. Further, they argue that “[r]eview of the record, including all
pleadings, does not establish a clear right to relief on PA Waste’s claims.” Id.
at 18.
We observe that our Supreme Court has said, “[t]o establish a clear
right to relief, the party seeking an injunction need not prove the merits of
the underlying claim, but need only demonstrate that substantial legal
questions must be resolved to determine the rights of the parties.” SEIU
Healthcare Pennsylvania v. Com., 104 A.3d 495, 506 (Pa. 2014) (citation
omitted). This Court has also observed that “[f]or a right to be ‘clear,’ it must
be more than merely ‘viable’ or ‘plausible.’ However, this requirement is not
the equivalent of stating that no factual disputes exist between the parties.”
Ambrogi v. Reber, 932 A.2d 969, 980 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Thus, “[w]e do not attempt to determine whether the party seeking the
preliminary injunction is guaranteed to prevail because our review of a
decision regarding a preliminary injunction does not reach the merits of the
controversy. The proper question is whether the party seeking the preliminary
injunction produced sufficient evidence to show that ‘substantial legal
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questions must be resolved to determine the rights of the respective parties.’”
Id. (citations omitted).
In the case sub judice, the trial court determined that PA Waste “will
likely prevail to establish a breach of contract here.” TCO at 2. Though
Appellants contrarily insist that a review of the record demonstrates that PA
Waste does not have a clear right to relief, see Appellants’ Brief at 18, they
do not specifically explain why they believe that. For instance, Appellants do
not identify how PA Waste has failed to establish a prima facie showing of
breach of contract, i.e., which elements PA Waste has not demonstrated.
Furthermore, Appellants vaguely claim that they have contested liability and
asserted defenses, without detailing what those defenses are nor articulating
how they have challenged PA Waste’s claims so far. See id. This Court has
maintained that “[w]e shall not develop an argument for [the appellant], nor
shall we scour the record to find evidence to support an argument;
consequently, we deem this issue waived.” J.J. DeLuca Co., Inc. v. Toll
Naval Associates, 56 A.3d 402, 411 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted).
Further, to the extent Appellants argue that “PA Waste did not offer any
testimony establishing the merits of its case against [them],” they provide no
authority conveying that testimony establishing the merits is required.6 See
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6 Appellants provide a citation to Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co.,
Inc., 903 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1990), noting that the court in that case found
that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim based on
“expert testimony.” See Appellant’s Brief at 19-20. Initially, we observe that
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In re S.T.S., Jr., 76 A.3d 24, 42 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[M]ere issue spotting
without analysis or legal citation to support an assertion precludes our
appellate review of a matter.”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we consider
this issue waived. No relief is due on this basis.
In Appellants’ second issue, they challenge the second prerequisite from
the above-stated test, averring that the trial court “erred as a matter of law
or in its discretion in apparently finding … that greater injury would result from
refusing an [i]njunction than granting it and, concomitantly, that the issuance
of an [i]njunction will not substantially harm other interested parties in the
proceedings.” Appellants’ Brief at 21-22. Appellants say that the trial court
“did not consider the impact of its restriction concerning the Fought
promissory note on [the] Evans []or Fought’s Disposal/Foughts.” Id. at 24.
Appellants claim that Douglas and Patricia Evans are only able to meet their
financial obligations through the pre-payment of $10,000.00 on the
promissory note. See id. at 22. Furthermore, Appellants allege that Fought’s
Disposal pre-pays on the note “in an effort to liquidate the balance due to
[Evans Disposal,]” and states that the preliminary injunction “effectively stops
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federal circuit court cases are not binding upon this Court. See
Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1012-13 n.49 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“We
recognize the holdings of federal circuit courts are not binding but may serve
as persuasive authority.”) (citations omitted). Moreover, Appellants provide
a weak analysis of this case, proffering little context for it and providing no
accurate pincites for the propositions they say the 27-page opinion contains.
Further, in their curt analysis of the case, Appellants do not even advance that
the Hoxworth Court held that ‘testimony establishing the merits’ is required,
but only observe that the party had offered expert testimony to support its
claims.
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… Fought’s Disposal from pre-paying…. There are no provisions advising
Fought’s Disposal what to do with the pre-payment. Is it to be held in escrow?
Does Fought’s Disposal receive credit for the payment if it is not paid to [the]
Evans?” Id. at 22, 23. They claim that the trial court “failed to consider the
impact of the restriction on the note[’s] pre-payment on Fought’s Disposal,
which in effect, does not permit it the ability to pre-pay on the note, which is
its contractual right under the promissory note. The [t]rial [c]ourt’s restriction
effectively requires … Fought[’s Disposal] to continue to pay interest on the
balance due and owing to [Evans Disposal] without the ability to pre-pay.”
Id. at 14. Appellants note that Fought’s Disposal was not “joined in the
[p]reliminary [i]njunction proceeding nor had the ability to argue its position
before the trial court.” Id. at 23-24.
To begin, with respect to Appellants’ claim that Douglas and Patricia
Evans cannot meet their financial obligations in light of the injunction, we
deem this claim waived. In their brief, Appellants state that “[the] Evans
presented uncontradicted testimony of their monthly expenses. Only with the
pre-payment of $10,000.00 on the promissory note and their weekly wages
from Fought’s Disposal[] are they able to meet their financial obligations. (RR
59A).” Id. at 22. We reviewed the citation Appellants provided to the
reproduced record, but that citation does not support Appellants’ claim that
Douglas and Patricia Evans cannot meet their financial obligations without the
pre-payment. N.T. Hearing, 4/9/19, at 45. Instead, that citation only shows
that the Evans have a $3,000 monthly payment due to the Internal Revenue
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Service. Id. Appellants do not point us to any other evidence of what further
financial obligations the Evans have, nor do they elaborate on those expenses
in their brief. As we decline to scour the record for evidence on their behalf,
we deem this issue waived. See J.J. DeLuca, supra; see also Pa.R.A.P.
2119(c) (“If reference is made to the pleadings, evidence, charge, opinion or
order, or any other matter appearing in the record, the argument must set
forth, in immediate connection therewith, or in a footnote thereto, a reference
to the place in the record where the matter referred to appears….”).
Next, regarding the pre-payment from Fought’s Disposal, Appellants do
not point us to where they raised this issue below. Our review of the record
indicates that, in Appellants’ Answer and New Matter to PA Waste’s Second
Petition for Injunction, they set forth a new matter, but make no mention of
Fought’s Disposal therein. See Appellants’ Answer and New Matter, 3/1/19,
at ¶¶ 80-89. Similarly, at the hearing on the preliminary injunction,
Appellants did not raise this issue. Accordingly, we deem this issue waived,
as well. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived
and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”); Mason-Dixon Resorts,
L.P. v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 52 A.3d 1087, 1112 (Pa. 2012) (deeming
an issue waived where it was not raised until a motion for reconsideration);
Meyer-Chatfield Corp. v. Bank Financial Services Group, 143 A.3d 930,
938 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“Raising an issue for the first time in a motion for
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reconsideration, however, does not rescue that issue from waiver.”) (citation
omitted).7, 8
Finally, in Appellants’ third issue, they contest the first prerequisite from
the above-stated test, arguing that “because PA Waste has failed to prove
success on the merit[s] of its claim, it cannot prove that it will be immediately
and irreparably harmed by [Appellants’] actions/inactions.” Appellants’ Brief
at 25. Furthermore, they claim that “[w]hile it is true that [Douglas and
Patricia] Evans had signed a listing agreement for the sale of [their 17 Pony
Trail Drive home], the listing agreement …. had expired. There is no testimony
of proposed or planned sale of this [r]eal [e]state[,] nor that the [r]eal
[e]state would be relisted for sale.” Id. (citation omitted). Consequently,
they say that “the [t]rial [c]ourt’s conclusion that PA Waste’s need was
immediate[] was never proven.” Id. at 25-26.
Initially, we note that Appellants have not clearly included this particular
issue in their Rule 1925(b) concise statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii)
(“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with
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7 Though waived, we observe that the plain language of the trial court’s order
does not preclude Fought’s Disposal from pre-paying on the note; rather, it
enjoins Appellants from “the expenditure of any accelerated payments made
by Fought’s Disposal…, over and beyond the contracted monthly amount.”
Order, 4/12/19 (emphasis added). See also PA Waste’s Brief at 16
(“Appellants mischaracterize the injunction as preventing the payor from pre-
paying. Nothing in the [o]rder enjoins Fought[’s Disposal] from pre-paying
into a trust fund under court supervision.”).
8We observe that, when asked at the conclusion of the hearing if Appellants
had any evidence to present, Appellants’ counsel answered no. See N.T.
Hearing, 4/9/19, at 55.
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the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”). Nevertheless, even if
not waived, we would reject this argument. As set forth supra, Appellants
have not convinced us that we should disturb the trial court’s finding that PA
Waste will likely prevail on the merits. Moreover, with respect to 17 Pony Trail
Drive, even though the listing agreement has expired and there is no evidence
of a new listing agreement, there was other evidence submitted at the hearing
supporting that Douglas and Patricia Evans planned to move as soon as
possible. Specifically, the trial court found that “[a]t the hearing that occurred
on April 9, 2019, it was established that [Douglas and Patricia Evans] were
planning on moving to Florida. Not only did [they] place their marital property
for sale, they also bought a one[-]third interest in a home in Florida, started
selling their assets, told people they were moving to Florida as soon as
possible, and began leaving assets in Florida, such as their motorcycle.” TCO
at 3 (citations omitted). Appellants do not challenge these findings.
Moreover, the Evans concede themselves in their brief that they intend to
move to Florida. See Appellants’ Brief at 10 (“The Evans do intend to relocate
to the State of Florida.”). Accordingly, Appellants’ argument regarding the
expired listing does not persuade us, and we conclude that no relief is due on
this basis.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 03/31/2020
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