Yochim, J. v. Patel, P.

J-A23003-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JOHN YOCHIM, AS THE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE : PENNSYLVANIA
OF: VICTOR YOCHIM :
:
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
: No. 325 EDA 2020
:
PRAFULKUMAR A. PATEL AND :
MURRAY RESNICH :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 9, 2020
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Civil Division at No(s): No. 160503157.
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 29, 2020
John Yochim, Administrator of his father Victor Yochim’s (“Mr. Yochim”)
Estate, appeals from a judgment awarding the Estate damages for medical
bills that Mr. Yochim incurred following a car accident. The Administrator
raises ten appellate issues; nine warrant no relief. However, counsel for a
defendant, Prafulkumar Patel, confessed error – namely, the parties agreed
to an amount of medical expenses that was larger than the jury awarded. We
therefore grant the Administrator judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(“JNOV”), vacate the appealed-from judgment, and remand.
On the evening of December 8, 2014, Mr. Patel was attempting a left
turn out of a shopping center, onto a four-lane road. The first two lanes,
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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heading to Mr. Patel’s right, were bumper to bumper. Murray Resnick, inching
forward in the tight traffic, stopped his vehicle to allow Mr. Patel to go in front
of him and make the left turn. The two left-bound lanes flowed freely. Mr.
Resnick waved Mr. Patel on.
Mr. Patel started his left turn into the left-bound lanes. He carelessly
entered the path of Mr. Yochim, who, according to Mr. Patel, was speeding at
50 or 60 miles per hour. See Trial Court Opinion, 12/11/19, at 6. Mr. Yochim
collided with Mr. Patel’s vehicle. A four-car accident ensued. Mr. Yochim sued
Mr. Patel and Mr. Resnick for negligence. While this lawsuit was pending, Mr.
Yochim died from unrelated causes, and the Administrator was substituted as
plaintiff. Prior to trial, the parties stipulated Mr. Yochim’s medical bills from
the accident were $9,549.91. See N.T., 8/9/19, at 61.
The jury found Mr. Patel 75% negligent, Mr. Yochim 25% negligent, and
Mr. Resnick 0% negligent. The jury awarded Mr. Yochim’s medical expenses
as $7,274.95 — $2,274.96 less than the stipulated amount. The trial court
then reduced the verdict to $5,456.21 for comparative negligence and added
$441.66 in delay damages. This brought the final judgment to $5,897.87.
The Administrator filed a post-trial motion for a new trial, which the trial
court denied. This timely appeal followed.
The Administrator raises three main issues, each with numerous sub-
issues. His main issues are general ideas, rather than specific claims of error.
We therefore list and reorder the Administrator’s sub-issues for clarity and
ease of disposition. The sub-issues are:
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1. Whether the trial court erred by permitting Mr. Patel
to testify regarding Mr. Yochim’s speed.
2. Whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence
regarding Mr. Yochim’s non-musculoskeletal medical
condition.
3. Whether the trial court erred by charging the jury on
the affirmative defense of limited tort.
4. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to charge the
jury on the doctrine of sudden emergency.
5. Whether the trial court erred by concluding that its
decision to reduce the verdict by 25% was not against
the weight of the evidence.
6. Whether the jury’s finding that Mr. Resnick was not
negligent was against the weight of the evidence.
7. Whether the jury’s finding that Mr. Yochim was 25%
at fault for the car accident was against the weight of
the evidence.
8. Whether the jury’s finding that Mr. Yochim had no lost
wages was against the weight of the evidence.
9. Whether the trial court erred by failing to award Mr.
Yochim a new trial in light of the cumulative effect of
the above alleged errors.
10. Whether the jury erred as a matter of law by ignoring
the trial court’s instruction not to adjust the damages
for past medical expenses.
See Administrator’s Brief at 6, 64, 68, 77, 80, 85, 87, 88, 91, 92, 94.
1. The First Eight Sub-Issues
We begin with the first eight of the Administrator’s sub-issues, which
involved evidentiary matters, the trial court’s jury instructions, and claims that
the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
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As the Administrator observes at the outset of his brief, this Court
reviews such claims for an “abuse of discretion.” Administrator’s Brief at 4-5
(citing Czimmer v. Janssen Pharm, Inc., 122 A.3d 1043, 1051 (Pa. Super.
2015) (regarding the denial of a motion for a new trial); Lykes v. Yates, 77
A.3d 27, 20 (Pa. Super. 2013) (regarding evidentiary rulings); Krepps v.
Snyder, 112 A.3d 1246, 1256 (Pa. Super. 2015) (regarding jury instructions);
and Ditz v. Marshall, 393 A.2d 701, 703 (Pa. Super. 1978) (regarding
weight-of-the-evidence claims)). Notably absent from the Administrator’s
brief is the definition of an abuse of discretion.
“An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment. Rather, an
abuse of discretion exists if the trial court renders a judgment that is
manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious; or if it fails to apply the law;
or was motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Ambrogi v. Reber,
932 A.2d 969, 974 (2007) (emphasis added).
In all of his appellate arguments, the Administrator argues to this Court
as if we review such issues de novo. In other words, he asserts the trial court
made errors of judgment and asks us to review these issues anew. The
Administrator’s misunderstanding of our deferential role in these matters
manifests in the first 60 pages of his brief. There, he relates the entire case,
procedural step by procedural step, as if we could rehear this matter from
square one.
When the Administrator eventually makes an argument, he focuses on
what he deems were “prejudicial, reversible errors” that the trial court made.
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E.g., Administrator’s Brief at 64, 68. He claims the “trial court erred as matter
of law in charging the jury.” Id. at 77, 80. Or that “the verdict is so contrary
to the evidence that it shocks one’s sense of justice and a new trial is
necessary . . . .” Id. 84. However, these are all arguments a party makes to
the trial court in the first instance. They are not appropriate arguments to an
appellate court under the abuse-of-discretion standard of review.
Instead, the Administrator needed to contend and explain to this Court
how and where the trial court abused its discretion. The Administrator never
claims (much less convinces us) that the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, the
jury charges, or determination that the verdict did not shock the trial court’s
sense of justice were “manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious;
[failed] to apply the law; or [were] motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias, or
ill will.” Ambrogi, supra. Essentially, the Administrator disagrees with the
judgments of the trial court. He believes those judgments on evidence, the
jury charge, and the weight of the evidence were erroneous. He wants us to
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on issues that are within the
lower court’s sound discretion. This we may not do.
A mere error in judgment — even one with which we disagree — does
not constitute an abuse of discretion. See id. The Administrator’s first eight
arguments, which ask us to review discretionary judgments of the trial court
de novo, fail to persuade us an abuse of discretion occurred. Therefore, we
dismiss the Administrator’s first eight sub-issues as warranting no appellate
relief.
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2. Cumulative Effect of the Alleged Errors
For his ninth sub-issue, the Administrator asserts that, if none of the
trial court’s alleged errors in judgment warrant a new trial individually, then
their cumulative, prejudicial effect upon the proceedings do. Because the
Administrator has not convinced us that any of his first eight issues warrant
relief, their cumulative effect upon the trial cannot serve as a basis to award
him a new trial. His cumulative-effect claim is meritless.
3. The Medical Bills
Finally, as his tenth sub-issue, the Administrator argues that the jury’s
verdict awarding him a fraction of Mr. Yochim’s medical bills was against the
weight of the evidence. See Administrator’s Brief at 85-86. During oral
argument, counsel for Mr. Patel conceded to the merits of this claim, because
the parties stipulated that Mr. Yochim’s medical bills were $9,549.91, but the
jury only awarded $7,274.95.
The Administrator correctly observes that the record evidence does not
support that lesser award. Nothing supports the jury’s decision not to
compensate the Administrator in full for Mr. Yochim’s medical expenses. The
parties stipulated to the amount, and the trial court could have awarded the
Administrator a directed verdict on the amount of economic damages, had it
been requested.
As such, there was no rational basis for the trial court to conclude the
jury’s unsupported award for medical-expenses did not shock its sense of
justice. Not only was the award of $7,274.95 against the weight of the
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evidence at trial, it flew in the face of the only evidence of record — i.e., the
parties’ stipulation. Hence, the jury’s reduced award was blatantly arbitrary
and capricious. As such, the trial court’s decision to sustain the
unsubstantiated reduction was equally arbitrary and capricious. This was no
“mere error in judgment,” because a reasonable person, following the law and
stipulated facts, could not possibly reach this result. Ambrogi, supra.
As such, we turn to the question of remedy. The Administrator contends
he deserves a new trial. We disagree.
The parties stipulated to Mr. Yochim’s medical bills. Thus, no issues of
material fact remain in dispute; a retrial is pointless. Instead, we grant the
Administrator a JNOV of $9,549.91 for medical expenses, which we reduce to
$7,162.43.1 We remand to the trial court to recalculate the delay damages.
Judgment and order denying post-trial relief vacated. Case remanded
for the entry of an order granting the Administrator JNOV and delay damages
consistent with this decision.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
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1 The $7,162.43 is 75% of the stipulated medical bills, which reflects the jury’s
finding that Mr. Yochim was 25% comparatively negligent.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/29/20
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