Sprouse, M. v. Keller, D.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MONICA SPROUSE : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
DANIEL KELLER AND KIM KELLER, & :
DONALD NEILL AND RE/MAX ACTION : No. 2000 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered May 2, 2019
in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No(s): 2014-28686
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 29, 2020
Monica Sprouse (“Sprouse”) appeals from the Orders granting the
Motions for summary judgment filed by Daniel Keller and Kim Keller (the
“Kellers”), Donald B. Neill (“Neill”), and Re/Max Action (“Re/Max”)
(sometimes collectively referred to as “Defendants”), and dismissing
Sprouse’s Complaint with prejudice. We affirm.
On November 27, 2012, Sprouse injured herself in the home in which
she and her family resided (the “Residence”).1 Sprouse fell while walking up
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1 Sprouse was a minor at the time of her fall.
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the stairs that connect the first floor to the second floor.2 Sprouse’s mother,
Cheryl Sprouse (“Cheryl”), rented the Residence from the Kellers. Re/Max
and Neill, an employee of Re/Max, managed rental of the Residence for the
Kellers.
On October 23, 2014, Cheryl, on behalf of Sprouse, filed a Complaint
in Personal Injury against the Kellers, alleging that the Kellers were
negligent in, inter alia, failing to keep the stairs free of defects. On June 2,
2015, the Kellers filed an Answer and New Matter. 3 On November 16, 2016,
the trial court granted Sprouse’s Motion to amend her Complaint to include
additional defendants, and to assert the claims on her own behalf instead of
by and through Cheryl, because she had reached the age of 18. On
November 23, 2016, Sprouse filed an Amended Complaint against
Defendants, restating the claims from her October 23, 2014, Complaint
against the Kellers, and asserting the same claims against Re/Max and Neill.
On October 29, 2018, Defendants filed Motions for Summary
Judgment, arguing that the evidence did not establish that they had
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2 Sprouse explains that the stairs “have an ‘L’ shaped design …, with a
landing three (3) steps up from the first floor, and an additional nine (9)
steps to reach the second floor. … The acident [sic] at issue occurred when
[Sprouse] was walking up the initial 3 steps….” Brief for Appellant at 8.
Sprouse claims that the stairs were defective because they lacked a handrail
along the first three steps, and that the absence of a handrail caused her
fall. Id. at 8-15.
3 Sprouse served the Complaint on the Kellers on March 9, 2015.
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breached a duty of care owed to Sprouse. Specifically, the Kellers argued
that they did not owe a duty of care to Sprouse, because they were out-of-
possession landlords. Re/Max and Neill argued that they did not owe a duty
of care to Sprouse, because they were not the owners of, nor responsible for
maintaining, the Residence. On May 2, 2019, the trial court entered Orders
granting Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. Sprouse filed a
timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise
Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
On appeal, Sprouse raises the following question for our review: “Did
the lower court err and/or abuse its discretion when it granted [Defendants’]
Motion[s] for Summary Judgment and dismissed [Sprouse]’s Complaint with
prejudice?” Brief for Appellant at 4.
In reviewing an order granting summary judgment, our
scope of review is plenary…. An appellate court may reverse the
entry of a summary judgment only where it finds that the lower
court erred in concluding that the matter presented no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that it is clear that the moving
party was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In making
this assessment, we view the record in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the
moving party. As our inquiry involves solely questions of law,
our review is de novo.
Thus, our responsibility as an appellate court is to
determine whether the record either establishes that the
material facts are undisputed or contains insufficient evidence of
facts to make out a prima facie cause of action, such that there
is no issue to be decided by the fact-finder. If there is evidence
that would allow a fact-finder to render a verdict in favor of the
non-moving party, then summary judgment should be denied.
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Gerber v. Piergrossi, 142 A.3d 854, 858 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation
omitted).
Sprouse argues that the trial court erred when it granted Defendants’
Motions for Summary Judgment. Brief for Appellant at 24-56. Regarding
the Kellers’ Motion, Sprouse acknowledges that landlords are generally not
liable for injuries suffered by their tenants, but argues that an exception to
this rule applies. Id. at 28-30. Sprouse cites Goodman v. Corn Exchange
National Bank & Trust Co., 200 A. 642 (Pa. 1938), and claims that a
landlord can incur liability “if the lessor fails to make repairs after having
been given notice of and a reasonable opportunity to remedy a dangerous
condition existing on the leased premises.” Brief for Appellant at 28-29.
Sprouse claims that the Kellers had actual or constructive notice that the
stairs were defective. Id. at 34-39. Sprouse states that the Kellers had
visited the Residence many times before the accident, and should have
known that the lack of a handrail created a dangerous condition.4 Id. at 31-
34.
The elements necessary to plead an action in negligence
are: (1) the existence of a duty or obligation recognized by
law, requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of
conduct; (2) a failure on the part of the defendant to conform to
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4Sprouse also argues that an exculpatory provision found within the lease
between Cheryl and the Kellers does not absolve the Kellers of liability.
However, in light of our disposition, we need not address this claim.
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that duty, or a breach thereof; (3) a causal connection between
the defendant’s breach and the resulting injury; and (4) actual
loss or damage suffered by the complainant.
Atcovitz v. Gulph Mills Tennis Club, Inc., 812 A.2d 1218, 1222 (Pa.
2002) (emphasis added).
The liability of a landlord to his tenant for injuries the
tenant sustains on the premises is based upon the following
principles:
(1) in the absence of any provision in the lease, a
landlord is under no obligation to repair the leased
premises, to see to it that they are fit for rental or to
keep the premises in repair; (2) a tenant takes the
premises as he finds them and the landlord is
not liable for existing defects of which the
tenant knows or can ascertain by a reasonable
inspection; (3) a landlord out of possession,
however, may be liable (a) where he conceals a
dangerous condition of which he has knowledge and
of which the tenant has no knowledge or cannot be
expected to discover and (b) where he knows or
should know of a dangerous condition and leases the
premises for a purpose involving a ‘public use’ and
has reason to believe the tenant will not first correct
the condition; (4) a landlord of a multiple-tenanted
building, reserving control of the common
approaches, such as sidewalks, passageways, etc.,
or parts of the building common to all tenants, such
as the roof and walls, is bound to keep such
approaches and parts reasonably safe for the use of
tenants and their invitees and a landlord becomes
liable where he either had actual notice of a
defective condition therein or was chargeable with
constructive notice, because had he exercised
reasonable inspection he would have become aware
of it.
Cholewka v. Gelso, 193 A.3d 1023, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2018) (emphasis
added).
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Here, the Kellers were the landlords of the Residence. See Amended
Complaint, 11/23/16, at ¶¶ 1-4 (stating that Sprouse resided at the
Residence, and the Kellers were the “owner[s], operator[s], maintainer[s],
possessor[s], lessor[s], lessee[s] and/or otherwise legally responsible for the
care, control and or safety of” the Residence); Lease, 5/23/12, at 1
(identifying the Kellers as the Landlords and Cheryl as the tenant of the
Residence). Additionally, the first three stairs did not contain a railing when
Sprouse moved into the Residence, and Sprouse was aware that the first
three steps lacked a railing. See N.T. (Deposition of Cheryl), 4/26/18, at 18
(wherein Cheryl stated that, because the first three stairs lacked a railing,
she taught Sprouse how to safely walk up the stairs). Finally, Sprouse has
not alleged that any of the above-stated exceptions apply.
Additionally, Goodman is inapplicable to the instant case. Goodman
involved a personal injury claim that was filed by a business invitee against
the landlord of a building. See Goodman, 200 A. at 643. The Goodman
Court stated that a landlord owes a duty of care to a business invitee where
the landlord has been given notice of, and fails to remedy, a dangerous
condition. Id. In the instant case, Sprouse was a tenant, not a business
invitee. See Keck v. Doughman, 572 A.2d 724, 728-29 (Pa. Super. 1990)
(setting forth the difference between an “invitee” and a “tenant”).
Accordingly, the Kellers did not owe a duty of care to Sprouse, and the trial
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court did not err in dismissing Sprouse’s Amended Complaint against the
Kellers. See Daley, supra.
Regarding the Motion filed by Re/Max and Neill, Sprouse argues that
the trial court erred in finding that Re/Max and Neill did not owe a duty of
care to Sprouse. See Brief for Appellant at 39-42. Sprouse claims that Neill
and Re/Max owe Sprouse a duty of care as rental agents for the Residence.
Id.
Here, Sprouse makes bald assertions that Re/Max and Neill owe her a
duty of care, without citing to any relevant legal authority or developing any
meaningful argument. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing that an appellant’s
argument shall include “such discussion and citation of authorities as are
deemed pertinent.”) “[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any
discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the
issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is
waived.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009). It
is not the role of this Court to “formulate [an a]ppellant’s arguments for
him.” Id. at 925. Because Sprouse has failed to establish that Re/Max and
Neill owe her a duty of care, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
dismissing Sprouse’s Amended Complaint against Re/Max and Neill. See
Atcovitz, supra; Daley, supra.
Orders affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/29/20
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