Com. v. Platts, S.

J-S57020-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
STEVEN JOSEPH PLATTS
Appellant No. 748 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 11, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County
Criminal Division at No: CP-54-CR-0001120-2018
BEFORE: BOWES, STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JANUARY 21, 2020
Appellant, Steven Joseph Platts, appeals from the April 11, 2019
judgment of sentence imposing 4 to 23 months of incarceration for criminal
trespass and receipt of stolen property.1 We affirm.
The charges against Appellant arose from a series of offenses at the
former St. Kieran’s Roman Catholic Church and an attached school in
Schuylkill County from April 10, 2008 to May 7, 2018. The church and school
are vacant and no longer in use. The record reflects that Appellant and his
friend John Stiles, who ran a junk removal business, were removing sections
of pews from the church and selling them on eBay. On appeal, Appellant
argues the record does not support his trespass conviction because there was
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3503, 3925.
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insufficient evidence as to who owned the church. Appellant also claims he
was entitled to believe that Stiles had permission to enter the church in
furtherance of his junk removal business. As to the receipt of stolen property
conviction, Appellant claims there is no evidence he knew the pews were
stolen.
The Commonwealth filed an information on July 30, 2018 charging
Appellant with the aforementioned offenses and several others. At the
conclusion of a February 15, 2019 trial, a jury found Appellant guilty of
trespass and receiving stolen property but not guilty of the remaining charges.
This timely appeal followed the trial court’s April 11, 2019 sentence. Appellant
challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence as to both of his
convictions.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as follows:
In reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, we must
determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all
the elements of the offense. Additionally, to sustain a conviction,
the facts and circumstances which the Commonwealth must
prove, must be such that every essential element of the crime is
established beyond a reasonable doubt. Admittedly, guilt must be
based on facts and conditions proved, and not on suspicion or
surmise. Entirely circumstantial evidence is sufficient so long as
the combination of the evidence links the accused to the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s
guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so
weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The fact
finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented
at trial.
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Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d 133, 136 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations
omitted), appeal denied, 44 A.3d 1161 (Pa. 2012).
We will consider Appellant’s convictions in turn. Section 3503 of the
Pennsylvania Crimes Code, governing criminal trespass, provides in relevant
part as follows:
(a) Buildings and occupied structures.--
(1) A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not
licensed or privileged to do so, he:
(i) enters, gains entry by subterfuge or surreptitiously
remains in any building or occupied structure or separately
secured or occupied portion thereof; or
(ii) breaks into any building or occupied structure or
separately secured or occupied portion thereof.
(2) An offense under paragraph (1)(i) is a felony of the third
degree, and an offense under paragraph (1)(ii) is a felony of the
second degree.
(3) As used in this subsection:
“Breaks into.” To gain entry by force, breaking,
intimidation, unauthorized opening of locks, or through an
opening not designed for human access.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a).
Appellant claims the evidence for his criminal trespass conviction is
insufficient because there was no evidence of ownership of the church, and
because he believed Stiles, who died prior to trial, had permission to enter the
church in furtherance of his junk removal business. The record does not
support Appellant’s argument. The Commonwealth presented the testimony
of David Pedron, the realtor who sold the church to its current owner. Pedron
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identified the current owner, and he testified that the church was locked and
not open to the public. N.T. Trial, 2/15/19, at 31-33. Corporal Peter Mohn of
the Pennsylvania State Police testified that the church had a broken window
and a door that had been tampered with, although both could have been
related to prior incidents. Id. at 54, 64. Officer Gerard Daley testified that
Appellant initially denied involvement, but then turned himself in and
confessed to the crimes. Id. at 97. Officer Daley read Appellant’s confession
into the record. Id. at 98-99. In that confession, Appellant admitted to being
inside of the church 13 times cutting and removing pews. Id. In his trial
testimony, Appellant denied that he was ever inside the church. Id. at 155.
The Commonwealth also introduced video footage of Appellant buying a pry
bar at Walmart. Id. at 45, 78. The UPC on the pry bar Appellant purchased
matched the UPC on pry bar packaging found at the church. Id. at 71-72.
Markings on a broken door at the church were consistent with pry bar damage.
Id. at 54, 58. And while the record indicates that the church had been broken
into on several prior occasions, the record also reflects that the damage from
prior break-ins had been repaired. Id. at 33-34, 39.
Thus, Pedron’s testimony confirms that neither Stiles nor Appellant had
permission to enter the church. The record, read in a light most favorable to
the Commonwealth, supports an inference that Appellant broke in to the
church using a pry bar. Furthermore, the jury was entitled to credit
Appellant’s confession and discredit the exculpatory testimony he gave at trial.
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Appellant also claims the evidence of trespass is insufficient because the
owner of the church did not testify, and because no deed was produced.
Appellant cites no law in support of his claim that the Commonwealth was
required to offer a deed or the testimony of the owner. The record reflects
that the owner of the church is elderly and living in New York City. Id. at 32.
Thus, the Commonwealth chose not to have him travel to testify. In any
event, Appellant fails to explain why the evidence of the break-in and the
evidence of his guilty mind apparent from his conflicting confession and
testimony, is not sufficient to establish his lack of license or privilege to enter
the church. For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude the Commonwealth
produced sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction for criminal trespass.
Next, Appellant claims the Commonwealth produced insufficient
evidence in support of his conviction for receiving stolen property.
(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of theft if he
intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of
another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has
probably been stolen, unless the property is received, retained, or
disposed with intent to restore it to the owner.
(b) Definition.--As used in this section the word
“receiving” means acquiring possession, control or title, or lending
on the security of the property.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925. Appellant claims he believed Stiles was authorized to
enter the church to remove the pews in furtherance of his junk removal
business, and that Appellant merely sold the pews on eBay without ever
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having entered the church. In other words, Appellant claims he did not know
the pews were stolen or have any reason to believe they were probably stolen.
As we have already explained, Appellant gave varying accounts of his
actions, and the jury was entitled to believe his confession, wherein he stated
that he participated in removing the pews from the church. Further, the
record, read in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, supports an
inference that the church was broken into, and that a pry bar Appellant
purchased was used in the break-in. For these reasons, we conclude that
sufficient evidence supports a finding that Appellant knew the church pews
were stolen.
Appellant also purports to challenge the weight of the evidence in
support of both convictions. Rule 607 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires a defendant to raise a weight of the evidence claim in a
motion for a new trial on the record, either before, during, or after
sentence. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A). Failure to do so constitutes waiver.
Commonwealth v. Gillard, 850 A.2d 1273, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal
denied, 863 A.2d 1143 (Pa. 2004). At the sentencing hearing, prior to
imposition of sentence, Appellant moved for judgment of acquittal. N.T.
Sentencing, 4/11/19, at 2. He did not move for a new trial. Because Appellant
never moved for a new trial as required under Rule 607, he has waived his
weight of the evidence challenges.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/21/2020
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