Lynn, K. v. Aria Health System

J-A17017-19
2020 Pa. Super. 11
KENNETH LYNN, CHARLIE AGNEW, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
AND MARGARET KNAPP, ON BEHALF : PENNSYLVANIA
OF THEMSELVES :
:
:
v. :
:
:
ARIA HEALTH SYSTEM, ARIA : No. 3741 EDA 2017
HEALTH, ROY A. POWELL, AND :
MICHAEL E. PEPE :
:
Appellants :
Appeal from the Order May 15, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): November Term, 2009 No. 004104
KENNETH LYNN, ACADIA WILCOX, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LORETTA MCDONNEL AND : PENNSYLVANIA
GERARDINA ILARIA :
:
:
v. :
:
:
JEFFERSON HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., : No. 3742 EDA 2017
THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY :
HOSPITALS, INC., MAGEE :
REHABILITATION HOSPITAL, MAIN :
LINE HEALTH, INC., ALBERT :
EINSTEIN HEALTHCARE NETWORK, :
AND ARIA HEALTH SYSTEM :
:
Appellants :
Appeal from the Order May 15, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): No. 004107 Nov. Term 2009
KENNETH LYNN, ACADIA WILCOX, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LORETTA MCDONNELL, AND : PENNSYLVANIA
GERARDINA ILARIA, ON BEHALF OF :
THEMSELVES AND OTHERS :
SIMILARLY SITUATED :
J-A17017-19
:
:
v. :
: No. 3743 EDA 2017
:
JEFFERSON HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., :
THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY :
HOSPITALS, INC., MAGEE :
REHABILITATION HOSPITAL, MAIN :
LINE HEALTH INC., ALBERT :
EINSTEIN HEALTHCARE NETWORK, :
AND ARIA HEALTH SYSTEM :
:
:
APPEAL OF: ALBERT EINSTEIN :
HEALTHCARE NETWORK :
Appeal from the Order May 15, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): November Term, 2009 No. 004107
JOHN DUNCHESKIE, DIANE READ, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
THELMA HARRIS AND ELEANOR : PENNSYLVANIA
JACKSON, ON BEHALF OF :
THEMSELVES AND OTHERS :
SIMILARLY SITUATED :
:
:
v. :
: No. 3744 EDA 2017
:
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY HEALTH :
SYSTEM, INC., TEMPLE UNIVERSITY :
HOSPITAL INC., EPISCOPAL :
HOSPITAL, JEANES HOSPITAL, :
TEMPLE UNIVERSITY CHILDREN'S :
MEDICAL CENTER, EDMOND :
NOTEBAERT, AND ROBERT :
BIRNBRAUER :
:
Appellants :
Appeal from the Order May 15, 2017
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J-A17017-19
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): November Term, 2009 No. 004110
CASSANDRA RUFF AND KESHA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
CARDWELL, ON BEHALF OF : PENNSYLVANIA
THEMSELVES AND OTHERS :
SIMILARLY SITUATED :
:
:
v. :
:
: No. 3745 EDA 2017
ALBERT EINSTEIN HEALTHCARE :
NETWORK AND ALBERT EINSTEIN :
MEDICAL CENTER :
:
Appellants :
Appeal from the Order May 15, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): November Term, 2009 No. 004111
COLLETTE DAVIS, ERICA WILLIAMS, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
KEVIN KELLER, AND CHARLENE : PENNSYLVANIA
MURDOCH, ON BEHALF OF :
THEMSELVES AND OTHERS :
SIMILARLY SITUATED :
:
:
v. :
: No. 3746 EDA 2017
:
ABINGTON MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, :
ABINGTON MEMORIAL HEALTH CARE :
CORPORATION, LANSDALE :
HOSPITAL CORPORATION, RICHARD :
L. JONES, JR., AND MEGHAN PATTON :
:
Appellants :
Appeal from the Order May 15, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): November Term, 2009 No. 004106
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J-A17017-19
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
OPINION BY OLSON, J.: FILED JANUARY 22, 2020
Appellants, Aria Health System, et al., appeal from the trial court’s May
15, 2017 orders, which granted the “Motion to Reinstate the Third Amended
Complaint Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(b)” filed by plaintiffs, Kenneth
Lynn, et al. (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”).1 We vacate and remand.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (“Third Circuit”)
summarized the facts and procedural posture of this case, as they existed at
the time the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania dismissed Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint. The Third Circuit
explained:
The five cases on appeal are among several similar actions
brought by a single law firm alleging systemic underpayment
in the healthcare industry. The parties are nurses and other
patient-care professionals, on behalf of a putative class, and
their alleged employers. Allegedly, [Appellants] maintained
three unlawful timekeeping and pay policies (collectively, the
“Policies”). First, under the “Meal Break Deduction Policy,”
[Appellants’] timekeeping system automatically deducted
[30] minutes of pay daily for meal breaks without ensuring
that the employees actually received a break. Second, under
the “Unpaid Pre- and Post–Schedule Work Policy,”
[Appellants] prohibited employees from recording time
worked outside of their scheduled shifts. Third, under the
“Unpaid Training Policy,” [Appellants] did not pay employees
____________________________________________
1 This appeal is composed of five cases and six numbered appeals. In this
opinion, we consider the six consolidated appeals together, as the parties’
filings, the court orders, and the procedural posture in the cases and the
appeals are substantively identical. Therefore, in this opinion, reference to
one record, court order, or court opinion encompasses all five cases and all
six numbered appeals.
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for time spent at “compensable” training sessions. Because
of the Policies, [Plaintiffs] allege that they “regularly worked
hours both under and in excess of [40] per week and were
not paid for all of those hours.”
In November 2009, [Plaintiffs] filed parallel complaints in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania against [Appellants], asserting violations of the
[Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)], 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et
seq.; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq.[fn.4]; and the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961, et seq. Less than one week later, the same
individual plaintiffs filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County, alleging that the Policies violated the
Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law (“PWPCL”),
43 [P.S.] §§ 260.[1], et seq.; the Pennsylvania Minimum
Wage Act (“PMWA”), 43 [P.S.] §§ 333.101, et seq.; and
Pennsylvania common law. [In the case of Davis v.
Abington Memorial Hospital, the plaintiffs’ federal
complaint was docketed at Case No. 09-5520 (hereinafter
“the 2009 Federal Court Docket”) and the plaintiffs’ court of
common pleas complaint was docketed at No. 09-11-4106
(hereinafter “the 2009 Court of Common Pleas Docket”)].
[fn.4] [Plaintiffs’] ERISA claims were: failure to keep
accurate records sufficient to determine benefits in
violation of ERISA's recordkeeping provision under 29
U.S.C. § 1059(a)(1) (ERISA § 209(a)(1)); and breach of
fiduciary duty under 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (ERISA
§ 404(a)(1)).
[Appellants] timely removed [the] . . . state court actions to
federal court, on the basis that several of the claims were
completely preempted by ERISA § 502(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1), and supplemental jurisdiction existed over the
remaining claims because they formed part of the same case
or controversy. The Jefferson Health and Albert Einstein
defendants additionally argued that the plaintiffs' PWPCL and
breach of contract claims were completely preempted by
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29
U.S.C. § 185. The District Court denied [Plaintiffs'] motions
to remand on September 15, 2010, holding that ERISA
preempted the state claims “in full” and LMRA § 301
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completely preempted [Plaintiffs'] PWPCL and breach of
contract claims. In the same order, the [District C]ourt
consolidated each of the state cases with its federal
counterpart and directed [Plaintiffs] to file consolidated
complaints.
[Plaintiffs] filed amended complaints on October 15, 2010,
averring, as before, that [Appellants]: denied them overtime
in violation of the FLSA; failed to keep accurate records and
breached their fiduciary duties in violation of ERISA; and, in
so doing, violated RICO. The amended complaints also
reasserted all of the state law claims. The District Court
granted [Appellants’] joint motions to dismiss in a
consolidated opinion. It found that the amended complaints
did not plausibly allege that [Appellants] were [Plaintiffs']
employers and thus failed to state claims under the FLSA or
ERISA. It also dismissed the RICO claims, on the ground that
the complaints did not adequately allege the predicate act of
mail fraud. Further, it “decline[d] to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction” over the state law claims. The [District Court]
granted [Plaintiffs] leave to amend, but cautioned them to
“remedy the gaping deficiencies” observed by it and other
district courts that have dismissed substantially similar
complaints. In particular, [Plaintiffs] were instructed to
“clari[fy]” whether they were also seeking gap time wages.
After [Plaintiffs] filed a second amended complaint in each
case, the parties stipulated to the filing of third amended
complaints. The third amended complaints, which were filed
on February 10, 2012, abandoned the ERISA and RICO claims
and instead sought relief solely under the FLSA and
Pennsylvania law. [Appellants] moved to dismiss, and the
District Court granted their motions in another consolidated
opinion. [On August 7, 2012, the District Court] dismissed
[Plaintiffs'] FLSA claims with prejudice on the grounds that
they failed to plausibly allege employer-employee
relationships between [Plaintiffs] and [Appellants] or that any
of the named plaintiffs had worked overtime and were not
compensated. The [District C]ourt again “decline[d] to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over the remaining state
law claims[. The District Court’s August 7, 2012 order reads
in full:
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AND NOW, this 7th day of August 2012, upon
consideration of [Appellants’] Motion to Dismiss the Third
Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs’ response in opposition
thereto, and [Appellants’] reply, and for the reasons
stated in the opinion filed this day, it is hereby ORDERED
that the Motions are GRANTED as follows:
1. Plaintiffs’ federal claims are DISMISSED with
prejudice.
2. The [District] Court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims which are DISMISSED without
prejudice to the reassertion of these claims in state
court to the extent Plaintiffs can do so consistent with
the [District] Court’s prior rulings.
The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
It is so ORDERED.
District Court Order, 8/7/12, at 1 (emphasis, citations, and
some capitalization omitted)].
Davis v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 238-240 (3rd Cir. 2014)
(some citations and footnotes omitted).
The District Court did not remand the case to the court of common pleas.
See District Court Order, 8/7/12, at 1.
On October 17, 2012, Plaintiffs filed, in the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County, a “Motion to Reinstate the Complaint Pursuant to 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(b)” (hereinafter “First Motion to Reinstate Complaint”).
Plaintiffs filed this motion at the 2009 Court of Common Pleas Docket. This is
the same docket where Plaintiffs filed their original, court of common pleas
complaint – and was the same action that had been removed to federal court
and never remanded. Within the motion, Plaintiffs declared:
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Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(b), [Plaintiffs] hereby move
[the court of common pleas] to reinstate the complaint which
was originally filed in [the court of common pleas],
subsequently removed to federal court by [Appellants], and
then dismissed from federal court for lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs’ First Motion to Reinstate Complaint, 10/17/12, at ¶ 2.
Plaintiffs attached their original state court complaint – that they filed in
2009 and that Appellants had removed to federal court – to their First Motion
to Reinstate Complaint. See id. at Exhibit A.
On November 7, 2012, Appellants filed a notice in the court of common
pleas, declaring: “[Appellants] do not oppose the relief [P]laintiffs request in
their motions – reinstatement of the complaints in [the court of common
pleas]. In so doing, [Appellants] reserve their rights to challenge the
complaints in all respects by way of preliminary objections.” Appellants’
Notice of No Opposition, 11/7/12, at 1. Nevertheless, on November 16, 2012,
Appellants filed a notice in the court of common pleas, declaring that they had
again removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. Appellants’ Notice of Filing Notice of Removal,
11/16/12, at 1. As a result, on November 19, 2012, the court of common
pleas ruled that Plaintiffs’ First Motion to Reinstate Complaint was moot. Trial
Court Order, 11/16/12, at 1.
In federal court, the cases received new docket numbers. Thus, in the
case of Davis v. Abington Memorial Hospital, the action was docketed at
No. 12-6491 (hereinafter “the 2012 Federal Court Docket”). There, Plaintiffs
filed a motion to remand and asked the District Court to remand the case to
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the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. On September 1, 2016, the
District Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion to remand because Appellants “filed
the notices of removal before the [court of common pleas] ruled on [Plaintiffs’
First Motion to Reinstate Complaint]” and Appellants’ notice of removal was,
thus, premature. Davis v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., No. 2:12-cv-06491-CMR
(E.D.Pa. 2016), at 4. The District Court reasoned:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446, “[t]he notice of removal of a civil
action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after the
receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a
copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief
upon which such action or proceeding is based.” As
[Appellants] filed the notices of removal before the state
court ruled on Plaintiffs’ motions to reinstate, there is no “civil
action or proceeding” in state court to be removed. This is
especially important because, were the state court to have
ruled upon the motions, it is unclear that they would have
been granted, and thus that the actions would be reinstated.
...
Plaintiffs’ motions were filed pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103,
which allows litigants to transfer a matter to Pennsylvania
state court where it was “filed in any United States court for
a district embracing any part of this Commonwealth and . . .
is dismissed by the United States court for lack of
jurisdiction.” The statute requires litigants to file a “certified
transcript of the final judgment of the United States court and
the related pleadings in a court or magisterial district of this
Commonwealth.” While Plaintiffs’ motions attached a copy of
their original state court complaint, Plaintiffs did not attach
their Third Amended Complaint, the operative federal court
pleading as required by statute. Moreover, § 5103 applies
only where the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
and the claims that Plaintiffs seek to reinstate are those in
their original complaint, which were not dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction but because the [District] Court found that they
were preempted. The [District] Court dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction only the remaining state-law claims as alleged in
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the Third Amended Complaint, which were different from
those Plaintiffs originally asserted in their initial state court
complaint. As a result, it is possible and even likely that the
state court would not have granted Plaintiffs’ motions to
reinstate, and thus that there would never be an action to
remove. Under these circumstances, the [District] Court
finds that removal was premature, and therefore will grant
the motions to remand.
...
Plaintiffs argue that [Appellants’] notices of removal
disregarded [the District] Court’s “unambiguous order
holding that it lacked jurisdiction over all remaining state law
claims.” As discussed, however, the [District] Court did not
hold that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims in the original
state court complaint that Plaintiff sought to reinstate. If
Plaintiffs had complied with [the District] Court’s orders by
seeking to reinstate the state-law claims in their Third
Amended Complaints, rather than complaints that assert
claims [the District] Court has already held to be preempted
by ERISA, these removal actions and the resulting litigation
could have been avoided. As the state court has dismissed
Plaintiffs’ motions to reinstate as moot, Plaintiffs have an
opportunity to remedy their mistake and comply with [the
District] Court’s orders should they choose to pursue their
claims again in state court.
Id. at 4-6 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
Thus, on September 1, 2016, the District Court entered an order, which
granted Plaintiffs’ motions to remand, remanded the cases to the court of
common pleas, and ordered the clerk of courts to close the cases in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Id. at 6. The District Court’s order was filed
in the court of common pleas on September 27, 2016. See Docket Entry, at
9/27/16.
On November 17, 2016, Plaintiffs filed, at the 2009 Court of Common
Pleas Docket, their “Motion to Reinstate the Third Amended Complaint
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Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(b)” (hereinafter “Motion to Reinstate the
Third Amended Complaint”). The motion declared: “[p]ursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 5103(b), [Plaintiffs] hereby move [the trial c]ourt to reinstate their Third
Amended Complaint related to this action that was previously filed in the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania . . . after removal of this case to federal court,
which the federal court then dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Plaintiffs’
Motion to Reinstate the Third Amended Complaint, 11/17/16, at ¶ 1. Plaintiffs
attached their Third Amended Complaint, which they filed at the 2009 Federal
Court Docket, to their motion. See id. at Exhibit A.
Appellants responded to Plaintiffs’ motion and requested that the trial
court deny the motion because: the trial court “has no jurisdiction over this
action any longer, as the docket was permanently closed in 2010 after a
federal court denied a motion to remand filed by Plaintiffs;” even if the docket
were active, Section 5103(b) does not permit the reinstatement of Plaintiffs’
claims because the claims were not dismissed, transferred, or remanded for
lack of jurisdiction; and, even if Section 5103(b) were applicable, denial would
still be necessary because Plaintiffs waited more than four years to seek
reinstatement of their claims and, thus, Plaintiffs did not “promptly” seek
relief. Appellants’ Response, 12/7/16, at 2.
On May 15, 2017, the trial court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reinstate
the Third Amended Complaint. Trial Court Order, 5/17/17, at 1. Appellants
later filed a petition, in this Court, seeking immediate appeal from the trial
court’s May 15, 2017 interlocutory order. Appellants’ Petition for Review,
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8/14/17, at 1-20; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b). We granted the petition
for review on November 29, 2017 and the current appeal is now before this
Court.
On appeal, Appellants raise two questions:
[1.] Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it
exercised jurisdiction over an action that was removed to
federal court in 2009 and not remanded[?]
[2.] Whether [42 Pa.C.S.A.] § 5103(b) allows [Plaintiffs] to
“reinstate” in the court of common pleas state law claims
when (1) the federal court chose not to exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) after
dismissing with prejudice the only federal claims present in
the action; and (2) Plaintiffs waited more than four years
after the state law claims were dismissed by the federal court
before taking any action to assert those claims in state
court[?]
Appellants’ Brief at 2 (some capitalization omitted).
First, Appellants claim that the trial court erred when it granted Plaintiffs’
Motion to Reinstate the Third Amended Complaint because the trial court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction over the action. Specifically, Appellants
claim that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the action because,
after the action was removed to federal court in 2009, the federal court did
not remand the case back to the court of common pleas. We agree.
“It is well-settled that the question of subject matter jurisdiction may
be raised at any time, by any party, or by the court sua sponte.” Grom v.
Burgoon, 672 A.2d 823, 824-825 (Pa. Super. 1996). The question of subject
matter jurisdiction “is purely one of law;” therefore, our standard of review
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over this issue is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 929 A.2d 205, 211 (Pa. 2007).
Section 1446 of the United States Judicial Code (28 U.S.C. § 1446) is
titled “procedure for removal of civil actions” and declares in relevant part:
(a) Generally.--A defendant or defendants desiring to
remove any civil action from a State court shall file in the
district court of the United States for the district and division
within which such action is pending a notice of removal
signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and containing a short and plain statement of the
grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process,
pleadings, and orders served upon such defendant or
defendants in such action.
...
(d) Notice to adverse parties and State court.--Promptly
after the filing of such notice of removal of a civil action the
defendant or defendants shall give written notice thereof to
all adverse parties and shall file a copy of the notice with the
clerk of such State court, which shall effect the removal and
the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the
case is remanded.
28 U.S.C. § 1446.
Thus, under the plain terms of Section 1446, once a case is removed to
federal court, “the State court shall proceed no further unless and until the
case is remanded.” Id. (emphasis added). As summarized by two legal
commentators:
The federal court's assertion of removal jurisdiction places
the state court's jurisdiction in a state of suspension until
such time as the federal court remands the case to state
court. If the [federal] court finds that it does have jurisdiction
and that the case has been properly removed, or if the federal
court dismisses the cause of action in response to a party's
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motions, then the removal operates to terminate the state
court's jurisdiction. Any proceedings that occur in the state
court between the filing of a copy of the federal removal
petition in the state court and the reinvestment of jurisdiction
that occurs upon the remand of the case to the state court
are void.
David A. Furlow & Charles W. Kelly, Removal and Remand: When Does a
Federal District Court Lose Jurisdiction Over a Case Remanded to State Court?,
41 SW. L.J. 999, 999-1001 (1988); see also Crown Constr. Co. v.
Newfoundland Am. Ins. Co., 239 A.2d 452, 455 (Pa. 1968) (“[w]hen a
removal has been effected in strict compliance with the statutory
requirements, then the state court's jurisdiction ceases and any further
proceeding in the state court is a nullity so long as the action is pending in the
federal court”); Wenrick v. Schloemann-Siemag Aktiengesellschaft, 522
A.2d 52, 54 (Pa. Super. 1987) (“[n]ormally, the filing of [a notice of removal]
imposes an automatic stay on any further proceedings in the state court and
any proceedings that are conducted in the state court are a nullity until there
has been a remand by the federal court”); Maseda v. Honda Motor Co.,
Ltd., 861 F.2d 1248, 1254-1255 (11th Cir. 1988) (“after removal, the
jurisdiction of the state court absolutely ceases and the state court has a duty
not to proceed any further in the case. Any subsequent proceedings in state
court on the case are void ab initio”) (citations and footnotes omitted).
Remand is accomplished by the federal clerk mailing a “certified copy of
the order of remand . . . to the clerk of the State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Section 1447(c) declares that, when the “certified copy of the order of
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remand” is mailed to the clerk of the State court, “[t]he State court may
thereupon proceed with such case.” Id.
Here, Plaintiffs filed their original complaint, in 2009, in the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Appellants removed the case to the
District Court, where the case proceeded and Plaintiffs eventually filed a Third
Amended Complaint. The Third Amended Complaint consisted of FLSA claims
and Pennsylvania state-law claims.
On August 7, 2012, the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Third
Amended Complaint and closed the case. In relevant part, the District Court’s
August 7, 2012 order declares:
1. Plaintiffs’ federal claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.
2. The [District] Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims which are
DISMISSED without prejudice to the reassertion of these
claims in state court to the extent Plaintiffs can do so
consistent with the [District] Court’s prior rulings.
The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case.
District Court Order, 8/7/12, at 1 (emphasis, citations, and some capitalization
omitted).
Of note, the District Court’s August 7, 2012 order did not remand the
case to the court of common pleas; correspondingly, no remand order was
entered on the court of common pleas docket. Nevertheless, following the
District Court’s August 7, 2012 order, Plaintiffs began filing motions at the
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2009 Court of Common Pleas Docket, which was an action that had been
removed to federal court and never remanded.
The question now is whether the trial court had subject matter
jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs’ filings at the 2009 Court of Common Pleas
Docket and to grant Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reinstate the Third Amended
Complaint. We conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over the action that was filed at the 2009 Court of Common Pleas Docket. We
must, therefore, vacate the trial court’s May 15, 2017 order.
In Fessler v. Hannagan, 601 A.2d 462 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991), the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania had occasion to consider a case similar
to the one at bar. In Fessler, the plaintiffs sued various defendants in the
Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County; the defendants included the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and the action
was docketed at No. 4055-C of 1989. The defendants removed the case to
federal court and the federal district court eventually dismissed the action on
the merits. Id. at 463.
After the district court dismissed the case, “plaintiffs filed in the Court
of Common Pleas of Luzerne County an amended complaint at the same
docket number as the removed and dismissed action (No. 4055–C of 1989).”
Id. The amended complaint eliminated HUD as a defendant, “but raised
substantially the same issues as the original pleading.” Id.
The defendants claimed that the court of common pleas lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the action because the case had been removed to
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federal court and never remanded. The trial court agreed with the defendants
and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed that the trial
court erred in dismissing their complaint because: 1) the “dismissal of the
action in federal court [] operate[d] as an automatic remand to the state
court” and 2) “the filing of a second, separate state court suit [was] not
prohibited by removal of the first such suit into federal court.” See id. at 464.
The Commonwealth Court rejected both of the plaintiffs’ arguments and
affirmed the trial court’s order.
First, the Commonwealth Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the
“dismissal of the action in federal court somehow operate[d] as an automatic
remand to the state court.” Id. The Fessler Court emphasized that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(d) explicitly states that, upon removal, “‘the State court shall
proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded.’” Id. at 464
(emphasis in original), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). Thus, “[o]rdinarily, any
further state court proceedings ‘are a nullity until there has been a remand by
the federal court.’” Fessler, 601 A.2d at 464, quoting Wenrick, 522 A.2d at
54. The Fessler Court held that “the plain and unambiguous language of the
federal removal statute” did not permit the state court to reestablish
jurisdiction after the federal court merely dismissed the action; instead, to
invest jurisdiction in the state court, an express remand by the federal court
was required. See Fessler, 601 A.2d at 464.
The Fessler Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ second claim, where the
plaintiffs contended they filed a permissible “separate” state court suit.
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Initially, the Fessler Court agreed with the plaintiffs that, “if a separate action
[were] filed in state courts, the automatic stay of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) would
not necessarily prohibit further state proceedings on the second action if it
was not filed simply in an attempt to defeat federal removal jurisdiction.” Id.
at 464-465. However, the Fessler Court held, the plaintiffs did not file a
“second action” – instead, the plaintiffs erroneously filed an amended
complaint at the original docket, which had been removed to federal court and
never remanded. As the Fessler Court explained, this was fatal to the
plaintiffs’ case:
On removal, the federal court “acquires total, exclusive
jurisdiction over the litigation,” and the mere filing of an
amended complaint in state court omitting the basis for the
federal claim does not defeat the federal court's jurisdiction.
Crummie v. Dayton–Hudson Corp., 611 F. Supp. 692, 693
(E.D.Mich. 1985). “The removed case is governed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is treated as though it
originally had been instituted in the federal court.” Id. at
693; see also Redfield v. Continental Casualty Corp.,
818 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1987).
Plaintiffs cannot amend in state court a pleading that is
treated as having been originally instituted in federal court.
Plaintiffs' amended complaint was filed in state court at the
same docket number as the removed action which the district
court dismissed without remand. Because plaintiffs'
amended complaint was not a separate action, but was an
attempt to continue the removed action in state court by
amendment, the court of common pleas was without
jurisdiction to take any further action. If plaintiffs wanted to
amend their original pleading, they were obligated to seek
leave to amend from the district court, which had jurisdiction
over the case by virtue of removal.
Fessler, 601 A.2d at 465.
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Although we are “not bound by decisions of the Commonwealth Court[,]
. . . such decisions provide persuasive authority[] and we may turn to our
colleagues on the Commonwealth Court for guidance when appropriate.”
Petow v. Warehime, 996 A.2d 1083, 1088 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2010). We
conclude that Fessler is persuasive authority for this Court, as Fessler’s
analysis and holding are consistent with the express language of Section
1446(d) and with the holdings of various other courts that have considered
the issue.
For example, in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Superior Court, 183 Cal.
Rptr. 330 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), the defendant removed an action to federal
court on the ground of federal diversity jurisdiction. In accordance with a
stipulation by the parties, the district court entered an order dismissing the
action without prejudice, so that the plaintiff could file a new action in state
court and name nondiverse defendants. Id. at 331.
Instead of filing a new action in state court, the plaintiff filed an
amended complaint at the original California state court docket number. The
defendant claimed that the state court did not have jurisdiction over the action
because the federal district court did not remand the case to the state court.
The California Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant, reasoning:
[28 U.S.C. § 1446] establishes that removal of a civil action
from a state court to a federal court, on the ground of the
defendant's diverse citizenship, operates as a literal
“removal” of the action from the state court and terminates
that court's jurisdiction to proceed in it at the time. [28
U.S.C. § 1447] makes it clear that proceedings in the action
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may thereupon be conducted in the federal court, which has
exclusive jurisdiction after removal; that the federal court
must “remand” the action to the state court of origin if federal
jurisdiction is subsequently found wanting; and that the state
court may resume its first-instance jurisdiction if—but only
if—there is a “remand” of the action to it from the federal
court.
It is undisputed that there was no remand by the federal
court in the present case, and that the action was dismissed
by that court on plaintiff's motion. The dismissal was entered
when the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction of the
action. The fact that the dismissal was “without prejudice”
permitted plaintiff to pursue his claims in another action, and
this prospect was clearly portended throughout the
proceedings in which he moved the federal court for
dismissal. The dismissal without prejudice nevertheless
terminated the action, and placed him in a “legal position” as
if he had never brought it. There having been a dismissal
without remand, there was no action in which respondent
court could “resume” jurisdiction as plaintiff contends.
[Accordingly, the state] court consequently erred, and
exceeded its jurisdiction, in permitting further proceedings
[at the original docket number] after the federal court had
dismissed it. . . .
Allstate Ins. Co., 183 Cal. Rptr. at 333 (emphasis in original) (footnotes and
some citations and emphasis omitted); see also Miller v. Equifax, Inc., 208
P.3d 498 (Or. App. 2009) (the plaintiffs filed a complaint, in state court,
against Equifax; after Equifax removed the case to federal court, the district
court (per the parties’ stipulation) dismissed the case without prejudice – but
the court did not remand the case; after dismissal, the plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint, in state court, at the original docket number; the
amended complaint omitted Equifax as a party and, instead, named
Consolidated Credit Services, Inc. as the defendant; the trial court dismissed
the action for lack of jurisdiction and the appellate court affirmed, reasoning:
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“[a]fter the federal court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims against Equifax,
plaintiffs presumably could have filed a new action in state court . . . Instead
of filing a new action, plaintiffs chose to raise their claims against Consolidated
in the same action that Equifax had removed. After removal, however, a state
court has no jurisdiction over the removed action. Because this action was
removed to and never remanded from the federal district court, the trial court
was correct to conclude that it lacked jurisdiction”) (citations omitted); Willis
v. Shelby County, 2009 WL 1579248 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (“[v]arious
plaintiffs have attempted to argue that dismissal of their claims in federal court
somehow automatically remands the case to the state court. State and federal
courts have consistently held, however, that a state court has no jurisdiction
to resume proceedings where a federal court, in its discretion, dismisses the
case rather than remanding it”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Preston, 842 F. Supp.
1441, 1443 (S.D.Fla. 1992) (“Section 1446(d) provides that, after an action
has been removed to federal court, the state court shall proceed no further
unless and until the case is remanded. Because the case was never remanded
. . . the state court is without jurisdiction to proceed in the action”) (citation
and footnote omitted).
Within their brief to this Court, Plaintiffs raise a number of arguments
wherein they insist that the trial court possessed jurisdiction to enter the May
15, 2017 order. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that the trial court possessed
subject matter jurisdiction over the action because: 1) when Plaintiffs
eliminated their ERISA claims in the Third Amended Complaint, “the order
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finding [ERISA] preemption became moot, the federal court no longer had
subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claims, and by operation of [28
U.S.C. § 1447(c), the case] had to be remanded to state court;” 2) the District
Court remanded the case to the court of common pleas sub silentio; 3)
Appellants acquiesced to Plaintiffs’ actions; and, 4) Plaintiffs were permitted
to transfer their action to state court by utilizing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(b). See
Plaintiffs’ Brief at 11-26. Plaintiffs’ contentions fail.
We first address Plaintiffs’ claim that the trial court had jurisdiction over
their action because, when they eliminated their ERISA claims in the Third
Amended Complaint, “the order finding [ERISA] preemption became moot,
the federal court no longer had subject matter jurisdiction over the state law
claims, and by operation of [28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the case] had to be
remanded to state court.” Plaintiffs’ Brief at 12. In relevant part, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) provides: “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that
the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be
remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
It is true that Plaintiffs’ original complaint consisted of ERISA claims and
that Appellants originally removed the case to federal court because of the
ERISA claims and because ERISA completely preempted the state-law claims.
See Davis, 765 F.3d at 239. It is also true that Plaintiffs filed a Third
Amended Complaint in federal court, which abandoned the ERISA claims and,
instead, raised FLSA and Pennsylvania state-law claims.
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Nevertheless, for our purposes, it is irrelevant that Plaintiffs abandoned
their ERISA claims in the Third Amended Complaint that they filed in the
District Court. Certainly, Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint consisted of a
federal claim and supplemental Pennsylvania state-law claims. Thus, even
though Plaintiffs abandoned their ERISA claims in the Third Amended
Complaint, the District Court still possessed jurisdiction over the case: it
possessed original jurisdiction over the federal claim and supplemental
jurisdiction over the state-law claims pleaded in the Third Amended
Complaint. Further, after the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims
with prejudice, the District Court exercised its discretion by “declin[ing] to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims which are dismissed without prejudice to the reassertion of these
claims in state court.” District Court Order, 8/7/12, at 1 (emphasis, citations,
and some capitalization omitted) (emphasis added).
Given this posture, Plaintiffs are incorrect to argue that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) required the District Court to remand the action to the court of
common pleas or that the refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
somehow resurrected the jurisdiction of the trial court in the absence of an
express remand order. To be sure, as the United States Supreme Court has
held: “[w]hen a district court remands claims to a state court after declining
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the remand order is not based on a lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction for purposes of §§ 1447(c) and (d).” Carlsbad
Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 641 (2009). Thus, since the
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District Court exercised its discretion and “declin[ed] to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims,” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) did not
apply and did not require that the District Court remand the case to the court
of common pleas. See id.
Next, Plaintiffs contend that the trial court possessed jurisdiction over
the action because the District Court’s August 7, 2012 dismissal order
remanded the case to the court of common pleas sub silentio. Plaintiffs’ Brief
at 16-18. This claim is meritless. Put simply, no remand order appears on
the court of common pleas docket from the District Court’s August 7, 2012
order and there is no evidence that, in response to that order, the federal clerk
of courts mailed a “certified copy of the order of remand . . . to the clerk of
the State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Therefore, the District Court’s August
7, 2012 dismissal order simply did not remand the case to the court of
common pleas.
Third, Plaintiffs argue that Appellants acquiesced to Plaintiffs’ actions in
the court of common pleas, when, following the District Court’s August 7, 2012
dismissal order, Appellants filed a notice in the trial court declaring:
“[Appellants] do not oppose the relief [P]laintiffs request in their motions –
reinstatement of the complaints in [the court of common pleas].” Appellants’
Notice of No Opposition, 11/7/12, at 1. Plaintiffs claim that, as a result of this
acquiescence, Appellants “should be estopped from now contending that the
trial court lacked jurisdiction.” Plaintiffs’ Brief at 19.
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Plaintiffs’ claim fails. It is irrelevant that Appellants arguably consented
to Plaintiffs’ filing on the 2009 Court of Common Pleas Docket. The issue at
hand implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction – and subject
matter jurisdiction cannot be “acquired by consent or waiver of the parties.”
Commonwealth v. McNeil, 808 A.2d 950, 954 (Pa. Super. 2002).
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(b) permitted their
actions in this case. Section 5103 is entitled “[t]ransfer of erroneously filed
matters.” In relevant part, Section 5103 declares:
(a) General rule.--If an appeal or other matter is taken to
or brought in a court or magisterial district of this
Commonwealth which does not have jurisdiction of the
appeal or other matter, the court or magisterial district judge
shall not quash such appeal or dismiss the matter, but shall
transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this
Commonwealth, where the appeal or other matter shall be
treated as if originally filed in the transferee tribunal on the
date when the appeal or other matter was first filed in a court
or magisterial district of this Commonwealth. A matter which
is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or magisterial
district judge of this Commonwealth but which is commenced
in any other tribunal of this Commonwealth shall be
transferred by the other tribunal to the proper court or
magisterial district of this Commonwealth where it shall be
treated as if originally filed in the transferee court or
magisterial district of this Commonwealth on the date when
first filed in the other tribunal.
(b) Federal cases.--
(1) Subsection (a) shall also apply to any matter
transferred or remanded by any United States court for a
district embracing any part of this Commonwealth. In
order to preserve a claim under Chapter 55 (relating to
limitation of time), a litigant who timely commences an
action or proceeding in any United States court for a
district embracing any part of this Commonwealth is not
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required to commence a protective action in a court or
before a magisterial district judge of this Commonwealth.
Where a matter is filed in any United States court for a
district embracing any part of this Commonwealth and the
matter is dismissed by the United States court for lack of
jurisdiction, any litigant in the matter filed may transfer
the matter to a court or magisterial district of this
Commonwealth by complying with the transfer provisions
set forth in paragraph (2).
(2) Except as otherwise prescribed by general rules, or by
order of the United States court, such transfer may be
effected by filing a certified transcript of the final
judgment of the United States court and the related
pleadings in a court or magisterial district of this
Commonwealth. The pleadings shall have the same effect
as under the practice in the United States court, but the
transferee court or magisterial district judge may require
that they be amended to conform to the practice in this
Commonwealth. Section 5535(a)(2)(i) (relating to
termination of prior matter) shall not be applicable to a
matter transferred under this subsection.
...
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5103.
As the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania has explained:
[Section 5103] provides that a case which has been
erroneously filed in federal court, but should have been
brought in state court, can be transferred[, by the litigant,]
to state court and treated as if it was first filed there. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 5103(b)(1). The policy behind this section is that
a plaintiff who files a timely action in Federal District Court
should not lose his opportunity to litigate that case on the
merits simply because he is in error regarding federal
jurisdiction.
In re Grocott, 507 B.R. 816, 825 (E.D.Pa. 2014) (quotations and some
citations omitted).
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Section 5103 thus addresses the procedure by which a litigant may
transfer, to state court, a matter that was erroneously filed in federal court.
The section simply does not speak to the situation currently before this Court,
where a plaintiff seeks to revive a state-court docket that was removed to
federal court and never remanded. Stated another way, Section 5103 has no
applicability to the remand procedures in federal court, which are governed
by federal law, and the section obviously cannot provide the court of common
pleas with subject matter jurisdiction to consider filings on a docket of a state-
court action that had been removed to federal court and never remanded.
Thus, Plaintiffs’ claim fails.2
Consistent with the above, we conclude that, since the District Court’s
August 7, 2012 order dismissed Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint and did
not remand the case to the court of common pleas, the court of common pleas
did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider anything that was filed at
the original, 2009 Court of Common Pleas Docket, as that action was removed
to federal court and never remanded. Therefore, we must vacate the trial
____________________________________________
2 The trial court claims that it possessed jurisdiction over the action because
Plaintiffs’ original “state law claims were neither preempted [by ERISA] nor
dismissed with prejudice.” Trial Court Opinion, 7/16/18, at 9. We recognize
that the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ state law claims without prejudice
and our holding today is not grounded in concepts of ERISA preemption.
Instead, we merely hold that the trial court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the current action because, after the action was removed to
federal court in 2009, the District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Third Amended
Complaint and did not remand the case back to the court of common pleas.
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court’s May 15, 2017 order, which granted Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reinstate the
Third Amended Complaint.
Orders vacated. Cases remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/22/20
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