Com. v. Christian, K.

J-S05027-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KEITH C. CHRISTIAN :
:
Appellant : No. 764 WDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 26, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-07-CR-0002050-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KEITH C. CHRISTIAN :
:
Appellant : No. 765 WDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 26, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-07-CR-0002066-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
KEITH C. CHRISTIAN :
:
Appellant : No. 766 WDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 26, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-07-CR-0002065-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
J-S05027-23
:
v. :
:
:
KEITH C. CHRISTIAN :
:
Appellant : No. 767 WDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 26, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-07-CR-0001732-2017
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED: March 15, 2023
Keith Christian appeals1 from the order, entered in the Court of Common
Pleas of Blair County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post
____________________________________________
1Christian filed a PCRA petition at four trial court docket numbers: CP-07-CR-
0002050-2017, CP-07-CR-0002066-2017, CP-07-CR0002065-2017, and CP-
07-CR-0001732-2017. By a single order entered on May 26, 2022, the PCRA
court dismissed Christian’s PCRA petition at all four trial court docket numbers.
On June 9, 2022, while still represented by counsel, Christian filed a timely,
pro se notice of appeal at each trial court docket number. The trial court
docketed the pro se notices of appeal but did not transmit them to this Court.
See Pa.R.A.P. 905(b) (when notice of appeal is filed, clerk of courts “shall
immediately transmit” copy of notice of appeal and all attachments to
prothonotary of appellate court named in notice of appeal); see also
Commonwealth v. Williams, 151 A.3d 621, 624 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“We
thus hold that this Court is required to docket a pro se notice of appeal despite
[a]ppellant being represented by counsel[.]”).
On June 13, 2022, Christian’s counsel filed four timely notices of appeal, one
at each docket number, in compliance with Commonwealth v. Walker, 185
A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018). The notices of appeal were docketed in this Court at
Nos. 764, 765, 766, and 767 WDA 2022. Even though Christian and counsel
each filed notices of appeal, only the four appeals filed by counsel were
docketed in this Court. Our Court consolidated the appeals, sua sponte,
because they are related and share a similar procedural history in the trial
court.
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Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Counsel has filed
an Anders2 brief and an application to withdraw as counsel. Upon careful
review, we affirm the order of the PCRA court and grant counsel’s application
to withdraw.
On January 17, 2019, on the second day of a jury trial, Christian entered
an open guilty plea to numerous drug- and firearms-related charges. The
court ordered a presentence investigation report and deferred sentencing until
April 4, 2019. At Christian’s request, sentencing was continued until
November 6, 2019. On August 26, 2019, Christian filed a motion to dismiss,
which the trial court denied, following oral argument, on September 25, 2019.
Counsel petitioned for leave to withdraw, which the trial court granted.
The court appointed new counsel, who filed a motion to withdraw Christian’s
guilty pleas. Following a hearing, the trial court denied that motion and
proceeded to sentencing on November 6, 2019. The court sentenced Christian
to an aggregate term of 10½ to 21½ years’ incarceration, with credit for time
served. The court deemed Christian Recidivism Risk Reduction Incentive
ineligible. Christian filed timely post-sentence motions, which were denied.
____________________________________________
2Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
apparently in the mistaken belief that an Anders brief is required where
counsel seeks to withdraw on appeal from the denial of PCRA relief. A
Turner/Finley no-merit letter, however, is the appropriate filing. See
Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc ). Because an Anders brief
provides greater protection to a defendant, this Court may accept an Anders
brief in lieu of a Turner/Finley letter. Commonwealth v. Fusselman, 866
A.2d 1109, 1111 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2004).
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On September 15, 2020, this Court affirmed Christian’s judgment of sentence.
See Commonwealth v. Christian, 240 A.3d 928 (Pa. Super. 2020) (Table).
On March 31, 2021, Christian filed a pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA
court appointed counsel and granted counsel 60 days to file an amended
petition. On May 7, 2021, Christian, acting pro se, filed an amended PCRA
petition.3 On June 28, 2021, the court held a status conference, with counsel
only, and, on March 24, 2022, proceeded to a hearing on Christian’s amended
PCRA petition. At the hearing, Christian’s counsel stated on the record the
following:
[My client and] I [] are in agreement, Your Honor, that there is
one issue involved here and that is ineffective assistance of [trial]
counsel for two reasons. That [trial counsel, Douglas J. Keating,
Esquire,] coerced [] Christian into taking a plea and that Mr.
Keating failed to notice the effect that certain medications were
having on [] Christian when he entered his plea.[4]
N.T. PCRA Hearing, 3/24/22, at 2.
After the PCRA hearing, at which Christian and Attorney Keating
testified, the PCRA court denied relief by order dated May 26, 2022. Christian
____________________________________________
3 It is unclear from the record why court-appointed counsel did not file an
amended petition, or why the PCRA court accepted Christian’s pro se amended
petition while he was represented by counsel. However, because the PCRA
court held a hearing at which the issues Christian wished to raise were
addressed, we will proceed with our review.
4 PCRA counsel also indicated that Christian had raised an issue relating to
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), in which the Supreme Court
held that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory minimum sentence be submitted to a jury. However, Christian was
not sentenced under any mandatory minimum sentencing statutes and, thus,
Alleyne is inapplicable to his case.
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filed a timely notice of appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.
Prior to reviewing the merits of Christian’s claim, we must address
counsel’s motion to withdraw. Where counsel seeks to withdraw from PCRA
representation, our Supreme Court has stated that independent review of the
record by competent counsel is required before withdrawal is permitted. Such
independent review requires proof of: (1) a “no-merit” letter by PCRA counsel
detailing the nature and extent of his review; (2) a “no-merit” letter by PCRA
counsel listing each issue the petitioner wished to have reviewed; (3) PCRA
counsel’s explanation, in the “no-merit” letter, as to why the petitioner’s issues
are meritless; (4) independent review of the record by the PCRA or appellate
court; and (5) agreement by the PCRA or appellate court that the petition was
meritless. Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 876 n.1 (Pa. 2009);
Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1184 (Pa. Super. 2012).
In Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607 (Pa. Super. 2006),5 this
Court imposed an additional requirement for counsel seeking to withdraw from
collateral proceedings:
PCRA counsel who seeks to withdraw must
contemporaneously serve a copy on the petitioner of
counsel’s application to withdraw as counsel, and must
____________________________________________
5 This Court’s holding in Friend was subsequently overruled on other grounds
by the Supreme Court in Pitts, supra. However, the additional requirement
that counsel provide copies of the relevant documentation to the petitioner
remains intact. Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 818 (Pa. Super.
2011).
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supply to the petitioner both a copy of the “no-merit”
letter and a statement advising the petitioner that, in the
event that the court grants the application of counsel to
withdraw, he or she has the right to proceed pro se or
with the assistance of privately[-]retained counsel.
Id. at 614.
Here, counsel has substantially complied with the Turner/Finley and
Friend requirements. Counsel has detailed the nature and extent of his
review, served a copy of his petition to withdraw and brief upon Christian and
informed him of his right to proceed pro se or with privately retained counsel,6
raised Christian’s issues in the form of a brief addressed to this Court, and
explained why Christian’s claims are meritless. Counsel having substantially
satisfied the procedural requirements for withdrawal, we now turn to an
independent review of the record to determine whether his claim merits relief.
This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a PCRA
petition is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by
evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5
A.3d 1260, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted). In evaluating a PCRA
court’s decision, our scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA
court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party at the trial level. Id. The PCRA court’s credibility
determinations are binding on this Court where the record supports those
determinations. Widgins, 29 A.3d at 820.
____________________________________________
6 Christian has not raised any additional issues, either pro se or through
private counsel.
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Here, Christian claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
by: (1) forcing him to enter a guilty plea and (2) failing to be aware that
Christian was under the influence of his medication to such a degree that he
was incapable of rendering a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. He is
entitled to no relief.
To establish a claim of counsel’s ineffectiveness, a petitioner must
overcome the presumption that counsel was effective by proving “(1) that the
underlying claim has merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for
his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors or omissions of counsel,
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would
have been different.” Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1244 (Pa.
Super. 2011) (citation omitted). “The failure to prove any one of the three
prongs results in the failure of petitioner’s claim.” Id.Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a
guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness
caused [A]ppellant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. In
determining whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly and
intelligently, a reviewing court must review all of the
circumstances surrounding the entry of that plea.
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2014) (citations
omitted).
To be valid, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently. Commonwealth v. Kpou, 153 A.3d 1020, 1023 (Pa. Super.
2016). “Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant who entered a guilty plea
was aware of what he was doing, and the defendant bears the burden of
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proving otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Jabbie, 200 A.3d 500, 505 (Pa.
Super. 2018). Where a defendant affirms on the record at the plea colloquy
hearing that he is satisfied with his attorney’s services in connection with his
plea, the defendant is then precluded from contradicting himself in collateral
proceedings and claiming he was coerced by counsel into pleading guilty. See
Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 384 (Pa. Super. 2002),
citing Commonwealth v. Barnes, 687 A.2d 1163, 1167 (Pa. Super. 1996);
see also Commonwealth v. Pier, 182 A.3d 476, 480 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“A
person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes in
open court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds for
withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at his plea
colloquy.”).
During a plea colloquy, a trial court is required to elicit the defendant’s
understanding of six areas to ensure that the defendant comprehends the full
impact and consequences of his plea: (1) the nature of the charges to which
he is pleading guilty; (2) the factual basis for the plea; (3) the right to a trial
by jury; (4) the presumption of innocence; (5) the permissible range of
sentences; and (6) the court’s power to depart from any recommended
sentence. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, comment. See also Kpou, 153 A.3d at
1023. A written colloquy signed by the defendant may supplement an oral
colloquy as long as there is some on-the-record examination of the defendant.
See Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, comment.
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Here, prior to the entry of his plea, the trial court engaged in a lengthy
colloquy with Christian as follows:
[BY THE COURT] Mr. Christian, it is my understanding that you
want to enter a guilty plea to all counts of the criminal information
at CR 1732, 2050, 2065 and 2066 of 2017; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And it is my understanding that also it will be an open plea
which simply means sentencing will be solely within the discretion
of this judge?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that your understanding as well?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you fill out and complete a guilty plea colloquy form?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you sign and date the bottom of each page?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you review these questions with Attorney Keating?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you have any question about any of the information set
forth within the colloquy?
A. No.
Q. But I would like to talk to you after you have done that.
Q. In the colloquy of course it sets forth 40[-]some questions
[about] each of the criminal charges to which you are pleading
guilty and the maximum sentences for each of those criminal
charges were set forth in the colloquy; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And, again, Mr. Christian, then do you have any question about
any of the information set forth in the colloquy?
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A. No, sir.
Q. Are you pleading guilty to each of these counts knowingly,
intelligently and voluntarily?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Has Attorney Keating or any third party in any way
forced you or pressured you or coerced you in any way to
enter a guilty plea to these charges?
A. No, sir.
Q. You are doing that of your own free will?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And, Mr. Christian, do you understand that we were well into
the jury trial for these cases; do you understand that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And by pleading guilty[,] then[,] you are giving up your right
to continue the jury trial, finish the jury trial, and put the decision
into the hands of the jurors; do you understand that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And, are you willing to do that?
A. Yes, sir.
...
Q. Mr. Christian, I will ask you again, are you in any way under
the influence of any drug, alcohol or medication here this
morning?
A. I am.
Q. Do you take medication?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that medication prescribed for you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was the nature of that medication?
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A. For my post-traumatic stress disorder and my depression and
anxiety.
Q. Okay. Is it three separate medications or is it one medication?
A. Three separate medications.
Q. Mr. Christian, did you take that medication today?
A. This morning, sir.
Q. This morning. You took all three of those medications?
A. [] I took two last night and two this morning.
Q. Can you identify those medications for us; if you know?
A. Seroquel, two hundred milligrams, Celexa, 50 milligrams, and
Clonidine, two milligrams.
Q. Mr. Christian, you took those medications then as prescribed
for you; is that correct?
A. Only as prescribed, sir.
Q. Only as prescribed. And the fact that you took those
medications last night or this morning, does that affect
your ability to understand what is going on here today?
A. It helps me to deal with what is going on in my mind
right now, you know.
Q. Have you fully understood all the questions that I have
asked so far?
A. I understand that, yes.
...
Q. Mr. Christian, let me ask you this. In the colloquy[,] each
count which you pled guilty to is set forth. Do you understand
each of the counts for which you were charged for which you were
pleading guilty?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you understand the elements of those particular charges?
A. Yes, sir.
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Q. And did you review those charges and[,] again[,] the elements
and the maximum sentences with Attorney Keating?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you have any question yourself as to exactly which charges
or the nature of those charges to which you are pleading guilty?
A. No.
N.T. Jury Trial/Guilty Plea, 1/17/19, at 70-74, 81 (unnecessary capitalization
omitted; emphasis added).
As the trial court noted in its oral colloquy, Christian also completed,
with the aid of Attorney Keating, a written colloquy in which Christian affirmed
his understanding of, inter alia, the nature of the charges to which he is
pleading guilty, the presumption of innocence, the permissible range of
sentences, and the court’s power to depart from any recommended sentence.
See Written Plea Colloquy, 1/17/19; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, comment.
In the written colloquy, Christian also confirmed that he was satisfied with
Attorney Keating’s representation, had sufficient time to discuss with him the
pros and cons of entering a plea, had not been threatened or forced into
entering a plea, and that no promises had been made to him in connection
with his plea. See Written Plea Colloquy, 1/17/19. Finally, Christian affirmed
that, although he had consumed medication the previous night and earlier
that morning, he had sufficient mental capacity to understand the written
colloquy and his answers in response thereto. See id.- 12 -
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At the PCRA hearing, Attorney Keating, whose testimony the PCRA court
found credible,7 see PCRA Court Opinion, 5/26/22, at 16, testified that, at the
time Christian decided to plead guilty, the Commonwealth was about to
present firearm evidence that was “very damaging” to Christian. N.T. PCRA
Hearing, 3/24/22, at 28. Attorney Keating “felt that was going to be a big
problem in this case for [his] client.” Id. In discussing with Christian the
possibility of taking a plea, Attorney Keating told him “I’m not promising you
what you’re going to get” as far as a sentence was concerned, but that
Christian should seriously consider entering a plea. Id. at 29. Attorney
Keating further testified that, in regularly consulting with Christian throughout
trial, “he was able to clearly answer[,] and quickly[,] too[,] every question I
had.” Id. at 30. Christian was “assisting himself and assisting [counsel] in
defending him.” Id. Attorney Keating testified that, on the day of his plea,
Christian was “alert and outgoing and loquacious as he always has been in
any conversation I had with him that day. He was on the ball. I had no
question about his mental capabilities.” Id. at 31.
Moreover, “there was never a time when [Christian] said to [Attorney
Keating], you know, I’m having an anxiety attack, I’m having a mental health
episode or any language that would indicate [that] he was [“]stressing out[,”]
so to speak[,] or he was incapable of understanding[.]” Id. at 32. Attorney
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7 Attorney Keating testified that he had been practicing criminal law for 31
years. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, at 25.
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Keating believed that Christian’s plea was “absolutely” knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent. Id. at 33. Attorney Keating testified:
I have no question about that based on my prior conversations
with this man, that he was not under the influence of anything,
that he clearly understood he was entering an open plea, that the
sentence was up to the [j]udge. He was going to argue at
sentencing or I was going to argue for him that he was taking
responsibility and accountability. If I remember it[,] I believe we
had even talked about some possible people who could put in
some good words for him at sentencing, like a pastor who was
assisting him who was a friend of his or he had communicated
with[.]
Id.
It is apparent from the record that Christian’s guilty plea was knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily entered, and that he was in full possession of his
mental faculties at the time. The PCRA court’s determination is supported by
evidence of record and is free of legal error. Burkett, supra. Accordingly,
we affirm.
Order affirmed. Application to withdraw granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/15/2023
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