Com. v. Parks, R.

J-S34020-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ROBERT JOHN PARKS :
:
Appellant : No. 62 MDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 18, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County Criminal Division
at No(s): CP-58-CR-0000492-2018
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 09, 2020
Appellant, Robert John Parks, appeals from the judgment of sentence of
12 months’ probation, as well as fines and restitution, imposed after he was
convicted of disorderly conduct, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(1), and harassment, 18
Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(1). Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain his convictions on appeal. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history, as follows:
On August 26, 2018, [Appellant] was involved in a loud
verbal argument and physical altercation with Clarence Davis
(hereinafter referred to as Davis) at White’s Mobile Home
Community. [Appellant] testified that he and his wife were
walking around the community when [Appellant] noticed Davis
standing outside of a trailer owned by [Appellant]. (N.T.,
[9/11/19,] at 192.) [Appellant] approached Davis to confront him
as to what he was doing near [Appellant’s] trailer. (Id. at 194.)
[Appellant] and Davis then exchanged obscenities. (Id.)
[Appellant’s] wife attempted to get between [Appellant] and
Davis[,] but was squeezed out as the two combatants continued
to get closer to each other. (Id.)
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[Appellant] testified that the parties were so close to each
other that he could feel Davis’ spittle striking his eyes while they
were speaking. (Id. [at 195.]) [Appellant] contended that Davis
attempted to “headbutt” [Appellant] and that [Appellant] reacted
by striking Davis in the face, knocking him to the ground, and
thereafter kicking Davis as he laid on the ground. (Id.) In his
testimony, Davis indicated that [Appellant] threatened to kill him,
“sucker punched” him, and kicked him while he was on the
ground. (Id. at 87-92.)
[Appellant] was eventually charged and a criminal
information was filed containing the following counts: Count 1:
Simple assault (M-2) under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1); Count 2[:]
Terroristic Threats (M-1) under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(a)(1); Count 3:
Disorderly Conduct (M-3) under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(1); and
Count 4: Harassment (S) under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(1). The
matter proceeded to a jury trial on September 11, 2019[,] and
the jury acquitted [Appellant] on Count 1 (Simple Assault) and
Count 2 (Terroristic Threats)[,] and convicted him on Count 3
(Disorderly Conduct). As to the summary harassment (Count 4),
the court convicted [Appellant] of that offense. On September 18,
2019, the court sentenced [Appellant] on Count 3 to 12 months
of probation and on Count 4 to a fine of $50.00 and restitution to
Davis for medical bills in the amount of $382.56. On September
30, 2019, [Appellant] filed a post-sentence motion seeking the
following relief: (1) modification of his sentence; (2) motion for
judgment of acquittal; (3) motion for arrest of judgment; and (4)
motion for a new trial. Oral argument was conducted on
December 4, 2019….
Trial Court Opinion, 12/6/19, at 1-2.
On December 6, 2019, the court issued an opinion and order denying
Appellant’s post-sentence motion. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on
January 6, 2020.1 He also timely complied with the trial court’s order to file
____________________________________________
1 Appellant erroneously stated that he was appealing from the December 6,
2019 order denying his post-sentence motion. “In a criminal action, appeal
properly lies from the judgment of sentence made final by the denial of post-
sentence motions.” Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410
n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001) (en banc) (citation omitted). We have corrected the
caption accordingly.
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a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. It
does not appear that the trial court issued an opinion as required by Rule
1925(a). Nevertheless, the court sufficiently addressed the issue Appellant
raises herein in its opinion accompanying the order denying his post-sentence
motion. Therefore, remand is unnecessary. Appellant states one issue for
our review: “Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion and/or reversible
error by failing to grant … Appellant’s post-sentence motion seeking a
judgment of acquittal/directed verdict and arrest of judgment?” Appellant’s
Brief at 3 (emphasis and unnecessary capitalization omitted).
This Court has explained:
A motion for directed verdict is the same as a motion for judgment
of acquittal. “A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction on a particular
charge, and is granted only in cases in which the Commonwealth
has failed to carry its burden regarding that charge.”
Commonwealth v. Emanuel, 86 A.3d 892, 894 (Pa. Super.
2014) (citation omitted).
Commonwealth v. Sunealitis, 153 A.3d 414, 420 (Pa. Super. 2016).
Additionally,
[i]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must
determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, and all
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
verdict winner, was sufficient to enable the fact finder to
conclude that the Commonwealth established all of the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence. Further, the trier of fact is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Woodard, 129 A.3d 480, 489–90 (Pa. 2015)
(citations omitted). “Whether sufficient evidence exists to support
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the verdict is a question of law; our standard of review is de
novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v.
Tejada, 107 A.3d 788, 722 (Pa. Super. 2015).
Id. at 419.
Here, Appellant challenges his convictions for disorderly conduct and
harassment. We will first address his argument that the evidence failed to
sustain his disorderly conduct conviction under section 5503(a)(3), which
states: “A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:
(1) engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior[.]”
18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(1). Additionally, “the word ‘public’ means affecting or
likely to affect persons in a place to which the public or a substantial group
has access; among the places included are highways, transport facilities,
schools, prisons, apartment houses, places of business or amusement, any
neighborhood, or any premises which are open to the public.” 18 Pa.C.S. §
5503(c). Further, Appellant’s disorderly conduct offense was graded as a
third-degree misdemeanor and, thus, the Commonwealth was required to
prove that he intended “to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience….”
18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(b).
Appellant insists that the Commonwealth failed to meet this burden. He
stresses that he “testified that he acted in self-defense while striking [Davis]
in this case, and [Davis] testified that he was unsure why … Appellant struck
him.” Appellant’s Brief at 6. Thus, Appellant avers that “[t]he record is
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completely devoid of any evidence that [he] acted with the requisite intent
that would be required to sustain [his] conviction.” Id.
We disagree. Initially, the jury was free to reject Appellant’s self-
defense testimony. See Sunealitis, 153 A.3d at 419. Furthermore, Davis
testified that Appellant approached him as he exited his girlfriend’s mobile
home and struck him in his ear with a closed fist. N.T. Trial at 91. When
Davis fell to the ground, Appellant began kicking him. Id. at 91, 92. Davis
asked Appellant’s wife to get Appellant off him, “[a]nd [as] she tried to get
[Appellant] away, … [Appellant] shoved her” and continued kicking Davis until
he was unconscious. Id. at 92. We conclude that this testimony was sufficient
to prove that Appellant intended to cause substantial harm or serious
inconvenience in assaulting Davis.
Additionally, we reject Appellant’s argument that the Commonwealth
failed to prove that the incident occurred in public. Appellant maintains that
the fight took place on private property, and the “only other person present
during the altercation was [his] wife.” Appellant’s Brief at 7. However, the
disorderly conduct statute does not require that the public actually be
inconvenienced, annoyed, or alarmed by the defendant’s conduct; it only
requires proof that the defendant intended to create such circumstances, or
recklessly risked doing so. In this case, Appellant at least recklessly risked
that the other residents of the trailer park would be alarmed or annoyed by
his fighting with Davis. Moreover, Davis testified that the neighborhood
contained 25 to 30 trailers. N.T. at 167. The fact that the trailer park was
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open to the residents of those homes, and their invitees, made it “a place to
which the public or a substantial group has access[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(c);
Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 939 A.2d 912, 914 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(concluding that an altercation on a private road that provides access to a
community’s residents and their invitees constitutes “a place to which the
public or a substantial group, namely the surrounding community’s residents
and their invitees, have access”).
Moreover, although the fight occurred on the front lawn of Davis’s
girlfriend’s residence, the evidence at trial established that the altercation
occurred “10 to 15 yards” from a road used by the residents of the
neighborhood, and the homes in the community were in close proximity to
one another. N.T. at 34. Therefore, the residents of the neighborhood, and
their invitees, could have observed the altercation from the surrounding
homes, or as they passed by on the roadway, and been alarmed or annoyed
thereby. Accordingly, the ‘public’ element of disorderly conduct was satisfied.
See Commonwealth v. Alpha Epsilon Pi, 540 A.2d 580, 584 (Pa. Super.
1988) (a fraternity’s playing loud music at night, in a private dwelling house
with the windows open, such that individuals in the neighborhood could hear
it, was sufficient to prove disorderly conduct).
Next, we address Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain his conviction for harassment. “A person commits the
crime of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another, the
person: (1) strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects the other person to
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physical contact, or attempts or threatens to do the same[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. §
2709(a)(1). Appellant cursorily states that his harassment conviction cannot
stand because there was no evidence “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that [he] acted with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another[,] and there is
not evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the other required
elements of the harassment offense [were] … prove[n]….” Appellant’s Brief
at 8. Based on Davis’s testimony, discussed supra, we conclude that the
evidence established that Appellant struck and kicked Davis with the intent to
harass, annoy, or alarm him. Therefore, no relief is due.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 09/09/2020
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