Norman, M. v. Norman, E.

J -A30007-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
EILEEN P. NORMAN IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
MAURICE NORMAN
No. 764 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree April 25, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Civil Division at No(s): 2012 -CV -1174 -DC
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON AND STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 05, 2017
Eileen P. Norman ("Wife") appeals from trial court's divorce decree and
order of equitable distribution adopting the master report and
recommendation of December 15, 2015. We affirm.
Wife and Maurice Norman ("Husband") married on October 12, 1997,
and separated on February 10, 2012. Three children were born of the
marriage. On February 10, 2012, Husband filed a complaint in divorce
seeking only to dissolve the marriage. Three days later, Husband filed an
amended complaint, adding a request that the trial court equitably divide the
marital assets. Wife filed a petition for related claims pursuing counsel fees,
alimony pendent lite, and permanent alimony.
J -A30007-16
On December 17, 2014, the trial court appointed a master to address
the dissolution of the marriage and Wife's economic claims. The master
directed the parties to attend a settlement conference on March 11, 2015.
Wife attended the conference in person and Husband appeared by
telephone. Both parties were represented by counsel. The conference was
not of record; however, the parties arrived at a settlement agreement.
Pursuant to that understanding, the parties declared that they had
previously distributed their personal property to their mutual satisfaction and
would remain responsible for any debt in each party's own name. In
addition, following their separation, Husband had transferred his interest in
two marital properties to Wife. Wife agreed to list one property for short
sale, and indemnify Husband for the mortgage and expenses related to the
second property. In exchange, Husband promised to pay insurance
premiums for two life insurance policies, one in each party's name, and
retain Wife as the beneficiary on his policy. Husband also agreed to remove
his personal vehicle from Wife's real estate and provide Wife with twenty-
four months of spousal support, and then at decreasing amounts for a total
of sixty months.
Following the conference, on March 13, 2015, the master filed a
settlement conference memorandum indicating that the parties had reached
an agreement resolving the outstanding economic issues and directing
-2
J -A30007-16
Husband's attorney to draft a settlement agreement outlining the terms of
the parties' arrangement.
Shortly thereafter, Wife communicated to her attorney that she did not
agree with the terms outlined in the master's memorandum. Nonetheless,
Wife's disagreement was not conveyed to Husband or his attorney until May
6, 2015, approximately one month after Husband had circulated a draft
marital settlement agreement based on the terms discussed during the
settlement conference. Husband filed a petition to enforce the agreement,
and a hearing was held on September 15, 2015. The master entertained
testimony and briefs from both parties. It then issued a report and
recommendation finding that the parties had reached an agreement during
the March 15, 2015 settlement conference, the terms of which were
contained within the master's settlement conference memorandum.
Wife filed exceptions to the master's report, contending that it had
erred in finding that the parties had reached an oral accord, and seeking a
remand to permit the master to hold a hearing on the distribution of the
marital property. The trial court denied Wife's exceptions, ruling that there
was sufficient evidence to support Husband's claim that the parties had
reached an enforceable oral settlement. Accordingly, it entered an order
divorcing the parties and adopting the master's report and recommendation
as the final order in regard to the economic claims. Wife filed this timely
appeal and a Rule 1925(b) statement of matters complained of on appeal.
- 3 -
J -A30007-16
The trial court authored its Rule 1925(a) opinion, and this matter is now
ready for our review.
Wife presents one question for our consideration: "Whether the
divorce court committed prejudicial error and/or abused its discretion and
violated Wife's right to due process by finding that the parties entered into
an enforceable oral contract which resolved all outstanding economic issues
and did not hold a hearing on the merits? Wife's brief at 4 (unnecessary
capitalization omitted).
Wife disputes the court's finding that she entered into an enforceable
oral contract during the settlement conference. Generally, we review a trial
court's order for equitable distribution for an abuse of discretion or an error
of law. Green v. Green, 69 A.3d 282, 285 (Pa.Super. 2013). Where the
appeal raises a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our
scope of review is plenary. Raines v. Raines, 149 A.3d 375, 378
(Pa.Super. 2016). Nevertheless, "it is within the province of the trial court
to weigh the evidence and decide credibility and this Court will not reverse
those determinations so long as they are supported by the evidence."
Morgante v. Morgante, 119 A.3d 382, 387 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation
omitted). Moreover, although the trial court decides the credibility of the
witnesses, where, as here, the parties have appeared before a master, "[w]e
are also aware that a master's report and recommendation, although only
advisory, is to be given the fullest consideration, particularly on the question
- 4 -
J -A30007-16
of credibility of witnesses, because the master has the opportunity to
observe and assess the behavior and demeanor of the parties." Id.With regard to the parties' alleged settlement agreement, our analysis
is governed by contract law unless the agreement provides otherwise.
Kraisinger v. Kraisinger, 928 A.2d 333, 339 (Pa.Super. 2007). A contract
is formed upon an offer and acceptance where "the parties to it 1) reach a
mutual understanding, 2) exchange consideration, and 3) delineate the
terms of their bargain with sufficient clarity." Company Image Knitware,
Ltd. V. Mothers Work, Inc., 909 A.2d 324, 330 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citation
omitted). Further, "[c]onsideration consists of a benefit to the promisor or a
detriment to the promisee." Id. As it relates to this matter:
Where a settlement agreement contains all the requisites for a
valid contract, a court must enforce the terms of the agreement.
This is true even if the terms of the agreement are not yet
formalized in writing. Pursuant to well -settled Pennsylvania law,
oral agreements to settle are enforceable without a writing.
Step Plan Services, Inc. v. Koresko, 12 A.3d 401, 409 (Pa.Super. 2010)
(citation omitted).
Wife's argument on appeal is two -fold. First, she contends that the
trial court erred in determining the parties had entered into an enforceable
oral contract since there is no evidence that Husband presented a valid offer,
and that she accepted that offer. She maintains that Husband did not make
an offer until he transmitted the draft agreement on April 7, 2015.
Moreover, Wife asserts that she rejected this offer on May 6, 2015. Thus,
- 5 -
J -A30007-16
she argues that she never demonstrated intent to be bound by the terms of
the agreement. In support of this position, Wife relies on her testimony at
the September 15, 2015 hearing wherein she insisted that she did not
acknowledge an intent to be bound at the settlement conference and that
she did not believe that equitable distribution would be finally resolved at
that time. Further, she emphasizes that, when the master circulated its
settlement conference memorandum, Wife immediately emailed her attorney
indicating that she did not agree with the terms contained therein.
Next, Wife argues that the supposed agreement fails for lack of
consideration. She posits that the terms described in the master's
memorandum do not inure to her benefit, and has consistently held that she
did not consent to those terms at the settlement conference. Hence, Wife
concludes, the trial court erred in finding that the parties had entered into an
enforceable, oral agreement during the settlement conference. We disagree.
Of notable import, we observe that the master's settlement
conference memorandum, authored contemporaneously to that meeting,
includes the following:
VII. Result of Settlement Negotiations. At the conclusion of the
[settlement conference], the parties had reached an overall
agreement resolving all outstanding economic issues. The basic
terms of their Agreement, that will be incorporated into a marital
settlement agreement prepared by Husband's attorney[.]
Settlement Conference Memorandum, 3/13/15, at 3. That document then
sets forth with specificity the agreed upon terms as they relate to the
- 6 -
J -A30007-16
distribution of the parties' various properties. Id. 3-5. At the September
15, 2015 hearing, Husband testified that those provisions were an accurate
reflection of the terms to which the parties agreed following the settlement
conference. N.T. Hearing, 9/15/15, at 4-9. Further, Husband acted in
reliance on those terms, for example, by immediately seeking to remove and
sell his vehicle, which had remained on Wife's real estate. Id. at 6;
Settlement Conference Memorandum, 3/13/15, at 3. The master credited
this testimony, and upon its review, the trial court determined the record
supported this finding.
The master did not credit Wife's testimony asserting that she believed
the subsequent draft agreement authored by Husband constituted the actual
offer. Similarly, the court found no support in the record for Wife's
assessment, noting that she conceded that her own attorney believed they
had reached an agreement following the settlement conference. Trial Court
Opinion, 7/11/16, at 7; Wife's Answer to Husband's Amended Petition to
Enforce, 8/14/15, at 115.
Wife contends that she communicated her disagreement with the
outcome of the settlement negotiations to her attorney shortly after
receiving the master's memorandum. However, Wife's behavior following
the settlement conference is not sufficient to refute the claim that she
previously consented to the terms of the agreement and merely changed her
mind. In light of the master's memorandum, Husband's credible testimony,
- 7 -
J -A30007-16
and Wife's acknowledgment that the parties' attorneys believed they had
reached an agreement, her subsequent conduct is more probative of a
change of heart, rather than a lack of mutual agreement. Hence, we
conclude that the record supports the finding that Husband made an offer
that Wife accepted, as enunciated in the master's memorandum.
Finally, we are not persuaded by Wife's assertion that the agreement
lacked consideration. Our review of the terms of the parties' agreement
reveals that Wife benefited from the property distribution. Husband
promised to continue to pay the premiums of the parties' Northwestern
Mutual Life Insurance policies, and Wife remained the beneficiary of the
policy insuring Husband's life. Husband also agreed to alimony payments
which directly benefit Wife at Husband's expense. Thus, the agreement was
supported by adequate consideration. Knitware, supra. As such, Wife is
not entitled to relief.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
J seph D. Seletyn,
Prothonotary
Date: 5/5/2017
-8