Com. v. Norton, P.

J-S71010-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
PATRICIA NORTON :
:
Appellant : No. 138 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Order Entered March 31, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0002388-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: Filed: July 23, 2020
Patricia Norton appeals from her March 31, 2015 judgment of sentence,
which was imposed in absentia.1 We vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence
and remand for resentencing.
On January 4, 2013, Appellant cursed at, punched, and then knocked
over Victoria Brown (the “victim”) on the steps of the SEPTA2 station located
in the 1200 block of Broad Street in Philadelphia. She continued to strike the
victim until a third person intervened. Appellant was subsequently arrested
and charged with aggravated assault, simple assault, and recklessly
endangering another person (“REAP”).
____________________________________________
1 Appellant’s appeal is timely filed as she obtained reinstatement of her direct
appeal rights nunc pro tunc on December 10, 2018, through the PCRA.
2 SEPTA is the acronym for the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority,
the public transportation authority that operates buses, rapid transit,
commuter rail, and light rail in Philadelphia and four surrounding counties.
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Prior to trial, the court ordered a psychiatric examination to assess
Appellant’s competency. Following a determination that she was competent
to stand trial, the trial court found her guilty of all charges on December 15,
2014. Appellant’s sentencing was deferred until March 6, 2015, to permit a
Forensic Intensive Recovery3 (“FIR”) evaluation and pre-sentence report.
On the scheduled sentencing date, the Commonwealth was granted a
continuance due to the unavailability of the victim. Appellant also did not
appear on that date, and thus, the Commonwealth requested that the trial
court issue a bench warrant to secure her appearance for the rescheduled
hearing on March 30, 2015. Defense counsel accepted service of the warrant
on behalf of his client. On March 30, 2015, Appellant did not appear. Counsel
represented to the court that he sent letters to her, and attempted to email
and call her, but that he had not received any response. Counsel for the
Commonwealth requested another bench warrant, and that Appellant be
sentenced in absentia. In support of the latter, the Commonwealth asked for
“a little bit of time” to enable its detectives to make the necessary checks.
N.T., 3/30/15, at 4. Defense counsel had no objection to the issuance of a
bench warrant, but opposed the Commonwealth’s request that his client be
sentenced in absentia. The court initially indicated that it would issue the
____________________________________________
3 FIR is a prison deferral initiative in Philadelphia that conducts comprehensive
behavioral health assessments upon eligible participants and offers substance
abuse treatment in lieu of incarceration.
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bench warrant, and the Commonwealth objected, insisting that this was
Appellant’s second failure to appear. The court then continued the sentencing
to permit the Commonwealth to complete the appropriate checks, “hopefully
. . . in an hour.” Id. Following a recess, the hearing resumed. The
Commonwealth represented that its witnesses could be ready to testify
regarding “an absentia matter” later that morning, but the trial court
scheduled it for 9:00 a.m., the next morning.
On March 31, 2015, the court heard testimony from Police Officer
Tanisha Rosaro regarding the Commonwealth’s efforts that morning to locate
Appellant. N.T., 3/31/15, at 5. The police officer testified that she checked
the morgue and various hospitals “with negative results.” Id. She also
confirmed that Appellant was not in custody. Id. The officer represented that
she could not find a current address for Appellant. Id. The Commonwealth
asked the court to find that Appellant willfully failed to appear for her
sentencing and proceed in absentia because she failed to appear on March 6,
2015, despite notice of the sentencing hearing; failed to appear on March 30,
2015, in response to a bench warrant nunc pro tunc; and that the police
officer’s check of hospitals, the prison, and the medical examiner’s office failed
to locate her. Id. at 7.
Defense counsel reminded the court that Appellant had low cognitive
capacity. He pointed out that she was in and out of different facilities both
prior to and following surgery for a brain tumor, as there was a concern that
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she was a danger to herself. Id. at 13. He argued that her non-appearance
was involuntary in light of this history.
The trial court re-examined the record to verify that Appellant had
received notice of the original sentencing date. The record reflected that, on
February 12, 2015, Appellant was ordered to comply with the FIR program
and keep attending Parkside Recovery as a condition of her bail. Id. at 10.
The court ruled that since Appellant did not appear on March 6, 2015, in
response to a subpoena, or on March 30, 2015, in response to a bench warrant
her counsel accepted on her behalf, the Commonwealth would be permitted
to proceed in absentia.
The Commonwealth introduced impact testimony from the victim, and
recommended that Appellant be sentenced to three to six years of
incarceration followed by five years of reporting probation. Id. at 19. Defense
counsel asked for a mitigated sentence, noting that Appellant had a prior
record score of zero, she suffered from a brain tumor when she perpetrated
the unprovoked attack on the victim, she had pre-existing mental health
issues, and she had not been arrested or in trouble since her release almost
two years before. The Commonwealth argued that Appellant was smarter
than portrayed and that she “did not care enough to appear for her
sentencing.” Id. at 25.
The court sentenced Appellant in absentia to the term recommended by
the Commonwealth on the aggravated assault charge. It acknowledged that
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the simple assault conviction merged, and stated that it was not imposing any
additional sentence for REAP.
Appellant’s counsel filed a post-sentence motion the next day. In that
motion, counsel averred that his client’s participation in the court-ordered
recovery program explained her failure to appear in court on March 6, 2015.
Her counselor at Parkside-Frankford confirmed that Appellant was attending
group therapy three times per week, and individual counseling once per week,
and that she was present at an orientation program on March 6, 2015.
Appellant pled that she mistakenly assumed that her attendance in the court-
ordered program took precedence over her appearance in court on that date.
Under the circumstances, Appellant maintained that it was an error or abuse
of discretion to sentence her in absentia. The motion was denied by operation
of law.
Appellant appealed on August 13, 2015, and was ordered to file a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. No
statement was filed. In its January 29, 2016 opinion, the court maintained
that all of Appellant’s claims were waived and that her appeal should be
dismissed for failure to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. On April 21, 2016, this
Court dismissed the appeal for failure to file a brief.
On July 24, 2017, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition. Counsel was
appointed, and filed an amended petition on her behalf. On December 10,
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2018, the PCRA court ordered reinstatement of Appellant’s direct appeal rights
and afforded her counsel the opportunity to file a Rule 1925(b) statement.
Appellant presents one issue for our review: “Did the sentencing court
deny Appellant her constitutional right to due process under the United States
and Pennsylvania Constitutions when the court, over objection, sentenced
Appellant on March 31, 2015, without Appellant being present?” Appellant’s
brief at 2.
Appellant alleges a violation of her right to be present in the courtroom
at every stage of a criminal trial. As our High Court reaffirmed in
Commonwealth v. Tharp, 101 A.3d 736, 762 (Pa. 2014), that right, while
not absolute, is guaranteed by Article I, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution
and Pa.R.Crim.P. 602. We review such claims de novo, and our scope of
review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Tejada, 161 A.3d 313 (Pa.Super.
2017).
Pa.R.Crim.P. 602(A) provides that “[t]he defendant shall be present at
every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of
the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence,” except in circumstances not
present here. When a defendant is absent, the Commonwealth has the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the absence is willful.
Commonwealth v. Decosta, 197 A.3d 813 (Pa.Super. 2018); see also
Commonwealth v. Kelly, 78 A.3d 1136, 1139-40 (Pa.Super. 2013)
(citing Commonwealth v. Scarborough, 421 A.2d 147 (Pa. 1980) (holding
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that when a constitutional right is waived, the Commonwealth must show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent)).
Appellant contends that the Commonwealth did not prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that she willfully failed to attend her
sentencing, and that court erred in sentencing her in absentia. She argues
that the Commonwealth did not establish that she was repeatedly absent or
that, given her individual circumstances, she made a knowing and intelligent
decision to abscond. Moreover, she faults the Commonwealth for its
halfhearted attempt to locate her.
The Commonwealth concedes that it did not meet its burden, and urges
this Court to vacate judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.
Commonwealth’s brief at 10. No attempt was made to locate Appellant where
she was known to reside or likely to be found. Id. Furthermore, its one
attempt to locate Appellant, over a two or three hour span, and limited to
checking local hospitals, the jail, and the morgue, was inadequate to justify
sentencing anyone in absentia, especially “a person with [Appellant]’s mental
illness, substance abuse problems, cognitive impairments, and apparent lack
of notice of her hearing.” Id.
The Commonwealth acknowledges that the facts herein contrast sharply
with those in Commonwealth v. Hill, 737 A.2d 255, 262 (Pa. 1999), where
“numerous attempts” were undertaken to find the appellant before the court
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sentenced him in absentia. See also Commonwealth v. King, 695 A.2d 412
(Pa.Super. 1997 ) (trial in absentia proper where defendant failed to appear
four times over seven months). Moreover, in determining that Appellant knew
and voluntarily waived her constitutional right to be present at sentencing,
the Commonwealth and the court largely ignored Appellant’s intellectual
disability, mental health issues, and her recent surgery for the removal of a
brain tumor, considerations that tended to undermine that notion.
The situation herein is factually distinguishable from that in
Commonwealth v. Williams, 2019 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 4489
*(Pa.Super. Dec. 4, 2019) (unpublished memorandum), where we upheld the
sentencing of the appellant in absentia. Williams was given bail with the
express condition that he complete a self-help drug treatment program. He
received notice of his sentencing hearing and knew he was required to be
present. It was undisputed that he absconded from the drug treatment facility
within three hours of his admission, and had no valid reason for doing so, or
failing to appear at his scheduled sentencing.
After a thorough review of the record, we agree that the Commonwealth
failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Appellant willfully
absented herself from the sentencing proceeding. It was unclear whether she
had actual notice of the date of the rescheduled sentencing. Additionally, the
two or three hours spent by the Commonwealth to locate her were limited to
ruling out that she was hospitalized, in jail, or deceased. No attempt was
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made to contact her family or her last known residences to locate her. Despite
knowledge that she had been accepted into a recovery program, the
Commonwealth did not attempt to contact the program to ascertain her status
and whereabouts. Absent herein is proof that would support a reasonable
inference that Appellant knowingly and willfully failed to appear at her
sentencing, and justify imposing sentence in absentia. We commend the
Commonwealth for its candor to this Court in acknowledging that fact.
Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/23/20
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