Taggart, K. v. JP Morgan

J-S06032-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
KENNETH TAGGART : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
JP MORGAN MORTGAGE TRUST :
2006-A-7, VENTURES TRUST 2013- :
I-NH AND GREAT AJAX OPERATING :
PARTNERSHIP, CHASE BANK USA :
N.A., CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC., :
AND JP MORGAN CHASE BANK N.A. : No. 1060 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Order March 9, 2018
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): No. 150101366
BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JULY 24, 2020
Kenneth Taggart appeals from the order in this action to quiet title that
sustained the Appellee-Defendants’ preliminary objections and dismissed Mr.
Taggart’s third amended complaint with prejudice. We vacate the order and
remand for further proceedings.
In 2005, Mr. Taggart executed a mortgage and note on a property on
Saul Street in Philadelphia. In 2010, after giving the requisite notice, the
bank1 initiated a mortgage foreclosure action in 2010, which was dismissed.
The bank filed a second foreclosure action in 2013 without issuing new pre-
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1The mortgage and/or note was assigned and reassigned at various times
between 2005 and the present. Since it has no bearing on any issue we
determine, we use the generic term “bank.”
J-S06032-19
complaint notice. In February 2015, Mr. Taggart commenced the instant
action to quiet title in the property at issue in the pending foreclosure case.
Thereafter, the foreclosure case proceeded to trial and a verdict was entered
in favor of the bank, Mr. Taggart appealed, and this Court affirmed on August
25, 2017. See JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Taggart, 175 A.3d 1111
(Pa.Super. 2017) (unpublished memorandum). By order of February 22,
2018, our Supreme Court granted in part Mr. Taggart’s petition of allowance
of appeal. See JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. v. Taggart, 180 A.3d 367 (Pa.
2018).
The Appellee-Defendants had filed preliminary objections to Mr.
Taggart’s third amended quiet title complaint after this Court affirmed the
foreclosure judgment, but before our Supreme Court granted Mr. Taggart’s
pending petition for allowance of appeal. The grounds for the objections raised
by each Appellee-Defendant included, inter alia, that collateral estoppel barred
Mr. Taggert from relitigating the issues raised in the complaint because they
were previously litigated in the foreclosure action.
By order of March 12, 2018, the trial court sustained the preliminary
objections in the nature of a demurrer, concluding that Mr. Taggart was
estopped to relitigate the issues in his complaint because they were decided
in the foreclosure action. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/27/18, at 5-6. Mr.
Taggart timely filed the instant appeal claiming, inter alia, that the trial court
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erred in applying collateral estoppel because the issues in the foreclosure
action were pending before our Supreme Court. See Appellant’s brief at 16.
On February 20, 2019, the High Court held that the bank had been
required to serve Mr. Taggart with new pre-complaint notice before initiating
the 2013 foreclosure action. See JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. v. Taggart,
203 A.3d 187 (Pa. 2019) (“Taggart II”). It therefore reversed this Court’s
order that had affirmed the foreclosure judgment and remanded the case to
the trial court for further proceedings. Id. at 197. Consequently, our
Supreme Court’s decision did not result in a final judgment on the merits in
the foreclosure action.
From the above, it is clear that the trial court’s order sustaining the
Appellee-Defendants’ preliminary objections on the basis of collateral estoppel
cannot stand.2 Issues decided in a prior case are barred pursuant to collateral
estoppel only if, inter alia, the prior case resulted in a final judgment on the
merits. See, e.g., Perelman v. Perelman, 125 A.3d 1259, 1265 (Pa.Super.
2015). Here, the decision in the prior action was not final at the time the trial
court applied collateral estoppel, as our Supreme Court had granted allowance
of appeal. Further, our Supreme Court ultimately held that the bank failed to
satisfy a condition precedent to initiating the foreclosure action against Mr.
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2“Our standard of review of an order of the trial court overruling or granting
preliminary objections is to determine whether the trial court committed an
error of law.” Perelman v. Perelman, 125 A.3d 1259, 1263 (Pa.Super.
2015).
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Taggart. See Taggart II, supra. Consequently, the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to decide the merits of any issues raised in the foreclosure action.
See Bankers Tr. Co. v. Foust, 621 A.2d 1054, 1056 n.1 (Pa.Super. 1993)
(observing that proper notice is “a prerequisite to the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction over the mortgagee’s foreclosure action”).
Accordingly, we vacate the March 12, 2018 order sustaining Appellee-
Defendants’ preliminary objections on the basis of collateral estoppel and
dismissing Mr. Taggart’s complaint with prejudice. We remand for further
proceedings consistent with this memorandum, including resolution of the
preliminary objections of Appellee-Defendants that are based on grounds
other than collateral estoppel.
Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/24/20
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