Silva, J. v. Phila. Yearly Meeting

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
JOHN SILVA AND FERNANDA SILVA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellants :
:
:
v. :
:
:
PHILADELPHIA YEARLY MEETING, : No. 2729 EDA 2019
A/K/A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY OF :
FRIENDS (QUAKERS) OF :
PHILADELPHIA & VICINITY :
Appeal from the Order Entered July 30, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): No. 190203148
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KING, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JULY 28, 2020
John and Fernanda Silva, h/w, (collectively, Silvas), appeal from the trial
court’s order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
sustaining the preliminary objections filed by Appellees, Philadelphia Yearly
Meeting a/k/a Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) of Philadelphia & Vicinity
(PYM), transferring venue of the underlying negligence action from
Philadelphia County to Bucks County, and ordering the Silvas to incur all costs
of transfer. After careful review, we affirm.1
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 We are aware that the trial judge, the Honorable Lisette Shirdan-Harris,
indicated in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that “[u]pon further review and this
court’s order, the court . . . respectfully request[]s that jurisdiction be
relinquished and the matter be remanded.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion,
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Richland Friends Meeting (RFM), a non-profit Quaker congregation, is
one of 103 local congregations affiliated with the larger regional body, PYM.
PYM’s Preliminary Objections, 6/4/19, Ex. B, at ¶¶ 6-8. PYM is a corporate
entity with its principal place of business in Philadelphia; RFM is located at 206
Main Street, Quakertown, Bucks County, Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint, 5/17/19, at ¶¶ 3-4. PYM considers “all members of its
constituent Friends meetings,” such as RFM, members of PYM and allows them
to attend PYM’s triannual general body meetings to worship, discuss issues
and concerns that affect the regional group, and join in fellowship. Plaintiffs’
Opposition to PYM’s Preliminary Objections, 6/19/2019, Ex. A.
On June 27, 2018, John Silva (John), a resident of Bucks County,
sustained serious and permanent injury to his left knee after he allegedly
“slipped and fell on water that had accumulated on the floor” of RFM’s
meetinghouse. Plaintiffs’ Complaint, 3/1/19, at ¶ 5, 10. The Silvas filed a
complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia on March 1, 2019,
and named “Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) of Philadelphia & Vicinity,
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1/15/20, at 1. Although we are mindful of considerations of judicial economy,
Judge Shirdan-Harris has provided no explanation of why remand is
necessary. Moreover, upon our careful review of the record, we do not believe
that any factual dispute exists with regard to the propriety of venue in
Philadelphia. Accordingly, we believe that the trial court properly granted
Defendants’ preliminary objections and transferred the case to Bucks County
without first ordering additional discovery.
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d/b/a Richland Friends Meeting,”2 as the sole defendant. Plaintiffs’
Complaint, 3/1/19, at ¶ 3 (emphasis added). In the complaint, 3 the Silvas
averred that the named defendant’s failure to properly account for an
“accumulation of water” just inside the entrance of the meetinghouse was the
direct cause of Silva’s injuries, which caused “significant pain and suffering”
and “will continue to require significant medical care and treatment.” Id. at
¶¶ 9-13.
On March 28, 2019, PYM filed its first set of preliminary objections,
challenging the legal sufficiency of the Silvas’ complaint and alleging improper
venue pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(1) (improper venue raised by
preliminary objection) and 2179 (venue for personal injury actions). PYM
Preliminary Objections, 3/28/19, at ¶¶ 18-26. PYM asserted that the Silvas’
complaint failed as a matter of law because: (1) there was “no entity known,”
or in existence, with the name of the listed defendant; (2) PYM did not and
had never “d/b/a” RFM; and (3) PYM did not exercise any control over or
maintain any financial ties with RFM. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 9-10, 14-15. The Silvas
subsequently amended their complaint on April 10, 2019, and again on May
17, 2019, naming RFM as a separate defendant in the lawsuit. See Plaintiffs’
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2 The Silvas later amended their complaint to list PYM and RFM separately as
defendants. See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, 5/17/19.
3 The complaint also made a claim for loss of consortium, alleging that Silva’s
wife, Plaintiff Fernanda Silva, “has been and will continue to be deprived of
the companionship, support, society and assistance of her husband, John
Silva, and has therefore sustained a loss of consortium[.]” Plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint, 5/17/19, at ¶ 21.
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Amended Complaint, 4/10/19, at ¶¶ 3-4, 11-15; Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint, 5/17/19, ¶¶ 3-4, 15-18.
In their second amended complaint, the Silvas alleged that PYM
“exercise[d] supervision and control” over RFM through its governing bodies.
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, 5/17/18, at ¶ 6. The Silvas also
alleged that RFM “regularly conduct[ed] business activities essential to and in
furtherance of the objects of both [RFM] and [PYM].” Id. at ¶ 7. Lastly, the
Silvas alleged that “[RFM] and/or [PYM] . . . were responsible for the
supervision, care, maintenance, and upkeep” of the RFM property, and that at
all times relevant, RFM and PYM “acted through their employees, workers,
agents, representatives, officers, and/or other individuals for whom
defendants are legally responsible.” Id. at ¶¶ 7-8.
PYM subsequently filed new preliminary objections on June 4, 2019,4 in
response to Plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. The preliminary objections
were affixed with certifications of Linell McCurry, the associate General
Secretary for Business and Finance for PYM, and Susan Miller Abbott, the
acting clerk for RFM. PYM Preliminary Objections, 6/4/19, Ex. B, Ex. C. These
certifications stated, respectively, in part, that: (1) PYM did not have control
over the day-to-day or maintenance operations of RFM; (2) PYM did not own
the property on which RFM is located; (3) PYM did not sponsor, advertise,
organize, attend or pay for the event on the date in question; (4) RFM had no
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4 Pursuant to Rule 1028(c)(1), “[i]f [the non-moving] party has filed an
amended pleading . . . the preliminary objections to the original pleading shall
be deemed moot.” Pa.R.C.P. 1028(c)(1).
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registered office or principal place of business in Philadelphia County; and (5)
RFM did not conduct any business transactions, own any property, have any
employees, pay any taxes or advertise in Philadelphia County. Id. at Ex. B,
¶¶ 1, 5, 9-11; Id. at Ex. C, ¶ 3. Further, PYM averred that it had not held an
annual meeting of PYM congregations in Philadelphia since 2012. Id. at ¶ 26.
Thereafter, the Silvas filed a motion in opposition to Defendants’
preliminary objections, highlighting language from PYM’s website which stated
that: (1) “members of [RFM] are also members of [PYM]” (2) PYM convenes
both regional meetings with the “100+ monthly meetings three times a year”
as well as one-day “continuing sessions held twice a year;” and (3) members
of the “monthly” congregations are “appointed to serve” on “councils” and
“committees” to “determine priorities, [as well as] monitor and evaluate work
within their areas of responsibility” for PYM. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to PYM’s
Preliminary Objections, 6/19/19, at Ex. A.
On July 20, 2019, the trial court sustained Defendants’ preliminary
objections to improper venue and transferred the case to Bucks County, with
costs to be borne by the Silvas. Order, 7/30/19. The court issued its ruling
without first ordering discovery on any issues of fact. See Pa.R.C.P.
1028(c)(2) (“If an issue of fact is raised [in preliminary objections], the court
shall consider evidence by depositions or otherwise.”).
On August 23, 2019, the Silvas filed a motion for reconsideration to
amend the court’s transfer order, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1311 and 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 702(B), to have it certified as an interlocutory appeal, and for a stay of the
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proceedings in the trial court pending appeal.5 On that same date, the Silvas
filed a timely notice of appeal. See Valley Forge Center Assoc. v. Rib-
It/K.P., Inc., 693 A.2d 242 (Pa. Super. 1997) (filing of motion for
reconsideration insufficient to toll appeal period; appeal period tolled only by
timely order expressly granting reconsideration of final appealable order).
Defendants filed an answer and brief in “Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Reconsideration” on September 11, 2019. On September 25, 2019, the trial
court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration.
The Silvas timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal. The Silvas raise one issue for
our review:
Did the Trial Court err in granting [Defendants’] preliminary
objections challenging venue without providing [Plaintiffs an]
opportunity to conduct discovery on the issue of venue when the
pleadings raised a question of fact material to the question of
whether venue is proper in Philadelphia?”
Appellants’ Brief, at 2.
We evaluate the sufficiency of the trial court’s reasoning through an
examination of the complaint and the supplemental record. Lugo v. Farmers
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5 We note that the Rules of Appellate Procedure provide for an appeal as of
right from an interlocutory order granting a petition to transfer venue from
one county to another. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(c); see also Goodman v.
Pizzutillo, 682 A.2d 363, 367 (Pa. Super. 1996).
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Pride, Inc., 967 A.2d 963, 966 (Pa. Super. 2009). Our scope and standard
of review in venue transfer cases is well-settled:
[A] trial court’s decision to transfer venue will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion. A [p]laintiff’s choice of forum is to
be given great weight,[6] and the burden is on the party
challenging the choice to show it was improper. However, a
plaintiff’s choice of venue is not absolute or unassailable. Indeed,
if there exists any proper basis for the trial court’s decision to
grant a petition to transfer venue, the decision must stand.
Fritz v. Glen Mills Schools, 840 A.2d 1021, 1023 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). An abuse of discretion is not a mere error in judgment; rather, it
must be shown that the trial court “missaplie[d] the law, exercise[d] its
discretion in a manner lacking reason, or d[id] not follow legal procedure.”
Continental Cas. Co. v. Pro Machine, 916 A.2d 1111, 1115-16 (Pa. Super.
2007); see also Francisco v. Ford Motors Co., 580 A.2d 374, 375 (Pa.
Super. 1990) (holding that appellate court, in determining whether trial court
abused its discretion, cannot “substitute [its] judgment for the judgment of
the trial court”).
Venue is where a particular action can be brought and decided; it is a
matter of convenience for the litigants. County Constr. Co. v. Livengood
Constr. Co., 142 A.2d 9 (Pa. 1958). A defendant can challenge a plaintiff’s
chosen forum as “improper,” through a preliminary objection to the complaint.
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6A plaintiff’s choice of forum is presumed to be valid, yet has no bearing on
whether venue is proper in said forum; venue either “is or is not proper.”
King v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 829 A.2d 673, 676 (Pa. Super. 2003).
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See Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(1).7 Subsequently, the trial court “shall determine
promptly all preliminary objections. If an issue of fact is raised, the court shall
consider evidence by deposition or otherwise.” Pa.R.C.P. 1028(c)(2)
(emphasis added).
The Silvas allege that the trial court misapplied the law and improperly
transferred venue from Philadelphia to Bucks County without first allowing
them to conduct any discovery on the following issues: (1) whether RFM, a
non-profit congregation based in Bucks County, regularly conducts association
activities in Philadelphia County sufficient to avail itself of personal jurisdiction
in that forum,8 and (2) whether [PYM], as a regional Quaker corporation,
“exercises ‘supervision and control,’ over [RFM.]” Appellant’s Brief, at 6.
In Pennsylvania, venue is governed by Rule 1006, which states in
pertinent part:
Rule 1006. Venue. Change of Venue
(b) Actions against the following defendants, except as
otherwise provided in subdivision (c), may be brought in and
only in the counties designated by the following rules:
political subdivision, Rule 2103; partnerships, Rule 2130;
unincorporated associations, Rule 2156; corporations and
similar entities, Rule 2179.
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7Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1006(e), if objections to improper venue are not raised
by preliminary objection they are otherwise waived.
8“As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained, for procedural purposes,
objections to venue are treated as raising a question of jurisdiction.”
Deyarmin, supra at 9 (internal citation omitted).
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Pa.R.C.P. 1006(b) (emphasis added). Although Rule 1006 differentiates
between “unincorporated associations”9 and “corporations and similar
entities,” this distinction merely reflects the fact that unincorporated
associations often do not have a principal place of business. The prerequisites
for asserting venue pursuant to Rule 2179 for corporations closely mirror
those of Rule 2156 for unincorporated associations, which provides that:
(a) [An] action against an association may be brought in and
only in a county where the association regularly conducts
business or any association activity, or in the county where
the cause of action arose or in a county where a transaction
or occurrence took place out of which the cause of actions
arose[.][10]
Pa.R.C.P. 2156(a) (emphasis added).11
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9 Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 2151, an “association” as used in the chapter,
“Unincorporated Associations as Parties,” is defined as “an unincorporated
association conducting any business or engaging in any activity of any nature
whether for profit or otherwise under a common name, but does not mean a
. . . corporation or similar entity as defined in Rule 2176.” Pa.R.C.P. 2151
(Definitions).
10 Pursuant to Rule 2179(a), venue is proper in actions against corporations
in all fora listed in Rule 2156(a), as well as in the “county where the
corporation’s registered office or principal place of business is located[.]”
Pa.R.C.P 2179(a).
11 Upon “information and belief,” the Silvas alleged that RFM, unlike PYM, is
an unincorporated association. See Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint
5/17/19, at ¶ 4. In their preliminary objections, Defendants neither admitted
nor denied this averment. However, they refer to RFM as a “non-profit
congregation,” PYM Preliminary Objections, 6/4/19, at ¶¶ 17 (internal citation
omitted), and analyze the venue issue under Rule 2179. However,
determining whether RFM is in fact an unincorporated association is not
dispositive in our analysis —neither party disputes that RFM is based in Bucks
County nor is the “principal place of business” prong of Rule 2179 relevant to
the issue raised on appeal. See PYM’s Preliminary Objections, 6/4/19, at ¶
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In Pennsylvania, courts determine whether an organization “regularly
conduct[s] business” for the purposes of establishing venue through an
analysis of the “quality”12 and “quantity”13 of its contacts with a particular
forum. Purcell v. Bryn Mawr Hosp., 579 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Pa. 1990). In
Purcell, the Supreme Court held that venue was not proper in Philadelphia,
where the defendant, a Montgomery County-based hospital, had contractual
affiliations with, recruited, and employed residents from several teaching
hospitals in Philadelphia, as well as purchased supplies and services for its
business, and received income from patients living in that forum. Id. at 1283-
84. The Court reiterated its prior distinction that only “direct” contacts,
compared to “collateral [or] incidental,” avail an organization to venue in a
particular forum.14 Id. (internal citation omitted). The Court found that
although the hospital’s contacts were “in aid of the main purpose” of its
business, they were not directly “furthering or essential to, corporate objects,”
as required to satisfied the quality analysis. Id. at 1285.
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17; Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, 5/17/19, at ¶ 4. Thus, we will
analyze the issue pursuant to Rule 2156(a).
12“‘Quality of acts’ means those directly, furthering or essential to, corporate
objects; they do not include incidental acts.” Purcell v. Bryn Mawr Hosp.,
579 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Pa. 1990) (internal citation omitted).
13“Quantity means those acts, which are ‘so continuous and sufficient to be
general or habitual.’” Id. (internal citation omitted).
14 “In combined form . . . those in ‘aid of a main purpose’ are collateral and
incidental, while ‘those necessary to its existence’ are ‘direct.’” Id. (internal
citation omitted).
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Relying almost exclusively on this Court’s holding in Deyarmin v.
CONRAIL, 931 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. 2007), the Silvas claim that the trial court
was required to permit discovery on the issue of venue, and its failure to do
so was a misapplication of law. However, this is not so. See id. at 14-15. In
Deyarmin, this Court found that the trial court had not abused its discretion
by failing to order discovery even though the moving party submitted
affidavits in furtherance of its objections. Id. Although a trial court is typically
required to resolve any factual disputes by ordering discovery, it has
considerable discretion to determine the necessity for additional evidence
before transferring venue. Purcell, supra at 1024.
This Court has since reiterated that a trial court does not abuse its
discretion per se by failing to order discovery on the issue of whether a
defendant could satisfy the “quality-quantity” test. Fritz, supra at 1023-24
(Pa. Super. 2003). In Fritz, this Court applied our Supreme Court’s holding
in Purcell, concluding that venue was not proper in Philadelphia against a
Bucks County-based juvenile institution even though the institution utilized
the Philadelphia Court System and received roughly 35% of its students from
the forum. Id. at 1023. In affirming the transfer of venue from Philadelphia
to Bucks County, we stated that even though the “trial court’s factual findings
were made without the benefit of sworn depositions or an evidentiary
hearing,” there was “no abuse of discretion” because there existed “no
disputed facts raised by appellant for purposes of establishing venue in
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Philadelphia . . . which would have been dispositive to the question of venue.”
Id. at 1024.
Here, the Silvas’ complaint fails to create a factual dispute with respect
to RFM’s contacts in Philadelphia County. In fact, outside of vague references
to “meetings” that RFM allegedly attends “regularly and systematically,” the
Silvas’ complaint lacks evidentiary support on this point. Plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint, 5/17/19, at ¶ 7. The Silvas rely in large part on two
screenshots of PYM’s website that merely suggest that PYM, as an
organization, holds regular meetings. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’
Preliminary Objections, 6/19/19, at Ex. A. Critically absent from this evidence,
however, is the location of the meetings that RFM allegedly attends 15 and
whether RFM regularly attends these meetings in an official capacity. See
also Wimble v. Parx Casino and Greenwood Gaming and Ent. Inc., 40
A.3d 174, 179 (Pa. Super. 2012) (holding that where parties’ pleadings do not
create factual disputes, trial court may rule on preliminary objections without
ordering further discovery).
Pursuant to Rule 1028(a)(1), the moving party carries the burden of
supporting its challenge to the court’s jurisdiction, and must affirmatively
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15 Defendants assert that PYM holds its yearly meetings all across the greater
Philadelphia area and, as previously stated, has not held one in Philadelphia
since 2012. Defendants’ Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Reconsideration, 9/11/19, at ¶ 9.
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present evidence in furtherance of the allegations in the preliminary objection.
Deyarmin, supra at 9. As the Deyarmin Court explained:
The moving party may not sit back and, by the bare allegations
as set forth in the preliminary objections, place the burden upon
the plaintiff to negate those allegations. It is only when the
moving party properly raises the jurisdictional issue that the
burden of proving jurisdiction is upon the party asserting it.
Id., citing Schmitt v. Seaspray-Sharkline, Inc., 531 A.2d 801, 803 (Pa.
Super. 1987).
Although the Silvas did not initially bear the burden of defending the
venue chosen in their complaint, they are required to establish the propriety
of jurisdiction in the chosen forum once the defendant has properly raised
jurisdictional issues. Deyarmin, supra. In their pleadings, the Silvas failed
to rebut information contained in Susan Miller Abbott’s certification regarding
the limited nature of RFM’s business in Philadelphia and the fact that RFM does
not possess any offices, own property, have any employees, pay taxes, or
advertise in Philadelphia. PYM Preliminary Objections, 6/4/19, Ex. C., at ¶3.
In fact, for almost four months (from the date that PYM filed its preliminary
objections to the date the court granted a transfer of venue), the Silvas failed
to dispute any of the testimony in Ms. Abbot’s certification, instead relying
almost exclusively on conclusory language in their many complaints. See
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, 4/10/19, at ¶¶ 5-6, 9; Plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint, 5/17/18, at ¶¶ 6-9, 11-12.
Even if the Silvas were able to establish that RFM attended multiple
yearly meetings in Philadelphia or had averred that PYM and RFM were
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engaged in contractual affiliations, these contacts would still be insufficient
under the Purcell “quality-quantity” test to subject RFM to jurisdiction in
Philadelphia. Regardless of whether RFM engaged in “worship” or “fellowship”
alongside PYM in Philadelphia, this activity does not affect RFM’s main purpose
– which is to provide a place of fellowship for its local community in Bucks
County. Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing
to order discovery on the issue of whether RFM had the requisite contacts in
Philadelphia County to establish proper venue. Wimble, supra.The Silvas next contend that the trial court should have permitted
discovery on the issue of whether PYM exercises supervision and control over
RFM, thus making PYM liable for the actions of RFM. Specifically, the Silvas
allege that although the accident occurred at RFM’s Bucks County property,
venue may rest in Philadelphia because PYM, which is based in Philadelphia,
exercises supervision and control over RFM’s activities in Bucks County.
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, 5/17/19, at ¶ 6. However, the Silvas
present scant evidence to support this claim. Instantly, PYM’s website does
not suggest that it exercises control over any of the 103 regional
congregations. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Preliminary Objections,
6/19/19, at Ex. A. Rather, PYM’s website merely states “all members of its
constituent friends meetings are also members of [PYM.]” Id. In fact, PYM’s
website does not indicate, and the Silvas offer no other evidence to prove,
that PYM has any direct control over RFM; thus, any correlative activity
between the regional meeting and PYM’s agenda is incidental. Id.- 14 -
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Further, there exists no evidence in the Silvas’ second amended
complaint or in the record pleadings to suggest that PYM’s “councils” – the
mechanism through which the Silvas allege PYM exercises control over
regional congregations -- force its ideals or initiatives upon local associations
like RFM. Id. As PYM’s website explains, members of regional meetings are
merely “encouraged to attend” yearly meetings to ensure a “larger pool of
wisdom and insight.” Id. The PYM website further explains that regional
meetings, like RFM, have their own “meeting for business,” in which they make
decisions about their own “management, pastoral care, membership, property
and social concerns of interest to the local group.” Id. In her certification,
Linell McCurry, the Associate General Secretary for Business and Finance for
PYM, reinforced these claims found on PYM’s website, explaining that PYM does
not own or supervise the maintenance operations of the property, or control
the day-to-day operations of RFM. See PYM Preliminary Objections, 6/4/19,
Ex. B, at ¶¶ 9-11.
In Pennsylvania, there exists no prohibition on “forum shopping per se
– to the contrary, our venue rules give plaintiffs various choices of different
possible venues, and plaintiffs are generally free to ‘shop’ among those forums
and choose the one they prefer.” Zappala v. James Lewis Group, 982 A.2d
512, 521 (Pa. Super 2009) (internal citation omitted). However, while a
plaintiff’s choice of venue is typically afforded great weight, it is the court’s
responsibility to be mindful of attempts to manufacture venue and engage in
improper forum shopping. In fact, this Court has distinguished between
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"proper” and “improper” forum shopping. “Proper” forum shopping occurs
when a plaintiff selects a certain venue for appropriate reasons, such as the
selected venue is "closer to the office of plaintiff's attorney, or closer to a
transportation center.” Walls v. The Phoenix Ins. Co., 979 A.2d 847, 852
(Pa. Super. 2009). “[I]mproper forum shopping occurs when a plaintiff
manufactures venue by naming and serving parties who are not proper
defendants to the action” in order to “manipulat[e] the venue rules to create
venue where it does not properly exist.” Zappala, supra at 521.
Here, the Silvas’ original and amended complaints suggest that their
focus has been to create venue in Philadelphia against RFM, even though the
accident, property, plaintiffs, and local organization are all located or based in
Bucks County. Initially claiming that PYM “d/b/a” RFM, the Silvas’ erroneous
naming of Defendants in the instant lawsuit, even after Defendants addressed
these mistakes in their preliminary objections, acts as a transparent attempt
to create venue where it does not lie.
The Silvas now ask us to disregard the evidence that disproves venue
in Philadelphia County, which they have failed to dispute for several months,
and require the court to order discovery. However, there have been no facts
pled to support the Silvas’ assertions that PYM was responsible for
maintaining, supervising, or caring for RFM’s property or event on the date in
question. Under such circumstances – where no factual disputes exist –
additional discovery is unnecessary. Wimble, supra. Accordingly, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion or misapply the law
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by not ordering additional discovery before transferring this case to Bucks
County, the venue with a real connection to the instant action. Deyarmin,
supra. Thus, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/28/2020
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