Com. v. Taylor, N.

J. A17031/20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
NATALIE TAYLOR, : No. 1272 EDA 2019
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 18, 2019,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0002323-2018
BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 28, 2020
Natalie Taylor appeals from the April 18, 2019 judgment of sentence,
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, following her
guilty plea to aggravated assault, endangering the welfare of children, simple
assault, recklessly endangering another person, and possession of
instruments of crime.1 Appellant received an aggregate sentence of
17-34 years’ incarceration. We affirm.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a), 4304(a)(1), 2701(a), 2705, and 907(a),
respectively. We note that in exchange for her plea, the Commonwealth
nolle prossed or dismissed several other charges, including criminal attempt
to commit murder, conspiracy, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, false
imprisonment and unlawful restraint (serious bodily injury). 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 901(a), 903(c), 3123(b), 2903(a), and 2902(a)(1), respectively. (See
notes of testimony, 10/9/18 at 7; appellant’s written guilty plea colloquy,
10/9/18 at unnumbered 1; and notes of testimony, 4/18/19 at 6.)
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The heart-wrenching facts of this case, as summarized by the trial court,
are as follows:
[Appellant] abused, neglected and systematically
tortured [the] five-year old complainant I.M. in a
course of conduct spanning at least three years and
culminating in an intervention by medics on
January 22, 2018. During the period of abuse,
[appellant] had repeatedly stepped on the child,
poked her buttocks and vagina with a pole and brush,
kicked her in the back causing her to fall down the
stairs, put a sock in her mouth, hit her with a cord on
the back of her head, made her stand in the corner
with her arms up because she “stole” food or urinated
on herself, made her lick urine off the floor, put dog
poop on her face, and put hot sauce in her mouth and
eyes. [Appellant] did not bathe I.M. for several
months, did not provide her clean clothes, routinely
withheld food from her, and locked her in a dog cage.
[Appellant] had not brought I.M. to the doctor since
she was two years old, claiming it “slipped her mind”.
[Appellant] exchanged text messages in which she
joked about abusing I.M., insinuating that the abuse
and neglect were warranted because the child was
“full-blown f***** retarded.”
On January 22, 2018, medics were called to [an
address] in Philadelphia for a report of an unconscious
five year old child. That child, I.M., was unresponsive
to painful stimuli when medics arrived and had slow
labored breathing. An initial physical examination by
the medics showed significant bruising and lacerations
all over the child’s body. I.M. was rushed to Children’s
Hospital of Philadelphia (CHOP). When she regained
consciousness, she told medics “I was beaten because
I was bad.” The child told Dr. Natalie Stavas, child
abuse pediatrician, “Help me. I’ve been beaten. Help
me. I hurt.” When I.M. arrived at the hospital she
was naked with nothing but a blanket that was
covered with her feces and urine. Due to concerns
over spinal injuries, I.M. was immediately placed in a
C-collar. I.M.’s initial CAT scan revealed bleeding
around her brain and numerous external injuries:
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head to toe bruises, lacerations and loop marks from
objects that [appellant] had used to hit her.
Dr. Stavas also observed thinning, patchy hair due to
nutritional neglect, numerous bruises on I.M.’s face,
one lip so badly swollen that she could barely open
her mouth, one lip torn so severely that it was almost
ripped from her gum line, bruising to her chin and
under her neck, bleeding from her nose, swelling and
abrasions around her eyes, general bruising on her
abdomen, inner thighs and genital area, loop marks
on her abdomen, genital lacerations in multiple areas
some of which were actively bleeding, a laceration
near her rectum, redness and swelling in her hymen,
bruising and loop marks to her hip and lower back,
bruising to her shoulders and arms, swelling and
lacerations to her hands, bruising and lacerations to
her legs, redness and swelling to her feet.
I.M. lost so much blood, likely from her genital
wounds, that she required a blood transfusion. Her
injuries were at multiple stages of healing and there
was evidence of older injuries as shown through
scarring on her body. Dr. Stavas saw signs of
nutritional neglect and opined that had I.M. not had
immediate attention she would have died. I.M.
remained in inpatient care for several weeks.
Dr. Stavas explained that some injuries I.M. sustained
at the hands of the [appellant] could either not be
repaired, or repair would have been so traumatic and
painful, or leave I.M. susceptible to infection, that the
decision was made to allow them to heal as best they
could on their own. I.M.’s medical team ultimately
made a diagnosis of severe child abuse, neglect and
applied the medical definition of torture – a
classification so severe the team had never used it
before.
Trial court opinion, 8/9/19 at unnumbered 1-3 (citations to notes of testimony
and exhibits omitted).
On October 9, 2018, appellant entered a plea of guilty. An aggregate
sentence of 17 to 34 years’ incarceration was imposed on April 18, 2019.
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Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions which were denied by the trial
court, without a hearing, on April 24, 2019. Appellant timely appealed. The
trial court ordered appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of
errors on appeal and appellant timely complied. The trial court then filed its
Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Appellant raises the following issue on appeal.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
WHEN IT IMPOSED A SENTENCE, WHICH WAS
OUTSIDE OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES, AND
FAILED TO MEANINGFULLY CONSIDER THE
SENTENCING FACTORS OF 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9721(b)?
Appellant’s brief at 6.
Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of her sentence.
[T]he proper standard of review when considering
whether to affirm the sentencing court’s
determination is an abuse of discretion. . . . [A]n
abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of
judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have
abused its discretion unless the record discloses that
the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable,
or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. In
more expansive terms, our [c]ourt recently offered:
An abuse of discretion may not be found merely
because an appellate court might have reached a
different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest
unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly
erroneous.
The rationale behind such broad discretion and the
concomitantly deferential standard of appellate review
is that the sentencing court is in the best position to
determine the proper penalty for a particular offense
based upon an evaluation of the individual
circumstances before it.
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Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 169-170 (Pa.Super. 2010)
(citation omitted; brackets in original).
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing
do not entitle an appellant to review as of right.
Commonwealth v. Sierra, [752 A.2d 910, 912
(Pa.Super. 2000)]. An appellant challenging the
discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this
Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to
determine: (1) whether appellant has
filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the
issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider
and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P.
[720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a
fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial
question that the sentence appealed from
is not appropriate under the Sentencing
Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Id. at 170 (citation omitted; brackets in original).
Here, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, properly preserved her
sentencing challenge in a post-sentence motion seeking reconsideration of
sentence, and included in her brief the requisite Rule 2119(f) statement.
Consequently, we must now determine whether appellant raises a substantial
question.
We determine whether an appellant raises a substantial question on a
case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 338
(Pa.Super. 2015) (citation omitted). “A substantial question exists only when
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an appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s
actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the
Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie
the sentencing process.” Id. (citation omitted).
In determining whether a substantial question exists,
this Court does not examine the merits of whether the
sentence is actually excessive. Rather, we look to
whether the appellant has forwarded a plausible
argument that the sentence, when it is within the
guideline ranges, is clearly unreasonable.
Concomitantly, the substantial question
determination does not require the court to decide the
merits of whether the sentence is clearly
unreasonable.
Id. at 340 (citation omitted).
Appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it
imposed a sentence that was outside the sentencing guidelines and failed to
meaningfully consider the factors enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9721(b).
“Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(3), a claim that the sentencing court
sentenced outside the guidelines presents a substantial question.”
Commonwealth v. Curran, 932 A.2d 103, 105 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation
omitted). Accordingly, we will review appellant’s claims.
The Sentencing Code provides, that in imposing a sentence,
the court shall follow the general principle that the
sentence imposed should call for confinement that is
consistent with the protection of the public, the
gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the
life of the victim and on the community, and the
rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). When the sentencing court imposes a sentence
outside the sentencing guidelines, the court must “provide a contemporaneous
written statement of the reason or reasons for the deviation from the
guidelines.” Id.
Here, the trial court had the pre-sentence investigation and mental
health reports.2 (Notes of testimony, 4/18/19 at 5.) Appellant did not request
any amendments or changes to those reports. (Id.) As noted by this court
in Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736 (Pa.Super. 2014):
[w]hen imposing sentence, a court is required to
consider the particular circumstances of the offense
and the character of the defendant. In considering
these factors, the court should refer to the defendant’s
prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics
and potential for rehabilitation. Where pre-sentence
reports exist, we shall . . . presume that the
sentencing judge was aware of relevant information
regarding the defendant’s character and weighed
those considerations along with mitigating statutory
factors. A pre-sentence report constitutes the record
and speaks for itself.
Id. at 761 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, the trial court
was advised of appellant’s prior record score, offense gravity score and
sentencing range. (Notes of testimony, 4/18/19 at 5.)
Appellant’s counsel acknowledged that there was no excuse for
appellant’s behavior, but argued several mitigating factors including that
appellant was remorseful from the beginning and accepted responsibility; had
2 We note that appellant’s counsel attached the pre-sentence report as
Exhibit B to his brief, in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 703.
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diminished capacity because of her upbringing, physical abuse by her mother,
mental conditions and addiction to heroin; was damaged emotionally and
medically; was not a danger to the community; and had no prior record.3 The
Commonwealth and the child advocate team requested the trial court to
impose the maximum sentence. (Id. at 27, 28.)
The trial court set forth its reasons for the sentence imposed as follows.
In fashioning a sentence here today, the [c]ourt has
taken into account the mental health evaluation,
presentence investigation, prior record score, offense
gravity score, and range in this particular case. And
while I have considered the guidelines in this case, I
believe that they are truly advisory in nature; that the
guidelines, and, frankly, even this cold record will
never do justice to what [I.M.] went through.
The level of torture, the level of inhumanity that you
have shown to a child who is our most vulnerable[.]
. . . . [T]his is the nastiest, ugliest case I have seen.
I want -- when this case goes up, because I’m sure it
will, I am going to insist the Superior Court look at
these color photo[s]. Black and white doesn’t do it
justice. The dog cage, the injuries to [I.M.]’s genital
area, the bruises, the marks. None of us can give
justice to what she went through.
And while I understand that you sit before me with an
open guilty plea, it tells me nothing. It tells me
nothing because, Ms. Taylor, there is no
accountability. None. I watched you during this
entire sentencing hearing, and in a hearing that I’ve
watched other people struggle to keep their
composure, you had no issue. Stone faced. Nothing.
The photos of [I.M.] standing in a corner, the text
3 These mitigating factors appear in the notes of testimony, 4/18/19 at 6-9.
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messages, you know, it shows what your true thought
process was.
She was not a child to you. She was not human to
you. And the case is not just about [I.M.], because
you had two of your own children. Whether or not
they were struck or tortured or sexually abused, they
knew what was happening in that home. They knew
what their mother was capable of. They are
traumatized beyond belief, and they will be for the
rest of their lives, and they are as much victims in this
case as [I.M.]
You have managed to destroy lives that never had a
shot, and, hopefully, because of the people in this
room, these children will have a better outcome.
Hopefully they’re getting the help that they need, but
it will never go away. They’ll be older than you and I
and remember what happened. They’ll be older than
you and I and make decisions that were affected
because of what happened to them as children, and
you are responsible for that.
And let me not be quiet because this system is so
broken. We left that child. We as a society left that
child with you, and I am ashamed at this moment to
be part of this system.
There is nothing that started off good . . . in this
situation. This situation was a mess from the start. I
mean, this child -- not a dog, not an animal. Heck, if
it was a dog, this case would be in front of me. If it
was an animal, this case would be in front of me.
And I’m saying all of this, frankly, not for your benefit,
Ms. Taylor, because I don’t think you can hear me.
It’s for the Superior Court when I sit here and write
my opinion and justify every year that I give you.
And so that they are clear, let me tick off the check
boxes. The reasons I am departing so far above the
guidelines is because: One, I do believe a lesser
sentence would depreciate the seriousness of this
crime; that your injuries to this complainant are
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lifelong; that you have failed in any way, shape, or
form to assist this victim during the prolonged period
of torture that you inflicted up until the moment that
you believed she was dead; the extreme mental
cruelty to the victim; the extreme physical cruelty to
the victim; the fact that these injuries did, in fact --
were inflicted during the time that you were drug
addicted and under the influence, which is also a
reason to depart above the guidelines; the
recommendation of both the prosecution, the child
advocates, and what I believe probably [I.M.]would
advocate before me; to deter others who look at the
system in it[s] broken form and believe that they can
take advantage of it.
Kinship is not always best. The monsters within our
own family are the ones that can do the worst.
The victim was in a position of trust, care, and
dependence upon you. She was particularly
vulnerable due to her age, the fact that she was in
foster care, as well as any possible mental or physical
impairments that she did suffer. Although they were
not gone into in detail as to what [I.M.]’s deficiencies,
if any, were, they were hinted to throughout this as
well as previous hearings. And the victim’s injuries
substantially undermine the severity of this charge in
this case, in that they were so much more severe than
an aggravated assault alone.
For all of these reasons, I am departing above the
guidelines.
Notes of testimony, 4/18/19 at 34-39.4
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sentence as
the court properly considered all of the evidence before it and adequately
stated its reasons on the record. Thus, the sentence was not manifestly
4 These reasons were reiterated and elaborated upon in the trial court’s
opinion, 8/9/19 at unnumbered 5-7.
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excessive, unreasonable, or contrary to dictates of the Sentencing Code. See
Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957 (Pa.Super. 2007), affirmed, 938
A.2d 1122 (Pa. 2007) (finding that victim was only seven years old at time
defendant, her grandfather, sexually abused her, defendant was in position of
trust and responsibility, and defendant analogizing assaults to accidents,
justified statutory maximum sentences in excess of sentencing guidelines).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
JosephD.Seletyn,Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/28/2020
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