Spoerlein, R. v. Stoner, S.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
RANDALL E. SPOERLEIN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
SANDRA J. STONER F/K/A SANDRA : No. 1534 WDA 2019
J. SPOERLEIN :
Appeal from the Order Entered September 11, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County Civil Division at
No(s): 112 DIVORCE 2008
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED AUGUST 21, 2020
Randall E. Spoerlein (Husband) challenges the equitable distribution
award for a marital estate in divorce proceedings with Sandra J. Stoner f/k/a/
Sandra J. Spoerlein (Wife). Upon review, we affirm.
Husband and Wife were married on September 18, 1970. Two children,
both now adults, were born of the marriage.1 The parties separated and
Husband filed a complaint in divorce on June 20, 2008. While the divorce and
equitable distribution claims were pending, Husband filed a voluntary
individual bankruptcy petition under Chapter 13 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
Thereafter, on August 6, 2010, Wife filed a petition to bifurcate the divorce
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The parties’ daughter, Donna Jano (Daughter), owns certain property as
tenants in common with Husband and Wife. The parties also have a son, Bud
Spoerlein (Son), who has special needs and lives with Wife.
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from the remaining economic claims, which the trial court granted on August
17, 2010. On February 9, 2011, Husband’s bankruptcy case was converted
from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. Following their divorce, Husband remarried
and now resides in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Wife now resides with her
father and does not individually own property of her own.
The trial court appointed a Divorce Master on December 7, 2010. Due
to Husband’s pending bankruptcy proceeding, the Divorce Master continued
the hearing on the parties’ economic claims until Husband was discharged
from bankruptcy. On September 27, 2013, Wife filed a motion to vacate the
appointment of the Divorce Master “until the issues before the bankruptcy
court have been resolved in their entirety and [Husband] is discharged
thereafter.” Motion to Vacate Hearing Master, 9/27/13, ¶ 8. The trial court
granted Wife’s request to discharge the appointment of the Divorce Master on
October 1, 2013.
Delays continued due to Husband’s bankruptcy proceeding, which finally
concluded on July 12, 2017. Trial Court Opinion, 9/11/19, at 1 (unnumbered).
“Further delay resulted from a guilty plea in criminal proceedings against
[Husband] for dissipation of extended family related assets.” Id. On May 8,
2019, the Honorable Daniel W. Rullo held a hearing on the parties’ equitable
distribution claims. In an order and opinion dated September 11, 2019, the
trial court concluded:
[Husband] is awarded the balance of the Trone Outdoor
Advertising rents held in escrow and the continuation of the rents
to the expiration of its current lease term. [Wife] is awarded
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[Husband’s] one-fourth interest in the parcels held jointly with
either [Daughter] or her sister-in-law, Linda K. Stoner. . . . [Wife]
shall indemnify and hold [Husband] harmless from the
outstanding mortgage owed to PJ Masonry LLC, which mortgage
is secured by above referenced parcels held jointly with
[Daughter].
Order, 9/11/19. This timely appeal resulted. Husband filed his court ordered
Rule 1925 concise statement of matters complained of on appeal on October
31, 2019. On December 31, 2019, the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a)
opinion, in which it relied on the rationale set forth in its order and opinion
dated September 11, 2019.
Husband presents four issues for our review:
A. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err as a matter of law and fact, abuse its
discretion and was arbitrary and capricious by holding
[Husband] dissipated the marital assets by filing for
Bankruptcy[?]
B. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err as a matter of law and fact, abuse its
discretion and was arbitrary and capricious by holding that
[Husband] should not receive any portion of the martial [sic]
assets when [Husband] paid the costs of Bankruptcy and
received no other marital property[?]
C. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err as a matter of law and fact and
abuse[] its discretion when determining [e]quitable
[d]istribution and awarding no martial [sic] portion to
[Husband] because of considering the [Husband’s] restitution
lien when the restitution lien is not considered by the facts of
23 Pa.C.S.[A]. § 3502[?]
D. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err as a matter of law and fact, abuse its
discretion and was arbitrary and capricious by holding
[Husband] should not receive any portion of the martial [sic]
assets when [Husband] and [Wife] are equal with respect to
each of the factors in 23 Pa.C.S.[A]. § 3502[?]
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Husband’s Brief at 2-3.2
Our standard of review is as follows:
We review a challenge to the trial court’s equitable distribution
scheme for an abuse of discretion. Brubaker v. Brubaker, 201
A.3d 180, 184 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). “We do not
lightly find an abuse of discretion, which requires a showing of
clear and convincing evidence.” Id. We will not find an abuse of
discretion “unless the law has been overridden or misapplied or
the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the
result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the
evidence in the certified record.” Carney v. Carney, 167 A.3d
127, 131 (Pa. Super. 2017). When reviewing an award of
equitable distribution, “we measure the circumstances of the case
against the objective of effectuating economic justice between the
parties and achieving a just determination of their property
rights.” Hayward v. Hayward, 868 A.2d 554, 558 (Pa. Super.
2005).
When determining the propriety of an equitable distribution
award, this Court must consider the distribution scheme as a
whole. Mundy v. Mundy, 151 A.3d 230, 236 (Pa. Super. 2016).
“We do not evaluate the propriety of the distribution order upon
our agreement with the court’s actions nor do we find a basis for
reversal in the court’s application of a single factor. Rather, we
look at the distribution as a whole in light of the court’s overall
application of the 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a) factors for consideration
in awarding equitable distribution. If we fail to find an abuse of
discretion, the order must stand.” Harvey v. Harvey, 167 A.3d
6, 17 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation and internal brackets omitted).
Finally, “it is within the province of the trial court to weigh the
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2 Although Appellant’s brief contains an argument section, it is not divided
“into as many parts as there are questions to be argued.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
However, because our ability to review the issues presented is not
substantially impaired by Appellant’s failure to conform with the dictates of
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), we decline to quash the appeal. See Forrester v.
Hanson, 901 A.2d 548, 551 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that the failure to
divide into appropriate subsections which correspond to the questions raised
could result in quashal, but since the ability to review the issues presented
was not substantially impaired review proceeded).
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evidence and decide credibility and this Court will not reverse
those determinations so long as they are supported by the
evidence.” Brubaker, 201 A.3d at 184 (citation omitted).
* * *
“A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award of
equitable distribution.” Brubaker, 201 A.3d at 184 (citation
omitted). “In making its decision regarding equitable distribution,
the trial court must consider at least the eleven factors
enumerated in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a).” Isralsky v. Isralsky,
824 A.2d 1178, 1191 (Pa. Super. 2003). However, there is no
standard formula guiding the division of marital property and the
“method of distribution derives from the facts of the individual
case.” Wang v. Feng, 888 A.2d 882, 888 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(citation omitted). While the list of factors in Section 3502 serves
as a guideline for consideration, the list is “neither exhaustive nor
specific as to the weight to be given the various factors.” Id.
(citation omitted). Accordingly, “the court has flexibility of
method and concomitantly assumes responsibility in rendering its
decisions.” Id. (citation omitted).
Hess v. Hess, 212 A.3d 520, 523-24 (Pa. Super. 2019).
Section 3502 of the Divorce Code provides, inter alia, that upon request
from either party in a divorce action:
the court shall equitably divide, distribute or assign, in kind or
otherwise, the marital property between the parties without
regard to marital misconduct in such percentages and in such
manner as the court deems just after considering all relevant
factors. The court may consider each marital asset or group of
assets independently and apply a different percentage to each
marital asset or group of assets.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a).
Here, with regard to Husband’s equitable distribution claims, the trial
court reviewed the eleven factors set forth at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502. In
particular, the trial court examined the parties’ assets, including four shared
parcels of land and rental income. Trial Court Opinion, 9/11/19, at 8-10
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(unnumbered). It further examined the effect of the bankruptcy proceeding
on the parties’ marital estate. Id. at 2-8. It acknowledged that the
bankruptcy proceeding liquidated nearly all of the marital assets and removed
by way of satisfaction or discharge most of Husband’s personal liabilities and
all of the marital liabilities. However, the trial court determined that the
utilization of the bankruptcy proceeding to discharge both personal and
marital liabilities “caused a significant diminution” in value for some marital
assets. Id. at 3.
For example, the parties stipulated the marital residence had a pre-
bankruptcy value of $458,400.00, which was based upon a contemplated third
party sale following separation. During the bankruptcy proceeding, the
appointed trustee accepted the fair market value of the residence at
$458,400.00. Ultimately, however, the trustee sold the residence for
$212,500.00, dissipating the marital estate by $245,900.00.
Likewise, the trial court noted further dissipation of marital assets as
reflected by the liquidation of the Spoerlein Family Trust (Trust). The parties
agreed that they held a one-third interest in the Trust, valued at $345,032.39.
The entire value of the Trust was liquidated as part of the bankruptcy
proceedings. Similarly, a marital escrow account held by the law firm of Fike,
Cascio & Boose, valued at $49,619.76, was liquidated as part of the
administration of the bankruptcy estate.
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Finally, the parties owned four parcels of vacant real estate totaling
approximately 134 acres.3 Husband’s appraiser valued the parcels at
$1,400.00 per acre. Despite the fact that the testimony supported the value
given by Husband’s appraiser, the bankruptcy trustee valued the parcels at
$1,000.00 per acre. Although the four parcels did survive the bankruptcy
liquidation and remain essentially the only significant marital asset for
distribution, the decrease in value of $400.00 per parcel acre resulted in
further dissipation of the marital estate.
Based upon review of the certified record, the parties’ appellate briefs,
the trial court’s opinions, and applicable law, we conclude that the trial court
thoroughly and accurately addressed all of the issues raised by Husband and
we discern no abuse of discretion in ruling on his claims. Consequently, we
affirm on the basis of the trial court opinions issued on September 11, 2019
and December 31, 2019, and adopt them as our own. The parties are
instructed to attach copies of those trial court opinions to all future filings
regarding this appeal.
Moreover, we recognize that Husband makes very general allegations
as to the alleged inequity of the trial court’s proposed equitable distribution,
complaining that he received an unfair proportion of the marital estate.
Husband’s Brief at 23-24. Husband makes his bald unsupported claims
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3Three of these parcels were held as tenants in common with Daughter, and
one parcel was held as tenants in common with Husband’s sister, Linda
Stoner.
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without any reference to relevant legal authority. The failure to support bald
assertions with citation to legal authority impedes meaningful review of his
claims. Commonwealth v. Rompilla, 983 A.2d 1207, 1210 (Pa. 2009);
Stimmler v. Chestnut Hill Hosp., 981 A.2d 145, 153 n.9 (Pa. 2009) (stating
that argument portion of brief must contain “sufficient citation to the record .
. . .”).
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/21/2020
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