Com. v. Miller, C.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CHRISTOPHER OWEN MILLER :
:
Appellant : No. 1789 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 3, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-26-CR-0002431-2017
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2020
Appellant Christopher Owen Miller appeals from the judgment of
sentence imposed following his jury trial conviction for failure to register with
Pennsylvania State Police under Section 4915.1 of the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA I).1 Appellant argues that his
conviction is against the weight and the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
In September of 2007, Appellant was arrested and charged with
attempted statutory sexual assault, attempted indecent assault of a person
less than sixteen years of age, attempted corruption of minors, and attempted
unlawful contact with a minor. Dkt. No. CP-26-CR-0001473-2007. Appellant
pled guilty to all offenses (2008 conviction). Id. At the time of Appellant’s
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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1) (eff. Dec. 20, 2012).
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2008 conviction, Megan’s Law III was in effect and required Appellant to
register for ten years. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(a)(2) (expired).
The trial court summarized the underlying facts and testimony as
follows:
On October 11, 2017, at the request of the Megan’s Law Division
of the Pennsylvania State Police, a Connellsville Police Officer went
to 509 Ray Street, Apartment B, Connellsville, Fayette County,
Pennsylvania to do an address check to determine if the Appellant
resided there. Due to a conviction from 2008, . . . Appellant was
required to report semi-annually to a Megan’s Law Registration
Center. Appellant was required to report within three (3) business
days if he changed his address, telephone number, or
employment. The officer went to Apartment B and was provided
entry into the apartment [by another tenant in the building]. The
officer testified the apartment was empty, “there wasn’t anything
in there whatsoever.” The officer checked with the local post office
and there was only a prior address listed for . . . Appellant.
Appellant’s cousin, Stanton Shroyer, testified that he moved out
of the apartment on September 29, 2017[,] and Appellant had
moved out a few days before Shroyer vacated the property. The
owner of the property testified that she entered the apartment on
either October 1 or 2, 2017. When she entered the apartment, it
was empty of furniture or possessions. She testified that she had
been in the apartment between ten and fourteen times during the
month of October and there was no indication that anyone was
residing there. [Appellant’s aunt] testified that she was unsure of
the date Appellant moved out. Appellant’s [paramour, who had
been residing with him,] testified that he moved out on October
14, 2017.
Testimony was presented by Trooper Sigwalt, from the Megan’s
Law Division, that Appellant was required to follow the
requirements of Tier II based on his 2008 conviction. As a Tier II
reporter, Appellant was required to report on a semi-annual basis
and within three days of a change of address.
Appellant testified that he remained in the residence until the 14th
or 15th of October. He testified that for a period of two weeks, he
used a credit card to sneak back into the apartment each night,
leaving each morning with his inflatable air mattress, PlayStation,
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and clothing. He carried his possessions around each day until he
broke back into the residence at night. Appellant reported to the
Pennsylvania State Police Barracks to report on October 16, 2017
to report his change of address.
Trial Ct. Op., 2/25/19, at 1-3 (record citations omitted).
On October 17, 2017, the police arrested Appellant and charged him
under Section 4915.1(a)(1) for failure to comply with registration
requirements—specifically, that Appellant failed to update his current address
with the Pennsylvania State Police (State Police) within seventy-two hours of
changing his address. Appellant was convicted following a jury trial on
October 3, 2018.2 That same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant to
twenty-seven to fifty-four months’ incarceration. On October 11, 2018,
Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging the weight and
sufficiency of the evidence. The trial court held oral arguments on October
31, 2018 and denied the motion on December 12, 2018. Appellant timely filed
a notice of appeal on December 14, 2018. On January 4, 2019, Appellant filed
____________________________________________
2 On February 21, 2018, our General Assembly enacted Act 10, see Act of
Feb. 21, 2018, effective immediately, known as Act 10 of 2018 (Act 10 of
2018), P.L. 27, No. 10 §§ 1-20, to amend the Sexual Offenders Registration
and Notification Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.10-9799.41, originally enacted on Dec.
20, 2012, effective Dec. 20, 2012 (SORNA I). Act 10 was reenacted and
amended on June 12, 2018, effective immediately, known as Act 29 of 2018
(SORNA II), see Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140, No. 29, 1-23, effective June
12, 2018 (Act 29 of 2018). SORNA II limited the applicability of Section
4915.1 (failure to comply with registration requirements) to individuals who
committed a sexual offense on or after December 20, 2012 under Subchapter
H, and added Section 4915.2 (failure to comply with registration
requirements) to be applicable to individuals that committed a sexual offense
after April 22, 1996, but before December 20, 2012 under Subchapter I.
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a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court filed a
responsive opinion.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the verdict as to failure to comply with registration
requirements was against the weight of the evidence, and so
contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.
2. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient
to prove that [Appellant] committed the crime of failure to
comply with registration requirements; specifically, failure to
register his address and failure to provide accurate information.
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (some formatting altered).
We first set forth our standard of review.
A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of
law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the verdict
when it establishes each material element of the crime charged
and the commission thereof by the accused, beyond a reasonable
doubt. . . . When reviewing a sufficiency claim the court is
required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner giving the prosecution the benefit of all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
A motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary
to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient
evidence to sustain the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no
obligation to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict winner. An allegation that the verdict is against the weight
of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 (Pa. 2000) (footnotes
and citations omitted).
First, Appellant argues that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support his conviction. Appellant’s Brief at 7-8. Appellant
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contends that the Commonwealth was required to show that “he was aware
that the information needed to be updated and he failed to do so.” Id. at 8.
According to Appellant, the Commonwealth failed to prove that he did not
reside at the previous address within seventy-two hours of informing the State
Police. Id. at 9. Appellant asserts that he slept in the apartment nightly for
approximately two weeks after his roommate moved out. Id. Appellant
contends that he did not move out of the apartment until October 14th or 15th
of 2017, and then updated his address to the Pennsylvania State Police on
October 17, 2017. Id. Appellant points out that Connellsville Police Officer
Hominsky, who went to the apartment, testified that he saw nothing there but
the officer did not check the bedroom. Id. Further, Appellant contends that
“[t]he testimony of the landlord, Ms. Fields, that she did not observe Appellant
in the apartment, or his things, is insufficient to prove that Appellant was not
residing there.” Id. Appellant also notes that he had not been evicted at the
time of Officer Hominsky’s inspection. Id.
The Commonwealth contends that Appellants arguments are without
merit. Commonwealth’s Brief at 5-6. The Commonwealth asserts that the
trial evidence was sufficient to show that Appellant failed to update his address
with the State Police between September 29, 2017 and October 16, 2017. Id.
at 6. Although Appellant testified that he returned to the apartment nightly,
the Commonwealth maintains “the jury was free to believe all, part or none of
the witnesses and clearly [they] did not find Appellant credible.” Id.
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Second, Appellant argues that the verdict is so contrary to the weight of
the evidence that it is shocking to one’s sense of justice. Appellant’s Brief at
10. According to Appellant, Officer Hominsky’s testimony that there was a
couch in the apartment conflicts with Ms. Fields’ testimony that she visited the
apartment numerous times in early October 2017 and did not observe
Appellant or any personal belongings in the apartment. Id. at 11. Appellant
contends that Ms. Field’s testimony was not credible. Id. “[S]pecifically, it is
incomprehensible that she would be able to scrub floors, and clean an entire
apartment, without navigating around or below the couch observed by Officer
Hominsky.” Id. Appellant maintains that the jury’s verdict is against the
weight of the evidence because no testimony was presented to “conclusively
determine that Appellant was not staying in the apartment within [seventy-
two] hours of updating his address with the Pennsylvania State Police.” Id.
Appellant seeks “a judgment of acquittal, an arrest of judgment, and/or a new
trial.” Id. at 10.
In response, the Commonwealth asserts that the verdict is not against
the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth’s Brief at 5. Summarizing the
testimony, the Commonwealth insists that a new trial is not the appropriate
remedy for “a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same
facts would have arrived at a different conclusion.” Id. The Commonwealth
concludes that the judgment of sentence should be affirmed. Id. at 6.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court opined that Appellant’s claims
were meritless. Trial Ct. Op., at 3. The trial court concluded that Appellant’s
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weight challenge was without merit because “the evidence presented . . . was
not vague, or tenuous, or so contradictory that it would shock one’s
conscience.” Id. Further, the trial court highlighted that the jury found the
evidence “to be factually sufficient to establish that Appellant was required to
report [and] moved out of Apartment B more than three days before he
reported to the Pennsylvania State Police Barracks.” Id. Concluding that
Appellant’s sufficiency claim is also without merit, the trial court opined that
“the jury was able to resolve any conflicts in the testimony to the benefit of
the Commonwealth.” Id.
Concerning Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
note that the Commonwealth is required to prove each element of Section
4915.1 beyond a reasonable doubt to satisfy its burden. See Widmer, 744
A.2d at 745. Section 4915.1 requires:
4915.1. Failure to comply with registration requirements
(a) Offense defined.—An individual who is subject to
registration under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13 (relating to applicability)
commits an offense if he knowingly fails to:
(1) register with the Pennsylvania State Police as required
under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.15 (relating to period of registration),
9799.19 (relating to initial registration) or 9799.25 (relating to
verification by sexual offenders and Pennsylvania State Police)
18 Pa.C.S. § 4915.1(a)(1).
Section 9799.13 states that “a sexual offender who has a residence
within this Commonwealth or is transient” is required to register with the
Pennsylvania State Police. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.13(1). According to Section
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9799.15(g)(2), “an individual specified in section 9799.13 shall appear
in person at an approved registration site within three business days
to provide current information relating to a commencement of
residence, change in residence, termination of residence or failure to
maintain a residence, thus making the individual a transient.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 9799.15(g)(2) (emphasis added).
Appellant’s sufficiency argument relies on his testimony, corroborated
by his paramour, that Appellant continued to reside at the apartment until
October 14th or October 15th of 2017. According to Appellant, once he left
the apartment permanently, he notified the State Police. Appellant suggests
that these facts negate the mens rea required to convict him of failing to
comply with the registration requirements.
Appellant also suggests that the testimony offered by two of the
Commonwealth’s witnesses was insufficient to prove Appellant was no longer
living there. Appellant points out that Officer Hominsky testified that he did
not observe personal belongings in the apartment aside from a couch, even
though he did not search the bedroom of the apartment. Further, Appellant
argues that the testimony of Mrs. Flowers, the owner of the property, should
not be believed because she testified that she cleaned and painted the
apartment but did not see a couch in the unit. We conclude that these
arguments implicate credibility considerations and therefore concern weight
of evidence determinations rather than the sufficiency of the evidence.
Accordingly, we will address them below.
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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth
as the verdict winner, we find that there was sufficient evidence in our review
of the record to convict Appellant of failure to comply with registration
requirements. Specifically, Trooper Sigwalt testified that Appellant’s 2008
conviction required him to register with the Pennsylvania State Police and
report within three days of a change of address. N.T., 10/3/18, at 50. Trooper
Sigwalt also testified that Appellant had registered previously and that he was
reminded of his requirements at the time of registration. Id. Trooper Sigwalt
confirmed that Appellant reported to the police barracks to change his address
on October 16, 2017. Id. at 52.
Appellant’s cousin, with whom he shared an apartment, testified that
Appellant moved out of the apartment a few days before September 29, 2017,
when Appellant’s cousin vacated the apartment. Id. at 20. Additionally,
Appellant testified that he knows he is required to register with the
Pennsylvania State Police and to notify them of address changes. Id. at 73.
Our review of the record including the above-described witness
testimony indicates that legally sufficient evidence was presented at trial such
that a reasonable jury could conclude that Appellant moved out of the
apartment in late September 2017, knew that he needed to notify the State
Police of his address change within three days, and failed to timely report.
Accordingly, Appellant’s sufficiency claim fails.
We now turn to Appellant’s weight claim. “The weight of the evidence
is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none or some of
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the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.”
Commonwealth v. Roane, 204 A.3d 998, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation
omitted). Resolving conflicts in the testimony is the responsibility of the fact-
finder and we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.
Commonwealth v. Cramer, 195 A.3d 594, 600 (Pa. Super. 2018).
[W]e must give the gravest consideration to the trial court’s
conclusion because it is the trial court, and not the appellate court,
that had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence
presented. Furthermore, a defendant will only prevail on a
challenge to the weight of the evidence when the evidence is so
tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the
conscience of the court.
Id. at 601.
Instantly, as stated above, Appellant challenges the credibility of the
testimony offered by Officer Hominsky and Mrs. Flowers. Appellant asserts
that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence because Mrs. Flowers is
the only witness who testified that she looked in the bedroom during the
seventy-two hours before Appellant reported to the police barracks.
Appellant’s Brief at 11. However, Appellant does not specify how the witness
testimony was so vague or tenuous that the verdict shocks one’s sense of
justice and the conscience of the court. See Cramer, 195 A.3d at 601.
Instead, Appellant invites this Court to re-weigh the evidence presented at
trial, which is not the role of our appellate review. See id (reiterating that it
is not for this Court to re-weigh the evidence).
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Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant’s weight claim is without merit.
The jury as the trier of fact, was free to believe all, some, or none of the
testimony presented at trial and resolve conflicting witness testimony. See
Roane, 204 A.3d at 1001; see also Cramer, 195 A.3d at 601. Therefore,
he is not entitled to relief.
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s weight and sufficiency of evidence
claims fail.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/24/2020
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