J-S75006-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MATTHEW WAYNE MORRIS
Appellant No. 403 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 19, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County
Criminal Division at No: CP-03-CR-0000046-2018
BEFORE: STABILE, KUNSELMAN, and PELLEGRINI,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MARCH 13, 2020
Appellant, Matthew Wayne Morris, appeals from the February 19, 2019
judgment of sentence imposing 15 to 30 months of incarceration for criminal
trespass.1 We affirm.
The trial court summarized the pertinent facts in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion:
On November 3, 2017, [Appellant] and the victim, Dawn
Aldrich, were communicating back and forth via text message and
on the social networking application “Snapchat.” [Appellant] and
Ms. Aldrich prior to this time had been involved in an “on-again,
off-again” relationship for several years. That evening,
[Appellant] had planned to come to Ms. Aldrich’s house to talk.
As they continued to communicate by text message, they began
to argue about whether either of them had put their Snapchat app
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503. The trial court imposed no further penalty for a
criminal mischief (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304) conviction.
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into “ghost mode.” Snapchat’s “ghost mode” prevents an
individual with whom a user is messaging from seeing his or her
physical location. When [Appellant] eventually arrived at Ms.
Aldrich’s home, he texted her to “open the door.” Ms. Aldrich, not
knowing [Appellant’s] location, texted back, “no your lying.”
Ms. Aldrich at this point had changed clothes and was in the
basement doing laundry. On her way back upstairs, she heard a
loud “thud” in the area of her backdoor. She initially thought
someone outside had thrown something and hit the door.
However, as she proceeded up the stairs, she heard a second
“thud” and a cracking sound. When Ms. Aldrich entered the
upstairs, [Appellant] was inside the house and the back door
frame was cracked. [Appellant] then grabbed Ms. Aldrich by the
neck and told her that he was going to “shoot her fucking brains
out” if she did not talk. [Appellant] then retrieved Ms. Aldrich’s
keys from a table in the kitchen and left the residence to search
her car. After [Appellant] exited the residence, Ms. Aldrich locked
the deadbolt on the back door and called 911. The police arrived
approximately 10 minutes later. [Appellant] had left by that point.
When the police arrived, Ms. Aldrich told them what
happened. [Appellant] did not return to the house and took Ms.
Aldrich’s keys with him when he left. The police took photographs
of the back door frame, which had a large crack. On the advice of
police, and because [Appellant] had taken her house key, Ms.
Aldrich left the residence and stayed at her parents’ home with
her two children for approximately the next month.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/5/19, at 2-3.
A jury found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned offenses—but not
guilty of burglary, theft by unlawful taking, and terroristic threats—on
September 11, 2018. He filed this timely appeal from the trial court’s
judgment of sentence on March 11, 2019. He raises two issues for our review:
1. The trial court erred in not granting judgment of acquittal
on the charge of criminal trespass as there was no
evidence presented that [Appellant] “broke into” the
alleged victim’s home (as that term is defined in 18
Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(ii)), particularly as there was no
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testimony that the alleged victim’s door was locked at
the time of entry or that [Appellant] intimidated [the]
alleged victim into opening the door.
2. The trial court erred in refusing to permit the alleged
victim’s ex-husband to testify as to her character for
untruthfulness pursuant to Pennsylvania Rules of
Evidence 404, 607, and 608.
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “our standard of
review is de novo [and] our scope of review is limited to considering the
evidence of record, and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom, viewed in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner.”
Commonwealth v. Rushing,
99 A.3d 416, 420–21 (Pa. 2014).
As noted, Appellant argues his criminal trespass2 conviction cannot
stand because there is no evidence the victim’s door was locked when
Appellant entered her home. As set forth in the trial court’s well-reasoned
opinion, the record belies Appellant’s argument. First, Appellant texted the
victim in attempt to gain entrance to her home. This text would have been
unnecessary absent a locked door. Second, the Commonwealth introduced
evidence of a cracked doorframe. This circumstantial evidence, viewed in a
____________________________________________
2 “A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged
to do so, he: […] (ii) breaks into any building or occupied structure or
separately secured or occupied portion thereof.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3503(a)(1)(ii). “Breaks Into” means “To gain entry by force, breaking,
intimidation, unauthorized opening of locks, or through an opening not
designed for human access.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(3).
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light most favorable to the Commonwealth, supports an inference that
Appellant broke into the victim’s home as per § 3503(a)(3). We adopt the
trial court’s April 5, 2019 opinion in support of our rejection of Appellant’s
sufficiency of the evidence argument.
Next, Appellant argues the trial court erred in refusing to permit him to
present the testimony of the victim’s ex-husband regarding the victim’s
character for truthfulness. We review the trial court’s evidentiary ruling for
abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Elliot,
80 A.3d 415, 446 (Pa. 2013),
cert. denied,
574 U.S. 828 (2014). Appellant’s brief simply cites several
Rules of Evidence but fails to develop any argument as to why the victim’s
character for truthfulness was pertinent in this case. We therefore deem
Appellant’s argument waived for failure to cite pertinent authority and
pertinent portions of the record. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b), (c); Commonwealth v.
Kane,
10 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal denied,
29 A.3d 796 (Pa.
2011). Were we to address this issue on the merits, we would reject it for the
reasons explained in the trial court’s April 5, 2019 opinion.
In summary, we find no merit to either of Appellant’s arguments. We
affirm the judgment of sentence based on the trial court’s April 5, 2019
opinion, and we direct that a copy of that opinion be filed along with this
memorandum.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/13/2020
-5-
Circulated 02/27/2020 02:32 PM
IN THE COURT OF CO:MMON PLEAS OF ARMSTRONG COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
COMM:ONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA )
)
vs. ) No. CP-03·CR·0000046·2018
)
MATTHEW WAYNE MORRIS, )
Defendant. )
RULE 1925(a) OPINION
RR·180a , ) , .
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF .ARMSTRONG COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CO:MMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA)
)
vs. ) No. CP·OS·CR·0000046·2018
)
MATTHEW WAYNE MORRIS, )
Defendant. )
RULE 1925(a) OPINION
Panchik, P.J.
Defendant Matthew Wayne Morris appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on February 19, 2019. Defendant was convicted by jury on September 11,
2018, of the following crimes: 1) criminal treapass', and 2) criminal mischief.2 He
was found not guilty of burglary, theft by unlawful taking or disposition, and
terroristic threats. The Court sentenced Defendant to 15 to 80 months'
incarceration on the criminal trespass charge, with 5 days' credit for time served.
The Court imposed no further penalty on the criminal mischief charge.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on March 11, 2019. On March 12,
2019, the Court ordered Defendant to file a Rule 1925(b) concise statement within
21 days. Defendant timely complied on March 29, 2019. In his concise statement,
Defendant raises the following two issues for appeal: 1) whether this Court erred in
not granting a judgment of acquittal on the criminal trespass charge, where there
was insufficient evidence to prove that Defendant 1'broke into" the alleged victim's
1 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.§ 3508(a)(l)(il).
11 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3S04(a)(6).
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No. CP..03-CR.-0000046-2018
home; and 2) whether this Court erred in refusing to permit the alleged victim's ex·
husband to testify to her character for untruthfulness pursuant to Pennsylvania
Rules of Evidence 404, 607, 608. The Court will address each issue in turn.
I. SUMM:ARY OF THE EVIDENCE
Because Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in his first issue
on appeal, the Court summarizes as follows the relevant evidence presented by the
Commonwealth.
On November 3, 2017, Defendant and the victim, Dawn Aldrich, were
communicating back and forth via text message and on the social networking
application "Snapchat." Defendant and Ms. Aldrich prior to this time had been
involved in an "on-again, off-again" relationship for several years. That evening,
Defendant had planned to come to Ms. Aldrich's house to talk. As they continued to
communicate by text message, they began t.o argue about whether either of them
had put their Snapchat app into "ghost mode." Snapchat "gho.st mode" prevents an
individual with whom a user is messaging from seeing bis or her physical location.
When Defendant eventually arrived at Ms. Aldrich's home, he texted her to "open
the door." Ms. Aldrich, not knowing Defendant's location, texted back, "no your
lying."
Ms. Aldrich at this point had changed clothes and was in the basement doing
laundry. On her way back upstairs, she heard a loud "thud" in the area of her
backdoor. She initially thought someone outside had thrown something and hit the
door. However, as she proceeded up the stairs, she heard a second '779 A.2d 1195, 1197 (Pa. Super. Ct. 200l)(quotation and citation omitted). "The
facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. However, any questions or doubts are to be resolved by the
factfinder, unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law,
no probability of fact may be drawn from the circumstances."
Id. (citation omitted).
2. .Analysis
Defendant argues in his first assertion of error that the Court erred by not
granting a judgment of acquittal on the charge of criminal trespass because the ·
Commonwealth did not present any evidence that he "broke into" the victim's home.
(Notes of Testimony, "N. T.,'' at 64:11 ·65:t 7). The pertinent crime of criminal
trespass is defined in section 3508(a)(1)(ii) of the Crimes Code:
. (a) Buildings and occupied structures...
(1) A person commits an offense if, knowing that he is not licensed or
privileged to do so, he:
(i) enters, gains entry by subterfuge or surreptitiously remains in
any building or occupied structure or separately secured or occupied
portion thereof; or
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Comm. v. Morris
No. CP.03-·CR-0000046-2018
(ii) breaks into any building or occupied structure or separately
secured or occupied portion thereof.
(2) An offense under paragraph (l)(i) is a felony of the third degree,
and an offense under paragraph (l)(ii) is a felony of the second degree.
(8) As used in this subsection:
"Breaks into." To gain entry by force, breaking, intimidation,
unauthorized opening of locks, or through an opening not designed
for human access.
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3508. Defendant was charged with and convicted of a
violation of subsection 3503(l)(ii), which is a felony of the third degree and requires
proof that Defendant entered the victim's home "by force, breaking, intimidation,
unauthorized opening of locks, or through an opening not designed for human
access." Id,§ 3508(8). To sustain a conviction under subsection 3503(1)(ii), the
Commonwealth must establish that a defendant utilized force greater than that
required merely to enter through an unlocked door. See Oommonwesltb v. Cook,
547 A2d 406, 410-11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
The Court concludes that the Commonwealth presented sufficient, and
indeed strong, circumstantial evidence from which the jury could conclude that
Defendant broke into the victim's home without privilege to do so. Ms. Aldrich
testified that she had been communicating with Defendant on the evening of
November 3, 2017, and that she did not know where he was because bis Snapchat
app was in "ghost mode." The text messages introduced by the Commonwealth
corroborate that testimony. Further, there is clear evidence that the door was
locked just prior to Defendant's entry. When Defendant texted Ms. Aldrich to "open
s
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Comm. v. Morris
No. CP-03·CR-0000046-201 S
the door," she replied, "no your [sic] lying," Quite obviously, if Defendant were
intent on entering the house, there would be no need to ask Ms . .Aldrich to open the
door if it were unlocked. Ms . .Aldrich also testified that she was on her way up the
steps out of her basement when she heard loud "thuds" and a cracking noise just
prior to arriving upstairs to find Defendant in the house. Together with the
photographs taken of Ms. Aldrich's broken door frame, this evidence, considered in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to prove that
Defendant was not privileged to enter the house and used enough force to open the
locked door and break the door frame. Defendant's argument that the evidence was
insufficient in this regard is without merit.
B. TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL ALDRICH
Defendant argues secondly that the Court erred in not permitting Ms .
.Aldrich's ex-husband to testify in Defendant's case-in·cbief. (N.T., at s1:2o·s4:9).
Defendant proffered Michael Aldrich, Ms. Aldrich's ex-husband, to testify to certain
unspecified "peraonality traits" of Ms. Aldrich.
Id., 82:4·8. Defendant contends now
.
on appeal that Mr. Aldrich was being proffered to testify to Me ..Aldrich's "character
for untruthfulness." The Court continues to conclude that Mr. Aldrich's testimony
properly was excluded.
1. StandR:rd of Review
On appeal, this Court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of .
discretion. Ooauuonweelth v. Walter, 98 A.8d 442, 449 (Pa. 2014). An abuse of
discretion occurs when "the law is overridden or misapplied; or the judgment
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No. CP-03-CR-0000046-2018
exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or
ill·will, as shown by evidence of record," Commonwealth v. Cooper, 941 A2d 655,
667 (Pa. 2007). Moreover, even if a trial court errs in precluding the admission of
certain evidence, the error is harmless if it is established that 1) the error did not
prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de minimus; or 2) the properly
admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so overwhelming and the
prejudicial effect of the error so insignificant by comparison that the error could not
have contributed to the verdict. Commonwealth v. Laich, 777 A2d 105'1, 1062-63
CPa. 2001).
2. �sis
Pennsylvania Bule of Evidence 404(a) sets forth certain circumstances in
which substantive character evidence may be introduced to prove particular
character traits. Rule 404(a)(l) provides that, as a general rule, such evidence is
not admissible to prove that an individual's actions conform to a particular
character trait. Rule 404(a)(2) establishes certain exceptions to this general rule in
criminal cases. Relevant in this case, Rule 404(a)(2)(B) provides that "subject to
limitations imposed by statute a defendant may offer evidence of an alleged victim's
pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted the prosecutor may (i) offer evidence
to rebut it; and (ii) offer evidence of the defendant's same trait; ...." Pa. R. Evid.
404(a)(2)(B)(emphasis provided). Further, if an alleged victim also is a witness,
Rules 607 and 608 permit the impeachment of the witness's truthfulness in certain
limited circumstances. Truthfulness may not, however, be attacked by extrinsic
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No. CP.03-CR...0000046-2018
evidence of particular acts other than certain criminal convictions. See Pa. R. Evid.
608(b)(l), 609. Testimony about a witness's character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness is permitted. Pa. R. Evid. 608(a).
Here, defense counsel did not proffer Mr. Aldrich as a character witness to
impeach the Ms. Aldrich's credibility by establishing her reputation for
untruthfulness. Rather, it appears that Mr. Aldrich's testimony was proffered for
purposes of proving that Ms. Aldrich herself was a violent or aggressive individual,
perhaps instigating certain instances of conflict between her and Mr. Aldrich.
(N.T., at s2:4-s; 82=24-83:6). Such testimony would not have been admissible under
Rules 607 and 608, as it would not have tended to prove Ms. Aldrich's reputation for
being untruthful. It also was not admissible under Rule 404(a)(2)(B). That
subsection permits admission of character evidence for "pertinent" traits, i.e., those
relevant to the crimes charged. If Defendant intended to establish that Ms. Aldrich
was herself aggressive or violent, such trait had nothing to do with whether
Defendant broke into her home without her permission. Although Ms. Aldrich
testified that Defendant grabbed her neck after entering her home, no charges
resulted from that interaction. Ms. Aldrich's character for being aggressive or
violent thus was irrelevant. See Comment, Pa. R. Evid. 404(a)(2)(B)("For example,
in an assault and battery case, if the defendant introduces evidence that the alleged
victim was a violent and belligerent person, the Commonwealth may counter by
offering evidence that the defendant also was a violent and belligerent person.
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Thus, the jury will receive a balanced picture of the two participants to help it
decide who was the first aggressor.'').
Further, even if Mr. Aldrich's testimony otherwise was admissible, the
Court's preclusion ofit was harmless error. Even assuming that Mr. Aldrich gave a
"synopsis" of his marriage with Ms. Aldrich, see N.T., at 82:4-8, such testimony
would have had little if any impact on the jury's consideration of whether Defendant
committed the acts of criminal trespass or criminal mischief. The clearest and
strongest evidence of those crimes, particularly of criminal trespass, was the broken
door frame in Ms. Aldrich's house. That fact, coupled with the text messages
introduced, sufficiently corroborated Ms. Aldrich's testimony that she heard loud
thuds and cracking noises at her back door as she walked up the stairs to find
Defendant inside the house. Any prejudice to Defendant therefore was nonexistent
or de minimus: And, given the other circumstantial evidence ofguilt, there is little
to no possibility that the exclusion of Mr. Aldrich's testimony contributed to the
guilty verdicts in this case.
For all of these reasons, and for the additional reasons set forth by the Court
in the record, the Court recommends affirmance of Defendant's convictions and
sentence in their entirety.
Dated: April 5, 2019
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MY COMM. f;'fJR.i5.HU'
MON. JAN. �!W'··T:J"ua