Name Change Peition of: H.J.M., Appeal of: Lotz, A

J-S40031-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
NAME OF H.J.M. : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: ASHLEY LOTZ :
:
:
:
: No. 907 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered February 25, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Civil Division at No(s):
No. 2019-00565
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2020
Appellant, Ashley Lotz (“Mother”), appeals from the order denying her
petition to change the name of her son, H.J.M. (“Child”), to H.J.L. to allow
Child to have Mother’s last name, rather than the last name of his father,
Joshua McCoy (“Father”). We affirm.
Mother filed the petition on November 12, 2019, and Father filed an
answer opposing the proposed name change on January 28, 2020. The trial
court held a hearing on that same date, at which both Mother and Father
testified.
The following factual background was developed at the hearing. Child
was born on April 20, 2014, and he was five years old on the date of the
hearing. Mother and Father were not in a romantic relationship at the time
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S40031-20
that Child was born, but had previously been in a relationship and had a
daughter together, C.L., who is two years older than Child. N.T., 1/28/20, at
5-6. Mother explained that she gave C.L. her last name because she
discovered that Father was still married when she was seven months’ pregnant
with C.L. Id. at 8. Mother testified that when Child was born, she and Father
argued regarding which last name Child would be given, with Mother taking
the position that Child and C.L. should only take Father’s last name when
Father completed his divorce. Id. at 8-9. Mother stated that Father at first
begrudgingly accepted that Child would be named H.J.L., but when they left
the hospital he announced that he would have nothing to do with Child or C.L.
unless Child was given the McCoy name. Id. at 10. Mother relented three
days later and they returned to the hospital to complete the birth certificate
paperwork with Child identified as H.J.M. Id. at 10, 23.
Despite the fact that Child’s legal name is H.J.M., Mother testified that
Child has been known since birth, both at home and in the community, as
H.J.L. Id. at 13, 15, 18. Mother stated that if Child was asked what his name
is, he would identify himself as H.J.L. Id. at 15. At the hearing, Mother
introduced Child’s school, medical, financial, and baptismal records, which
identify him with the Lotz surname. Id. at 8-9, 11, 13-15; Mother’s Exhibits
A, C-G. In addition, Father has identified Child as H.J.L. in filings in a custody
matter involving Child. N.T., 1/28/20, at 15-16; Mother’s Exhibit H. Mother
testified that Father had only begun objecting to Child being identified with
-2-
J-S40031-20
the last name Lotz in the few months prior to the hearing. N.T., 1/28/20, at
16.
Mother is the primary custodian for Child and C.L. Id. at 12-13, 40.
Father’s visitation has fluctuated between unsupervised and supervised visits,
and as of the date of the hearing he had unsupervised visitation with Child
and C.L. one day per week for five hours. Id. at 12. In 2017, Mother married
another man, Michael Krupa, and she kept her last name when they married
to have the same last name as Child and C.L. Id. at 6-7. As of the date of
the hearing, Mother and Mr. Krupa were expecting a child. Id. at 29. The
parents had not decided whether the baby would take as a surname Lotz,
Krupa, or a hyphenated version of both names. Id. Mother also had an older
daughter from an earlier relationship who was given the father’s last name.
Id. at 28-29. Child also has a 19-year old half-brother on Father’s side with
the McCoy surname. Id. at 32.
Mother testified that she filed the petition to change Child’s name to
allow her, Child, and C.L. to share the same last name and avoid an identity
crisis for Child if he became known as H.J.M. Id. at 18. Mother stated that
she, Child, and C.L. “do everything” together and that Child is “super close”
to C.L. Id. Mother testified that Child is aware of the “confusion with his last
name” as Father and C.L. have both discussed it with Child. Id. at 19. Mother
stated that she has a very strong bond with Child, and that Father was also
bonded with Child, although their relationship was “strain[ed]” because of the
limited visitation. Id. at 19-20. According to Mother, Father’s relationship
-3-
J-S40031-20
did not suffer when he thought Child’s last name was Lotz and changing Child’s
name would not affect his bond with Father. Id. at 20. Mother further
testified that she was aware of no negative associations with the name Lotz
that would negatively impact Child. Id. at 22.
Father testified that he had been under the understanding that Child
had been given the last name McCoy at birth, but he also had received medical
correspondence and other mail for Child with the Lotz name. Id. at 16.
However, in 2016 when Child was two, Father obtained Child’s social security
card and confirmed that his legal last name was McCoy. Id. at 32. Father
has communicated with Child’s school that they should not refer to Child as
Lotz but instead with his legal last name of McCoy. Id. at 34-35.
Father insisted that all of his children, including Child and C.L., have his
last name. Id. at 34. He has asked Mother “[m]ultiple times” to change C.L.’s
last name to McCoy, although he had never filed a petition to change Child’s
or C.L.’s name. Id. at 38. Father denied having told Mother shortly after
Child’s birth that he would not be involved in parenting Child and C.L. unless
Child was given Father’s last name. Id. at 39.
Father has always referred to Child as McCoy and never Lotz. Id. at 33.
Father stated that Child knows his name is McCoy, “identifies with me as
McCoy,” and knows his half-brother’s name is also McCoy. Id. at 32-33.
However, Father believes that Child “is currently confused” by his last name.
Id. at 41. Father testified that he had an “extremely close” bond with Child,
and that his bond with Child would not be affected if the petition was granted.
-4-
J-S40031-20
Id. at 37, 42. However, Father believed that Child would be negatively
affected if his name was changed to Lotz. Id. at 42.
Father testified that he and Child are direct descendants of Asa Harmon
McCoy, the individual whose death sparked the Hatfield-McCoy family rivalry.
Id. at 37. Father had explained this heritage to Child and stated that he
believed it was “important for [Child’s] understanding [of] his identity” to
know that he was a McCoy. Id. at 32, 37.
On February 25, 2020, the trial court issued an opinion and order
denying without prejudice the petition to change Child’s name. The trial court
found that Child will not be “negatively impacted by his school records being
changed to match his legal name” in light of the short time he has spent in
school. Trial Court Opinion, 2/25/20, at 2. The trial court further found that
Mother’s desire to have Child share his last name with his full sister C.L. “is
not a determinative factor” because, regardless of whether the petition is
granted or denied, Child will have siblings with whom he does not share a last
name. Id. Finally, the court found that there is no social stigma associated
with either the Lotz or McCoy last names, notwithstanding the “unique
connection with American history” associated with Father’s name. Id. The
trial court accordingly concluded that Mother had “failed to meet her burden
of coming forward with evidence that the name change requested would be in
-5-
J-S40031-20
[C]hild’s best interest.” Id. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the
trial court’s order.1
Mother raises the following issue for our review:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying [M]other’s
request to formally change the surname of her five-year old son
to the surname that the child has informally used his entire life
when the child is known in the community and knows himself by
the requested surname, the child’s primary custodian and full
sibling with whom the child is very close share the requested
surname, and the requested change would not affect the father’s
bond with the child?
Mother’s Brief at 4.
Our review of an appeal concerning a petition for name change is under
an abuse of discretion standard. T.W. v. D.A., 127 A.3d 826, 827 (Pa. Super.
2015).
An abuse of discretion exists if the trial court has overridden or
misapplied the law, or if the evidence is insufficient to sustain the
order. Further, resolution of factual issues is for the trial court,
and a reviewing court will not disturb the trial court’s findings if
those findings are supported by competent evidence. It is not
enough for reversal that we, if sitting as a trial court, may have
made a differing finding or reached a different result.
Id. (citations omitted).
In Pennsylvania, “[t]he court of common pleas of any county may by
order change the name of any person resident in the county.” 54 Pa.C.S. §
____________________________________________
1 Mother filed her statement of errors complained of on appeal on April 1,
2020. On April 15, 2020, the trial court filed a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a), in which it indicated that it was relying on the reasoning set forth in
its earlier opinion.
-6-
J-S40031-20
702(a). Generally, courts adopt a “liberal policy” regarding name change
requests and the “necessity for judicial involvement centers on governmental
concerns that persons not alter their identity to avoid financial obligations.” 2
In re Change of Name of Grimes, 609 A.2d 158, 160 (Pa. 1992). Our
Supreme Court has explained that “courts reviewing petitions for change of
name [should] exercise their discretion in such a way as to comport with good
sense, common decency and fairness to all concerned and to the public.” Id.(citation and quotation marks omitted).
In Grimes, our Supreme Court held that a trial court may not grant a
petition to change the name of a minor child unless the court has determined
that the proposed change is in the “best interest of the child in question.” Id.
at 160-61 (citation omitted). In adopting the best interest standard, the Court
stated:
Specific guidelines are difficult to establish, for the circumstances
in each case will be unique, as each child has individual physical,
intellectual, moral, social and spiritual needs. However, general
considerations should include the natural bonds between parent
and child, the social stigma or respect afforded a particular name
within the community, and, where the child is of sufficient age,
whether the child intellectually and rationally understands the
significance of changing his or her name.
____________________________________________
2 Mother complied with the statutory requirements for a name change petition
by attaching records from Wayne County and Pike County reflecting that no
judgments or decrees have been entered against Child. See Petition for Name
Change, 11/12/19, Exhibits A-D; see also 54 Pa.C.S. § 701(a.1)(4)(ii)(B)
(providing that a petition must set forth that there are “no judgments, decrees
of record or other similar matters against the petitioner”).
-7-
J-S40031-20
Id. at 161 (citations omitted). The proponent of the name change bears the
burden of demonstrating that the change would be in the best interest of the
child. Id. at 161. “[W]here a petition to change a child’s name is contested,
the court must carefully evaluate all of the relevant factual circumstances to
determine if the petitioning parent has established that the change is in the
child’s best interest.” T.W., 127 A.3d at 828.
Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
petition and disregarded the evidence that she presented that showed that
changing Child’s last name to Lotz was in his best interest with respect to each
of the three best interest considerations set forth in Grimes. First, Mother
asserts that the evidence at the hearing showed that, contrary to the trial
court’s finding that both parents had a strong bond with Child, her bond with
Child was stronger as a result of her being his primary custodian while Father
had a more limited parental role in Child’s life. As to the second consideration
identified in Grimes, Mother argues that the trial court ignored the stigma
associated with the McCoy name for its association with the “infamous feud
between the Hatfields and the McCoys.” Mother’s Brief at 22. With respect
to the final best interest consideration outlined in Grimes, Mother contends
that Child identified using the Lotz name and that she feared he would suffer
from an identity crisis if he were forced to use a different name at school and
in the community.
In addition to these identified best interest considerations, Mother
argues that the trial court disregarded other evidence that showed that Child’s
-8-
J-S40031-20
name change was in his best interest. Mother asserts that the trial court
“glosse[d] over the significance of abruptly switching Child’s surname” in light
of the fact that he had used Lotz for his entire life and nearly all of his
important records reflected this name. Id. at 24. Furthermore, Mother
maintains that the trial court overlooked the “embarrassment, discomfort,
anxiety, and/or inconvenience” that Child will feel if he is not identified with
the same family name as his only full sibling, C.L., with whom he has a “super
close” bond. Id. at 25.
Upon a careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the petition to change Child’s name. The
main thrust of Mother’s argument is that the trial court did not take sufficient
account of the fact that Child has been known and knows himself as H.J.L. and
it will be traumatic for Child to have to go by H.J.M. We agree with Mother
that a Child’s self-identified name is central to the trial court’s best interest
analysis. However, the evidence in this case does not clearly establish that
Child exclusively knew himself as H.J.L. While Mother testified that she uses
H.J.L. on forms and Child is known at school as H.J.L., Father testified that
Child has known his name is H.J.M. “for quite some time” and he identifies to
Father as H.J.M. N.T., 1/28/20, at 8-9, 11, 13-16, 18, 32-33. Indeed, both
Mother and Father stated that Child is “confused” regarding his two last
names. Id. at 18-19, 41. In rendering its decision, the trial court did not
have the benefit of direct evidence relating to Child’s understanding of his last
name even though it appeared that Child, at least to some degree,
-9-
J-S40031-20
“intellectually and rationally underst[ood] the significance of changing his []
name.” See Grimes, 609 A.2d at 161-62 (stating that, while the child as to
whom a name change was sought was only five years old, “an interview with
the child may have been helpful” in light of the conflicting testimony of his
parents). Given this record, therefore, we cannot say that the trial court
ignored competent evidence that Child was known and knew himself solely as
H.J.L.
Regarding the best interest consideration of “the natural bonds between
parent and child,” Grimes, 609 A.2d at 161, both parents professed to have
a strong bond with Child, and Mother admitted that Father was bonded with
Child. N.T., 1/28/20, at 19-20, 37. Furthermore, neither parent indicated
that the bond would be impacted if they did not share a last name with Child,
and no evidence was presented that changing Child’s name to match one of
his parents was necessary to strengthen the bond with that parent. Therefore,
this factor did not weigh strongly in favor of granting the petition.
Similarly, we agree with the trial court that the issue of having Child’s
last name match that of his siblings “is not a determinative factor.” See Trial
Court Opinion, 2/25/20, at 2. Child has an older full-sister, C.L., on Mother’s
side, an older half-sister on Mother’s side, an older half-brother on Father’s
side, and Mother was expecting another child as of the date of the hearing, as
to whom a last name had not been decided as of the hearing. While changing
Child’s last name to Lotz would have the benefit of him having a matching
name with his one full-sibling, C.L., Child would still not share a last name
- 10 -
J-S40031-20
with all of his siblings in Mother’s family and he would no longer have a shared
last name with his older brother on Father’s side. Thus, as the trial court
explained, “[r]egardless of [the c]ourt’s determination, the minor child will
have siblings with different last names than his.” Id.
In addition, the trial court’s finding that there is no stigma related to the
Lotz or McCoy names is well-supported. No testimony was offered that either
name had a negative association within the local community. While Mother
maintains that Child may be harmed by taking a last name associated with a
violent episode in this nation’s history, the trial court correctly observed that
any potential effect on Child from his association with the Hatfield-McCoy
rivalry – whether positive or negative – is too attenuated to take into account
in the best interest analysis.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not misapply the
relevant law and its decision is supported by competent evidence. T.W., 127
A.3d at 827. Therefore, pursuant to our “narrow standard of review,” we
affirm the trial court’s order denying Mother’s petition to change Child’s name.
Id. at 830.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/25/20
- 11 -