Gaskill, S. v. McIlvain, J.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
SHIRLEY GASKILL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
JOAN MCILVAIN : No. 556 EDA 2020
Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 16, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at
No(s): No. 2018-005598
BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 26, 2020
Shirley Gaskill appeals from the judgment entered against her and in
favor of Joan McIlvain following a non-jury trial concerning ownership and
possession of real property. We affirm.
Succinctly, the facts are as follows. Ms. Gaskill wished to purchase a
home for herself and her children, but did not qualify for a mortgage loan. In
2012, her mother, Ms. McIlvain, agreed to obtain a loan and purchase the
house in her own name, and Ms. Gaskill would provide the funds to Ms.
McIlvain to make the resulting payments. In 2018, Ms. Gaskill filed a
complaint against Ms. McIlvain alleging that Ms. McIlvain had failed to uphold
an additional agreement to transfer title to the property into both of their
names as joint tenants with right of survivorship, provided that Ms. Gaskill
demonstrated her ability to make the payments and maintain the property.
Ms. Gaskill sought an order requiring Ms. McIlvain to convey title to her as a
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joint tenant. Ms. McIlvain filed an answer denying that Ms. Gaskill had made
the payments in accordance with the agreement, denying that the agreement
had included adding Ms. Gaskill’s name to the deed, positing that the statute
of frauds barred enforcement of oral agreements concerning interests in real
property, and a counterclaim in ejectment.
The trial court offered the following summary of the subsequent
procedural history of the case.
[T]his case first came before the undersigned for a pretrial
conference on November 22, 2019. At the time of the conference,
the court inquired regarding the merits of an outstanding petition
for relief [filed by Ms. McIlvain to be granted possession of the
property]. Counsel for [Ms. Gaskill] responded as follows: “well,
my problem right now, Your Honor, is my client is not
communicating with me or cooperating with me.” The court
advised counsel that it would refrain from addressing the merits
of the motion that day and stated that the matter would be
rescheduled for a new date. In doing so, the court relisted the
matter for December 20, 2019, a date agreed to by counsel that
was in accordance with their respective schedules.
The parties appeared again on December 20, 2019 on [Ms.
McIlvain’s] petition for special relief. Counsel for [Ms. Gaskill]
appeared and stated: “My client is not communicating with me.
She’s not responding to correspondence or phone calls. She is
refusing to meet with me. And she’s not here today despite the
fact that I told her she was required to appear today for this
hearing.” Counsel further advised the court that he was
concerned about his client’s mental status and stated “my client
is not cooperating, she’s not cooperating with me, and she she’s
not paying me either.” The court then asked counsel how much
time was needed to continue the trial and both counsel for [Ms.
Gaskill] and [Ms. McIlvain] confirmed that they would be ready to
proceed to trial on January 9, 2020. Accordingly, the case was
continued again and given a new trial date of January 9, 2020.
On January 9, 2020 the case was called to trial. Again, [Ms.
Gaskill] failed to appear. Counsel for [Ms. Gaskill] requested a
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continuance, and explained that he had spoken to [her] the night
before and told her to appear the next day for trial. Counsel
informed the court that after he appeared in court in December
he had hand-delivered notice to [Ms. Gaskill] of the trial date and
had made many phone calls in an effort to reach her to discuss
the trial date. . . . [H]e relayed that he had finally reached [Ms.
Gaskill] by phone the night before trial. Despite counsel’s advice
to appear in court, [she] did not appear. Counsel stated that he
had a conversation with [Ms. Gaskill] that “was interesting, not
necessarily relevant or responsive.” Counsel did not provide any
cogent reason for her non-appearance. Ultimately, this court
denied counsel’s request for a continuance and proceeded to trial.
Trial Court Opinion, 3/13/20, at 4-6 (footnotes, citations, and unnecessary
capitalization omitted).
At trial, counsel for Ms. Gaskill presented testimony and exhibits to
support her claim, while Ms. McIlvain testified to present her version of the
agreement and events. At the conclusion of trial, the court indicated that it
had considered the evidence, and what testimony Ms. Gaskill would have
offered had she appeared, but concluded that the evidence did not warrant an
equitable transfer of title. See N.T. Trial, 1/9/20, at 80-81. Ms. Gaskill filed
a timely post-trial motion, alleging, inter alia, that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying her January 9, 2020 continuance request. The trial court
also received correspondence from Ms. Gaskill’s physician which detailed Ms.
Gaskill’s physical conditions and reported that she had been upset and
stressed about family matters when he saw her in December 2019, but offered
no “diagnosis or justification that would excuse Appellant from appearing at
trial.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/13/20, at 7 n.4.
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The court denied Ms. Gaskill’s post-trial motion, and Ms. Gaskill filed a
notice of appeal.1 The trial court ordered her to file a concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Ms. Gaskill
filed a statement, containing what the trial court described as a “run-on
narrative.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/13/20, at 1. Nonetheless, the court
authored a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion addressing the issues Ms. Gaskill
presents to this Court:
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit a
reversible error when it denied [Ms. Gaskill’s] post trial request to
vacate the order (verdict) entered on January 10, 2020 and
schedule a date when [she] could testify in a non jury trial after
receiving a written report from [her] physician outlining [her]
medical conditions including a statement by [Ms. Gaskill] to the
doctor on December 23, 2019 that “she felt like she was on the
verge of a nervous breakdown”?
2. Did the trial court’s refusal to vacate the order
(verdict) entered on January 10, 2020 and schedule a date when
[Ms. Gaskill] could testify and submit documentary evidence in
support of her case constitute a denial of due process under the
unusual and special circumstances of this case?
Ms. Gaskill’s brief at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
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1 The appeal was premature, as judgment had not yet been entered on the
verdict. Ms. Gaskill subsequently filed a praecipe in the trial court for entry of
judgment on the verdict. See Order, 4/30/20. Hence, the appeal is deemed
properly filed from that judgment. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (“A notice of
appeal filed after the announcement of a determination but before the entry
of an appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the
day thereof.”).
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We begin with the relevant legal principles. Since Ms. Gaskill concedes
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her pre-trial request
for a continuance on January 9, 2020,2 the issue is whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying her post-trial request to rescind the verdict
and allow Ms. Gaskill to testify. Hence, our standard of review is as follows:
The general rule is that a court may in its discretion grant a
rehearing, but such decisions are peculiarly within the sound
discretion of the trial court. A denial of an opportunity for
rehearing or reconsideration for the purpose of receiving
additional evidence will not ordinarily be disturbed by an appellate
court. Reversal is appropriate only if the lower court has
committed an abuse of discretion.
Kruth v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 499 A.2d 354, 356 (Pa.Super. 1985)
(citations omitted).
“An abuse of discretion exists when the trial court has rendered a
judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, has failed
to apply the law, or was motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.”
Zaleppa v. Seiwell, 9 A.3d 632, 635 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In the context of continuance motions, this Court has
explained that the following factors are relevant to reviewing the trial court’s
decision on a motion to delay resolution of the case: “whether there was
prejudice to the opposing party by a delay, whether opposing counsel was
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2 See Ms. Gaskill’s brief at 17. (“In this case there is no evidence and no
suggestion by plaintiff that the trial court’s denial of plaintiff's request for a
continuance on January 9, 2020 was an abuse of discretion.”).
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willing to continue the case, the length of the delay requested, and the
complexities involved in presenting the case.” Rutyna v. Schweers, 177
A.3d 927, 933 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc).
In support of its decision, the trial court noted that Ms. Gaskill had
already had the benefit of multiple continuances, yet without explanation
repeatedly failed to appear to prosecute her claim. See Trial Court Opinion,
3/13/20, at 6; N.T. Trial, 1/9/20, at 10-11. Ms. Gaskill offered no timeframe
for when she would be ready to appear. See N.T. Trial, 1/9/20, at 15.
Moreover, Ms. Gaskill failed to offer a medical opinion that she suffered from
a condition that would preclude or excuse her appearance at trial. See Trial
Court Opinion, 3/13/20, at 7 n.4.
On the other hand, Ms. McIlvain established that she would be
prejudiced by further delay. It was undisputed that Ms. Gaskill had not been
providing Ms. McIlvain with the money for the aforementioned mortgage
payments. At the time of the bench trial, Ms. McIlvain protested that she
“does not have a lot of money and cannot afford for this to continue” when
she already had “been waiting over a year-and-a-half to get ger house back.”
See Trial Court Opinion, 3/13/20, at 6.
Ms. Gaskill posits that the trial court acted unreasonably in denying her
request to reopen the case to allow her to be present and offer her testimony
because: (1) it was a non-jury trial and there was no compelling reason not
to reschedule another trial date; (2) Ms. Gaskill’s physician indicated that she
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suffers from Type 1 Diabetes, high blood pressure, Dyslipidemia, and Celiac
Disease, and websites suggest that these conditions may cause symptoms
such as confusion, trouble understanding, mood changes, and anxiety; (3) the
trial court could have eliminated the prejudice to Ms. McIlvain by requiring Ms.
Gaskill to become current in her payments pending resolution of the trial; (4)
there was additional documentary evidence that was not offered at trial due
to Ms. Gaskill’s failure to appear; (5) assuming what Ms. Gaskill’s testimony
would have been is not an adequate substitute for observing her testify in
open court; and (6) the unusual and special circumstances of the case
warranted giving her one more chance to appear and testify. See Ms. Gaskill’s
brief at 18-20.
None of Ms. Gaskill’s arguments demonstrates that the trial court made
a decision that was “manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious,[;] failed
to apply the law[;] or was motivated by partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.”
Zaleppa, supra at 635. On the contrary, the trial court, having already
accommodated Ms. Gaskill’s non-appearance on multiple prior occasions
without requiring justification, considered the relevant factors of the prejudice
to Ms. McIlvain, counsel’s readiness, and the indefinite nature of the length of
time needed, and reasonably and fairly determined that no further delay was
warranted. While Ms. Gaskill now points to extraordinary measures the trial
court could have taken, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in declining to drag this matter out further.
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Ms. Gaskill also argues that the trial court’s decision denied her due
process. In support, she cites cases concerning the right to a hearing, with a
meaningful opportunity to be heard, before one is deprived of a property
interest. See Ms. Gaskill’s brief at 21 (citing, inter alia, Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
552 (1965)). She again suggests that her medical conditions, unknown to
counsel prior to trial, explained her failures to appear and presented special
circumstances that warranted giving her another opportunity to be heard.
Due process rights do not require that a court actually hear from a
litigant before adjudicating a claim, or that it let the litigant dictate the time
and manner. Rather, “[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”
Mathews, supra at 333 (cleaned up, emphasis added). As detailed above,
Ms. Gaskill had notice of the scheduled trial dates, the court was open and
available for her to appear and present her case, she demonstrated no
physical or mental condition that prevented her from appearing, yet she did
not appear. Ms. Gaskill was afforded ample opportunities to be heard, but
failed to avail herself of them. There was no due process violation. Accord
Hahalyak v. A. Frost, Inc., 664 A.2d 545, 551 (Pa.Super. 1995) (rejecting
due process challenge to the denial of a continuance, noting that the right to
due process does “not mandate an absolute right to be heard, only an
opportunity to be heard”).
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Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/26/20
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