Com. v. Wright, D.

J-S28043-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DWAYNE WRIGHT :
:
Appellant : No. 1468 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 10, 2019
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0004113-2018
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED OCTOBER 26, 2020
Dwayne Wright (“Wright”) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his conviction of two counts each of firearms not to be
carried without a license and possession with intent to deliver controlled
substances, and one count each of person not to possess firearms, receiving
stolen property, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving while operating
privileges are suspended or revoked.1 We affirm.
While on patrol on June 12, 2018, Lancaster City Bureau of Police
(“LCBP”) Officers Jacob Bingham (“Officer Bingham”) and Timothy Sinnot
(“Officer Sinnot”) conducted a traffic stop of a black Ford Focus, driven by
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118 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6106(a)(1), 6105(a)(1), 3925(a); 35 P.S. § 780-111(a)(30),
(32); 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a).
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Wright, with an expired registration. Wright pulled the vehicle to the side of
the street, out of the way of traffic. The expired registration revealed that the
vehicle was registered to Bruce Dates (“Dates”),2 at 425 Church Street,
Lancaster, Pennsylvania. The officers then made contact with Wright,3 who
provided them with a photo identification, rather than a driver’s license.
Officer Bingham used the information to search Wright’s Pennsylvania
Department of Transportation driver’s history, which revealed that Wright’s
driver’s license was suspended. Additionally, dispatchers informed the officers
that there was an active parole warrant for Wright based on a parole violation.
The officers confirmed the existence of the parole warrant, and placed Wright
under arrest.
During a search incident to Wright’s arrest, the officers searched Wright,
and retrieved from his pocket $79 in U.S. currency, bound together by a
rubber band. The officers also retrieved $35 in “loose” cash from the same
pocket.
While Wright was detained in the police cruiser, Officer Bingham
conducted an inventory search of the Ford Focus. Officer Bingham searched
the interior of the vehicle, and located a black jacket on the passenger seat.
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2The proof of insurance pertaining to the vehicle was also in Dates’s name,
and placed in an envelope marked “Keep for Dwayne.” See N.T. (Bench Trial),
5/8/19, at 16.
3 Wright was the sole occupant of the vehicle.
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In the jacket’s front pocket, Officer Bingham found a clear plastic corner-tied
bag containing a white powder, which he recognized as cocaine. Based on
that finding, the officers decided to obtain a search warrant. While Officer
Sinnot transported Wright to the police station, Officer Bingham drove the
Ford Focus to the police station and applied for a search warrant for controlled
substances.
After the search warrant was issued, Officers Bingham and Sinnot
searched the vehicle. The officers found a bag in the trunk of the vehicle,
which contained powder cocaine, crack cocaine, and a firearm. The officers
left the items in the vehicle, and applied for a separate search warrant for
firearms, weapons, and ammunition. While executing the second search
warrant, the officers recovered the cocaine (approximately 50 grams total),
marijuana and drug paraphernalia, a Kahr Arms 9 mm pistol (“the Kahr Arms
pistol”), a Hi-Point .45 caliber pistol, and ammunition for both weapons.
Additionally, the officers found approximately $1,579 in U.S. currency, and
several receipts identifying Wright.
On September 5, 2018, Wright filed an Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion,
including a Motion to Suppress the physical evidence recovered from the
vehicle, challenging the legality of the search. The suppression court
conducted a hearing, after which it denied Wright’s Motion to Suppress.
Following a stipulated bench trial, Wright was convicted of the above-
mentioned offenses. The trial court deferred sentencing, and ordered the
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preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report. On July 10, 2019, the trial
court sentenced Wright to an aggregate term of 7½ to 20 years in prison, plus
costs and a $25 fine.
Wright filed a Notice of Appeal on July 11, 2019,4 and the trial court
directed Wright to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal. On July 22, 2019, Wright filed a counseled Post-
Sentence Motion, indicating his intention to discontinue the appeal, 5 and
challenging the legality of the sentences imposed for his firearms not to be
carried without a license convictions. Specifically, Wright argued that the
firearms not to be carried without a license offenses, which were graded as
felonies of the third degree, carry a statutory maximum sentence of 7 years;
however, the trial court imposed concurrent terms of 5 to 10 years in prison.
Wright also acknowledged that modification of these individual sentences
would not alter the aggregate sentence, as they were ordered to run
concurrently with all other sentences. On July 29, 2019, the trial court entered
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4 On the same date, Wright’s trial counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel. From the record, it is unclear whether the trial court ever acted on
the Motion to Withdraw.
5 Wright’s counsel did not discontinue the appeal at that time, and failed to
perfect the appeal by filing a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement. On August
16, 2019, trial counsel filed a Praecipe to Withdraw Wright’s direct appeal on
August 16, 2019. By that time, the time period for filing a direct appeal of
the July 10, 2019 judgment of sentence had expired.
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an Order modifying the sentences for firearms not to be carried without a
license to concurrent terms of 3½ to 7 years in prison.
On September 3, 2019, Wright, through new counsel, filed a Petition for
relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), see 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§§ 9541-9546. Therein, Wright alleged that because trial counsel did not
withdraw the July 11, 2019 Notice of Appeal, the Post-Sentence Motion, filed
while the appeal was still pending, was a legal nullity. Wright therefore
averred that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, and sought
reinstatement of his direct appeal rights, nunc pro tunc. On the same date,
the PCRA court granted Wright’s PCRA Petition, restored his direct appeal
rights, and directed him to file a notice of appeal within 30 days.
Wright filed a timely Notice of Appeal, nunc pro tunc, and a court-
ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement.
On appeal, Wright raises the following issues for our review:
I. Did the trial court err in denying [] Wright’s Motion to Suppress,
where [] Wright’s vehicle was immobilized but not impounded
when police searched it[;] there was no lawful basis to impound
the vehicle[;] and the guns and drugs seized were the fruit of the
illegal inventory search and subsequent illegally-obtained search
warrants[?]
II. Was the evidence presented by the Commonwealth insufficient
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [] Wright committed the
offense of receiving stolen property, where there was no evidence
that [] Wright knew that the Kahr Arms [pistol] had been stolen,
or that he believed that the firearm had probably been stolen?
Brief for Appellant at 7.
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In his first claim, Wright asserts that the suppression court erred in
denying his Motion to Suppress, because his vehicle was immobilized, but not
impounded, at the time of the search. Id. at 19, 22, 31. According to Wright,
Officer Bingham acknowledged that he did not have probable cause to believe
there was anything illegal in the vehicle. Id. at 22. Wright claims that the
Commonwealth failed to establish that he was using the vehicle without
permission. Id. at 24; see also id. at 24-25 (arguing that the Commonwealth
had reason to believe that Wright was in lawful possession of the vehicle
because Wright and the owner lived at the same address). Wright therefore
argues that any challenge by the Commonwealth regarding his lawful
possession of the vehicle is waived. Id. at 25.6 Additionally, Wright states
that some of the court’s findings of fact must be corrected: (1) the vehicle’s
registration was in the name of Bruce Dates, who moved to Alabama; and (2)
after arresting Wright, Officer Bingham followed the policies outlined in the
LCBP, including an inventory search and securing the vehicle in the garage,
until the owner could be contacted. See id. at 25-29. Wright also faults the
Commonwealth’s contention that the physical evidence seized from the vehicle
would inevitably have been discovered when the abandoned car was
ultimately towed. Id. at 30-31.
In reviewing the trial court’s denial of Wright’s Motion to Suppress,
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6 The Commonwealth does not contest Wright’s standing to challenge the
search on appeal.
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our responsibility is to determine whether the record supports the
suppression court’s factual findings and legitimacy of the
inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings. If the
suppression court held for the prosecution, we consider only the
evidence of the prosecution’s witnesses and so much of the
evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record
as a whole, remains uncontradicted. When the factual findings of
the suppression court are supported by the evidence, the
appellate court may reverse if there is an error in the legal
conclusions drawn from those factual findings.
Commonwealth v. Arnold, 932 A.2d 143, 145 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation
omitted).
Section 6309.2 of the Motor Vehicle Code provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
§ 6309.2. Immobilization, towing and storage of vehicle
for driving without operating privileges or registration
(a) General rule.--Subject to subsection (d), the following shall
apply:
(1) If a person operates a motor vehicle … on a highway or
trafficway of this Commonwealth while the person’s operating
privilege is suspended, revoked, canceled, recalled or
disqualified or where the person is unlicensed, as verified by
an appropriate law enforcement officer in cooperation with the
department, the law enforcement officer shall immobilize the
vehicle … or, in the interest of public safety, direct that
the vehicle be towed and stored by the appropriate towing
and storage agent pursuant to subsection (c), and the
appropriate judicial authority shall be so notified.
* * *
(b) Procedure upon immobilization.--
(1) When a vehicle is immobilized pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), the operator of the vehicle may appear before the
appropriate judicial authority within 24 hours from the time the
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vehicle was immobilized. The appropriate judicial authority
may issue a certificate of release upon:
(i) the furnishing of proof of registration and financial
responsibility by the owner of the vehicle; and
(ii) receipt of evidence that the operator of the vehicle has
complied with the pertinent provisions of Title 42 (relating
to judiciary and judicial procedure) and this title.
* * *
(3) If a certification of release is not obtained within 24 hours
from the time the vehicle was immobilized, the vehicle shall be
towed and stored by the appropriate towing and storage agent
under subsection (c).
(c) Procedure upon towing and storage.--
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the following steps
shall be taken:
(i) The appropriate judicial authority shall notify the
appropriate law enforcement officer of the county in which
the violation occurred.
(ii) The Officer notified under subparagraph (i) shall notify
the appropriate towing and storage agent to tow and store
the vehicle … and provide notice by the most expeditious
means and by first class mail, proof of service, of the towing,
storage and location of the vehicle … to the owner of the
vehicle …, if the names and addresses of the owner … are
known or can be ascertained by investigation.
* * *
(d) Recovery of towed and stored vehicle.--
(1) The owner or lienholder of any vehicle … which has been
towed and stored under this section may obtain possession of
the vehicle or combination by:
(i) furnishing proof of valid registration and financial
responsibility; and
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(ii)(A) if the towing and storage resulted from the operation
of the vehicle … by the owner, paying all fines and costs
associated with the towing and storage of the vehicle … and
any other than outstanding fines and costs of the owner ….
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6309.2(a)(1), (b)(1), (3), (c)(1), (d)(1) (emphasis added);
see also Commonwealth v. Lagenella, 83 A.3d 94, 100 (Pa. 2013)
(concluding that there is no distinction between the terms “impounded” and
“towed and stored” for purposes of section 6309.2).
First, we determine whether the vehicle driven by Wright was
immobilized or impounded. Our Supreme Court has previously considered
the distinction between immobilizing a vehicle (i.e., restricting movement of
the vehicle using a boot or other locking device), and impounding a vehicle:
[P]ursuant to section 6309.2(a)(1), an officer who stops a
vehicle operated by a person whose driving privilege is, inter alia,
suspended, is faced with two options: immobilize the vehicle in
place or, if it poses public safety concerns, have it towed and
stored at an impound lot….
The relevant requirements for purposes of immobilization
are: (i) the person operates a motor vehicle while the person’s
operating privilege is suspended … and (ii) the vehicle does not
pose public safety concerns.
For purposes of towing, the requirements are: (i) the
person operates a motor vehicle while the person’s operating
privilege is suspended … and (ii) the vehicle poses public safety
concerns warranting its towing and storage at an impound lot.
Lagenella, 83 A.3d at 100 (citing Commonwealth v. Thompson, 999 A.2d
616, 620 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
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Here, the suppression court determined that the vehicle did not pose a
risk to public safety because “[t]he vehicle was likely legally parked, did not
have anything of value visible, and was not damaged in any way.” Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 2/27/19, at 5 (footnote omitted). During
the suppression hearing, Officer Bingham testified that when he effectuated
the traffic stop, Wright pulled the vehicle to the side of the road, and
positioned it out of the roadway. N.T. (Suppression), 11/15/18, at 21-22;
see also id. (wherein Officer Bingham stated that he believed the street had
metered parking at that location, and he was unsure whether the vehicle was
positioned in such a way that would be legal for meter enforcement purposes).
Officer Bingham specifically acknowledged that the vehicle did not cause any
type of public safety concern. Id. at 22. Additionally, Officer Bingham
indicated that he did not observe any extensive damage to the vehicle, other
than “some scratches, and paint fading,” presumably due to its age. Id.
Officer Bingham testified that there was a vacuum cleaner on the front seat
of the vehicle, but otherwise, there was nothing of value in plain view. Id. at
23. Further, Officer Bingham testified that, prior to conducting the inventory
search, his intent was to immobilize the vehicle. Id. at 25-26; see also id.
at 23 (wherein Officer Bingham stated that the vehicle’s expired registration
and Wright’s suspended driver’s license were the only reasons supporting his
decision to search the vehicle). We therefore agree with the suppression
court’s determination, which is supported by the record. Because the vehicle
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did not pose a public safety risk, section 6309.2 permitted the vehicle’s
immobilization, not its impoundment. See Lagenella, 83 A.3d at 100; id.
101-02 (concluding that the evidence did not support a finding that the
vehicle, operated by a defendant with a suspended license, posed a public
safety risk, where the vehicle was not disabled or damaged; there were no
items of value in plain view; and the parked vehicle did not impede the flow
of traffic). But see Commonwealth v. Peak, 2020 WL 1501302, at **5-6
(filed Mar. 30, 2020) (concluding that police had authority to tow a vehicle
and conduct an inventory search, driven by a defendant with suspended
license (and who did not own the vehicle), where the vehicle was parked at a
gas station, in front of one of the gas pumps, and its location interfered with
the regular course of the gas station’s business).
Next, we turn to the legality of the inventory search performed by Officer
Bingham while Wright was detained in the police cruiser and the vehicle was
at the scene. We first note that Wright does not contest the validity of the
initial traffic stop. Rather, Wright challenges the search of the vehicle after it
was immobilized. Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protect citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures. Commonwealth v. Richter, 791 A.2d
1181, 1184 (Pa. Super. 2002). Therefore, “[a] warrantless search or seizure
is per se unreasonable unless it falls within a specifically enumerated
exception.” Commonwealth v. Lee, 972 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 2009)
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(citation omitted). An inventory search is one such exception to the warrant
requirement. See Lagenella, 83 A.3d at 102.
The purpose of an inventory search is not to uncover
criminal evidence. Rather, it is designed to safeguard seized items
in order to benefit both the police and the defendant. Inventory
searches serve one or more of the following purposes: (1) to
protect the owner’s property while it remains in police custody;
(2) to protect the police against claims or disputes over lost or
stolen property; (3) to protect the police from potential danger;
and (4) to assist the police in determining whether the vehicle was
stolen and then abandoned.
Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245, 254-55 (Pa. Super. 2000)
(emphasis added; citations and quotation marks omitted).
In determining whether a proper inventory search has
occurred, the first inquiry is whether the police have lawfully
impounded the automobile, i.e., have lawful custody of the
automobile. The authority of the police to impound vehicles
derives from the police’s reasonable community care-taking
functions. Such functions include removing disabled or damaged
vehicles from the highway, impounding automobiles which violate
parking ordinances (thereby jeopardizing public safety and
efficient traffic flow), and protecting the community’s safety.
The second inquiry is whether the police have conducted a
reasonable inventory search. An inventory search is reasonable if
it is conducted pursuant to reasonable standard police procedures
and in good faith and not for the sole purpose of investigation.
Lagenella, 83 A.3d at 102-03 (emphasis added; citation omitted). The
Lagenella Court reviewed the language of section 6309.2, as well as
persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, and specifically held that “a
vehicle which has simply been immobilized in place is not in lawful custody of
police for purposes of an inventory search.” Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
Thus, “a warrantless inventory search of a vehicle is permissible only when
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the police have lawfully towed and stored, or impounded the vehicle.” Id. at
106.
Here, after concluding that the vehicle should have been immobilized,
the suppression court also concluded that “the vehicle should not have been
impounded. Rather, it should have been immobilized without an inventory
search at the time of [Wright’s] arrest.” Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, 2/27/19, at 5 (emphasis added). We agree. Because there was no legal
basis for Officer Bingham to tow or impound the vehicle immediately upon
securing it at the scene, the inventory search was improper, notwithstanding
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any contrary standard inventory policy employed by LCPB.7 See Lagenella,
83 A.3d at 104; id. at 106 (stating that “because there was no basis for [the
officer] to tow [a]ppellant’s vehicle in the first instance, the inventory search
of [a]ppellant’s vehicle was improper….).
Nevertheless, the suppression court concluded that the evidence seized
from the vehicle was admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery.
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7 During the suppression hearing, Officer Bingham testified that his
understanding was that in circumstances where a vehicle is operated by an
individual with a suspended license, or the vehicle is not legally registered, an
officer may either immobilize or tow the vehicle. See N.T. (Suppression),
11/15/18, at 11-12. Officer Bingham also stated that LCBP policy requires
officers to conduct an inventory search under such circumstances. See id. at
12, 25-26. LCBP’s Inventory Search Policy provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
.10 Impoundment or Custody of Vehicles.
Before an inventory search of a vehicle may be done, the vehicle
must be legally impounded or lawfully in law enforcement custody.
Reasons for the impound or custody must be clearly stated in the
[LCBP] Investigative report or on a form provided for such
purpose.
A. A vehicle is not considered lawfully in law enforcement
custody when we merely park the vehicle and secure it after the
driver has been arrested.
.20 Vehicles to be Searched.
Inventory searches must be conducted on all vehicles impounded
or in lawful custody of the Police Department.
Stipulation of Counsel to Correct Record, 10/28/19, Exhibit 3 (LCBP Inventory
Search Policy) (emphasis in original). Thus, based upon our review, it appears
that LCBP’s Inventory Search Policy limits its search requirements to vehicles
that are impounded, in accordance with section 6309.2 and the Lagenella
decision.
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See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 2/27/19, at 5-7. The doctrine
of inevitable discovery
provides that evidence which would have been discovered was
sufficiently purged of the original illegality to allow admission of
the evidence. Implicit in this doctrine is the fact that the evidence
would have been discovered despite the initial illegality.
If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the illegally obtained evidence ultimately or
inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means, then the
evidence is admissible. The purpose of the inevitable discovery
rule is to block setting aside convictions that would have been
obtained without the police misconduct. Thus, evidence that
ultimately or inevitably would have been recovered by lawful
means should not be suppressed despite the fact that its actual
recovery was accomplished through illegal actions.
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 890 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
Recovery of a vehicle, whether it is immobilized or impounded, requires
the owner to produce a valid proof of registration.8 See id. § 6309.2(b)(1)(i),
(d)(1)(i). In the case of immobilization, the operator must produce the
necessary paperwork (i.e., registration and proof of insurance), before an
appropriate judicial authority within 24 hours of the vehicle’s immobilization.
See id. § 6309.2(b)(1). Here, the record reflects that Dates did not appear
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8 We acknowledge that subsection 6309.2(b) concerning immobilization,
refers to the “operator of a vehicle,” while subsection 6309.2(d), concerning
towing and storage, refers to the owner of the vehicle. However, even if
Wright were permitted to appear before an appropriate judicial authority as
the vehicle’s “operator,” he would still be unable to produce a valid
registration.
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before an appropriate judicial authority with the necessary paperwork within
24 hours of the vehicle’s immobilization, at which time the police could tow
the vehicle, and conduct an inventory search. See Lagenella, 83 A.3d at 105
(stating that “only upon the vehicle operator’s failure to obtain a certificate of
release within 24 hours will the judicial authority notify law enforcement, who,
at that time, shall arrange for the towing and storage of the vehicle.”), 106
(stating that “a warrantless inventory search of a vehicle is permissible only
when the police have lawfully towed and stored, or impounded the vehicle.”).
Accordingly, we affirm the suppression court’s denial of Wright’s Motion to
Suppress, based on the doctrine of inevitable discovery.
In his second claim, Wright contends that there was insufficient evidence
to support his conviction of receiving stolen property. Brief for Appellant at
32. Wright acknowledges that during the stipulated bench trial, his trial
counsel stipulated that the elements of the crimes had been met, but argues
that the trial court did not adequately colloquy the defendant as to his
admission of guilt. Id. at 33 n.7. Wright also points out that “[i]t does not
appear, however, that the trial court believed that counsel for [] Wright was
conceding guilt of all offenses, as he found [] Wright not guilty of driving an
unregistered vehicle.” Id. Additionally, Wright argues that there was no
evidence to establish that Wright knew or believed that the Kahr Arms
handgun had been stolen. Id. at 32. Wright points out that he was in
possession of two firearms, only one of which was stolen, and therefore, his
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possession of a firearm, without more, is insufficient to establish that he knew
or believed the Kahr Arms pistol was stolen. Id. at 35.
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we
may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the
fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt
may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the finder of fact, while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Furness, 153 A.3d 397, 401 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation
and brackets omitted).
Pursuant to section 3925 of the Crimes Code, “[a] person is guilty of
theft if he intentionally receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of
another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has probably been
stolen, unless the property is received, retained, or disposed with intent to
restore it to the owner.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(a). Thus, “[i]n order to convict
a defendant of [r]eceiving [s]tolen [p]property, the Commonwealth must
establish three elements: (1) intentionally acquiring possession of the
movable property of another; (2) with knowledge or belief that it was probably
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stolen; and (3) the intent to deprive permanently.” Commonwealth v.
Gomez, 224 A.3d 1095, 1099 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
Here, Wright challenges only the second element, i.e., whether he had
knowledge or belief that the Kahr Arms pistol was stolen. “[M]ere possession
of stolen property is insufficient to prove guilty knowledge.” Commonwealth
v. Foreman, 797 A.2d 1005, 1012 (Pa. Super. 2002). The knowledge
requirement may be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence.
See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Newton, 994 A.2d 1127, 1132 (Pa.
Super. 2010) (stating that “[o]ften, intent cannot be proven directly but must
be inferred from examination of the facts and circumstances of the case.”
(citation and quotation marks omitted)). “To establish a defendant had guilty
knowledge, … the Commonwealth may introduce evidence that the underlying
theft occurred recently. Such evidence will permit a fact-finder to infer guilty
knowledge, particularly where there is no satisfactory explanation for the
defendant’s possession of recently stolen goods.” Gomez, 224 A.3d at 1099-
1100 (citations omitted).
Circumstantial evidence of guilty knowledge may include, inter
alia, the place or manner of possession, alterations to the property
indicative of theft, the defendant’s conduct or statements at the
time of the arrest (including attempts to flee apprehension), a
false explanation for the possession, the location of the theft in
comparison to where the defendant gained possession, the value
of the property compared to the price paid for it, or any other
evidence connecting the defendant to the crime.
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 128 A.3d 261, 268 (Pa. Super. 2015).
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While specifically addressing the receiving stolen property charge, the
following exchange occurred between the assistant district attorney and
Officer Bingham:
Q. In addition to the firearms being carried without a license, the
Kahr Arms was also charged as receiving stolen property?
A. Correct.
Q. And we would stipulate that Mr. Jeffrey Yunginger -- Yunginger
has been subpoenaed by my office and is ready and available for
testimony[,] and would testify that his gun indeed was stolen in a
burglary, I believe in April of that year?
A. I believe that’s the time frame, yes.
Q. And that [] Wright never had his permission or authority to
possess that firearm?
A. That is correct.
N.T. (Stipulated Bench Trial), 5/8/19, at 14-15.
After detailing the relevant stipulations for each of the charges, the
assistant district attorney stated, “Your Honor, based on the above, my
understanding is [defense c]ounsel will be stipulating that the elements of
these crimes have been met.” Id. at 26. The trial court asked Wright’s trial
counsel to confirm the stipulations, and counsel agreed. Id.
In its Opinion, the trial court concluded that there was sufficient
evidence to support Wrights receiving stolen property conviction. See Trial
Court Opinion, 11/4/19, at 4-5 (unnumbered). Regarding the circumstantial
evidence supporting its finding of the “guilty knowledge” requirement, the trial
court stated that the Kahr Arms pistol had been stolen in a burglary less than
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two months prior to the vehicle stop. Id. at 5 (unnumbered). Additionally,
the trial court points to Wright’s criminal history, which triggered the separate
conviction of person not to possess firearms (i.e., a prior persons not to
possess firearms conviction, and prior felony drug convictions), as
circumstantial evidence that Wright did not come into possession of the pistol
through legal means. Id.
Upon review, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to support Wright’s conviction
of receiving stolen property. See Furness, supra. During the traffic stop,
Wright was in possession of a stolen Kahr Arms pistol, which had been the
subject of a burglary approximately two months prior. Additionally, the stolen
pistol was found in the trunk of the vehicle along with a significant quantity of
drugs, and Wright stipulated during the bench trial that the packaging of the
drugs, the currency, and other circumstances indicated that he was in
possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver them. See N.T.
(Stipulated Bench Trial), 5/8/19, at 11, 17-18. Thus, the totality of the
circumstances permitted the trial court to infer that Wright believed that the
Kahr Arms pistol was probably stolen. See Newton, 994 A.2d at 1132(stating that “[w]hen examining the totality of the circumstances to determine
if there is sufficient evidence from which a [fact finder] could infer the requisite
mens rea, we must, as with any sufficiency analysis, examine all record
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom.” (citation and quotation
marks omitted)); see also Gomez, 224 A.3d at 1100 (concluding that there
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J-S28043-20
was sufficient evidence to infer that the defendant believed firearms were
probably stolen, where expert testimony established that drug dealers often
obtain firearms illicitly, even where there was no evidence that the defendant
did, in fact, know that the firearms were stolen). Thus, the evidence, viewed
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth (and particularly in light of
the stipulations in this case), was sufficient to sustain Wright’s conviction of
receiving stolen property.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Olson joins the memorandum.
Judge Bowes files a dissenting memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/26/2020
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