Com. v. Davis, D.

J-S24039-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DARON DAVIS :
:
Appellant : No. 1972 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 17, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0001064-2017
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: Filed: October 29, 2020
I respectfully dissent with respect to the Majority’s position that the
PCRA court did not err in dismissing, without a hearing, Appellant’s claims that
his guilty plea counsel was ineffective for causing Appellant to enter an
involuntary or unknowing plea, and/or that the plea was unlawfully induced
for similar reasons.
As our Supreme Court has made clear, we must remand for an
evidentiary hearing “in cases where the PCRA court declined to hold a hearing,
and where an assessment of witness testimony was essential to a petitioner’s
ineffectiveness claims….” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 540
(Pa. 2009). This is so that the PCRA court can assess the witness and make
credibility determinations based upon live testimony. Id. at 539 (noting that
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S24039-20
“one of the primary reasons PCRA hearings are held in the first place is so that
credibility determinations can be made; otherwise, issues of material fact
could be decided on pleadings and affidavits alone”).
With respect to both issues, the Majority reviewed both the written and
oral guilty plea colloquies, noting that those colloquies conformed to the
appropriate legal standards. The Majority found no evidence in the record
that Appellant’s plea was unlawfully induced, or that plea counsel caused
Appellant to enter the plea unknowingly or involuntarily. With this much of
the Majority’s decision, I fully agree.
However, neither Appellant nor plea counsel testified regarding their
discussions prior to and during the guilty plea hearing. Thus, the PCRA court
either did not assess the credibility of Appellant’s accusations at all, or
preemptively determined that the accusations were not credible before
Appellant had an opportunity to testify about them. While I agree that the
plea colloquies at issue may ultimately undermine the credibility of Appellant’s
accusation that he was manipulated into pleading guilty, that record must
nonetheless be weighed against Appellant’s testimony, not merely against
averments he made in his PCRA petition.
Here, I believe Appellant’s testimony is essential to both his
ineffectiveness and unlawful inducement claims. In essence, Appellant is
maintaining that his statements in the written and oral plea colloquies were
not truthful. See Appellant’s Brief at 21 (“Appellant raised a genuine issue of
material fact that he was coerced into entering a guilty plea and was
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overwhelmed by Trial Counsel and the [c]ourt to answer positively when asked
if he was satisfied with Trial Counsel, and also to answer negatively when
asked if he was coerced into entering the guilty plea.”). Because this presents
a genuine issue of material fact turning on a credibility assessment, I believe
the PCRA court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing to assess the
credibility of Appellant’s accusations.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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