Com. v. Burkhart, D., Jr.

J-S44006-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
DONALD ANTHONY BURKHART, JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 1916 MDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 26, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-36-CR-0007022-2018
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2020
Appellant, Donald Anthony Burkhart, Jr., appeals from the judgment of
sentence of an aggregate term of 3-7 years’ incarceration, imposed following
his conviction for two counts of terroristic threats, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706. Herein,
Appellant challenges the trial court’s admission of hearsay testimony, its
imposition of separate sentences at each count, and the jurisdiction of the
court to order conditions on Appellant’s state parole. After careful review, we
vacate Appellant’s sentence for the misdemeanor-graded count of terroristic
threats, and vacate any portion of the sentencing order purporting to set
conditions on Appellant’s state sentence or parole beyond the minimum and
maximum terms of incarceration. We affirm Appellant’s sentence with respect
to the charge of terroristic threats graded as a felony.
The trial court summarized the relevant procedural history of this case
and the facts adduced at Appellant’s jury trial as follows:
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On June 7, 2019, [Appellant] was found guilty of one count each
of terroristic threats graded as a felony of the third degree and
terroristic threats graded as a misdemeanor of the first degree.
The convictions relate to multiple threats [Appellant] made to
certain staff at UPMC [Pinnacle] Lititz hospital throughout the day
on November 20, 2018. [Appellant] was at the hospital that day
with his partner for the delivery of his child by means of a
scheduled cesarean section. [Appellant] first manifested his anger
to Dr. Jill Satorie and to his partner in the operating room when
he claimed a male anesthesiologist saw his partner’s “butt crack.”
After the delivery, [Appellant]’s agitated demeanor continued to
escalate[,] with [Appellant] and his partner continually arguing
with each other, [Appellant] discouraging an examination of his
partner that was recommended, threatening Dr. Satorie that his
partner might kick her and hurt her if the examination were
performed, [Appellant’s] asking Nurse Dana Mastromatteo when
they could perform a paternity test on the baby, explaining that
he wanted to know if the baby was a miracle or “something else”
because [Appellant] had a vasectomy[,] and [Appellant’s]
becoming agitated [and] confrontational about wanting to bring
his pit bull into the hospital room.
Later, when a decision was made to move the baby to the NICU
due to respiratory issues and the atmosphere in the room,
[Appellant] became particularly agitated and stated that he felt
like the hospital was kidnapping the baby. When a clinical nurse
manager, Eliza Zeidman, came to speak with [Appellant] about
the transfer of the baby, [Appellant] pointedly told her that he had
previously done time in jail and was not going to go back and then
he asked if she understood what he was saying. Nurse Zeidman
reported the threat to her boss who she believes reported it to
security. [Appellant] was overheard on two other occasions
making similar statements about his time in jail over his temper
to a visitor and then a house supervisor.
[Appellant]’s anger seemed to peak over hospital staff refusing to
permit his partner to smoke in the room or to go outside to smoke.
He threatened Dr. Satorie that if anyone laid a hand on his partner
when she attempted to go outside to smoke he would become
angry, punch the wall in and hurt somebody. He informed both
Dr. Satorie and Nurse Mastromatteo separately when discussing
the smoking issue that he was the president of a motorcycle gang
and that he would have that gang come to the hospital and make
things ugly[,] like he did on a prior occasion at a hospital in
Williamsport. In response to this final, specific threat, Dr. Satorie
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and Nurse Mastromatteo contacted hospital administration[,]
which resulted in security and police being contacted and
responding. Due to the nature of the threats concerning the
motorcycle gang, a decision was made to put the hospital into a
lockdown situation.[1] [Appellant] was arrested and the hospital
remained in lockdown from approximately 6:00 p.m. on
November 20, 201[8,] until sometime between 6:30 a.m. and
8:00 a.m. on November 21, 201[8].
After completion of a [pre-sentence investigation report],
[Appellant] was sentenced on August 26, 2019 to three to seven
years of incarceration on the felony count of terroristic threats and
a concurrent one to five years of incarceration on the
misdemeanor count of terroristic threats. [Appellant] filed a post-
sentence motion on September 4, 2019, which was denied by
Order dated October 25, 2019. [Appellant] filed a [timely] notice
of appeal on November 22, 2019.
Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 1/21/20, at 1-4 (footnotes omitted).
Appellant filed a timely, court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, and
the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on January 21, 2020. Appellant
now presents the following questions for our review:
I. Did the trial court err in admitting significant hearsay testimony
regarding [Appellant’s] alleged statements, under the guise of
explaining Jeffrey Hatfield’s course of conduct, where the
testimony was extremely prejudicial, there was great risk that the
jury would accept the testimony for its truth, and the jury was not
given a limiting instruction regarding the use of said testimony?
II. Did the trial court err in imposing separate sentences for Count
3, terroristic threats, graded as a first-degree misdemeanor, and
Count 1, terroristic threats, graded as a third-degree felony,
where the two offenses charged a violation of 18 Pa.C.S. §
2706(a)(1), both charges addressed identical conduct, and the
sole difference was the additional element resulting in felony three
grading, as set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706(c), for causing the
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1The decision to lock down the hospital was made by the Security Supervisor
at UPMC Pinnacle Lititz, Jeffrey Hatfield.
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occupants of the building to be diverted from their normal or
customary operations?
III. Did the trial court err in imposing a condition of no contact
with the victims and in banning [Appellant] from UPMC Pinnacle
[Lititz], where the court had no jurisdiction to impose such
conditions, which are the province of Pennsylvania Probation and
Parole?
Appellant’s Brief at 6-7.
Hearsay
In his first claim, Appellant alleges that the trial court erred when it
admitted hearsay through the testimony of Jeffrey Hatfield. As explained by
Appellant,
Jeffrey Hatfield, a security supervisor for UPMC Pinnacle for a
region including UPMC Pinnacle’s Lititz hospital, testified that at
4:26 p.m. he was notified of a potential security situation at the
hospital. [N.T., 6/7/19-6/9/19, at] 230. As Mr. Hatfield began
describing what he had been told about the situation, defense
counsel objected that what he had been told was hearsay. [Id.
at] 231. The [prosecutor] argued that what he had been told went
to his course of conduct. [Id.] The court overruled the objection
after a sidebar discussion. [Id.] Mr. Hatfield then testified that
Dave Schmidt, the chief nursing officer for the Lititz hospital, told
him that [Appellant] was harassing the staff and making threats.
[Id. at] 231-[]32.
The [prosecutor] asked Mr. Hatfield what threat contributed to his
decision to lock down, and defense counsel objected, arguing that
the specific threat was hearsay. [Id. at] 234-[]35. Again, the
[prosecutor] argued that the specific threat was relevant to Mr.
Hatfield’s course of conduct, and the court overruled the
objection. [Id.]. Mr. Hatfield testified that he was advised that
[Appellant] was supposedly a president of a motorcycle gang, and
that he would have hundreds of motorcycles descend on the
hospital to get his way, and that there had been a shooting in
Chicago the day before and he would make it happen in Lititz.
[Id. at] 235.
Appellant’s Brief at 11-12.
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Appellant argues that the trial court erred by overruling his objection
because the details of the testimony were more prejudicial than probative,
and that the error was not harmless because the jury was not specifically
instructed as to the statement’s limited, non-hearsay purpose. We conduct
our analysis of Appellant’s claim with the following in mind:
Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial
court and will be reversed only where the court clearly abused that
discretion. Proper judicial discretion conforms to the law and is
based on facts and circumstances before the court. An abuse of
discretion is not a mere error of judgment but, rather, involves
partiality, prejudice, bias, ill-will, or manifest unreasonableness.
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make any fact that
is of consequence to the case more or less probable. Pa.R.E. 401.
All relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise provided by
law. Pa.R.E. 402. Although relevant, a trial court may exclude
evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury.
Pa.R.E. 403.
…
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at trial, offered into evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted. Pa.R.E. 801(c). Sometimes, out-of-court
statements are offered not to prove the truth of the matter
asserted but, for example, to explain the course of conduct
undertaken by an investigating police officer. Commonwealth
v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571, 577 (Pa. Super. 2003). Such statements
are not hearsay. Id.
Even if a court does wrongly admit hearsay, this Court will not
disturb a verdict on that basis alone if the admission constitutes
harmless error. Id. at 582 n.2. Error is harmless if: (1) the
prejudice to the appellant was nonexistent or de minimis; (2) the
erroneously admitted evidence was merely cumulative of other
untainted, substantially similar and properly admitted evidence;
or (3) the properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence was so
overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so
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insignificant by comparison that the error could not have
contributed to the verdict. Id.
Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 776-77 (Pa. Super. 2007) (some
citations omitted).
Here, the trial court determined that the
record clearly establishes that this testimony was not offered for
the truth of the matter asserted or to demonstrate that
[Appellant] actually made the threats. The testimony was offered
to show the information upon which the witness acted and to
explain the witness’s course of conduct and why he felt a lockdown
was necessary at the facility.
Furthermore, the admission of such testimony did not cause
[Appellant] any prejudice. Two separate witnesses had already
testified that [Appellant] made the threat concerning the
motorcycle gang. In fact, those witnesses went into greater
detail, explaining that [Appellant] had supported his threat by
telling them that he had caused it to happen on a prior occasion
at another facility to get his way. Therefore, this portion of the
testimony was merely cumulative. While it is true that the
security supervisor went on to mention a shooting in Chicago, the
way that portion of the testimony was offered also did not cause
[Appellant] any prejudice. [P]rior to the testimony, it was
explained, in the presence of the jury, that the witness was not
testifying from personal knowledge or memory of what was said
by [Appellant] and that such testimony was not being offered as
to the truth of what happened. The actual victims of [Appellant]’s
threats never stated that [Appellant] made threats concerning a
shooting or any facility in Chicago. In fact, it could be argued that
the security supervisor’s testimony could have benefited
[Appellant]. To obtain a conviction for a felony count of terroristic
threats, the burden was on the Commonwealth to demonstrate
that [Appellant]’s threats caused the occupants of the building to
be diverted from their normal or customary operations. The
security supervisor’s statement that the decision to put the facility
on lockdown was made because of threats concerning a
motorcycle gang and threats of a shooting undermined the
Commonwealth’s case. The jury could have found that the
lockdown was caused not by [Appellant]’s threats, but by
miscommunication, misunderstanding or exaggeration.
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TCO at 7-8.
We agree with the trial court that the at-issue testimony was relevant
for a non-hearsay purpose—to explain Hatfield’s course of conduct leading to
the decision to lock down the hospital. The Commonwealth charged Appellant
with terroristic threats graded as a felony. As such, the Commonwealth was
required to prove that the terroristic threats caused “the occupants of the
building, place of assembly or facility of public transportation to be diverted
from their normal or customary operations[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706. Hatfield’s
testimony established a causal link between his decision to lock down the
hospital and Appellant’s threats.
Appellant argues that the prejudice stemming from this testimony
nevertheless outweighed its probative value. He contends that the details
conveyed by Hatfield—in particular, the specific threat to have hundreds of
gang members target the hospital, and the reference to a shooting in
Chicago—were unduly prejudicial, and that Hatfield could have explained his
course of conduct by simply stating “that he called police and locked down the
hospital because of threats attributed to” Appellant. Appellant’s Brief at 24
(unnumbered page). However, we agree with the trial court that Hatfield’s
testimony was cumulative of the testimony of two witnesses who directly
heard Hatfield’s threats.
As to Appellant’s assertion that the trial court failed to instruct the jury
regarding the limited purpose of Hatfield’s at-issue testimony, Appellant never
requested a limiting instruction when the court issued its ruling. See N.T.,
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6/7/19-6/9/19, at 234-35. Accordingly, Appellant has waived this aspect of
his claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the trial court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Thus, we ascertain
no clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in admitting Hatfield’s course-
of-conduct testimony. For that reason, Appellant’s first claim lacks merit.
Merger
Next, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it issued separate,
concurrent sentences for each count of terroristic threats. He argues that both
charges “addressed identical conduct, and the sole difference was the
additional element resulting in felony[-]three grading….” Appellant’s Brief at
26 (unnumbered page). To the contrary, the trial court determined that
Appellant “communicated several distinct threats to several distinct individuals
on separate occasions throughout the day[,]” and that some “of his threats
resulted in reports to hospital administration causing a diversion of regular
activity for the hospital and some of them did not.” TCO at 10. Thus, the trial
court ruled that the offenses did not merge because they applied to separate
criminal acts.
“A claim that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence by failing to
merge sentences is a question of law. Accordingly, our standard of review is
plenary.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 874 A.2d 66, 70 (Pa. Super. 2005)
(cleaned up).
Whether these offenses merge turns on Section 9765 of our
Sentencing Code, which provides:
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§ 9765. Merger of sentences
No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the
crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the
statutory elements of one offense are included in the
statutory elements of the other offense. Where crimes
merge for sentencing purposes, the court may sentence the
defendant only on the higher graded offense.
42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9765.
“The statute’s mandate is clear. It prohibits merger unless two
distinct facts are present: 1) the crimes arise from a single
criminal act; and 2) all of the statutory elements of one of the
offenses are included in the statutory elements of the other.”
Commonwealth v. Baldwin, … 985 A.2d 830, 833 ([Pa.] 2009).
Accord Commonwealth v. Wade, 33 A.3d 108 (Pa. Super.
2011) (holding Section 9765 prohibits merger of sentences unless
strict two-part test met).
Commonwealth v. Martinez, 153 A.3d 1025, 1030 (Pa. Super. 2016).
Here, it is undisputed that all of the elements of the misdemeanor-
graded terroristic threats offense are included within the felony-graded
offense. However, the record clearly reflects that Appellant made numerous
threats on several occasions on the day in question. Nevertheless, Appellant
argues that the separate charges in the amended criminal information filed by
the Commonwealth “involved identical conduct, and were based on the same
series of statements [Appellant] allegedly made over the course of the day.”
Appellant’s Brief at 29 (unnumbered page). Appellant also challenges the trial
court’s reliance on Commonwealth v. Petterson, 49 A.3d 903 (Pa. Super.
2012).
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Initially, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with two counts of the
felony-level grading of terroristic threats at counts 1 and 2.2 See Criminal
Information, 12/28/18, at 1. That criminal information stated, verbatim, as
follows:
COUNT 1 - TERRORISTIC THREATS - 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2706 (A1)-
(FELONY 3)
Person commits the crime of terroristic threats if the person
communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to commit any
crime of violence with intent to terrorize another; TO WIT: Actor
did state to UPMC hospital staff that, “For your sake I don’t
want what happened in Williamsport to happen here.”
Actor also stated to the staff, “I’ve spent five years in jail,
I’m not doing that again. I can’t control my temper and I
will start punching holes in the wall.” The staff said that
they feared for their lives causing UPMC to go on lock down
causing the hospital to divert from their normal operations.
Said offense occurring 1500 Highlands Drive, Warwick
Township, Lancaster, PA on November 20, 2018 at
approximately 1645 hours.
COUNT 2 -TERRORISTIC THREATS CAUSE SERIOUS PUBLIC
INCONV. - 18 PS 2706 (A)(3)-(FELONY 3)
Did communicate directly or indirectly, and caused serious public
inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such
terror or inconvenience; TO WIT: Actor did state to UPMC
hospital staff that, “For your sake I don’t want what
happened in Williamsport to happen here.” Actor also
stated to the staff, “I’ve spent five years in jail, I’m not
doing that again. I can’t control my temper and I will start
punching holes in the wall.” The staff said that they feared
for their lives causing UPMC to go on lock down causing the
hospital to divert from their normal operations. Said
offense occurring 1500 Highlands Drive, Warwick
Township, Lancaster, PA on November 20, 2018 at
approximately 1645 hours.
____________________________________________
2The Commonwealth also charged Appellant with disorderly conduct at count
3.
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Id. (emphasis in description added). The amended criminal information was
identical to the initial criminal information but for the addition of count 4,
which stated, verbatim:
COUNT 4 - TERRORISTIC THREATS - 18 PS 2706(A1) -
(MISDEMEANOR 1)
Did threaten to commit any crime of violence with the intent to
terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a building, place of
assembly, or facility of public transportation, or otherwise to cause
serious public inconvenience, or in reckless disregard of the risk
of causeing such terror or inconvenience; TO WIT: Actor did
state to UPMC hospital staff that, “For your sake I don't
want what happened in Williamsport to happen here.”
Actor also stated to the staff, “I've spent five years in jail,
I'm not doing that again. I can't control my temper and I
will start punching holes in the wall.” The staff said that
they feared for their lives causing UPMC to go on lock down
causing the hospital to divert from their normal operations.
Said offense occurring 1500 Highlands Drive, Warwick
Township, Lancaster, PA on November 20, 2018 at
approximately 1645 hours.
Amended Criminal Information, 5/17/19, at 2 (emphasis in description
added).
It is clear from the emphasized passages above that the factual basis
for all three terroristic threats offenses in the criminal information described
identical conduct by Appellant. The jury acquitted Appellant at count 2, and
convicted him at counts 1 and 4.3 As noted above, the trial court determined
that Appellant was convicted for separate criminal acts; however, there is no
____________________________________________
3 The jury was not charged with deciding Appellant’s guilt for disorderly
conduct. Thus, count 4 of the amended criminal information was presented
to the jury as count 3. For ease of disposition, we will continue to refer to
that charge as count 4. See Verdict Slip, 6/7/19, at 1.
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indication in the jury’s verdict slip that the conduct addressed by count 1 was
distinct from that of count 4. Id. The Commonwealth argues that no relief is
warranted, pointing to the fact the offense descriptions contained in the
amended criminal information contained multiple, distinct threats directed at
multiple victims. The Commonwealth, like the trial court, also relies on
Petterson.
In Petterson, the defendant broke into the victim’s house, found her in
her bedroom, hit her in the head with a hammer, and then dragged the victim
out of her room. Petterson, 49 A.3d at 906. Petterson “then stabbed her in
excess of ten (10) times in the chest and back area. He then placed a plastic
bag over her head and tried to suffocate her.” Id. at 906–07. The
Commonwealth ultimately charged Petterson with three counts of aggravated
assault and three corresponding counts of simple assault. Convinced that this
constituted one criminal episode, the magistrate dismissed two counts of
aggravated assault and two counts of simple assault. Id. at 907-08.
However, the Commonwealth refiled a criminal information,4 charging three
counts of each offense, for which Petterson was tried and convicted in the trial
court. Id. at 908.
On appeal, Petterson alleged that all of the charged assaults were part
of the same criminal episode. Id. at 911. The Petterson Court disagreed,
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4While the Petterson Court determined that the Commonwealth’s refiling of
charges violated Pa.R.Crim.P. 544, the Court held that the violation did not
warrant relief.
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concluding that Petterson had “engaged in at least three separate, criminal
acts, and that each individual act could independently fulfill the elements of
aggravated assault.” Id. at 912. The trial court had previously determined
that the three simple assaults merged with the three aggravated assaults for
sentencing purposes. Id. at 907. Notably, there was no discussion in
Petterson of the manner in which the separate assaults were described in
the criminal information.
We agree with Appellant that Petterson is not controlling here. The
question in that case was whether the Commonwealth could pursue separate
charges for each act in a series of assaults that occurred close in time. Here,
the Commonwealth charged Appellant with two counts of terroristic threats
for the entire series of threats issued by Appellant at count 1 and at count 2
under the felony grading, and for identical conduct at count 4. Count 4 thus
appears on its face to have been a lesser-included offense to either count 1 or
2, not a distinct offense addressing distinct conduct, just as Petterson was
charged separately with simple assault for each count of aggravated assault.
Nothing in the amended criminal information or in the jury’s verdict slip
suggests that counts 1 and 4 addressed distinct conduct. Moreover, we have
reviewed the trial court’s jury charge, and we cannot find any directions
suggesting that the jury could only consider separate acts for purposes of
ascertaining guilt at each count. See N.T., 6/7/19-6/9/19, 418-23.
Consequently, we agree with Appellant that his misdemeanor-graded
and felony-graded terroristic threats convictions should have merged for
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sentencing purposes, as count 4 was a lesser-included offense of count 1, both
were charged for identical conduct in the amended criminal information, and
nothing in the record suggests that the jury considered separate conduct as
the factual basis for each offense. The trial court therefore erred when it
imposed a separate, albeit concurrent sentence for the misdemeanor-graded
count of terroristic threats. Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s sentence for
the count of terroristic threats that was graded as a misdemeanor. Because
that sentence was concurrent to and shorter than the sentence imposed for
the felony-graded count of terroristic threats, we need not remand for
resentencing, as our disposition does not affect the sentencing scheme of the
trial court.
Conditions of Parole
In his final claim, Appellant argues that the trial court issued an illegal
sentence by imposing conditions on his state-level sentence, specifically, by
ordering him to have no contact with the victims, and banning him from UPMC
Pinnacle “as part of the sentence.” See N.T., 8/26/19, at 18. The trial court
construes the conditions as only advisory and, therefore, permissible. See
TCO at 9. The Commonwealth adopts the position of the trial court, and
contends that Appellant is not entitled to any form of relief. See
Commonwealth’s Brief at 20. We note that the conditions were not
memorialized in a written sentencing order. However, those conditions were
presented by the trial court in the recommendation section of its DC-300B
sentencing form. See Form DC-300B, 8/27/19, at 2.
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An issue concerning “the statutory authority for the imposition of a
condition of sentence … is a challenge to the legality of the sentence.
Challenges to an illegal sentence cannot be waived and may be reviewed sua
sponte by this Court.” Commonwealth v. Mears, 972 A.2d 1210, 1211 (Pa.
Super. 2009) (footnote omitted).
The scope and standard of review applied to determine the legality
of a sentence are well established. If no statutory authorization
exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject
to correction. An illegal sentence must be vacated. In evaluating
a trial court’s application of a statute, our standard of review is
plenary and is limited to determining whether the trial court
committed an error of law.
Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Leverette, 911 A.2d 998, 1001–02 (Pa.
Super. 2006)).
When a defendant is sentenced “to a maximum term of incarceration of
two or more years,” his or her “parole would be under the exclusive
supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“PBPP”) and
not the Court of Common Pleas.” Id. at 1212. “Therefore, any condition the
sentencing court purported to impose on” the defendant’s “state parole is
advisory only.” Id.
Here, the trial court and the Commonwealth both essentially concede
that the court was not permitted to set conditions on Appellant’s state
sentence beyond the minimum and maximum terms of incarceration.
Consistent with this concession, the DC-300B form filed by the court sets forth
the at-issue conditions merely as recommendations. However, it does appear
from the sentencing hearing that the trial court ordered the conditions as part
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of Appellant’s sentence. Thus, out of an abundance of caution, we vacate any
portion of the sentencing order that can be construed as setting mandatory
conditions on Appellant’s sentence or parole beyond the minimum and
maximum terms of incarceration. Again, no remand is necessary because this
does not affect the sentencing scheme of the trial court, which admits that it
only intended to recommend the conditions to the PBPP.
Judgment of sentence affirmed in part, vacated in part. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/18/2020
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