Com. v. Jones, B.

J-S52043-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
BRYHEIM JONES :
:
Appellant : No. 2469 EDA 2019
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 9, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0002968-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
BRYHEIM JONES :
:
Appellant : No. 2470 EDA 2019
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 9, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0002967-2017
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 04, 2020
Appellant, Bryheim Jones, appeals from the August 9, 2019, orders
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing his
first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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§§ 9541-9546, without an evidentiary hearing. After a careful review, we
affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: The
Commonwealth filed two Informations charging Appellant with numerous
crimes in connection with two separate shooting incidents. The cases were
consolidated and, on June 16, 2017, Appellant, who was represented by
counsel, entered a negotiated guilty plea.
Specifically, at docket number CP-51-CR-0002967-2017, Appellant pled
guilty to aggravated assault, robbery, and possession of a firearm prohibited.1
At docket number CP-51-CR-0002968-2017, Appellant pled guilty to
aggravated assault and possession of a firearm prohibited.2 In exchange, the
Commonwealth agreed to nolle pros all remaining charges.
At the June 16, 2017, guilty plea hearing, the following relevant
exchange occurred between the trial court and Appellant:
THE COURT: [Appellant], I understand you want to plead guilty
on two different cases before me. Both of them involve
aggravated assault as a felony of the first degree. They both also
involve violations of the Uniform Firearms Act, 6105,
misdemeanors of the first degree. And one of the matters has the
additional charge, robbery as a felony of the first degree. Is that
your understanding?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 3701(a)(1)(i), and 6105(a)(1), respectively.
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1) and 6105(a)(1), respectively.
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THE COURT: [Appellant], your attorney tells me she has gone over
both of these written guilty plea colloquies with you. Is that
accurate?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Did you understand everything in each document,
sir?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Is that why you signed both of them?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: [Appellant], I understand you went through the 11th
grade, and you’re 20 years of age?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you read, write, and understand the English
language?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Have you ever been treated for any mental health
issues?
[APPELLANT]: No.
THE COURT: Are you thinking clearly today?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Are you under the influence of any drugs or alcohol?
[APPELLANT]: No.
THE COURT: Have you taken any medication in the last week?
[APPELLANT]: No.
THE COURT: Do you understand, [Appellant], that if you wanted
to you could have gone to trial before a judge or a jury?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: And you would have been presumed to be innocent
until a verdict was reached?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: But by pleading guilty, you’ll lose the presumption of
innocence. So, I’ll most likely accept your pleas and then find you
guilty. Do you understand?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
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THE COURT: Has your attorney gone over the facts of each case
with you?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Has she explained to you the elements of all the
charges that I just descried you pleading guilty to?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you understand that you faced, in combination of
all five charges, up to 70 years in prison and up to $85,000 in
fines?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Now, sir, after you plead guilty and I eventually
sentence you today—well, in a couple weeks, you’ll be able to
appeal my sentence. But your appellate rights will be severely
limited, and you’re not likely to be successful in any future appeal.
Do you understand?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: That means the sentence that I will eventually
impose will most likely take effect, and the only thing that will
remain will be completing that sentence. Do you understand, sir?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: And that’s because you can only appeal a guilty plea
on three very limited grounds. The first of those three grounds is
called the voluntariness of your plea. So, that’s what I’m going to
ask you, sir. Are you pleading guilty of your own free will?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Has anybody forced or threatened you?
[APPELLANT]: No.
THE COURT: Did you make the final decision?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: You can see, [Appellant], why it’s so hard to win an
appeal on the first ground based on the responses you just gave
me on the record. Right?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
***
THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any questions at all of [your
defense counsel] or I [sic]?
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[APPELLANT]: No.
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with your lawyer’s representation
thus far?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Do either counsel know of any reason not to accept
these pleas?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor.
[ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Lastly, [Appellant], I understand that you have
negotiated a plea. And I’m going to accept the negotiation
[be]cause I know how hard your attorney worked to try to get a
reasonable sentence on these matters. It’s my information that
you’re going to get six to 20 years on the aggravated assaults on
each of them and the robbery. But I’m going to have all those
charges be served concurrently, or just one time. So, on
aggravated assault, robbery, and aggravated assault, your
sentence is going to be six to 20 years. Do you understand that?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Credit for time served, of course. On the violation of
the Uniform Firearms Act on each case, you’re going to get two-
and-a-half to five years. But that’s going to be consecutive to the
six to 20, which will make your total sentence eight-and-a-half to
25. Do you understand that?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: And, of course, you’ll get credit for time served.
Whatever time you’ve been in will come off the eight-and-a-half.
Understood?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: Is that the sentence you believe you negotiated?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
THE COURT: And you are willing to accept?
[APPELLANT]: Yes.
N.T., 6/16/17, at 6-10, 14-15.
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At the guilty plea hearing, the Commonwealth provided the factual basis
for the guilty pleas. Specifically, as to docket number CP-51-CR-0002967-
2017, on November 11, 2016, David Martin was on the streets of Philadelphia
attempting to purchase crack cocaine. Id. at 16. On Tioga Street, he
encountered Appellant and engaged in a conversation about buying crack
cocaine. Id. Appellant told Mr. Martin to go around the corner to Braddock
Street and wait for him between two parked cars. Id. at 17. Appellant met
Mr. Martin at the location, pistol-whipped him, and demanded his wallet. Id.
Appellant then took a few steps, turned back towards Mr. Martin, and shot
him three times in the stomach, as well as once in the arm. Id. Mr. Martin
required surgery, but he survived the shooting and identified Appellant from
a photo array. Id. at 17-18.
As to docket number CP-51-CR-0002968-2017, on November 13, 2016,
the police responded to the corner store on the 1900 block of East Tioga,
which is one block from the intersection of Tioga and Braddock Streets, for a
report of gunshots. Id. at 18-19. Video surveillance footage from the store
showed Appellant inside of the store and then outside of the store discharging
his firearm. Id. at 19. The video footage also showed Appellant aiming at a
specific individual and shooting him in the upper leg. Id. Appellant later
confessed to the police that he was the shooter in the video. Id. Furthermore,
the Commonwealth noted Appellant had a prior juvenile adjudication for
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aggravated assault, thus making him ineligible to possess a firearm. Id. at
20.
The trial court asked Appellant if the facts were “substantially correct,”
and Appellant responded affirmatively. Id. Appellant then entered his guilty
plea to each of the crimes indicated supra, and the trial court indicated it
would defer imposing the negotiated sentence so that Appellant could remain
at the local county prison to say goodbye to his family. Id. at 20-22. The
trial court asked Appellant if he wanted to “plead guilty for the negotiations,”
and Appellant responded affirmatively. Id. at 25-26.
Moreover, on this same date, Appellant executed written guilty plea
colloquies. Therein, Appellant indicated: “Nobody promised me anything or
threatened me or forced me to plead guilty. I, myself, have decided to plead
guilty.” Written Guilty Plea Colloquies, filed 6/16/17. Further, he indicated:
“I am satisfied with the advice and service I received from my lawyer. My
lawyer spent enough time on my case and I had enough time to talk with my
lawyer about the case. My lawyer left the final decision to me and I decided
myself to plead guilty.” Id.
On July 12, 2017, Appellant, who was represented by counsel, appeared
for the sentencing hearing. The trial court imposed the negotiated sentence
agreed upon by Appellant and the Commonwealth. Namely, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to six years to twenty years for each count of aggravated
assault and robbery; however, the trial court imposed the sentences
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concurrently. The trial court also sentenced Appellant to two-and-a-half to
five years for one count of possession of a firearm prohibited, with the
sentence to run consecutively to the other sentences imposed, and two-and-
a-half to five years for the other count of possession of a firearm prohibited,
with the sentence to run concurrently to the other sentences imposed. Thus,
the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of eight-and-a-half to 25 years
in prison. Appellant acknowledged this was the agreed upon sentence. N.T.,
7/12/17, at 10. The trial court provided Appellant with his post-sentence and
appeal rights.
Appellant filed neither a timely post-sentence motion nor a direct
appeal. However, on or about July 17, 2018, he filed a timely pro se PCRA
petition, and the PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA
petition.
On June 28, 2019, the PCRA court provided Appellant with notice of its
intent to dismiss the PCRA petition without an evidentiary hearing, and on
August 9, 2019, the PCRA court dismissed the petition. This timely, counseled
appeal followed.3 All Pa.R.A.P. 1925 requirements have been met.
On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following sole issue in his “Statement
of Question Involved” (verbatim):
I. Did the trial court err in denying the appellant an evidentiary
hearing when appellant asserted in his PCRA petition that trial
____________________________________________
3Appellant filed separate notices of appeal at each lower court docket number.
This Court consolidated the appeals.
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defense counsel coerced the appellant’s guilty plea thereby
rendering the appellant’s guilty plea involuntary?
Appellant’s brief at 2.
On appeal, Appellant claims his guilty plea was involuntarily entered and
coerced by defense counsel. Specifically, Appellant claims he pled guilty only
because defense counsel informed him that, if he proceeded to trial, she could
not effectively represent him. Appellant’s Brief at 6. He contends this
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, and the PCRA court erred in
failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue.
Initially, we note our standard of review is well settled. “When reviewing
the denial of a PCRA petition, we must determine whether the PCRA court’s
order is supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v.
Anderson, 234 A.3d 735, 737 (Pa.Super. 2020).
Appellant contends plea counsel was ineffective. “Allegations of
ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a
basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an
involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 A.2d 526,
531 (Pa.Super. 2007) (quotation marks and quotation omitted). To establish
ineffectiveness, a petitioner bears the burden of pleading and proving that
“(1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable
basis for h[er] action nor inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered actual
prejudice as a result.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 84 A.3d 294,
311 (2014).
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At a minimum, a plea colloquy must inform the defendant of: (1) the
nature of the charges; (2) the factual basis for the plea; (3) the right to be
tried by a jury; (4) the presumption of innocence; (5) the permissible range
of sentences; and (6) the fact that the judge is not bound by the terms of any
plea agreement. Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212 (Pa.Super.
2008). When the record clearly demonstrates that a guilty plea colloquy was
conducted, during which it becomes evident that the defendant understood
the nature of the charges against him, the voluntariness of the plea is
established. Commonwealth v. McCauley, 797 A.2d 920, 922 (Pa.Super.
2001).
Moreover:
The longstanding rule of Pennsylvania law is that a
defendant may not challenge his guilty plea by asserting that he
lied while under oath, even if he avers that counsel induced the
lies. A person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the
statements he makes in open court while under oath and he may
not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict
the statements he made at his plea colloquy.
***
A criminal defendant who elects to plead guilty has a duty
to answer questions truthfully. We [cannot] permit a defendant
to postpone the final disposition of his case by lying to the court
and later alleging that his lies were induced by the prompting of
counsel.
Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876, 881 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations
and quotation omitted).
In the case sub judice, we conclude Appellant has failed to demonstrate
that his plea was involuntary. At Appellant’s plea hearing, the trial court
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engaged in a colloquy with Appellant in which it discussed the above
requirements. See generally N.T., 6/16/17. See Bedell, supra (setting
forth minimum requirements). Furthermore, Appellant signed written guilty
plea colloquies confirming his understanding of these requirements.
Moreover, he indicated his understanding of the fact that, as a result of the
negotiated plea agreement, he would receive an aggregate sentence of eight-
and-a-half to 25 years in prison. Also, the trial court established that
Appellant was competent to enter into the plea.
More relevant to Appellant’s instant claim, Appellant affirmed that no
other promises or threats had been made to him. He indicated no one forced
him to plead guilty, and it was his decision to do so. He acknowledged that
he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation, and he had read and signed
the written guilty plea colloquies. In signing the written guilty plea colloquies,
Appellant affirmed that no one had promised him anything or threatened or
forced him to plead guilty. See Written Guilty Plea Colloquies, filed 6/16/17.
Additionally, he acknowledged he had sufficient time to confer with his
attorney, and the decision to plead guilty was his alone. See id.In light of the statements Appellant made on the record at his guilty
plea hearing, as well as in his written guilty plea colloquies, it is clear that his
plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Appellant is bound
by his statements, and he may not now assert grounds for withdrawal that
contradict the statements. See Turetsky, supra. Accordingly, there is no
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merit to Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and the PCRA court
did not err in denying the PCRA petition on this basis.
Finally, as it pertains to Appellant’s claim that the PCRA court erred in
denying his petition without an evidentiary hearing, we note “[t]here is no
absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on a PCRA petition, and if the PCRA
court can determine from the record that no genuine issues of material fact
exist, then a hearing is not necessary.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d
903, 906 (Pa.Super. 2008). In the case sub judice, the PCRA court properly
concluded that Appellant did not raise a genuine issue of material fact, and
the PCRA court did not otherwise abuse its discretion in failing to hold a
hearing.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/4/20
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