Leicht, D. v. Leicht, P.

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2017 PA Super 165DAVID LEE LEICHT IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
PATRICIA DENISE LEICHT
Appellee No. 1088 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered June 2, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Civil Division at No(s): 2010 FC 000182-2015
BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MAY 30, 2017
David Leicht (Husband) appeals from the order, entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of York County, granting in part and denying in part Patricia
Leicht’s (Wife) exceptions to the master’s report and recommendation.
Husband claims the trial court order requiring him to pay alimony indefinitely
was an abuse of discretion. After our review, we affirm.
The parties were married in 1988, and they separated in 2006. The
court entered a divorce decree on June 2, 2016. The parties have three
adult children, one of whom lives with Wife during college breaks and
summer.
Both parties were age 50 at the time of the hearing before the divorce
master, which was held on March 24, 2015. We summarize the master’s
findings as follows:
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Both parties graduated from York Technical School. Husband has
worked in manufacturing jobs since the mid-1980s, and works as a press
operator, earning approximately $44,000.00 gross income annually.
Husband has medical benefits through his employment, and he participates
in a 401(k) retirement plan. Husband is in good health. He lives in a two-
bedroom apartment with his girlfriend, where he pays rent of $550 each
month. Husband’s girlfriend pays utilities.
Mother is a certified Licensed Practical Nurse. Although she worked
until 2009, she suffered from a variety of mental issues throughout the
marriage. Her condition deteriorated in 2009, and she was hospitalized on
two occasions in 2010. She is currently being treated by a psychiatrist,
receives counseling regularly, and takes various medications to treat
anxiety, depression and various physical conditions, including congestive
heart failure and diabetes. Wife has been on disability for approximately
four years, and currently receives disability benefits in the amount of $1,117
per month (net of Medicare Part B premium of $105 per month). Wife also
receives $585.58 each month in spousal support. She lives in a one-
bedroom apartment and pays rent of $1,010 each month, including utilities.
Upon separation, the parties had minimal marital property. The
marital home went into foreclosure shortly after separation. The master
found Wife has no earning capacity at present and that her situation was
unlikely to change in the future. The master found no marital misconduct.
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The master recommended that Husband continue paying Wife $585.58
per month through September 30, 2016 (as alimony pendente lite, to
convert to alimony upon entry of final divorce decree on June 2, 2016). The
master also recommended Husband pay $600 towards Wife’s counsel fees,
payable in monthly installments of $50 over one year following entry of the
final divorce decree. In the report and recommendation, the master
suggested Wife consider subsidized housing and government benefits for
low-income and disabled persons, as well as a “representative payee” to
assist her in managing financially on her budget. Wife filed exceptions.
On August 26, 2015, the trial court granted Wife’s exceptions, in part,
and entered an order requiring Husband continue alimony payments to Wife
indefinitely. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(c) (“The court in ordering alimony
shall determine the duration of the order, which may be for a definite or an
indefinite period of time which is reasonable under the circumstances.”).
Husband appealed. He raises one issue for our review:
Did the trial judge abuse his discretion in reversing the
recommendation of the Divorce Master[,] who
recommended a limited period of alimony[,] and instead
imposed a lifetime obligation
Appellant’s Brief, at 2.
An award of alimony may be reversed “where there is an apparent
abuse of discretion or there is insufficient evidence to support the award.”
Balicki v. Balicki, 4 A.3d 654, 659 (Pa. Super. 2010), citing Jayne v.
Jayne, 663 A.2d 169 (Pa. Super. 1995).
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We previously have explained that the purpose of alimony is not
to reward one party and to punish the other, but rather to
ensure that the reasonable needs of the person who is unable to
support himself or herself through appropriate employment, are
met. Alimony is based upon reasonable needs in accordance
with the lifestyle and standard of living established by the parties
during the marriage, as well as the payor’s ability to pay.
Moreover, alimony following a divorce is a secondary remedy
and is available only where economic justice and the reasonable
needs of the parties cannot be achieved by way of an equitable
distribution award and development of an appropriate
employable skill.
In determining whether alimony is necessary, and in determining
the nature, amount, duration and manner of payment of
alimony, the court must consider numerous factors including the
parties’ earnings and earning capacities, income sources, mental
and physical conditions, contributions to the earning power of
the other, educations, standard of living during the marriage, the
contribution of a spouse as homemaker and the duration of the
marriage.
Teodorski v. Teodorski, 857 A.2d 194, 200 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal
citations, quotations and original emphasis omitted).
First, we point out that, contrary to Husband’s assertion, the trial
court’s order did not impose a lifetime obligation. The order may be
terminated or modified if “either party has a significant change in financial
circumstances.” Order, 8/26/15. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(e) (alimony
award “is subject to further order of the court upon changed circumstances
of either party of a substantial and continuing nature whereupon the order
may be modified, suspended, terminated or reinstituted or a new order
made.”). Additionally, although the master’s recommendations to Wife
were intended to assist her in improving her financial situation and
improving her budgetary shortfalls, we agree with the trial court that the
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recommendation is not consistent with the finding that Wife is currently, and
for the foreseeable future, disabled and unable to support herself. It is also
inconsistent with the overarching purpose of the Divorce Code, especially
with respect to alimony, which is to “effectuate economic justice between
the parties[.]”). See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3102(a)(6) (“[I]t is the policy of the
Commonwealth to: . . . (6) Effectuate economic justice between parties who
are divorced or separated and grant or withhold alimony according to the
actual need and ability to pay of the parties and insure a fair and just
determination and settlement of their property rights.”). Moreover, the fact
that Wife may be eligible for government-subsidized programs does not
eliminate Husband’s responsibility.
In Remick v. Remick, 456 A.2d 163 (Pa. Super 1983) (en banc), this
Court held that “the necessity and amount of permanent alimony should be
determined without regard to whether the dependent spouse would be
entitled to public assistance or other social welfare benefits[.]” Id. at 168.
There, husband and wife were married in 1950 and separated in 1968; the
case remained dormant until 1980, when husband amended his divorce
complaint to proceed under the new Divorce Code.1 Following a hearing
before a master, both parties filed exceptions. The trial court entered a
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1
Act of April 2, 1980, P.L. 63, No. 26. Notably, alimony did not come into
existence in Pennsylvania until the enactment of the 1980 Divorce Code.
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divorce decree and ordered husband to pay wife permanent alimony of
$80.00 per week. Id. at 165.
On appeal, this Court, noting that wife was receiving Social Security
disability benefits and living in subsidized housing, stated:
[Husband] argues rather unabashedly that the court erred in
awarding permanent alimony in any amount because, as he
asserts, [wife] does not lack sufficient property to provide for her
needs because of “the proliferation of governmental benefits to
which [wife] would be entitled if she were only to apply for the
same[.]” . . . It appears, therefore, that [husband] is suggesting
that [wife] would be eligible for public assistance benefits, and
other social welfare benefits, and therefore, does not need
alimony. We do not believe the Legislature enacted the alimony
provisions of the Divorce Code with the intent that the financial
welfare of a dependent spouse should devolve upon the
Commonwealth following divorce. . . . The purpose of social
welfare benefits is to subsidize whatever other resources a
recipient may have or may be entitled to and should be a last
resort, not a first one.
Id. at 168-69 (emphasis added).
Remick remains the law, and its principles are applicable here.
Because the trial court properly considered and applied the statutory factors,
see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(b)(1)-(17), and because we find the award is
supported by the record, we discern no abuse of discretion. Balicki, supra.Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/30/2017
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