The Adoption of: Z.D.C.-C., Appeal of: C.E.C.

J-S05003-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF: Z.D.C.-C., A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.E.C., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1133 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 2, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Orphans' Court at No(s):
29A IN ADOPTION 2022
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF: F.M.C., A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.E.C., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1134 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 2, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Orphans' Court at No(s):
29 IN ADOPTION 2022
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: APRIL 3, 2023
C.E.C. (Mother or Appellant) filed appeals from the decrees entered on
September 2, 2022, that granted the petitions filed by the Erie County Office
of Children and Youth (Agency) to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental
rights to her minor children, F.M.C. (born in July of 2020), and Z.D.C.-C. (born
J-S05003-23
in June of 2021) (collectively Children).1 Following our review, we affirm the
decrees on appeal.2
The trial court set forth an extensive factual and procedural history of
this case in its opinion that provided the background of this case, which began
shortly after F.M.C. was born, when it was determined that his umbilical cord
tested positive for THC and methamphetamines. The court discussed the
evidence presented at each of the hearings held over the course of the case,
including five adjudication and dispositional hearings that began in February
of 2021 after F.M.C. was removed from Mother’s care. When Z.D.C.-C. was
born, he was immediately removed from Mother’s care. The court’s opinion
includes information about Mother’s cooperation or lack thereof with
submitting to drug testing, her inability to maintain adequate housing and
employment, and her continued contact with Father, who subjected Mother to
domestic violence.
The Agency filed the termination petitions in June of 2022, and the
involuntary termination trial (IVT) was held on August 31, 2022. Both Mother
and Father were represented by counsel, as were the Children. The court’s
opinion listed all the individuals who testified and provided extensive
____________________________________________
1M.D.C.’s (Father) parental rights to the Children were also terminated on the
same date as Mother’s rights were terminated; however, Father did not file
appeals.
2 This Court consolidated Mother’s two appeals sua sponte by order dated
November 8, 2022, in that they involve related parties and issues. See
Pa.R.A.P. 513.
-2-
J-S05003-23
information relating to each witness’s testimony. The witnesses included John
Drozdowski, a police officer from the Millcreek Police Department, and Andrew
Hayes, a police officer from Erie County. Additionally, the court heard
testimony from Tiffany Walker, a house manager at Mercy Center, Lindsey
Miller, a case manager at Mercy Center, Kristina Szczesny, another case
manager, Lisa Kobusinski, an employee with Project First Step, a parental
program with Erie Homes for Children and Adults, and Agela Leggett, a case
aid for the Agency. The court also heard testimony from Mother. Based upon
the testimony and the exhibits submitted into evidence, the court determined
that the Agency had demonstrated that Mother’s parental rights should be
terminated and that the termination was in the Children’s best interests.
Mother filed timely notices of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i)
and (b). On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review:
A. Whether the Orphans’ Court committed an error of law and/or
abused its discretion when it concluded that termination of
parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8)?
B. Whether the Orphans’ Court committed an error of law and/or
abused its discretion when it concluded that termination of
parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(b)?
Mother’s brief at 3.
We review an order terminating parental rights in accordance with the
following standard:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating
parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the
-3-
J-S05003-23
decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence.
Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient
evidentiary support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must
stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily
terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing
judge’s decision the same deference that we would give to a jury
verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the
record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is
supported by competent evidence.
In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879
A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005)). Moreover, we have explained that:
The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as
testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
Id. at 276 (quoting In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super.
2003)). The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and
resolve conflicts in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super.
2004). If competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm
even if the record could also support the opposite result. In re Adoption of
T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental
rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The
party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds
for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
-4-
J-S05003-23
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511,
other citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination
of parental rights are valid. R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276.
With regard to our review, we note that the court’s opinion set forth the
applicable standard of review and the portions of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), (8) and (b), which it found were applicable to this matter. Moreover,
the court’s opinion discussed the facts it found credible, which supported its
findings and conclusions. Specifically, the court stated:
In the instant case, the record demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that the termination of Appellant’s parental
rights was proper as Appellant failed to alleviate the conditions
that led to the [C]hildren’s removal. In fact, the record is replete
with evidence that Appellant spent more time trying to deceive
the people that were trying to help than she did recognizing and
alleviating the circumstances that brought her [C]hildren into the
care of the Agency.
Even at the time of the IVT trial, Appellant was still unable
and unwilling to admit her need for drug treatment or
acknowledge her positive drug tests were a result of her drug use.
The common theme throughout this dependency action was
Appellant’s inability to take responsibility for anything. Appellant’s
behaviors became more erratic throughout the life of the case as
her manipulation tactics began to fall flat with the [c]ourt and her
service providers. The [c]ourt has no doubt that had Appellant
spent [more] time working her treatment plan than [she] spent
calculating ways to manipulate her drug testing and the people
-5-
J-S05003-23
around her[,] this case would have had a completely different
outcome.
While there are clearly discrepancies between Appellant’s
drug test results at Esper and the Mercy Center, this [c]ourt has
no doubt as to the accuracy of Appellant’s positive
methamphetamine tests. The evidence in this matter speaks for
itself. Appellant’s known drug of choice is methamphetamine[;]
in fact she used it while pregnant with both [C]hildren. She had
no choice [but] to admit to using methamphetamine while
pregnant with F.M.C. after his umbilical cord tested positive for
the substance. Then[,] despite being open with the Agency and
having F.M.C. removed from her care, she again used
methamphetamine while pregnant with Z.D.C.-C. Yet she expects
the [c]ourt to believe she only used the substance while pregnant
and any positive urine tests since then were caused by her inhaler.
Additionally, the items located in Appellant’s room, i.e., rolling
papers next to white powder, aluminum foil with burn marks and
residue and hollowed out pens, are all familiar to this [c]ourt as
paraphernalia associated with drug use.
Appellant’s actions demonstrate her willingness to use
manipulation tactics to control the results of her drug tests. First,
due to the discrepancies in her urine testing[,] Appellant was
given the opportunity to submit to hair follicle testing, which she
should have jumped at to demonstrate her sobriety, yet the record
reflects otherwise. When Ms. Miller informed Appellant about the
hair follicle testing, she credibly testified Appellant became upset
and erratic. Instead of immediately getting the test done,
Appellant spent the next several days avoiding Ms. Szczesny.
Appellant then got a short reprieve when she was unable to leave
the Mercy Center due to a quarantine. As soon as the quarantine
period ended, Appellant bleached her hair and continued to avoid
contact from Ms. Miller and Ms. Szczesny. When confronted by
Ms. Miller on January 24th, Appellant still avoided the subject[,]
stating she will get the follicle testing done on January 27th,
fourteen (14) days after it was ordered by the Court.
Next, the [c]ourt notes Ms. Miller’s credible testimony
regarding Appellant’s avoidance tactics when asked to produce a
urine [sample] on March 16th. In this instance, the record reflects
Appellant attempted to deflect and avoid the testing:
-6-
J-S05003-23
Stating she could not pee, [s]aying that she needed
to go out for a smoke, [t]here was some water
drinking. During this time the house manager
followed her around and supervised her for the course
of a couple of hours in order to get a urine [sample].
And at this point in time there [were] some red flag
concerns about that avoidance behavior. [Appellant]
was observed to be reaching into her pockets in a
discreet manner trying to rearrange or grab
something from her pockets during this outside smoke
break.
N.T. at 94-96. Eventually, Appellant did provide a urine [sample]
and the cup was noted to be cold to the touch causing staff to
believe she dipped it in the toilet water to dilute it. The following
morning Appellant was woken up so that staff could obtain her
urine first thing to avoid tampering, and presumably use of her
inhaler. Appellant’s urine test was positive for methamphetamine.
Finally, after Appellant was discharged from the Mercy
Center, Ms. Miller located a bag of urine in Appellant’s coat pocket.
Ms. Kobusinski credibly testified that Appellant told her she
purchased the bag of urine to beat her drug test because she had
used a vape pen containing marijuana. Not only is this an
example of another manipulation tactic on Appellant’s part, but it
also contradicts her testimony at the IVT trial. Specifically,
Appellant described to the [c]ourt that it would be impossible to
bring urine into Esper to beat a urine test. Clearly, she did not
believe that to be true or she would not have purchased a bag of
urine to ensure a negative drug test for marijuana.
Ultimately[,] Appellant’s lack of accountability for her
actions makes it impossible for her to do anything but work a
treatment plan on the surface. Without acknowledging her drug
use, need for treatment, and [the] danger her relationship with
Father poses to her and the C]hildren[,] Appellant will never be
able to alleviate the circumstances that led to the [C]hildren’s
dependency. Therefore, the record supports the [court’s]
termination of Appellant’s parental rights under [23] Pa.C.S.[] §
2511 (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5) and (a)(8).
Likewise, the record supports the [court’s] finding that
terminating Appellant’s parental rights was in the best interest of
the [C]hildren under [23] Pa.C.S.[] § 2511 (b). Ms. Szczesny
-7-
J-S05003-23
testified the [C]hildren were both doing well in their foster home
and were bonded with the foster parents. The testimony
established F.M.C. has collectively only spent seven (7) out of the
twenty-four (24) months of his life in Appellant’s care and Z.D.C.-
C. has been in foster care since his birth, except for his short stay
at the Mercy Center.
While F.M.C. may very well have a bond with Appellant, the
record reflects he has a strong bond with his foster parents, who
are able to keep him safe. In fact, Ms. Szczesny credibly testified
F.M.C. transitioned right back into the care of his foster parents
after he was removed from the Mercy Center. Additionally, she
testified F.M.C. has demonstrated the most stability she has seen
since his visits with Appellant stopped.
As noted by the [C]hildren[’]s legal counsel[,] Appellant[’]s
inability to stop using drugs and maintain safe living conditions
while she was in a supervised capacity at the Mercy Center speaks
volumes for her overall ability to keep [the Children] safe outside
of a controlled environment. Ultimately, Appellant’s inability to
keep the [C]hildren safe and secure outweighs any bond she may
have with them. (See In re G.M.S., 193 A.3d 395, 401 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (“In addition to a bond examination, the trial court
can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should
also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security,
and stability the child might have with the foster parent.”).
Therefore, the [c]ourt found the termination of Appellant’s rights
was in the [C]hildren’s best interest … so that they could obtain
permanency.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/31/2022, at 34-36.
Based upon the facts found by the trial court that our review reveals are
supported by the evidence of record, we discern no abuse of discretion in its
conclusion that the asserted grounds for seeking termination of parental rights
are valid and that terminating Mother’s parental rights would best serve the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the Children.3
____________________________________________
3 We further observe that the attorney representing the Children filed a brief
in support of the trial court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights.
-8-
J-S05003-23
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decrees terminating Mother’s parental
rights to the Children.
Decrees affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/3/2023
-9-