Com. v. Coudriet, S.

J-S42044-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SHAWN RICHARD COUDRIET :
:
Appellant : No. 527 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 5, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-20-CR-0000878-2019
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: April 12, 2023
Shawn Richard Coudriet appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following an open guilty plea in which Coudriet pleaded guilty to
burglary and aggravated indecent assault.1 For these two offenses, in addition
to being adjudicated a sexually violent predator, Coudriet was aggregately
sentenced to 120 to 240 months of incarceration. Despite Coudriet filing a pro
se notice of appeal and concise statement of matters complained of on appeal,
Coudriet’s counsel, appointed post-notice, has filed a petition to withdraw
from representation and a corresponding brief pursuant to Anders v.
California. See 386 U.S. 783 (1967). After an exhaustive review of the
record, we affirm Coudriet’s judgment of sentence and additionally grant
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 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)(i) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a)(2),
respectively.
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counsel's petition to withdraw.
As best that can be discerned, Coudriet pleaded guilty to an incident in
2019 wherein he unlawfully entered a residence in Meadville, Pennsylvania,
and thereafter, inter alia, forcibly placed his fingers in the genitals of the
victim. That victim happened to be the girlfriend of Coudriet’s brother.
Stemming from this event, Coudriet was charged with ten criminal offenses,
ranging from burglary to simple assault and harassment.
Although Coudriet was represented by the Crawford County Public
Defender’s Office at or around the time that he waived his preliminary hearing,
Coudriet subsequently requested to proceed pro se, which the lower court
allowed. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/25/22, at 1 n.1 (“Coudriet was permitted
to proceed without representation following a competency and Grazier-type
hearing [see 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998)] held on May 11, 2020. A competency
examination was ordered and filed on January 1, 2021[.]”). Notwithstanding
his desire to proceed pro se, standby counsel2 provided at least some level of
assistance to Coudriet in him pleading guilty to the two above-mentioned
crimes, with the court ordering a nolle prosequi of the remaining charges.
Following sentencing, Coudriet filed, pro se, a timely notice of appeal
and later, while still pro se, submitted a statement of matters complained of
on appeal. Several weeks after these filings, the court appointed him with
counsel. The relevant parties complied with their respective obligations under
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2 Coudriet’s standby counsel was the same attorney now representing him in
the present matter.
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Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925, and accordingly, this matter
is ripe for review.3
Prior to any substantive consideration of appellate issues that may be
present, we must first consider counsel’s petition to withdraw. See
Commonwealth v. Garang, 9 A.3d 237, 240 (Pa. Super. 2010). By its very
nature, an Anders brief signals counsel’s belief that the current appeal is
frivolous. As such, to withdraw from representation, counsel must avail
himself or herself of a well-defined set of procedures. Specifically, counsel is
required to:
(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after
making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
determined the appeal would be frivolous;
(2) file a brief referring to any issues that might arguably support
the appeal, but which does not resemble a no-merit letter; and
(3) furnish a copy of the brief to the defendant and advise him of
his right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any
additional points [counsel] deems worthy of this Court's attention.
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 906 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(citation omitted). In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa.
2009), our Supreme Court expounded upon the necessary components of an
Anders brief, mandating that counsel:
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3 As discussed, infra, the court’s opinion is responsive to Coudriet’s pro se
concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, finding all three issues
Coudriet has raised to be either unmeritorious or incoherent. See Trial Court
Opinion, 5/25/22, at 2-4.
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(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record;
(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
supports the appeal;
(3) set forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and
(4) state counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Id., at 361. If there is compliance with Anders, this Court must then “conduct
a simple review of the record to ascertain if there appear on its face to be
arguably meritorious issues that counsel, intentionally or not, missed or
misstated.” Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super.
2018) (en banc).
After delving into counsel's submissions, we conclude that there has
been satisfactory compliance with Anders. First, the petition to withdraw4
establishes that in addition to counsel’s “active involvement as standby
counsel[,]” counsel performed a “conscientious examination of the record” and
concluded that Coudriet’s appeal would be “frivolous.” Petition to Withdraw
as Legal Counsel, 10/29/22, at 7. Second, counsel's Anders brief substantially
conforms to the dictates of Santiago. Inter alia, the brief contains a well-
developed summary of this matter’s facts and procedural history. See Anders
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4 We note that on October 24, 2022, this Court issued an order requiring
counsel to file a petition to withdraw as counsel that was separate from the
Anders brief. Counsel complied with this directive on November 1, 2022.
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Brief, at 7-11. Third, counsel has included a copy of the letter that he sent to
Coudriet, which evinces counsel's clear intention to withdraw from
representation and, too, informs Coudriet of his right to either seek new
counsel or proceed pro se.5 See Petition to Withdraw as Legal Counsel,
10/29/22, at 14. As the technical requirements of Anders have been met, we
review the brief’s contents to ascertain the frivolousness of any issues counsel
has raised. Following that analysis, we independently review the record to
establish whether Coudriet’s appeal is without merit in all other capacities.
In the Anders brief, while acknowledging that Coudriet suffers from
mental health issues, it explicitly states that “undersigned counsel does not
believe that there are any issues that support an appeal.” Anders Brief, at 5
(stating further that Coudriet underwent “three competency examinations …
[which] indicated that [he] was competent to stand trial[]”). The Anders brief
then details the facts underpinning Coudriet’s convictions, the very facts that
Coudriet inherently assented to by entering into both a written and oral guilty
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5 Coudriet has filed at least three pro se responses to counsel’s Anders brief.
However, the contents of these responses are, at times, unintelligible. See,
e.g., Brief of Appellant, 12/10/22, at 1 (“I was born noticeably genetically
advanced. Exturnally [sic] positive electromagnetic most are all inturnal [sic].
This has lead [sic] to medical extortions that have been harmful with sexual
depositions and various forms of idenity [sic] thieft [sic] and misreputations
[sic].”) (unnecessary capitalization omitted). However, later in that same
filing, Coudriet states that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his
convictions because of police misconduct. See id., at 4. Moreover, Coudriet
asserts that his guilty plea was unlawfully induced due to his innocence. See
id.
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plea.
As Coudriet entered into a guilty plea, the Anders brief addresses the
limited bases from which a plea-taking appellant can appeal. In so doing, the
brief comprehensively compares those discrete precepts with Coudriet’s case
and finds that there is no arguable merit to anything that Coudriet could seek
on appellate review.
“The entry of a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all defenses and
defects except claims of lack of jurisdiction, invalid guilty plea, and illegal
sentence.” Commonwealth v. Messmer, 863 A.2d 567, 571 (Pa. Super.
2004); see also Commonwealth v. Roden, 730 A.2d 995, 997 n.2 (Pa.
Super. 1999) (“Upon entry of a guilty plea, a defendant generally waives all
defects and defenses except those concerning the validity of the plea, the
jurisdiction of the trial court, and the legality of the sentence imposed.”).
Going in the order as discussed in the Anders brief, counsel quotes the
relevant portions of Coudriet’s guilty plea colloquy and concludes that said
plea was “voluntarily and understandingly made.” Anders Brief, at 10-11.
Moreover, counsel emphasizes that there is nothing apparent in the plea
colloquy, or anywhere else in the record, to establish that Coudriet was
unlawfully induced to enter the plea. See id., at 11.
To the extent that there is any validity to a claim that Coudriet was
somehow induced into taking a plea,
[a] defendant wishing to challenge the voluntariness of a guilty
plea on direct appeal must either object during the plea colloquy
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or file a motion to withdraw the plea within ten days of sentencing.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)(i). Failure to employ either
measure results in waiver. Commonwealth v. Tareila, 895 A.2d
1266, 1270 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2006). Historically, Pennsylvania
courts adhere to this waiver principle because “[i]t is for the court
which accepted the plea to consider and correct, in the first
instance, any error which may have been committed.”
Commonwealth v. Roberts, [352 A.2d 140, 141 (Pa. Super.
1975)] (holding that common and previously condoned mistake of
attacking guilty plea on direct appeal without first filing petition to
withdraw plea with trial court is procedural error resulting in
waiver; stating, “(t)he swift and orderly administration of criminal
justice requires that lower courts be given the opportunity to
rectify their errors before they are considered on appeal”; “Strict
adherence to this procedure could, indeed, preclude an otherwise
costly, time consuming, and unnecessary appeal to this court”).
Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609–10 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Here, there is no evidence that Coudriet objected to the plea during
either the oral or written colloquy. See, e.g., Plea Hearing, 6/2/21, at 13-15
(demonstrating Coudriet’s acquiescence to the charges he pleaded guilty to
by stating that he was entering the plea of his own free will, that he was not
threatened or coerced in any way, and that he engaged in the illicit activities
leading to his convictions). Furthermore, as the lower court writes, “[Coudriet]
did not file a post-sentence motion.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/25/22, at 2
(signaling the absence of a specific motion to withdraw the plea). Therefore,
Coudriet failed to properly preserve this issue and has waived review of such
a contention on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Tukhi, 149 A.3d 881, 888
(Pa. Super. 2016) (“An issue that is waived is frivolous.”).
Next, the Anders brief discusses the legality of the sentences that were
imposed, which resulted in an aggregate incarceration term of ten-to-twenty
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years. The brief states that Coudriet’s burglary charge was a first-degree
felony, carrying a statutory maximum sentence of twenty years, and his
aggravated indecent assault conviction, a second-degree felony, featured a
maximum incarceration term of ten years. Individually, the sentences were
imposed as two consecutive terms of five-to-ten years.
A challenge to the legality of a sentence:
is essentially a claim that the trial court did not have jurisdiction
to impose the sentence that it handed down.... A trial court
ordinarily has jurisdiction to impose any sentence which is within
the range of punishments which the legislature has authorized for
the defendant's crimes.
Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 960 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations
omitted).
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103(1) provides that, except as it relates to second or
subsequent offenses, first-degree felonies carry a maximum term of
incarceration of “not more than 20 years.” In addition, second-degree felonies
carry a maximum term of “not more than ten years.” Id., at § 1103(2).
Consequently, the constituent parts of Coudriet’s aggregate sentence do not
exceed the maximum incarceration terms allowable by statute. There is also
nothing evident of record to suggest any other legality of sentence issues. As
such, any appeal challenging the legality of his aggregate sentence would be
frivolous.
As to jurisdiction, the Anders brief notes that the subject incident, filing
of the criminal complaint, guilty plea/conviction, and sentencing all occurred
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in Crawford County, Pennsylvania. “As such, … Crawford County, Pennsylvania
had proper jurisdiction over [Coudriet’s] case.” Anders Brief, at 12.
“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction exists when the court is competent to hear
the case and the defendant has been provided with a formal and specific notice
of the crimes charged. [A] court's competency hinges upon a demonstration
that a criminal act occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.”
Commonwealth v. Jones, 929 A.2d 205, 208 (Pa. 2007). There is no
evidence that Coudriet did not receive a formal and specific notice of the
charges that were filed against him via criminal complaint. Coudriet appears
to have been present at all critical stages leading up until the point in which
he entered into the guilty plea, so any claim on jurisdictional grounds is
patently frivolous. In addition, the very language of Coudriet’s plea establishes
that the crimes he committed occurred within Crawford County.
Finally, to the extent Coudriet could attempt to raise an ineffective
assistance of counsel argument, the Anders brief succinctly states that
Coudriet “chose voluntarily to represent himself in this case.” Anders Brief,
at 12. To that point, it is obvious that one cannot raise an ineffective
assistance of counsel argument against oneself, which makes any claim in this
domain meritless.
Independent of the later-filed Anders brief, the trial court, in its opinion,
addressed the issues raised in Coudriet’s pro se statement of matters
complained of on appeal. In that statement, Coudriet presented three
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arguments for appellate review, with the first seemingly suggesting that the
evidence was insufficient to convict him.6
Unfortunately, Coudriet waived his ability to seek review of such a
contention by assenting to the guilty plea. See Commonwealth v.
Rounsley, 717 A.2d 537, 539 (Pa. Super. 1998) (“It is well established that
any issue relating to sufficiency of the evidence is waived by entry of a guilty
plea[.]”). Accordingly, there is no merit to any of the issues he attempted to
raise in a pro se capacity.
Pursuant to Anders, we have independently reviewed the record to
uncover other non-frivolous issues. However, this review has provided nothing
legally viable for Coudriet to have pursued on appeal.
As we have found no non-frivolous issues and further see no merit to
anything explored in the Anders brief, we grant counsel's petition to withdraw
and affirm Coudriet’s judgment of sentence.
Petition to withdraw from representation granted. Judgment of sentence
affirmed.
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6 Despite giving wide latitude to his writings, we agree with the lower court’s
conclusion that the other two matters are not able to be understood. See,
e.g., Statement of Matters … Complain[ed] of on Appeal, at 2 (“(3) Aiding
prisoner’s dangerous to society in extortive release by harm. Never came to
be now, advanced genetically to all things. Genetic weponization [sic] as law
is inefficient for the criminal capacity. Errored this way. People as we were
home invaded.”) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/12/2023
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