Com. v. Dickson, J.

J-S04009-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMES ELIJAH DICKSON :
:
Appellant : No. 803 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 2, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004796-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004797-2016, CP-51-CR-0004798-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004799-2016, CP-51-CR-0004800-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004801-2016, CP-51-CR-0004802-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMES ELIJAH DICKSON :
:
Appellant : No. 804 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 2, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004796-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004797-2016, CP-51-CR-0004798-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004799-2016, CP-51-CR-0004800-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004801-2016, CP-51-CR-0004802-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMES ELIJAH DICKSON :
:
Appellant : No. 805 EDA 2022
J-S04009-23
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 2, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004796-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004797-2016, CP-51-CR-0004798-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004799-2016, CP-51-CR-0004800-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004801-2016, CP-51-CR-0004802-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMES ELIJAH DICKSON :
:
Appellant : No. 806 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 2, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004796-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004797-2016, CP-51-CR-0004798-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004799-2016, CP-51-CR-0004800-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004801-2016, CP-51-CR-0004802-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMES ELIJAH DICKSON :
:
Appellant : No. 807 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 2, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004796-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004797-2016, CP-51-CR-0004798-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004799-2016, CP-51-CR-0004800-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004801-2016, CP-51-CR-0004802-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
-2-
J-S04009-23
:
:
JAMES ELIJAH DICKSON :
:
Appellant : No. 808 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 2, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004796-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004797-2016, CP-51-CR-0004798-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004799-2016, CP-51-CR-0004800-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004801-2016, CP-51-CR-0004802-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAMES ELIJAH DICKSON :
:
Appellant : No. 809 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 2, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004796-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004797-2016, CP-51-CR-0004798-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004799-2016, CP-51-CR-0004800-2016,
CP-51-CR-0004801-2016, CP-51-CR-0004802-2016
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED APRIL 20, 2023
In these consolidated appeals, James Elijah Dickson (Appellant) appeals
pro se from the orders dismissing his first petition filed pursuant to the Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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This Court previously recited the underlying facts:
During the evening of April 16, 2016, [Appellant] was
hanging out at the home of his cousin, Alphonso Liverpool. Also
at the home were Ziyon Laboy, Levi Almonte, Joel Almonte, Edwin
Laboy, and Christine Chromiak [(Chromiak)]. At some point, the
group decided to walk over to [Appellant’s] home at 637 East
Westmoreland Street in Philadelphia. Along the way, they ran into
Kenny Stowe [(Stowe)]. [Appellant] told Liverpool that he did not
want Stowe to come over, and threatened that if Stowe did, he
would kill Stowe and Liverpool. However, Stowe remained
persistent about going to [Appellant’s] home with the group, so
[Appellant] eventually relented and allowed Stowe to come over.
Once at the home, the group ate, drank alcohol, and smoked
marijuana and PCP. Stowe began to argue with [Appellant], so
[Appellant] ejected Stowe from his home; however, [Appellant]
allowed Stowe to return approximately twenty minutes later.
Once Stowe returned, he again argued with [Appellant],
prompting [Appellant] to eject Stowe from his home a second
time; however, like before, [Appellant] allowed Stowe to
eventually reenter the home.
At some point, a transgender individual came over, and
[Appellant] went upstairs with the individual. After the individual
left, Stowe told [Appellant] to “stop messing with boys,” and called
[Appellant] a faggot. [Appellant] then told Liverpool to get Stowe
out of his home, or he would kill them both. At the time,
[Appellant] had a shotgun in his hand and proceeded to point it in
Liverpool’s direction and pull the trigger; however, it was not
loaded. [Appellant] then asked Liverpool and Joel Almonte to
come upstairs with him, and there, Almonte admitted to unloading
the shotgun earlier that evening because he felt unsafe in the
home with the loaded gun. Almonte then went back downstairs,
but Liverpool remained upstairs with [Appellant]. While the pair
was upstairs, [Appellant] told Liverpool that the people downstairs
were trying to kill him. Liverpool tried to convince [Appellant]
otherwise, and eventually told him that he would go downstairs to
see what was going on. Once downstairs, Liverpool warned Stowe
that they had to leave immediately, but Stowe refused to leave,
so Liverpool left alone.
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After Liverpool left, [Appellant] walked down the stairs with
the shotgun, and shot Stowe, who was standing in the living room,
in the head. Ziyon Laboy ran to the door; however, before he
escaped, [Appellant] shot him twice in the arm. [Appellant] next
shot Edwin Laboy [(Laboy)], who was also in the living room at
the time, in the head. After seeing [Appellant] shoot [] Laboy,
Levi Almonte made his escape through the front door. Joel
Almonte and [] Chromiak ran into the kitchen and hid in two
different corners. [Appellant] followed the pair into the kitchen
with the shotgun in his hands, and eventually pointed the gun at
Almonte. Almonte thereafter smacked the gun and ran away from
the scene. After Almonte escaped, [Appellant] shot Chromiak
three times.
After the shootings concluded, [Appellant] called 911. While
he remained on the line with the authorities, he barricaded himself
in his home when police arrived. Police therefore secured the
perimeter and called in the SWAT team. While members of the
SWAT team were on the roof of [Appellant’s] home, [Appellant]
shot through the roof at them. Eventually, [Appellant] exited his
home without incident and was taken into custody. Once
[Appellant] had left the home, officers entered the premises and
found the bodies of Stowe, [] Laboy, and Chromiak. In addition,
police recovered numerous spent shotgun casings and a
camouflage-printed shotgun at the scene, as well as unspent
shotgun casings on [Appellant’s] person.
Commonwealth v. Dickson, 216 A.3d 413 (Pa. Super. 2019) (unpublished
memorandum at 1-4) (citation omitted).
The Commonwealth charged Appellant with numerous crimes at seven
separate dockets. The case proceeded to a non-jury trial in May 2017.
Attorneys Wendy Ramos and Mythri Jayaraman (Trial Counsel) represented
Appellant. The trial court found Appellant guilty of four counts of simple
assault; three counts of first-degree murder; two counts each of attempted
murder, aggravated assault on a police officer, aggravated assault, and
recklessly endangering another person; and one count each of persons not to
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possess a firearm and possession of an instrument of crime. On May 24, 2017,
the trial court sentenced Appellant to three consecutive terms of life
imprisonment. Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions, which the trial
court denied.
Appellant filed a direct appeal, and this Court affirmed the judgment of
sentence. Dickson, supra. Appellant did not petition the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court for allowance of appeal. The PCRA court explained:
On August 23, 2019, [Appellant timely] filed a pro se “Motion for
a New Trial on the Ground of After-Discovered Evidence,” which
the court deemed to be a petition (“Initial Petition”) under the …
PCRA[]. [See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516,
521 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“any petition filed after the judgment of
sentence becomes final will be treated as a PCRA petition.”
(citation omitted)).] On November 20, 2019, [Appellant] filed a
motion to proceed pro se. The court held a Grazier[1] hearing on
January 17, 2020, and granted [Appellant’s] motion to proceed
pro se.
On November 23, 2020, [Appellant] filed an amended PCRA
petition…. Apparently having changed his mind about
representing himself, [Appellant] filed a motion for appointment
of counsel on April 26, 2021. However, at a video hearing on July
9, 2021, [Appellant] withdrew his request for counsel. On October
4, 2021, [Appellant] filed a supplemental amended PCRA
petition….
____________________________________________
1 See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81, 82 (Pa. 1998) (“When a
waiver of the right to counsel is sought at the post-conviction and appellate
stages, an on-the-record determination should be made that the waiver is a
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary one.”); cf. Pa.R.Crim.P. 904(C) (providing
“when an unrepresented defendant satisfies the judge that the defendant is
unable to afford or otherwise procure counsel, the judge shall appoint counsel
to represent the defendant on the defendant’s first petition for post-conviction
collateral relief.”).
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PCRA Court Opinion, 5/10/22, at 4 (original footnotes omitted; one footnote
added).
On December 14, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss
Appellant’s PCRA petition on the basis that the claims lacked merit or were
waived. Motion to Dismiss, 12/14/21. The Commonwealth also averred:
On July 16, 2021, in response to [Appellant’s] discovery motion,
the Commonwealth provided [Appellant] by mail: (1) two [crime]
scene photographs taken by personnel from the [Philadelphia]
medical examiner’s office, and (2) criminal histories of decedents
[] Laboy, [] Chromiak, and [] Stowe.
Id. at 2 (citing Commonwealth’s correspondence, Exhibit “A”); see also id.at 5 n.1 (explaining Exhibit “A” consisted of “two photographs depicting the
folded knife referenced in the medical examiner crime scene notes”).
On December 20, 2021, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice
of intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. Appellant did not
respond. The court dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition on March 2, 2022.
On March 10, 2022, Appellant timely filed seven notices of
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appeal at each of the seven trial court dockets.2 This Court consolidated the
appeals sua sponte. On March 16, 2022, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to
file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.
The order cautioned Appellant that “any issues not contained in a concise
statement of errors … will be deemed to have been waived.” Order, 3/16/22
(some capitalization modified). Appellant timely filed a pro se Rule 1925(b)
concise statement on March 29, 2022 (Concise Statement).
____________________________________________
2 Appellant’s notices of appeal were identical, and the caption listed all seven
trial court dockets (with no distinguishing marks). Appellant’s notices of
appeal implicate Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 971 (Pa. 2018)
(requiring appellants to file separate notices of appeal from single orders that
resolve issues on more than one docket) (overruled in part by
Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462, 477 (Pa. 2021) (holding that
“where a timely appeal is erroneously filed at only one docket, [Pa.R.A.P.]
902 permits the appellate court, in its discretion, to allow correction of the
error, where appropriate.”)).
In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 236 A.3d 1141 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc),
this Court emphasized that “Walker only required an appellant to file
a ‘separate’ notice of appeal for each lower court docket the appellant was
challenging,” and “Walker made no mention of case numbers on a notice of
appeal.” Id. at 1148 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, we held that
[b]ecause Johnson appealed from four docket numbers and filed
four notices of appeal, Johnson has complied with Walker. The
fact that each notice of appeal listed all four docket numbers does
not invalidate his notices of appeal, and we decline to quash his
appeals.
Id. (overruling Commonwealth v. Creese, 216 A.3d 1142, 1144 (Pa. Super.
2009) (“a notice of appeal may contain only one docket number” under
Walker)). Instantly, we conclude the “fact that each [of Appellant’s seven]
notice[s] of appeal listed all [seven] docket numbers does not invalidate his
notices of appeal[.]” Johnson, 236 A.3d at 1148.
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Appellant presents ten issues for our review:
A. Whether the PCRA court made a plain error, an error of law, by
its conclusions in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, dated May 10,
2022[, to the extent it stated] that “In any event, the evidence
of a knife found on Mr. Stowe’s body was not material to any
issues in the case[”;] and [“]since [Appellant] failed to proffer
evidence to show that the Commonwealth suppressed evidence
of the knife[,] Appellant’s Brady[3] claim premised upon the
knife was properly rejected[”;] and that Appellant never raised
a claim in the PCRA court asserting that [the] Commonwealth
withheld exculpatory evidence regarding cell-phones the claim
is waived? The PCRA court abused its discretion when there
would have been no prejudice because Appellant did present
such facts in the PCRA court.
B. [Whether] the PCRA court committed an error of law by
denying the petitions for post conviction relief based upon
discovery of exculpatory evidence of a knife, withheld by police
at the crime scene, and cell-phones and a false, staged crime
scene[?]
C. [Whether] the PCRA court committed an error of law by
denying Appellant an evidentiary hearing to present the
fabrications within the crime scene photographs, to
demonstrate that the crime scene were [sic] staged by the
crime scene police agents[?]
D. [Whether] the PCRA court committed an error of law by
denying the petition for post conviction relief based on
ineffective assistance of Trial Counsel[?]
E. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for [his] failure to present the
Pennsylvania Castle Doctrine defense in conformance as being
attacked in Appellant’s home by gang members and dealer[s]
with [18 Pa.C.S.A. §] 505(b)(2.1) and other portions of 18
Pa.C.S. § 505 …, which is a procedural statute?
____________________________________________
3 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); see also Commonwealth
v. Cam Ly, 980 A.2d 61, 75 (Pa. 2009) (“Under Brady, the prosecution’s
failure to divulge exculpatory evidence is a violation of a defendant’s
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.”).
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F. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for interfering with Appellant’s
fundamental right to finish testifying on Appellant’s own behalf
at trial?
G. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for failure to investigate and call
as a witness police officer Donna Jaconi, the crime scene unit
agent concerning the weapon, the knife, and cell-phones not
being put on property receipts, and the inconsistencies within
the crime scene photographs?
H. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for failure to investigate and call
police officer Alvin Outlaw as a witness?
I. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for failure to introduce the
criminal histories of decedents?
J. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for failure to cross-examine police
officer Stephen Cross[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 7-8 (footnote added; some capitalization and punctuation
modified).
Critically, Appellant did not raise any of his issues in his Concise
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Statement.4 It is axiomatic that “any issue not raised in a Rule 1925(b)
statement will be deemed waived for appellate review.” Commonwealth v.
Bonnett, 239 A.3d 1096, 1106 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing Commonwealth v.
Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998) (“Any issues not raised in a 1925(b)
statement will be deemed waived.”)); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii)
(“Issues not included in the Statement … are waived.”); Pa.R.A.P.
302(a) (issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).
To the extent Appellant vaguely claimed in his Concise Statement,
“numerous issues of Trial Counsel’s ineffectiveness,” the claim is undeveloped
and insufficient to preserve the various assertions of ineffectiveness Appellant
presents in his statement of questions. See Concise Statement, 3/29/22, at
2. This Court has instructed that an appellant’s
concise statement must properly specify the error to be addressed
on appeal. In other words, the Rule 1925(b) statement must be
____________________________________________
4 Appellant’s Concise Statement states, in pertinent part:
Brady[] violations. The crime scene unit police agents withheld
[]suppressed evidence at the crime scene favorable to [Appellant
that was] “material” exculpatory, and impeachment evidence[.]
The knife w[as] exculpatory, and the [] cell-phones were
impeachment evidence….
***
Ineffective assistance of counsel, numerous issues of Trial
Counsel’s ineffectiveness.
Concise Statement, 3/29/22, at 2 (paragraph numbering omitted; some
capitalization modified). Appellant did not expound on his claim(s) of Trial
Counsel’s ineffectiveness.
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specific enough for the trial court to identify and address the issue
an appellant wishes to raise on appeal. A concise statement [that]
is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on
appeal is the functional equivalent of no concise statement at all.
The court’s review and legal analysis can be fatally impaired when
the court has to guess at the issues raised. Thus, if a concise
statement is too vague, the court may find waiver.
Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations,
quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
The PCRA court determined that Appellant’s vague ineffectiveness claim
resulted in waiver. The PCRA court explained:
[Appellant’s] claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness completely fails
to specify any specific claims of ineffectiveness that [Appellant]
intends to raise on appeal. For that reason, his claims of trial
counsel ineffectiveness are waived. Commonwealth v. Parrish,
224 A.3d 682, 700 (Pa. 2020) (a Rule 1925(b) statement that
“generically and capaciously encompassed every conceivable
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel contained in the
amended PCRA petitions” was waived for failure to comply with
Rule 1925(b)).
PCRA Court Opinion, 5/10/22, at 11. We agree.
We are mindful that Appellant is pro se. While “this Court is willing to
liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no
special benefit upon the appellant.” Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d
496, 498 (Pa. Super. 2005). “To the contrary, any person choosing to
represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume
that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing.” Id.Accordingly, Appellant has waived his ineffectiveness issues. See Bonnett,
supra; Hansley, supra.- 12 -
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Our review further reveals that Appellant preserved in his Concise
Statement only one of the issues he presents in his statement of questions;
namely, his Brady claim.5 See n.5, supra.
Appellant asserts the PCRA court erred by rejecting his claim that the
Commonwealth committed a Brady violation. According to Appellant, the
Commonwealth failed to disclose to the defense exculpatory evidence of the
knife police discovered on Stowe’s body and cellphones. See Appellant’s Brief
at 13-25. Appellant claims he has established “not only the element[]s
necessary for a successful Brady claim, but also … that the crime scene unit
police agents[] actually concealed the … knife[] and cell-phones.” Id. at 21.
Appellant maintains “there is a reasonable probability that, had the … knife[]
____________________________________________
5Before addressing this claim, however, we note that Appellant’s brief does
not comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), which requires the argument section of an
appellate brief to
be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be
argued; and shall have at the head of each part - in distinctive
type … - the particular point treated therein, followed by such
discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.
Id. (emphasis added). Appellant’s argument section headings do not
correspond to his ten issues listed in his statement of questions presented.
Nevertheless, we address the merits of Appellant’s Brady claim to the best of
our ability. See Pa.R.A.P. 105(a) (requiring liberal construction of appellate
rules); but see also Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 343 (Pa.
2011) (“The briefing requirements scrupulously delineated in our appellate
rules are not mere trifling matters of stylistic preference; rather, they
represent a studied determination by our Court and its rules committee of the
most efficacious manner by which appellate review may be conducted[.]”).
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and cell-phones … been disclosed to the Appellant[,] the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 14.
“When reviewing the denial of a PCRA petition, an appellate court must
determine whether the PCRA court’s order is supported by the record and free
of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Drummond, 285 A.3d 625, 633 (Pa.
2022) (citation, quotations, and footnote omitted). With respect to Brady,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated:
To prove a Brady violation, [an a]ppellant must demonstrate
that: (1) the prosecution concealed evidence; (2) which evidence
was either exculpatory or impeachment evidence favorable to him
and; (3) he was prejudiced by the concealment. In order to prove
prejudice, [a]ppellant must show a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
Commonwealth v. Bomar, 104 A.3d 1179, 1189 (Pa. 2014) (citations and
quotations omitted).
Here, the PCRA court explained its rationale for rejecting Appellant’s
allegation of a Brady violation:
[Appellant] claims that the Commonwealth suppressed
evidence of a knife that was found on the body of victim [] Stowe,
as well as photographs of the knife taken by the Philadelphia
Medical Examiner’s office. Initial Petition[, 8/23/19,] at p. 20.
[Appellant] claims that such evidence would have been relevant
to [his] self-defense argument at trial. Id. at 14.
In support of his claim, [Appellant] presented evidence of
a portion of a report from the medical examiner’s office stating
that a knife was removed from the pants of Mr. Stowe. Initial
Petition[, 8/23/19,] Exhibit CP-4832 at p. 30. However, the
Commonwealth avers that this report was provided to [Appellant]
prior to the trial, and [Appellant] does not deny that allegation.
Instead, he seems to aver that the actual knife was suppressed to
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his prejudice. Initial Petition[, 8/23/19,] at p. 20. While
[Appellant] also claims the Commonwealth suppressed
photographs of the knife, he proffered no evidence to contradict
evidence submitted by the Commonwealth establishing that
compact discs containing photographs of the knife were sent to
[Trial C]ounsel under cover of a letter from the assigned assistant
district attorney dated April 28, 2017, several weeks prior to the
trial. See Commonwealth’s Motion to Dismiss, [12/14/21,]
Exhibit B. Since [Appellant] failed to proffer evidence to show that
the Commonwealth suppressed evidence of the knife, his Brady
claim premised upon the knife was properly rejected. See
[Commonwealth v.] Simpson, 66 A.3d [253,] 264 [(Pa. 2013)]
(“To demonstrate a Brady violation, [a]ppellant must show that:
(1) the prosecution concealed evidence….”).
In any event, the evidence of a knife found on Mr. Stowe’s
body was not material to any issues in the case. At the trial,
[Appellant] testified that he committed the killings in self-defense
because he believed the victims were conspiring to kill him with
the shotgun that he ultimately used to kill the victims. N.T.
5/23/2017 at 148-55. At no point during [Appellant’s] testimony
did he ever reference a knife or threat of a knife as a reason for
his killings. See id. at 130-63; N.T. 5/24/2017 at 7-52.
[Appellant] explicitly stated that the victims “ain’t have no weapon
before I come down stairs.” N.T. 5/23/2017 at 155. Accordingly,
given [Appellant’s] reasons for the murders as described in his
testimony, the Commonwealth’s alleged concealment of a small
knife found in the pants of one of the three people [Appellant]
admittedly killed with a shotgun could not have affected the
outcome of the trial. Therefore, the knife does not give rise to a
Brady violation. Simpson, 66 A.3d at 264.
[] Cellphones
[Appellant] also asserts that the Commonwealth withheld
exculpatory evidence regarding cellphones. [Concise]
Statement[, 3/29/22,] at ¶ 3. However, [Appellant] never raised
this claim in the PCRA court. For that reason, the claim is waived.
See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”)[.]
PCRA Court Opinion, 5/10/22, at 9-10.
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Our review discloses ample record and legal support for the PCRA court’s
rationale. Thus, Appellant’s Brady claim does not merit relief.
For the above reasons, we affirm the PCRA court’s dismissal of
Appellant’s first PCRA petition.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/20/2023
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