Com. v. Warrick, S.

J-S33024-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
SHAUN C. WARRICK :
:
Appellant : No. 545 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 4, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004005-2011
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
SHAUN C. WARRICK :
:
Appellant : No. 546 EDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 4, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004006-2011
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED APRIL 19, 2023
Appellant, Shaun C. Warrick, appeals from the order entered in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his first petition
under the Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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In its opinion, the PCRA court fully and correctly set forth the relevant
facts and procedural history of this case. (See PCRA Court Opinion, filed
4/25/22, at 1-5). Therefore, we do not restate them here.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA
petition without a hearing because trial counsel was
ineffective and Appellant suffered prejudice because trial
counsel failed to object to an erroneous jury charge in
relation to first-degree murder which improperly conflated
the concepts of specific intent to kill and malice?
2. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA
petition without a hearing because trial counsel was
ineffective and Appellant suffered prejudice because trial
counsel failed to request a cautionary instruction relating to
other crimes/bad acts evidence wherein Appellant was
alleged to have threatened witness Alicia Watkins regarding
potential cooperation with police?
3. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA
petition without a hearing because trial counsel was
ineffective and Appellant suffered prejudice because trial
counsel failed to object to the trial court’s incomplete jury
instruction on consciousness of guilt when the court failed
to instruct the jury that such evidence, by itself, is
insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict?
4. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA
petition without a hearing because trial counsel was
ineffective and Appellant suffered prejudice because trial
counsel failed to object to the trial court’s and prosecutor’s
remarks which improperly bolstered the Commonwealth’s
case?
5. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA
petition without a hearing because trial counsel was
ineffective and Appellant suffered prejudice because trial
counsel failed to investigate Appellant’s potential defense
that Appellant was at Traffic Court when the underlying
crimes occurred?
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6. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA
petition without a hearing because trial counsel was
ineffective and Appellant suffered prejudice because the trial
prosecutor deprived Appellant of a fair trial by engaging in
racially improper jury selection which was highlighted by
new access to such practices during the PCRA process?
7. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA
petition without a hearing because trial counsel was
ineffective and Appellant suffered prejudice because trial
counsel failed to object to the speculative testimony of Kelly
Hunt that implicated Appellant?
8. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA
petition without a hearing because new evidence shows that
the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory materials
from two of its key witnesses, Kiana Walker and Octavia
Dugger?
9. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA
petition without a hearing because new evidence shows that
multiple corrupt homicide detectives with a habit of
corrupting the judicial process were involved in the
investigation in Appellant’s case and an evidentiary hearing
and new trial are warranted because there are discovery and
ineffectiveness issues associated with the failure to present
this evidence at trial?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4-6) (reordered for purpose of disposition).
Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to
examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination
and whether its decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Conway,
14 A.3d 101, 108 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 612 Pa. 687, 29 A.3d 795(2011). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if
the record contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd,
923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d
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74 (2007). We give no similar deference, however, to the court’s legal
conclusions. Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa.Super.
2012).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Glenn B.
Bronson, we conclude Appellant’s claims merit no relief. The PCRA court
opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the claims raised.
(See PCRA Court Opinion at 5-26). Specifically, regarding Appellant’s first
issue, the court determined that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to
object to the court’s instruction defining specific intent to kill and malice.
Appellant claims the court conflated the two concepts, and argues that in cases
of self-defense or voluntary manslaughter, a killing can be intentional but not
with malice. Nevertheless, the court noted that self-defense and voluntary
manslaughter were not at issue in this case so there was no possibility of
confusion for the jury on the grounds alleged by Appellant. Moreover, the
court’s instruction accurately stated the law and tracked the exact language
in the Pennsylvania Standard Criminal Jury Instruction.
With respect to Appellant’s second issue, the court found that trial
counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a cautionary instruction after
Alicia Watkins testified that a few days after the shooting, Appellant told her
that she “didn’t have to say anything because they don’t know nothing,” in
relation to speaking with the police. The court found that a cautionary
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instruction about prior bad acts was unnecessary because Ms. Watkins did not
testify that Appellant threatened her or intimidated her to prevent her from
speaking with the police. While encouraging Ms. Watkins to stay silent
evidenced consciousness of guilt, it was not a criminal act that required a
Pa.R.E. 404(b) instruction.
Regarding Appellant’s third issue, the court found no merit to Appellant’s
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the court did
not instruct the jury that consciousness of guilt, by itself, is insufficient
evidence for a conviction. Notably, the court did not suggest to the jury that
they could convict based solely on consciousness of guilt but properly stated
that it could be considered with all the other evidence in the case.
As it pertains to Appellant’s fourth issue, the court found no merit to
Appellant’s claims of ineffective assistance regarding statements made by the
court and the prosecutor that Appellant insists improperly bolstered the
Commonwealth’s case. Specifically, the court’s comment instructing the jury
not to converse with “anybody [who] is here to support the prosecution, family
members of the decedent, for example” was in the context of cautioning jurors
from speaking with anyone related to the case and did not serve to bolster
the Commonwealth’s case. Additionally, the prosecutor’s comment to the
Commonwealth witnesses to answer defense counsel’s questions to the best
of their ability did not improperly imply the prosecutor’s personal belief that
the Commonwealth’s witnesses were credible.
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Concerning Appellant’s fifth claim that trial counsel failed to investigate
Appellant’s alibi evidence, the court noted that the fact that Appellant was at
traffic court on the same day as the shooting did not preclude the possibility
that Appellant had time to arrive at the scene of the murders. Further, Ms.
Watkins testified that she accompanied Appellant to traffic court, where they
remained for only approximately an hour and there were multiple
eyewitnesses who placed Appellant at the scene of the murders.
With respect to Appellant’s sixth issue, the court found that Appellant
failed to establish that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a
Batson2 challenge because the mere fact that the prosecutor noted the race
and gender of the prospective jurors in his notes does not demonstrate actual
purposeful discrimination. Further, there were no issues of race in the case,
the final racial makeup of the jury was well balanced, and the prosecutor only
utilized six of twenty preemptory strikes.
Regarding Appellant’s seventh issue, the court determined that trial
counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a hearsay objection to Kelly
Hunt’s testimony that she overheard the decedent, Mercedes Ivery, speaking
with Appellant on the phone prior to the murder. Ms. Ivery’s statements were
not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but as evidence of Appellant’s
state of mind and the court promptly instructed the jury to consider the
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2 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
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evidence only for this purpose. Further, Appellant was not prejudiced by
deficiencies in the prosecutor’s form of questioning during Ms. Hunt’s
testimony because there is no indication that the prosecutor could not have
elicited the same information even if trial counsel had objected.
With respect to Appellant’s eighth issue, the court determined that
Appellant did not suffer prejudice as a result of the Commonwealth’s failure
to disclose handwritten notes made by the prosecutor indicating that Kiana
Walker and Octavia Duggar spoke to the prosecutor prior to the trial and
stated that they did not see or remember anything from the shooting.
Notably, Ms. Walker testified consistently at trial with the prosecutor’s note,
stating that she did not see the man leave the house where the killings took
place, and that most of the information she recalled from the incident was
based on information she received from a friend. Although the Commonwealth
introduced an eyewitness account from Ms. Walker that she had provided to
police, Ms. Walker disavowed that statement at trial. Thus, the handwritten
note regarding the prosecutor’s call with Ms. Walker stating that Ms. Walker
did not see anything was substantially consistent with her in-court testimony,
cumulative, and had little probative value. Additionally, it is clear from the
totality of the notes regarding the prosecutor’s conversation with Ms. Dugger,
that Ms. Dugger’s statement that she did not remember anything merely
demonstrated an understandable reluctance to testify in court. Ms. Dugger’s
statement to the prosecutor that she did not remember anything was
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inconsistent with her detailed statement to police and her trial testimony.
While Appellant could have used the prosecutor’s notes to impeach Ms.
Dugger’s testimony, the impeachment value would have been de minimus,
and this evidence does not give rise to a reasonable probability that had the
notes been disclosed, the outcome of trial would have been different.
Finally, the court found that Appellant is not entitled to relief based on
after-discovered evidence of misconduct by various detectives involved in
Appellant’s case because the instances of misconduct cited by Appellant are
unrelated to the instant case. Further, none of the witnesses in this case who
were interviewed by these detectives claimed any kind of coercion or
intimidation by police. Thus, Appellant’s evidence of unrelated police
misconduct would not likely result in a different verdict if a new trial were
granted.
The record supports the PCRA court’s findings. See Conway, supra.Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court’s opinion.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/19/2023
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