In the Int. of: C.P., Appeal of: M.B.

J-S07017-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.P., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: M.B., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 2512 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered September 14, 2022,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000806-2018.
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.C.P., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: M.B., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 2513 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 14, 2022,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000758-2021.
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.P., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: M.B., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 2514 EDA 2022
J-S07017-23
Appeal from the Order Entered September 14, 2022,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0001237-2019.
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.T.P., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: M.B., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 2515 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 14, 2022,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000759-2021.
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED APRIL 17, 2023
M.B. (Mother) appeals the decrees issued by the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas, which terminated her rights to her five-year-old son,
C.C.P., and her four-year-old daughter, C.T.P. (the Children), pursuant to the
Adoption Act. See 25 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), (b). Mother also
challenges the trial court’s decision to change the goal of the Children’s
respective dependency cases, from reunification to adoption.1 After review,
we affirm the termination decrees and dismiss Mother’s goal change appeals
as moot.
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1The trial court also terminated the rights of T.P. (Father) and likewise issued
goal change orders. See 2460, 2461, 2462, and 2463 EDA 2022. Father’s
appeal is separately listed before this panel.
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In its opinion filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court
thoroughly set forth the following factual and procedural history:
[…] DHS first became aware of this family on February 27,
2016, when it received a general protective services (GPS)
report indicating concerns for the safety of the Children’s
older sibling and parent’s drug activity. The report indicated
concerns for the older sibling’s hygiene and food intake,
Mother’s use and abuse of Xanax and Percocet, and the
family’s living conditions. Based on this report, Community
Umbrella Agency (CUA) Tabor Community Partner services
were implemented in-home for the family until October 16,
2017, when it was determined that the family was
stabilized.
[In March 2018], following the birth of C.C.P., DHS received
a GPS report which alleged Mother tested positive for
benzodiazepine, marijuana and opiates at the birth of C.C.P.
C.C.P. also tested positive for benzodiazepine and
marijuana at birth. Mother was not prescribed the
medication and admitted to taking Xanax, Percocet and
marijuana every other day. Mother also admitted that she
last used drugs […] two days prior to the birth of C.C.P.
When Father was present at the hospital, the room smelled
of marijuana and he appeared under the influence of drugs
and/or alcohol. Father was walking unsteadily, falling,
slurring his words, and exhibiting inappropriate behavior.
Following the birth of C.C.P., Father and Mother continued
to visit the hospital under the influence of drugs and neither
[was] engaged in drug and alcohol treatment. On April 8,
2018, DHS obtained an order of protective custody (OPC)
for C.C.P. and placed him into the care of [Maternal
Grandmother]. FN3
FN3: C.C.P. was placed together with his older sibling at
the [Maternal Grandmother’s] home.
The adjudicatory hearing was held on April 19, 2018
whereby this court adjudicated C.C.P. dependent based on
[the] present inability of parents to provide proper parental
care and control, and C.C.P. was fully committed to DHS.
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[In July 2019, C.T.P. was born.] [On the day of the birth],
DHS received another GPS report stating that Mother had
given birth and tested positive for benzodiazepines,
marijuana, and oxycodone. C.T.P. tested negative for those
substances, however, C.T.P. was showing withdrawal
symptoms which led to the hospital keeping C.T.P. for
observations. Mother and Father appeared to be under the
influence of drugs when they arrived at the hospital. They
were unable to speak coherently, and Mother did not recall
the date or year. A few days later, DHS spoke with Maternal
Grandmother who stated that Mother was active in her drug
use and not receiving treatment. [In July 2019], DHS
obtained an OPC, and placed C.T.P. in care with [Maternal
Grandmother]. The adjudicatory hearing was held on
August 22, 2019 whereby this court adjudicated C.T.P.
dependent based on the present inability of parents to
provide parental care and control, and C.T.P. was fully
committed to DHS.
Throughout the life of this case, Mother’s single case plan
objectives have remained essentially the same. Mother was
referred to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU) for a forthwith
drug screen, an assessment, monitoring, and three random
drug screens. She was also ordered to: 1) attend a
substance abuse treatment program; 2) attend Achieving
Reunification Center (“ARC”) or another agency for
parenting and housing; 3) attend weekly supervised visits
with Children at the agency; and 4) attend a domestic
violence counseling program. FN4
FN 4: Domestic violence counseling was added as an
objective after Mother and Father engaged in a fight
during a visit.
At the relevant goal change [and termination] hearing,
Mother was not present. FN5
FN 5: As to service, DHS Solicitor, Jim Kelly, stated that
Mother was present at previous listings, and also good
service was found several listings ago. He further stated
that the proceeding had been continued a number of times
for the same reason.
The former CUA case manager supervisor, Tenessa Overton,
testified that she had been the supervisor on this case from
March of 2018 until January of 2020. She stated Mother’s
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compliance throughout the life of this case has been
consistently minimal. Ms. Overton testified that Mother only
provided one out of the three required CEU screens in
November of 2019. She stated that the screen was positive
for marijuana, amphetamines, and benzos. As for Mother’s
substance abuse treatment, CUA case Manager, Sakeena
Sidq, who was assigned this case in January of 2022,
testified that Mother has never completed a drug and
alcohol treatment program. Ms. Overton testified that after
C.C.P. was born, Mother started outpatient treatment at
Caring Together and Guadenzia. She stated that staff at
Caring Together provided her with oral verification as to
Mother’s drug screens which were all reported as positive.
Ms. Sidq testified that Mother’s intake date at Caring
Together was about three years ago on September 12,
2019. Ms. Sidq also received progress reports and drug
screens from Caring Together for Mother. She testified that
over the past seven months Mother provided Caring
Together with two drug screens, one in December of 2021
and the other in June of 2022. Ms. Sidq stated both drug
screens came back positive for marijuana and benzos, but
Mother currently has a prescription for benzos. She stated
Mother completed her dual diagnosis screening at Caring
Together and receives outpatient therapy through them. As
for Mother’s consistency at Caring Together, Ms. Sidq
testified that Mother was an active participant during
therapy, however, she needs to be more consistent by
attending sessions. Since the last court date on June 23,
2022, Mother attended only four of her individual sessions
and three psych appointments. Ms. Sidq testified that
Mother told the program that she missed the sessions due
to work, however, she has not provided any work
documents to Caring Together or CUA.
Over the life of this case, Mother’s housing situation has
remained inconsistent and inappropriate for Children. Ms.
Overton testified that Mother was referred to ARC for
housing and parenting. She stated that Mother never
attended, and her case was closed out. Ms. Overton also
stated Mother was previously living with a family member,
but the agency could not verify if Mother really lived there.
Ms. Sidq further testified that Mother does not have housing,
but Mother is in the process of obtaining housing. Ms. Sidq
further stated Mother never provided her with verification of
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an address that she could do a walkthrough. As lack of
verified housing has persisted throughout the case, Ms.
Overton testified that Mother was transient. Additionally,
Mother has been unable to provide Ms. Overton or Ms. Sidq
verified proof of employment. Ms. Sidq stated Mother
reported about four different jobs but has not provided any
documentation confirming employment.
With regard to Mother’s visitation objective, Ms. Overton
testified that visits never progressed passed supervised at
the agency. She stated that there were some domestic
violence issues with the parents during a visit resulting in
the separation of their visits. [Footnote omitted]. Ms.
Overton and Ms. Sidq testified that Mother has not provided
them with a certificate of completion for domestic violence.
Ms. Overton further testified that Mother was inconsistent
with her visits, but she would visit at least once every year.
Ms. Sidq, who has been on the case since January of 2022,
testified that Mother has only missed two visits since the
last court date in June of 2022.
The CUA case manager also testified about the relationship
and bond that the Children share with their pre-adoptive
families. Ms. Sidq testified that C.C.P. has been in care now
for his whole life for four and a half years since birth. C.C.P.
looks at his Maternal Aunt as his mother and her husband
as a father. C.T.P. has been in care for three years, since
birth as well. Ms. Sidq stated that C.T.P. has been in her
current placement for over 18 months. FN7.
FN 7: C.T.P. has been in her current placement since
March of 2021 with Paternal Cousin.
Ms. Sidq testified that C.T.P. looks to her Paternal Cousin as
a mother. She further stated that C.T.P. has some
attachment issues from being moved and not having a
consistent caregiver or her biological parents since birth.
The current kinship parents are willing to be adoptive
resources for the Children. Additionally, Ms. Sidq testified
that the Children would not suffer any harm from
terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and that
she believes it is in the best interest of the Children to
change the goal to adoption.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court issued a decree
involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights and
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changing the permanency goal to adoption pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and finding in
accordance with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) that such
termination best serves the developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare of the [Children].
Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 12/14/22, at 1-6 (citations to the record and
some footnotes omitted) (style adjusted).
Mother timely filed this appeal. She presents the following issues for
our review.
1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error
when the trial court changed the goal to adoption and
involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights,
where such determination was not supported by clear
and convincing evidence under the Adoption Act, 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8).
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error
when the trial court changed the goal to adoption
without giving primary consideration to the effect that
the adoption would have on the developmental,
physical and emotional needs of the Children as
required by the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
3. Whether the trial court erred because the evidence
was overwhelming and undisputed that Mother
demonstrated a genuine interest and sincere,
persistent, and unrelenting effort to maintain a
parent-child relationship with her Children.
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and erred
as a matter of law in changing the permanency goal
to adoption from reunification, as there was not
competent evidence presented that it was in the best
interests of the Children.
Mother’s Brief at 8.
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We first address whether the court erred when it concluded that
termination was warranted under Section 2511(a), and then (b). Thereafter,
we address whether Mother’s appeals from the goal change order are moot,
and if not, whether they have merit.
We begin with our well-settled standard of review:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact
and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
supported by the record. If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's
decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that in termination cases,
deference to the trial court is particularly crucial. In re Adoption of L.A.K.,
265 A.3d 580, 597 (Pa. 2021); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d 1108,
1124 (Pa. 2021) (“When a trial court makes a ‘close call’ in a fact-intensive
case involving…the termination of parental rights, the appellate court should
review the record for an abuse of discretion and for whether evidence supports
that trial court’s conclusions; the appellate could should not search the record
for contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”).
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The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential
standard and, to the extent that record supports the court’s decision, we must
affirm even though evidence exists that would also support a contrary
determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only
if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court
engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section
2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the
child[.]
In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of
Adoption Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).
Critically, we may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis
exists for the result reached. C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201. We need only agree
with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well
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as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (en banc).
Therefore, we review Mother’s first appellate issue insofar as it concerns
the termination of her rights under Section 2511(a)(2), which provides:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
[…]
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).
To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party
must prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;
(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes
of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.”
In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt
assumption of full parental duties. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa.
Super. 2010). We note that the grounds for termination are not limited to
affirmative misconduct like abuse but concern parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied. See id.- 10 -
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Instantly, the trial court determined that DHS met its burden under
Section 2511(a)(2) for the following reasons:
The evidence established that “incapacity” and “refusal”
under Section 2511(a)(2) existed given that Mother failed
to demonstrate a concreted desire or ability to care for the
Children. Mother has failed to complete her single case plan
objectives throughout the life of this case. Any compliance
on Mother’s part has come recently after the petitions were
filed. Despite having had four years to do so, Mother has
failed to obtain employment or appropriate housing. She
has also failed to complete a parenting program, a domestic
violence program, and a drug and alcohol program. As for
visits, prior to June of 2022, Mother would only visit the
Children at least once a year. Additionally, Mother continues
to test positive for non-prescribed drugs and remains
inconsistent with her individual therapy and psych
appointments. This court found that Mother’s failure to
comply with her single case plan objectives and obtain
housing and employment for the Children has left the
Children without essential parental care, and the cause of
such neglect, refusal, and continued incapacity will not be
remedied by Mother.
T.C.O. at 11-12 (citations to the record omitted) (style adjusted).
On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court’s decision was erroneous,
because Mother had been active in her visitation and had been working on her
single case plan objectives. Mother also notes that she has been prescribed
benzodiazepines, and thus a positive test for this drug should not count
against her. Mother concludes that the court’s decision was not supported by
competent evidence. See Mother’s Brief at 24-25.
In addressing these claims, we reiterate that it is not the function of this
Court to search the record for evidence that would support a contrary result.
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See S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d at 1124. Mother’s claims ask us to do just that. She
asks us to view the record in a light most favorable to her. Mother notes that
she eventually obtained a valid prescription for benzodiazepines, that her most
recent screen did not show opiate use. Mother also cites her recent
participation in her single case plan. As an appellate court, we employ a
highly-deferential standard in termination matters. “Not only are our trial
judges observing the parties during the hearing, but usually, as in this case,
they have presided over several other hearings with the same parties and
have a longitudinal understanding of the case and the best interests of the
individual child involved[.]” Id. (quoting R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa.
2010)). Our role is simply to review the record for an abuse of discretion and
for whether the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusions. Id.When doing so, we observe that the Children have been without parental
care for four years. During that time, Mother has been unable to make
progress with her single case plan objectives. Her lack of progress
demonstrates an inability or a refusal to take the necessary steps toward
reunification. For instance, although Mother was an active participant in
therapy when she went, she did not attend regular sessions. In her most
recent screen, the only illicit drug Mother tested positive for was marijuana.2
While this exemplified progress, Mother’s refusal or inability to commit to drug
and alcohol treatment prevented the trial court from increasing Mother’s
____________________________________________
2 Evidently, Mother does not have a medical marijuana card.
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visitation with the Children. Indeed, Mother visited infrequently, and she
never progressed to unsupervised visits. Mother has struggled to find
employment and suitable housing. In her Brief, Mother makes arguments as
to why each of these unfulfilled goals does not warrant termination. But it is
the totality of these unfulfilled goals, over the course of four years, that we
find constitutes sufficient evidence under Section 2511(a)(2). Mother’s first
issue merits no relief.
Having discerned no error or abuse of discretion as to the first prong of
the bifurcated termination analysis, we next address the trial court’s findings
under Section 2511(b), which Mother challenges in her second appellate issue.
That Section provides:
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
This Court has explained further:
[S]ection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of
parental rights would best serve the developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.
In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005),
this Court stated, “Intangibles such as love, comfort,
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security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the
needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed
that the trial court must also discern the nature and status
of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect
on the child of permanently severing that
bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of
a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer
that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63
(Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-
effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of
the particular case. Id. at 763.
In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
Concerning the bond, the question is not merely whether a bond exists,
but whether termination would destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial
relationship. See C.M.K., 203 A.2d at 264 (citation omitted); see also K.Z.S.,
946 A.2d at 764 (holding there was no bond worth preserving where the child
had been in foster care for most of the child’s life, which caused the resulting
bond to be too attenuated). Moreover, the court is not required to use expert
testimony to resolve the bond analysis. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121
(citing In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008)).
“Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also
consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they
have a bond with their foster parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. Finally, we
emphasize that “[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with her and/or her child
is a major aspect of the Section 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when
determining what is in the best interest of the child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d
95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).
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Returning to the instant matter, the trial court set forth its findings
under Section 2511(b) as follows:
[T]his court determined that the Children would not suffer
irreparable emotional harm if Mother’s parental rights were
terminated. There was compelling testimony that the
Children would not suffer harm if Mother’s parental rights
were terminated and that the Children are significantly
bonded with their kinship parents. […] Additionally, Mother
failed to offer any evidence establishing the existence of a
parent-child bond. The testimony demonstrated that the
Children’s primary bond is with their pre-adoptive
resources. Additionally, the testimony demonstrated that
the Children’s kinship resources meet all of their general
needs and emotional needs. In determining that
termination would best serve the needs and welfare of the
Children, this Court considered that Mother has not been
able to meet the Children’s emotional, physical, and
developmental needs for over three years prior to the
termination hearing.
T.C.O. at 15 (citations to the record omitted).
On appeal, Mother argues that there was no evidence, one way or
another, whether a bond existed. See Mother’s Brief at 28. Mother’s
argument merits no relief. We reiterate that the lack of evidence of a bond
between a parent and child, allows a trial court to reasonably infer that no
bond exists. K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 762-63. Upon review of the record, such an
inference was reasonable in this case.
Moreover, the bonding analysis is just one as aspect of the Section
2511(b) analysis. Mother has been unable to meet the Children’s needs and
welfare for years. They have lived outside of her care for most of their lives.
As a result, their primary attachments are to their respective pre-adoptive
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kinship parents. For these reasons, we discern no err or abuse of discretion
with the court’s determination that DHS met its burden under Section
2511(b). Mother’s second appellate issue is without merit.
Having concluded that the trial court properly terminated Mother’s rights
to the Children, we turn our focus to Mother’s remaining issues. These claims
allege the trial court erred when it changed the goals of the dependency cases
from reunification to adoption. Because we have concluded that termination
was warranted, we dismiss these challenges as moot. See Interest of
D.R.W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“An issue before a court is
moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any
legal force or effect.”).
Decrees affirmed. Appeals concerning the goal change orders
dismissed.
Judge King joins the memorandum.
Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/17/2023
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