Com. v. Show, A.

J-S10011-22
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ANTHONY ROBERT SHOW :
:
Appellant : No. 982 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 23, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Criminal Division at CP-35-CR-0001165-2020
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ANTHONY ROBERT SHOW :
:
Appellant : No. 983 MDA 2021
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 23, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Criminal Division at CP-35-CR-0001420-2020
BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED APRIL 21, 2022
In this consolidated appeal, Anthony Robert Show (Appellant) appeals
from the judgment of sentence imposed after he pled guilty to sex crimes
against minors. Additionally, Appellant’s counsel (Counsel) has filed an
application to withdraw from representation and brief pursuant to Anders v.
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S10011-22
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978
A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). Upon review, we grant Counsel’s application to withdraw
and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
In August 2020, the Commonwealth charged Appellant at two separate
dockets with numerous sex crimes involving four children. At docket 1165-
2020 (case 1165), the Commonwealth charged Appellant with one count each
of aggravated indecent assault of a child, unlawful contact with a minor,
unlawful restraint of a minor, and corruption of minors, as well as three counts
each of indecent assault and indecent exposure.1 The Commonwealth alleged
Appellant repeatedly sexually assaulted a nine-year-old female, J.H., and also
assaulted two other minors, E.W. and W.T.
At docket 1420-2020 (case 1420), the Commonwealth charged
Appellant with one count each of aggravated indecent assault of a child,
aggravated indecent assault, corruption of minors, and indecent assault.2 The
Commonwealth alleged Appellant digitally penetrated the vagina of a nine-
year-old, L.M.
On December 9, 2020, Appellant entered an open guilty plea at case
1165 to one count each of aggravated indecent assault of a child and
corruption of minors, and at case 1420 to indecent assault. The trial court
deferred sentencing for the preparation of a presentence investigation (PSI)
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3125(b), 6318(a)(1), 2902(b)(2), 6301(a)(1)(ii),
3126(a)(7), and 3127(a).
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3125(b), 3125(a)(7), 6301(a)(1)(ii), and 3126(a)(7).
-2-
J-S10011-22
report and for the Sexual Offender Assessment Board (SOAB) to assess and
recommend whether Appellant should be classified as a sexually violent
predator (SVP). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b).
Mary Muscari, Ph.D. (Dr. Muscari), conducted the SOAB evaluation and
testified as the Commonwealth’s sole witness at the SVP/sentencing hearing.
The trial court qualified Dr. Muscari as an expert in the assessment of sexual
deviance. N.T., 4/30/21, at 7-8. Dr. Muscari concluded: “My opinion is within
a reasonable degree of professional certainty that [Appellant] meets the
criteria for Sexual[ly] Violent Predator.” Id. at 20. Appellant did not testify
or present witnesses. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court
determined Appellant met the criteria of an SVP and sentenced him to an
aggregate 122-244 months in prison. See id. at 28-30.
On May 7, 2021, Appellant timely filed a petition for reconsideration of
sentence, asserting: 1) his sentence was unduly harsh and excessive; 2) the
sentencing court erred in erroneously considering juvenile offenses3 when
calculating Appellant’s prior record score (PRS); and 3) his designation as an
SVP was unconstitutional. Petition for Reconsideration of Sentence, 5/7/21,
at ¶¶ 3, 7, 8-10. The trial court granted Appellant’s petition in part on June
2, 2021, conceding that it erred in calculating Appellant’s PRS. The court
denied Appellant’s petition in all other respects.
____________________________________________
3Appellant had a juvenile record for sexual offenses. See N.T., 4/30/21, at
11; N.T., 6/23/21, at 6.
-3-
J-S10011-22
On June 23, 2021, the trial court resentenced Appellant to an aggregate
8-17 years in prison, comprised of 78 to 156 months at case 1165 for
aggravated assault of a child; 12-24 months at case 1165 for corruption of
minors; and 6-24 months at case 1420 for indecent assault. The court ordered
Appellant’s respective sentences, which were in the aggravated range, to run
consecutively.
Appellant timely appealed.4 This Court consolidated the appeals sua
sponte on August 30, 2021. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.
On January 11, 2022, Counsel filed an Anders brief in this Court,
asserting Appellant’s appeal is frivolous and requesting permission to
withdraw from representation. Appellant did not file a response to Counsel’s
Anders brief or raise any additional claims.
We first address Counsel’s application to withdraw. See
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 593 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“When
presented with an Anders brief, this Court may not review the merits of the
underlying issues without first passing on the request to withdraw.”). Before
being permitted to withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must satisfy certain
procedural and substantive requirements. Commonwealth v. Tejada, 176
A.3d 355, 358 (Pa. Super. 2017). Procedurally, counsel must:
____________________________________________
4 Appellant complied with the dictates the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 971 (Pa. 2018) (“where a single
order resolves issues arising on more than one docket, separate notices of
appeal must be filed for each case.”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 341, Official Note.
-4-
J-S10011-22
(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
determined that the appeal would be frivolous; (2) furnish a copy
of the [Anders] brief to the defendant; and (3) advise the
defendant that he or she has the right to retain private counsel or
raise additional arguments that the defendant deems worthy of
the court’s attention.
Id. at 359 (citation omitted). Substantively, counsel must file an Anders
brief, in which counsel:
(1) provide[s] a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record; (2) refer[s] to anything in the record that
counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set[s] forth
counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state[s]
counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
Here, Counsel has complied with Anders’ procedural and substantive
requirements. Counsel states in her application to withdraw that she found
Appellant’s issues to be frivolous after conducting a thorough review of the
record, Appellant’s file, and applicable case law. Application to Withdraw as
Counsel, 1/11/22, at ¶ 6. Counsel attached to her application a copy of the
letter she sent to Appellant, in which Counsel advised Appellant that he could
retain private counsel or proceed pro se. Id. at Ex. A; see also
Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005). Counsel
also provided Appellant with a copy of the Anders brief, which summarizes
the facts and procedural history, includes issues that could arguably support
Appellant’s appeal, and explains Counsel’s assessment of why the issues are
-5-
J-S10011-22
frivolous. Accordingly, we review the issues presented in Counsel’s Anders
brief. We also conduct an independent review of the record to determine
whether Appellant’s appeal is, in fact, wholly frivolous. See Santiago, 978
A.2d at 358; see also Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272
(Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (“part and parcel of Anders is our Court’s duty
to review the record to insure no issues of arguable merit have been missed
or misstated.”).
Counsel’s Anders brief presents the following issues:
A. Whether the sentences imposed were harsh, excessive and an
abuse of discretion[?]
B. Whether the trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s motion
to reconsider his SVP designation[?]
Anders Brief at 4 (capitalization omitted).
Appellant first challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
“The right to appellate review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not
absolute[.]” Commonwealth v. Fuentes, 2022 PA Super. 43, *15 (Pa.
Super. 2022). Rather,
[p]rior to reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue[,
w]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P.
902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question
that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
-6-
J-S10011-22
Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d 472, 489 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(some citations omitted).
Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal, preserved his sentencing claim
in a post-sentence motion, and included in his brief the requisite Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f) statement. See Anders Brief at 12-13. We therefore examine
whether Appellant has raised a substantial question.
“We examine an appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement to determine
whether a substantial question exists.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 249 A.3d
1206, 1211 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). “A substantial question
exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the
sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific
provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms
which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117
A.3d 763, 768 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (citation omitted).
In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant presents a general allegation
of excessiveness and does not identify a violation of the Sentencing Code or
fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process. See Anders Brief at
12-13 (asserting “the sentences were harsh and excessive” and “the
circumstances [did not] justify such long sentences.”); see also
Commonwealth v. Provenzano, 50 A.3d 148, 154 (Pa. Super. 2012) (we
cannot look beyond the statement of questions presented and 2119(f) concise
statement to determine whether a substantial question exists). Appellant’s
-7-
J-S10011-22
claim does not present a substantial question for review. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Andrews, 213 A.3d 1004, 1017 (Pa. Super. 2019) (“a
generic claim that a sentence is excessive does not raise a substantial question
for our review.” (citation omitted)); Commonwealth v. Giordano, 121 A.3d
998, 1008 (Pa. Super. 2015) (same).
Moreover, our independent examination of the record discloses no other
non-frivolous sentencing claims Appellant could raise on appeal.5 See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Bishop, 831 A.2d 656, 661 (Pa. Super. 2003) (stating
the appellant did not present “a substantial question for our review. In
accordance with Anders, our independent examination of the record
convinces us that there are no other sentencing claims, not advanced by
counsel, that would raise a substantial question to permit review of
[appellant’s] sentence.”); Commonwealth v. Titus, 816 A.2d 251, 256 (Pa.
Super. 2003) (same). Accordingly, Counsel correctly determined Appellant’s
sentencing challenge is frivolous.
____________________________________________
5 At sentencing, the trial court stated that Appellant deserved a lengthy
sentence in light of his heinous, repeated crimes perpetrated against multiple
minor victims. See N.T., 6/23/21, at 5-7. In its opinion, the court
“submit[ted] that it sentenced Appellant appropriately and reasonably upon
consideration of the serious nature and gravity of the offenses charged and
pled to, the impact on the victims and their families, the particular
characteristics and history of Appellant conveyed within the [PSI,] as well as
the letter he submitted to the [c]ourt, the information reported by the SOAB,
and the sentencing guidelines.” Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/21, at 6. We
discern no abuse of the court’s sentencing discretion.
-8-
J-S10011-22
In his second issue, Appellant argues the Commonwealth failed to
present sufficient evidence that he met the criteria of an SVP, and thus the
trial court erred in designating him as such. Anders Brief at 17. In
considering the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an SVP designation, we
adhere to the following standard of review:
In order to affirm an SVP designation, we, as a reviewing court,
must be able to conclude that the fact-finder found clear and
convincing evidence that the individual is an SVP. As with any
sufficiency of the evidence claim, we view all evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth. We will reverse a trial court’s determination of
SVP status only if the Commonwealth has not presented clear and
convincing evidence that each element of the statute has been
satisfied.
Commonwealth v. Hollingshead, 111 A.3d 186, 189 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citation and brackets omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Meals, 912
A.2d 213, 219 (Pa. 2006) (“The clear and convincing standard requires
evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier
of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the
precise facts in issue.” (citation and brackets omitted)). We may not weigh
the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.
Commonwealth v. Prendes, 97 A.3d 337, 355 (Pa. Super. 2014).
The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10—9799.42, requires a trial court to order an individual
who has been convicted of a “sexually violent offense” to be assessed by the
SOAB. Id. § 9799.24(a); see also id. § 9799.12 (defining sexually violent
-9-
J-S10011-22
offense). Following the entry of such order, the SOAB is responsible for
conducting an assessment to recommend whether the individual should be
classified as an SVP. Id. § 9799.24(b). The assessment must consider the
following:
[W]hether the instant offense involved multiple victims; whether
the defendant exceeded the means necessary to achieve the
offense; the nature of the sexual contact with the victim(s); the
defendant’s relationship with the victim(s); the victim(s)’ age(s);
whether the instant offense included a display of unusual cruelty
by the defendant during the commission of the offense; the
victim(s)’ mental capacity(ies); the defendant’s prior criminal
record; whether the defendant completed any prior sentence(s);
whether the defendant participated in available programs for
sexual offenders; the defendant’s age; the defendant’s use of
illegal drugs; whether the defendant suffers from a mental illness,
mental disability, or mental abnormality; behavioral
characteristics that contribute to the defendant’s conduct; and any
other factor reasonably related to the defendant’s risk of
reoffending.
Hollingshead, 111 A.3d at 190; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b)(1)-(4)
(statutory factors). There is no requirement that all statutory factors or
any particular number of them be present or absent in order to
support an SVP designation. Commonwealth v. Brooks, 7 A.3d 852,
863 (Pa. Super. 2010). After the SOAB completes its assessment, the trial
court holds a hearing to “determine whether the Commonwealth has proved
by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is a[n SVP].” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9799.24(e)(3).
SORNA defines an SVP as an individual who has been convicted of one
of the enumerated offenses, and “who is determined to be a[n SVP]
- 10 -
J-S10011-22
under section 9799.24 (relating to assessments) due to a mental abnormality
or personality disorder that makes the individual likely to engage in predatory
sexually violent offenses.” Id. § 9799.12. An act is considered “predatory”
under SORNA if it is “directed at a stranger or at a person with whom a
relationship has been initiated, established, maintained or promoted, in whole
or in part, in order to facilitate or support victimization.” Id.
Appellant does not dispute his guilty plea to sexually violent offenses.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.12, 9799.14; see also Anders Brief at 17. He
argues, however, “since [Dr.] Muscari did not find that [Appellant] had
exhibited undue cruelty or manifestations of physical violence, her finding that
he is an SVP was not based upon sufficient evidence.” Anders Brief at 21.
The Commonwealth asserts Appellant waived this issue because he
failed to preserve it. See Commonwealth Brief at 11-15. The Commonwealth
emphasizes that Appellant, in his petition for reconsideration of sentence,
argued as to his SVP classification:
8. This Honorable Court designated [Appellant] as a sexually
violent predator (hereinafter SVP) after considering the testimony
provided by the Commonwealth.
9. The process and designation of SVP status has been ruled
unconstitutional.
10. The Pennsylvania Legislature has provided no guidance
regarding SVP status and this Honorable Court should vacate the
order designating [Appellant] as an SVP.
- 11 -
J-S10011-22
Petition for Reconsideration of Sentence, 5/7/21, at ¶¶ 8-10 (some
capitalization omitted);6 see also Commonwealth Brief at 11. The
Commonwealth further observes that Appellant, in his court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement, failed to raise a sufficiency challenge to his SVP
classification, and the trial court did not address sufficiency in its opinion. See
Commonwealth Brief at 12; see also Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/21, at 7
(rejecting Appellant’s constitutional challenge to his SVP classification, citing
Commonwealth v. Butler, 226 A.3d 972, 976 (Pa. 2020) (“the procedure
for designating individuals as SVPs under [42 Pa.C.S.A. §] 9799.24(e)(3) …
remains constitutionally permissible.”)).
Appellant disagrees. He argues,
since he has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the SVP determination, this issue is not waived for failure to raise
it in the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Fuentes, [991 A.2d
935,] 941, n.4. [(Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc) (holding a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an SVP determination
may be made on appeal).] Pa.R.Crim.P. 606(A)(7) sets forth the
manner in which a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting SVP [sic] and states that “[A] challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence [may be] made on appeal.”
Anders Brief at 17.
Upon review, we conclude Appellant has not waived this issue. See,
e.g., Fuentes, supra; Commonwealth v. Askew, 907 A.2d 624, 631 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (Lally-Green, J., concurring) (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 606(A)(7) and
____________________________________________
6 Appellant abandoned his constitutional challenge on appeal.
- 12 -
J-S10011-22
stating, “this Court has not required defendants to challenge the sufficiency
of the SVP evidence in a post-sentence motion”; thus, “[a]ppellant may
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his SVP determination for
the first time on appeal.”).
At the hearing, Dr. Muscari testified as the SOAB member who
conducted Appellant’s SVP assessment, and an expert in the field of sexual
deviance. N.T., 4/30/21, at 7-8. Appellant declined to be interviewed for Dr.
Muscari’s assessment. Id. at 8. Dr. Muscari testified about the documents
and information she reviewed in completing the assessment, and recounted
the facts of Appellant’s crimes. Id. at 10-11. Dr. Muscari referenced
Appellant’s juvenile record of sexual offenses (aggravated indecent assault
and voluntary deviate sexual intercourse). Id. at 11, 16; but see also id. at
11 (stating the SOAB “investigator was not able to get those records.”). Dr.
Muscari then addressed each of the statutory SVP factors seriatim. See
id. at 12-20; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(b)(1)-(4). Dr. Muscari stated
it was “significant” that Appellant perpetrated crimes against multiple minor
victims, and assaulted one of the victims “for a couple years[.]” N.T., 4/30/21,
at 12. Dr. Muscari conceded Appellant did not exceed the means necessary
to commit the offenses, but noted Appellant “threaten[ed] [the victims] not
to tell.” Id. Dr. Muscari detailed the nature of Appellant’s sexual contact with
the victims. Id. at 12-13. She also explained the relationship between
Appellant and the victims, i.e., they were acquaintances. Id. at 13; see also
- 13 -
J-S10011-22
id. at 14 (“when we look later at the predatory criteria, it’s how [Appellant]
manipulated that relationship and meets the predatory part.”). Dr. Muscari
considered the young ages of the victims, stating “that is consistent with
pedophilic disorder.” Id. at 14. Dr. Muscari conceded Appellant did not
display unusual cruelty during the commission of the crimes. Id. She also
considered the mental capacities of the victims:
In this case, there was no indication of diminished capacity
considering their ages at the time. However, these are very young
children, and, just by their age alone at the time of the offense[s],
that makes them very, very vulnerable and it also makes them
incapable of giving legal consent for any kind of sexual con[tact].
Id. at 15.
Dr. Muscari further considered Appellant’s age at the time of the
offenses, i.e., 26 to 28 years of age, stating it was significant that Appellant
“was considerably older than the victims[.]” Id. at 16. Dr. Muscari observed
no evidence that Appellant used illegal drugs or was under the influence at
the time of the offenses. Id. at 16-17. Dr. Muscari opined Appellant had a
mental abnormality, pedophilic disorder, since he exhibited, over a period in
excess of six months, interest, urges, fantasies or behaviors towards
prepubertal children. Id. at 17-19. Dr. Muscari stated Appellant’s “sexual
deviance is reasonably related to the risk of re-offense, according to the
literature.” Id. at 19. Finally, Dr. Muscari opined that Appellant’s deviant
behavior was predatory, as that term is defined by statute. She testified that
Appellant,
- 14 -
J-S10011-22
was close with all of his victims as a babysitter, or [as] the
paramour [of] one of the victim’s mothers, and he used these
relationships to gain access to these children. He did threaten at
least two of them, which is also part of that grooming process …
[T]herefore, he promoted these relationships, at least[] in part, to
facilitate sexual victimization, and, therefore, meets the predatory
criteria.
Id. at 19-20 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). Consequently, Dr. Muscari
classified Appellant as an SVP. Id. at 20.
On cross-examination, Dr. Muscari confirmed Appellant exhibited no
manifestations of physical violence or unusual cruelty, id. at 21-22, which
Appellant emphasizes on appeal. Anders Brief at 21.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated:
Having heard the testimony and the evidence before the Court, …
I find that the Commonwealth has met its burden in establishing
[Appellant] as [an SVP], not only by clear and convincing evidence
as required by the statute, but also, … they’ve established it by
beyond a reasonable doubt, as well.
N.T., 4/30/21, at 23-24.
After careful review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as the verdict winner, we conclude the evidence was sufficient
to support the trial court’s designation of Appellant as an SVP. Appellant’s
repeated sex crimes against multiple minors, combined with Dr. Muscari’s
testimony and pedophilia diagnosis, provide clear and convincing evidence
that Appellant suffers from a mental abnormality which makes him likely to
engage in predatory, sexually violent offenses. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12; see
also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stephens, 74 A.3d 1034, 1041-42 (Pa.
- 15 -
J-S10011-22
Super. 2013) (evidence that defendant was convicted of several sexual
offenses involving a minor, was diagnosed with pedophilia, and that expert
witness examined each statutory factor was sufficient to support defendant’s
classification as an SVP).
Although Dr. Muscari conceded Appellant did not manifest physical
violence or unusual cruelty, she also correctly observed that a defendant does
not have to meet all statutory factors to be classified as an SVP. N.T.,
4/30/21, at 22; see also Brooks, supra; Commonwealth v. Geiter, 929
A.2d 648, 652 (Pa. Super. 2007) (rejecting defendant’s sufficiency challenge
to SVP determination, which was supported by clear and convincing evidence,
where “[m]any of the [statutory] factors, including the lack of … gratuitous
violence or unusual cruelty, … favored” defendant). Accordingly, we agree
with Counsel that Appellant’s sufficiency challenge is frivolous.
Finally, our review of the record reveals no arguably meritorious issues
Appellant could raise on appeal. See Dempster, 187 A.3d at 272. We
therefore grant Counsel’s application to withdraw from representation and
affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Application to withdraw as counsel granted. Judgment of sentence
affirmed.
Judge Colins joins the memorandum.
Judge McLaughlin concurs in the result.
- 16 -
J-S10011-22
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 04/21/2022
- 17 -