In the Int. of: P.M., Appeal of: P.M.

J-S07031-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: P.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: P.M., MOTHER : No. 3095 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered November 9, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000509-2020
IN THE INTEREST OF: P.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: P.M., MOTHER : No. 3096 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered November 9, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000509-2022
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: P.M., MOTHER : No. 3097 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered November 9, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0000510-2020
J-S07031-23
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: P.M., MOTHER : No. 3098 EDA 2022
Appeal from the Decree Entered November 9, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000506-2022
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED APRIL 21, 2023
Appellant, P.M. (“Mother”), appeals from the decrees and orders entered
in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, granting the petition of
Appellee, Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (“DHS”), for
involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to her minor children,
P.L.M. and A.M.M. (“Children”), and changing the placement goal to adoption.
We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.
P.L.M. was born in May 2008. A.M.M. was born in January 2010. DHS first
became aware of the family in May 2020, when it received a General Protective
Services report regarding Mother’s struggles with bipolar disorder, incidents
of domestic violence, and sporadic periods of homelessness. (See Petition for
Goal Change for P.L.M., filed 8/24/22, at Exhibit A, ¶b). Specifically, Mother
and Children were homeless in May 2020. Mother and Children went to New
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Jersey to stay with Mother’s parents for a short time. Mother and Children
left the home after Mother “had been aggressive with the children’s maternal
grandmother … resulting in [Mother] being charged with assault.” (Id.)
Ultimately, Mother and Children returned to Philadelphia to reside with A.C.
(“Father”).1 Father later informed DHS that Mother “was very unstable,” and
Father “had never seen her exhibit such concerning behavior.” (Id.)
On May 5, 2020, DHS employees went to the family home for further
investigation. Upon arrival, DHS employees observed Mother speaking with
police officers outside the residence. The police officers informed DHS that
Mother had called for assistance alleging that Father was abusive. The DHS
employees questioned Children about the incident separately. Children stated
that their parents argued frequently, and Father would “beat the demons” out
of Mother. (Id. at ¶d). Children also confirmed that during their most recent
stay in the family home, Father “pinned [Mother] to the floor” during an
argument. (Id.)
On May 14, 2020, DHS filed separate dependency petitions for P.L.M.
and A.M.M. The court adjudicated Children dependent on June 26, 2020. In
conjunction with the dependency petitions, the court granted legal custody of
Children to DHS. In turn, DHS placed Children into kinship care with their
maternal uncle and aunt. Children have remained with their maternal uncle
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1Father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights on November 9, 2022, and
he is not a party to the current appeals.
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and aunt ever since. (See N.T. Termination Hearing, 11/9/22, at 14, 55-57).
Mother received single case plan objectives, including referrals to the
Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) for parenting classes, an evaluation
from Behavioral Health Services (“BHS”), domestic violence and healthy
relationship classes, and obtaining employment. (Id. at 16). Initially, Mother
was slow to comply with her objectives. Nevertheless, Mother’s “compliance
level went upward [in] May of 2022.” (Id. at 21).
On August 23, 2022, DHS filed a petition for the involuntary termination
of Mother’s parental rights to A.M.M. On August 24, 2022, DHS filed a petition
for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights to P.L.M. DHS also
filed corresponding petitions seeking to change Children’s goals to adoption.
The court conducted a termination hearing on November 9, 2022. At the
hearing, the court received testimony from Mother and the Community
Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) case manager. Following the hearing, the court
entered decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children. The court
entered separate orders noting the change of Children’s goal to adoption. On
December 6, 2022, Mother timely filed separate notices of appeal and concise
statements of errors. This Court consolidated the matters sua sponte on
December 29, 2022.
Mother now raises four issues for this Court’s review:
Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the parental rights of Mother … pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. Section 2511(a)(1) without clear and convincing
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evidence that Mother failed to perform her parental duties.
Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the rights of Mother … pursuant to 23 Pa C.S.A.
Section 2511(a)(2) without clear and convincing evidence
of Mother’s present incapacity to perform her parental
duties.
Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the rights of Mother … pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
Sections 2511(a)(5) and 2511(a)(8) without clear and
convincing evidence that the conditions that led to
placement continue to exist when Mother presented
evidence of compliance with the goals and objectives of her
single case plan.
Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by
terminating the rights of Mother … pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.
Section 2511(b) without clear and convincing evidence that
there is no parental bond between Mother and children and
that termination would serve the best interest of the
children.
(Mother’s Brief at 7).
Appellate review in termination of parental rights cases implicates the
following principles:
A parent’s right to make decisions concerning the care,
custody, and control of his or her children is among the
oldest of fundamental rights. The time-tested law of the
Commonwealth requires that we balance this intrinsic
parental interest within the context of a child’s essential
needs for a parent’s care, protection, and support. We
readily comprehend the significant gravity of a termination
of parental rights, which has far-reaching and intentionally
irreversible consequences for the parents and the child. For
these reasons, the burden of proof is upon the party seeking
termination to establish by clear and convincing evidence
the existence of the statutory grounds for doing so. [C]lear
and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so
clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier
of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of
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the truth of the precise facts in issue. Because of this
serious impact attending the termination of parental rights,
it is important that a judicial decree extinguishing such
rights be based solely on competent evidence.
In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental
rights, appellate review is limited to a determination of
whether the decree of the termination court is supported by
competent evidence. This standard of review corresponds
to the standard employed in dependency cases, and
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
supported by the record, but it does not require the
appellate court to accept the [trial] court’s inferences or
conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings are
supported, we must determine whether the trial court made
an error of law or abused its discretion. An abuse of
discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
court might have reached a different conclusion; we reverse
for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of
manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill
will. Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law,
or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
decision, the decree must stand. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have
first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings. However, [w]e must employ a broad,
comprehensive review of the record in order to determine
whether the trial court’s decision is supported by competent
evidence.
In re Adoption of C.M., ___ Pa. ___, ___, 255 A.3d 343, 358-59 (2021)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
DHS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental
rights on the following grounds:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to
a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
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(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a
period of at least six months immediately preceding
the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled
purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or
has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
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(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating
the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b). “Parental rights may be involuntarily
terminated where any one subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along
with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In re Z.P., 994
A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2010).2
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only
if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court
engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to
Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of
the child under the standard of best interests of the child.
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2 DHS also sought the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights
under Section 2511(a)(2), (5) and (8), but we need only analyze Section
2511(a)(1) for purposes of this appeal.
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In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
Mother’s issues are related, and we address them together. Mother
contends that she successfully completed her case plan objectives by the time
of the termination hearing. Mother emphasizes that she completed her
referrals to ARC, obtained a BHS evaluation, and finished programs on
domestic violence and healthy relationships. Although Mother had yet to
obtain suitable housing, Mother maintains that a court cannot terminate
parental rights based solely on an environment factor such as housing.
Mother acknowledges that her visits with Children were virtual. Mother
insists, however, that Children “came into care during the worst time of the
COVID pandemic,” and she “always asked about the children” whenever she
contacted the CUA case manager. (Mother’s Brief at 21). Mother also
acknowledges that visitation is at Children’s discretion. To the extent that
Children might have been reluctant to engage in visitation due to the family’s
history with domestic violence, Mother notes that Father left the family
residence in January 2022. Mother complains that the CUA case manager
failed to inform Children about Father’s departure, and Children might have
desired more visitation if they had known that Father was no longer in the
home. Under these circumstances, Mother asserts that she “never evidenced
a settled purpose of relinquishing her parental rights nor has she refused to
perform her parental duties.” (Mother’s Brief at 23). Thus, Mother insists that
DHS failed to present clear and convincing evidence warranting termination
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under Section 2511(a)(1).
Regarding Section 2511(b), Mother argues that the CUA case manager
did not testify about the existence of a bond between Mother and Children.
Mother posits:
It is impossible to assess the bond between Mother and …
Children and whether termination of Mother’s parental
rights would have a detrimental effect on … Children based
on the fact that she [did not] have the opportunity to visit
with … Children for some time prior to the termination of
parental rights hearing. Mother’s ability to deepen and
strengthen the bond between her and her children was
limited by the actions of [DHS] and [its] agents.
(Id. at 31-32). Mother also insists that the CUA case manager’s testimony
and the comments from Children’s legal counsel established that Children and
Mother love each other. Based upon the foregoing, Mother concludes the
court erred and abused its discretion by terminating her parental rights. We
disagree.
“A court may terminate parental rights under subsection 2511(a)(1)
when the parent demonstrates a settled purpose to relinquish parental claim
to a child or fails to perform parental duties for at least six months prior to
the filing of the termination petition.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 10 (Pa.Super.
2009).
Though we do not adhere to any strict definition of parental
duty, a child has a right to essential parental care, and our
jurisprudence reveals certain irreducible qualities of a
parent’s attendant obligation. Foremost, it is a positive duty
requiring affirmative performance. [C]ommunication and
association are essential to the performance of parental
duty[.] [P]arental duty requires that a parent exert himself
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to take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.
A parent must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting
obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parent-child
relationship, or his rights may be forfeited. Parental rights
are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities
while others provide the child with his or her physical and
emotional needs.
Adoption of C.M., supra at ___, 255 A.3d at 364 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Regarding the six-month period prior to filing the termination petition:
[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given
case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory
provision. The court must examine the individual
circumstances of each case and consider all explanations
offered by the parent facing termination of his or her
parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the
totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the
involuntary termination.
In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 582 Pa.
718, 872 A.2d 1200 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
Under Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether termination
will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520
(Pa.Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability
are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child. The
court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying
close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond.”
Id. (internal citations omitted). “In this context, the court must take into
account whether a bond exists between child and parent, and whether
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termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.”
In re Z.P., supra at 1121.
Instantly, the court received testimony from Kim Augustus, the CUA
case manager. Ms. Augustus was assigned to this case in September 2021.
(See N.T. Termination Hearing at 10). Nevertheless, she was familiar with
the entire case file, which she was responsible for maintaining. (Id. at 11).
Ms. Augustus identified Mother’s single case plan objectives, and she indicated
that Mother had achieved substantial compliance with her objectives by the
time of the hearing. (Id. at 16, 21). However, Mother’s compliance level was
“minimal” when Ms. Augustus first inherited the case, and Mother compliance
level began to “shift upward” as recently as May 2022. (Id. at 21).
Ms. Augustus confirmed that visits occur at Children’s discretion. (Id.
at 22). P.L.M. no longer wished to visit with Mother at the time of the hearing,
and her last visit occurred in November 2021. (Id.) Likewise, A.M.M. no
longer wished to visit with Mother. (Id. at 56). Ms. Augustus could not
provide the date of Mother’s last visit with A.M.M.3 Nevertheless, Ms.
Augustus explained that A.M.M. did not want to continue visitation because
“she does not like how she feels after visiting with her mother.” (Id.)
Regarding a parent/child bond, Ms. Augustus could not state whether it
exists. (Id. at 24, 57). Children, however, do not look to Mother for care,
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3Later in the hearing, the child advocate stated that A.M.M.’s last visit with
Mother occurred during “holiday time last year.” (Id. at 71).
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comfort, or support. (Id. at 24, 58). Rather, Children have developed a close
relationship with their maternal uncle and aunt, on whom they rely for
stability. (Id. at 25, 58). Consequently, Ms. Augustus opined that Children
would not suffer irreparable harm if the court terminated Mother’s parental
rights. (Id. at 58). Further, Ms. Augustus testified that a goal change to
adoption was in Children’s best interests. (Id. at 27, 58).
Following the testimony from Ms. Augustus, the court received
argument from the guardian ad litem and the child advocate. The guardian
ad litem agreed that termination was warranted. While the guardian ad litem
commended Mother for her efforts at compliance with the case plan objectives,
he argued that Mother had done “[t]oo little, too late.” (Id. at 46). The child
advocate agreed that termination was in Children’s best interests. (Id. at 49).
The child advocate also provided insight into Children’s relationship with
Mother and their desire to be adopted. The child advocate discussed P.L.M.
as follows:
She wasn’t angry. She wasn’t resentful. She just believed
that Mother had issues. But she said she believes that her
mother loves her. And she still doesn’t want any contact
with her. Her concerns were Mother’s mental health.
And she felt like Mother needed to prove to them, or to her
… that she was in touch with her emotional and
psychological needs before she would be able to care for
[P.L.M.], which I thought was very mature. She also
indicated that the home in which they lived, and she
believes her mother still lives, was deplorable. And that
even if her mother moved, she doesn’t want to go there.
She stated that in her resource home she has a space. She
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has her own room. She has a family that spends time with
her, engaged in activities with her, is supportive of her. She
also, which was striking to me, indicated that the resource
parents have a good relationship. And that was very
important to her.
(Id. at 47).
The child advocate expressed similar sentiments from A.M.M.:
And it’s interesting that she still does not want to see Mother
based on the same fears, concerns about Mother’s mental
stability. Although she did not indicate that she had as
much compassion for Mother. She wasn’t angry. But she
just didn’t find that Mother’s issues were her concern. And
she—as I said, she still does not want to see her.
* * *
[A.M.M.’s] not an old soul, but she’s mature. And it’s
apparent that whatever the parents were going through
when she was living with them [has] left a scar on her as
well. And so she said that she wants to have the resource
parents as parents.
She doesn’t want to have to go through … what she went
through with her mother and father. And that she wants to
have her cousins as siblings. She too indicated she does not
want to live in a place without her sister. And that she has
found a place where she says she’s the most important
person there.
(Id. at 71-73).
The court considered the testimony and determined that DHS had
provided clear and convincing evidence in support of termination. When
explaining its decision, the court stated:
And while [Mother] may be substantially compliant at this
time, her progress has been recent. And at this time she
does not have appropriate housing for reunification to take
place…. The testimony reflects that [Children] would not
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suffer irreparable harm if [Mother’s] rights are terminated.
Notwithstanding again [Mother’s] recent completion of
some of the single case plan objectives, the children deserve
permanency. They both want to be adopted.
* * *
The developmental, physical, emotional needs and welfare
of the children are being met by their foster parents. The
inference would be that there is a bond with them. And they
are in the home where they are well cared for and where
they are currently thriving.
(Id. at 75-76). We accept the court’s analysis, which is supported by the
record.
While Mother argues that she did not demonstrate a settled purpose of
relinquishing her parental claim to Children, the record reveals a failure to
perform any parental duties since Children’s initial placement in June 2020.
See Adoption of C.M., supra; In re I.J., supra. Additionally, regardless of
whether a bond exists between Mother and Children, terminating Mother’s
parental rights would not destroy existing, necessary, and beneficial
relationships for Children. See In re Z.P., supra. Based upon the foregoing,
our review of the record confirms that clear and convincing evidence
supported termination of Mother’s parental rights under Sections 2511(a)(1)
and (b). Id. Consequently, we affirm the decrees terminating Mother’s
parental rights and the orders changing the placement goals to adoption.
Decrees and orders affirmed.
Judge Kunselman joins this memorandum.
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Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this
case.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/21/2023
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