Com. v. Cherry, A.

J-S20029-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ALLISON RENEE CHERRY :
:
Appellant : No. 1293 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 10, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001775-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OTT, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED AUGUST 29, 2018
Allison Renee Cherry appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
on August 10, 2017 in the Centre County Court of Common Pleas, following
her revocation from a county intermediate punishment (“IP”) program. The
court sentenced Cherry to a term of 12 months to five years’ incarceration.
Cherry raises claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence in sustaining
her IP violations and the discretionary aspects of her sentencing. Based on
the following, we affirm.
On July 4, 2013, a State College police officer found Cherry passed out
in a gas station parking lot. The officer detected a strong odor of alcohol and
observed Cherry to have bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. She admitted
she had been drinking and she performed unsatisfactorily on the field sobriety
J-S20029-18
tests. Video surveillance from the gas station confirmed that Cherry was
driving. Cherry was taken to the hospital and after agreeing to a blood draw,
the results revealed her blood alcohol content was 0.226%. See generally,
Affidavit of Probable Cause, 8/12/2013. She was charged with various crimes
related to the incident and on January 23, 2014, she pled guilty to driving
under the influence of alcohol (“DUI”).1 On March 27, 2014, the court
sentenced Cherry to a term of five years’ IP in the Centre County DUI Court
program.
Since that time, Cherry committed numerous violations of her IP
sentence and received five notices of those violations in the form of written
warnings on April 8, 2015, August 25, 2015, September 21, 2015, October
13, 2015, and June 28, 2017.2 Subsequently, on July 31, 2017, Cherry
____________________________________________
1 See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c).
2 With respect to each violation notification, the court did not revoke Cherry’s
IP but did warn of potential ramifications for misconduct. As to her first
violation, the court imposed a sanction of one month of enhanced curfew
compliance/electronic monitoring. As to her second violation, the court
instructed Cherry to follow her plan of action until she could be placed in a
rehabilitation facility. Subsequently, on August 27, 2015, the court issued an
order, requiring that Cherry attend and successfully complete an inpatient
treatment program at Pyramid Healthcare. With respect to her third violation,
Cherry received a sanction of one month of enhanced curfew
compliance/electronic monitoring, followed by 60 days of Transdermal Alcohol
Detection. Cherry did not receive any new sanctions with regard to her
remaining violations.
-2-
J-S20029-18
received her sixth notice of violations. No sanctions were imposed at the time,
but she was notified of a revocation hearing.
At the conclusion of the revocation hearing3 on August 10, 2017, the
court found Cherry violated conditions #1, #2, #4, #10, and #11 of her IP
sentence. The court explained its determination as follows:
[T]his Court revoked [Cherry]’s Intermediate Punishment
because it found that [she] had violated Conditions 1, 2, 4, 10,
and 11 of the Intermediate Punishment. DUI Condition 1 states
that [Cherry] had to comply with all municipal, county, state, and
federal criminal laws, as well as provisions of the Vehicle Code,
Controlled Substance, Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act, and the
Liquor Code. It was alleged that [Cherry] violated DUI Condition
1 when she pled guilty to a Public Drunkenness and Similar
Misconduct charge for incidents occurring on August 23, 2015.
[Cherry] also allegedly violated Condition 2, In-Home
Detention/Electronic Monitoring, by leaving her residence on
February 22, 2015 without authorization. [Cherry] allegedly
violated Condition 4, Leaving the Commonwealth Without
Permission, when she travelled to the Carolinas from July 25-29,
2017 without permission.
[Cherry] allegedly violated condition 10, Abstention from
Alcohol/Non-Prescribed Drugs on several occasions. First[,] she
admitted to having alcoholic beverages on August 15, 21, and 22,
of 2015. Several alcoholic beverages/empty alcoholic beverage
containers were found at her approved residence on June 27, 2017
allegedly violating Condition 10. [Cherry] allegedly violated
condition 10 when she tested positive for EtG (alcohol). She
admitted that she had consumed alcoholic beverages at an
establishment selling alcohol on April 30, 2017 and June 26, 2017.
[Cherry] allegedly violated Condition 11, Entering an
Establishment that Sells Alcohol. [Cherry] allegedly violated
condition 11 after she admitted that she was at Indigo Night
Club/Bar drinking alcohol on August 21 and 22 of 2015. [Cherry]
also admitted to violating condition 11 on April 30, 2017 and June
____________________________________________
3 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
-3-
J-S20029-18
26, 2017 by drinking alcohol at Pickles Bar. In total [Cherry]
received six notifications of violations for the incidents listed above
since entering the DUI Court Program by Court Order of March 27,
2014.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/2017, at 1-2. The court then revoked Cherry’s IP
sentence and imposed a term of 12 months to 5 years in state correctional
institution. This timely appeal follows.4
In her first argument, Cherry challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
regarding her revocation, complaining the court should not have revoked her
IP sentence based on her prior conduct in 2015 because those violations had
been previously subject to court sanctions, and therefore, the double jeopardy
clause5 applies. See Cherry’s Brief 15. Specifically, she states:
The double jeopardy clause of the constitution does not
preclude, as double punishment, a second sentencing where there
have been violations of a conditional sentence like probation or
intermediate punishment. Double jeopardy does not preclude the
remand for a new revocation hearing where a reviewing court has
determined that the evidence presented at the first revocation
hearing was insufficient to sustain the violation.
It does not follow, as the Commonwealth suggests, that
principles grounded in double jeopardy do not apply to the
revocation process. Collateral estoppel bars the Commonwealth
____________________________________________
4 On August 17, 2017, the trial court ordered Cherry to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Cherry filed a concise statement on September 1, 2017. The trial court issued
an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on October 6, 2017.
5 See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 147 A.3d 7, 13 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“The
double jeopardy clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibits retrial of a
defendant when the conduct of the prosecutor is intentionally undertaken to
prejudice the defendant to the point of denying him a fair trial.”) (citation
omitted).
-4-
J-S20029-18
from revoking parole based on conduct for which the probationer
was tried and acquitted prior to the violation hearing. It also
invalidates a probation violation based solely on a new conviction
that is subsequently vacated on appeal.
Res judicata differs from collateral estoppel only in that the
latter contemplates different adjudicative forums while the former
contemplates identical adjudicative forums. Res judicata
recognizes the sanctity of final judgment on a litigated claim and
protects the rights of the parties by barring the re-litigation of that
claim in a subsequent proceeding in the same forum. In the
context of probation and parole, it has been used by the
Commonwealth Court to bar a second revocation hearing where
the Parole Board found insufficient evidence of the claim at the
first hearing.
In the instant matter, revoking Ms. Cherry’s intermediate
punishment based on the 2015 conduct was barred by res
judicata. Unarguably, she was served with a notification of
violations for the 2015 conduct and a final determination was
made by the court that sanctions short of revocation and re-
sentencing was appropriate punishment for that conduct.
Id. at 15-17 (citations omitted).
We are guided by the following:
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of law
subject to plenary review. We must determine whether the
evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as the verdict winner, is sufficient to support all
elements of the offenses. A reviewing court may not weigh the
evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.
Commonwealth v. Perreault, 930 A.2d 553, 558 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(citations and internal quotations omitted), appeal denied, 945 A.2d 169 (Pa.
2008).
-5-
J-S20029-18
“Revocation of a probation sentence is a matter committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court and that court’s decision will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.” Id.6
When assessing whether to revoke probation, the trial court must
balance the interests of society in preventing future criminal
conduct by the defendant against the possibility of rehabilitating
the defendant outside of prison. In order to uphold a revocation
of probation, the Commonwealth must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that a defendant violated his probation.
Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 33 A.3d 31, 37 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation
marks and citations omitted), appeal denied, 49 A.3d 441 (Pa. 2012). “A
probation violation is established whenever it is shown that the conduct of the
probationer indicates the probation has proven to have been an ineffective
vehicle to accomplish rehabilitation and not sufficient to deter against future
antisocial conduct.”7 Commonwealth v. Ortega, 995 A.2d 879, 886 (Pa.
Super. 2010), appeal denied, 20 A.3d 1211 (Pa. 2011). “A trial court does
not necessarily abuse its discretion in imposing a seemingly harsh post-
revocation sentence where the defendant originally received a lenient
____________________________________________
6 This Court has previously held the revocation of a county intermediate
punishment sentence is equivalent to the revocation of probation. See
Commonwealth v. Philipp, 709 A.2d 920, 921 (Pa. Super. 1998); see also
Commonwealth v. Melius, 100 A.3d 682, 685-686 (Pa. Super. 2014).
7 “[T]he reason for revocation of probation need not necessarily be the
commission of or conviction for subsequent criminal conduct. Rather, this
Court has repeatedly acknowledged the very broad standard that sentencing
courts must use in determining whether probation has been violated[.]”
Commonwealth v. Ortega, 995 A.2d at 886 (citations and internal
quotations omitted).
-6-
J-S20029-18
sentence and then failed to adhere the conditions imposed on him.”
Commonwealth v. Schutzues, 54 A.3d 86, 99 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 67 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2013). Lastly, “technical violations
are sufficient to trigger the revocation of probation.” Commonwealth v.
Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted).
Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9773, a trial court may “revoke a sentence of
county intermediate punishment upon proof of a violation of specific conditions
of the sentence.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9773(b). Additionally, Subsection (c) requires
that before doing so, the trial court must conduct a hearing “at which the court
shall consider the record of the initial sentencing proceeding as well as the
conduct of the defendant while serving a sentence of county intermediate
punishment.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9773(c). See also Pa.R.Crim.P. 708 (violation of
probation, intermediate punishment, or parole: hearing and disposition).
Moreover, because Cherry argues the doctrines of collateral estoppel
and res judicata apply, we note: Both doctrines "preclud[e] parties from
contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate."
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Collateral estoppel “means simply that when an issue of
ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that
issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future
lawsuit.” Commonwealth v. Castro, 856 A.2d 178, 181-82 (Pa. Super.
2004). “Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action
-7-
J-S20029-18
precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could
have been raised in that action[.]” In re Stevenson, 40 A.3d 1212, 1222
(Pa. 2012), quoting Allen v. McCurry, 49 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
Here, the court explained its rationale for revoking Cherry’s IP sentence
as follows:
This Court found that the preponderance of evidence
presented supported the allegations that [Cherry] violated []
Conditions 1, 2, 4, 10, [and] 11. This Court notes, with heartfelt
regret, that [Cherry] was unable to follow the DUI Court
Conditions despite [Cherry] receiving leniency on many
opportunities in the hopes of rehabilitation. The six notices of
violations demonstrate that [Cherry] had continuously struggled
with rehabilitation while involved in the Intermediate Punishment.
The evidence before the Court demonstrated that Intermediate
Punishment was no longer a viable means of rehabilitating
[Cherry] and therefore revocation was in order.
The first issue complained of by [Cherry] concerning
Conditions 1 and 2 is that the incidents occurred at least two years
ago. This statement demonstrates that [Cherry] had difficulty
adhering to the Conditions of the Intermediate Punishment for
several years. This was further evidence that Intermediate
Punishment was not a viable means of rehabilitating [Cherry] and
therefore revocation was in order.
The second issue complained of by [Cherry] concerning
Conditions 1 and 2 is that [she] already suffered court sanctions
for the conduct at the time. This argument seems to implicate
collateral estoppel as the argument being asserted by [Cherry].
Collateral estoppel means simply that when an issue of ultimate
fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that
issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any
future lawsuit. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
Sanctions are a part of the Intermediate Punishment and
are an appropriate condition since they are intended to effectuate
rehabilitation and reintegration into society. The sanctions allow
the Court to discipline a [probationer] without having to revoke
the Intermediate Punishment. The sanction process starts when
-8-
J-S20029-18
the DUI team discovers a [probationer] violated a condition of the
Intermediate Punishment. Then the DUI team meets with this
Court to discuss whether the violation requires a sanction and if
so what sanction should the Court issue. Then on the day of the
DUI Court the DUI team initiates the discussion of the violation.
The [probationer] then has an opportunity to respond before the
sanction is issued. The sanctioning process for DUI Court is not a
judicial one but an administrative one. There is not an ultimate
fact which has been determined by a valid and final judgment in
the DUI Court sanctioning process which would trigger collateral
estoppel. Furthermore these violations demonstrate that the DUI
Court had tried to be lenient in the past in order for the
rehabilitation to succeed but [Cherry] was not able to comply with
the Conditions and therefore the Intermediate Punishment was
revoked.
…
Assuming arguendo, [Cherry]’s violations of Conditions 1, 2,
and 4 were not proper for consideration, this Court would still have
grounds for finding revocation was in order for the violations of
Conditions 10 and 11. [Cherry] admitted to entering an
establishment that sells alcohol, admitted to consuming alcohol,
and alcohol was found at her residence. These violations alone
demonstrate that Intermediate Punishment was not a viable
means of rehabilitating [Cherry] and therefore revocation was in
order.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/2017, at 3-5.
We agree with the court’s sound rationale.
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not provide the defendant with
the right to know at any specific moment in time what the exact
limit of his punishment will turn out to be. Congress has
established many types of criminal sanctions under which the
defendant is unaware of the precise extent of his punishment for
significant periods of time, or even for life, yet these sanctions
have not been considered to be violative of the Clause. Thus,
there is no double jeopardy protection against revocation of
probation and the imposition of imprisonment. (citation omitted).
There are other situations where probation may be revoked and
sentence of imprisonment imposed. (citations omitted).
-9-
J-S20029-18
Commonwealth v. Mysnyk, 527 A.2d 1055, 1056-1057 (Pa. Super. 1987)
(italics in original), appeal denied, 538 A.2d 498 (Pa. 1987).
Here, Cherry’s 2015 violations of Conditions 1 and 2, and resulting
sanctions, were not being relitigated by the trial court during the August 10,
2017, revocation hearing. Moreover, the Commonwealth was not pursuing
these claims for a second time but rather, was requesting the trial court to
consider Cherry’s multiple failures to adhere to the conditions of her IP in
determining whether or not to revoke it.8 N.T., 8/10/2017, at 3-4, 7-8.
Additionally, as noted by the trial court, these sanctions were administrative
in nature, not criminal, and based on the circumstances, it was evident that
Cherry was incapable of following simple DUI Court conditions despite
receiving numerous leniency opportunities.9 Cherry’s arguments concerning
collateral estoppel and res judicata do not persuade us otherwise.
Nevertheless, as the trial court found, even if the prior violations were
not proper for review, it would still have grounds for finding revocation based
on the fifth and sixth violations of Conditions 4, 10, and 11 in 2017.10 The
____________________________________________
8 With respect to the first four violations, there were no formal proceedings,
resulting in revocation. The court either ordered Cherry to one-month periods
of enhanced curfew compliance/electronic monitoring, placement at a
rehabilitation facility, or imposed no sanction.
9 It merits repeating that Cherry committed six violations since her sentencing
in March of 2014.
10 Cherry’s counsel admitted to her conduct supporting those violations. See
N.T., 8/10/2017, at 7.
- 10 -
J-S20029-18
court acted within its province when it determined that IP did not satisfy
Cherry’s rehabilitative needs. See Allshouse, supra. Furthermore, it merits
mention that when Cherry signed her “Centre County DUI Court Program –
Conditions of In-Home Detention/Electronic Monitoring,” she agreed to the
following:
I acknowledge that the Intermediate Punishment Program/In-
home Detention Program has been explained to me, and I have
been advised that under the law, the Court may at any time, for
cause, revoke or modify any condition of your Intermediate
Punishment Sentence.
I realize I am subject to arrest and incarceration, for cause, by
the Centre County Probation Department. The Court may, if it
sees fit, revoke my Intermediate Punishment Sentence and
impose an appropriate sentence.
N.T., 8/10/2017, Exhibit - Centre County DUI Court Program – Conditions of
In-Home Detention/Electronic Monitoring, 6/24/2014, at unnumbered 2.11
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly revoked Cherry’s IP
sentence, and her first argument fails.
In her second argument, Cherry contends that her sentence is
excessive. Cherry’s Brief at 18. Specifically, she states:
Absent the summary public drunkenness conviction and [the]
2015 technical violations, the [trial] court articulated that the April
2017 conduct of entering a bar, consuming, and possessing
alcoholic beverages “… alone demonstrated that Intermediate
____________________________________________
11 In her written guilty plea colloquy, Cherry indicated that she understood
her DUI offense carried a possible maximum prison term of five years, her
simple assault offense carried a possible maximum prison term of two years,
and that her DUI offense had a mandatory minimum sentence of one year.
See Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 3/13/2014, at unnumbered 2.
- 11 -
J-S20029-18
Punishment was not a viable means of rehabilitating [Cherry] and
therefore revocation was in order.” This reasoning ignores the
fact that at the time of the relapse it deemed her continued
outpatient counseling sufficient to address this brief relapse. One
is left with the inescapable conclusion that she was not
“disingenuous” in her [concise statement] and she was revoked
because that vacation she took with her girlfriend was the last
straw for her probation officer. There were no allegations of other
violations during this [sic] four days in July.
No one challenged her testimony she retained her sobriety.
There was nothing in the 2017 violations which would indicate that
it was likely that she would commit a future crime. There was no
allegations of operating an automobile during the entire course of
her intermediate punishment. There was no challenge to
testimony that she had a good job that she would lose if sent to
state prison.
Cherry’s Brief at 19-20 (record citation omitted).12 Cherry’s complaint
challenges the discretionary aspects of her sentence.
"[T]his Court’s scope of review in an appeal from a revocation
sentencing includes discretionary sentencing challenges.” Commonwealth
v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1034 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). Furthermore,
“[t]here is no absolute right to appeal when challenging the
discretionary aspect of a sentence.” Commonwealth v. Crump,
995 A.2d 1280, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2010); 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b).
Rather, an “[a]ppeal is permitted only after this Court determines
that there is a substantial question that the sentence was not
appropriate under the sentencing code.” Crump, supra at 1282.
In determining whether a substantial question exists, this Court
does not examine the merits of the sentencing claim.
Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (Pa.
1987).
____________________________________________
12 In her Rule 2119(f) statement, Cherry maintains that the trial court “abused
its discretion in sentencing her to an excessive sentence of state incarceration
based on mere technical violations of supervision.” Cherry’s Brief at 12.
- 12 -
J-S20029-18
In addition, “issues challenging the discretionary aspects of
a sentence must be raised in a post-sentence motion or by
presenting the claim to the trial court during the sentencing
proceedings. Absent such efforts, an objection to a discretionary
aspect of a sentence is waived.” Commonwealth v. Kittrell,
2011 PA Super 60, 19 A.3d 532, 538 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Furthermore, a defendant is required to preserve the issue in a
court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement and a
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement. Commonwealth v. Naranjo, 2012
PA Super 183, 53 A.3d 66, 72 (Pa. Super. 2012).
Cartrette, at 1042.
A review of the record reveals that while Cherry filed a timely notice of
appeal, and included in her appellate brief a statement of reasons relied upon
for appeal pursuant to Tuladziecki, supra, and Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), she did
not raise any objections to the sentence at sentencing and she did not file a
post-sentence motion for reconsideration. However, there is no indication in
the record that the trial court advised her of those post-sentence rights when
she was sentenced following the revocation of her IP. See N.T., 8/10/2017,
at 15-16. Therefore, we decline to find waiver on this basis. See
Commonwealth v. Patterson, 940 A.2d 493, 498 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“The
courts of this Commonwealth have held that a court breakdown occurred in
instances where the trial court, at the time of sentencing, either failed to
advise Appellant of his post-sentence and appellate rights or misadvised
him.”), appeal denied, 960 A.2d 838 (Pa. 2008). Therefore, we must
determine whether she has raised a substantial question justifying our review.
A substantial question exists when an appellant sets forth “a colorable
argument that the sentence imposed is either inconsistent with a specific
- 13 -
J-S20029-18
provision of the Sentencing Code or is contrary to the fundamental norms
underlying the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d
1128, 1133 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 161 (Pa. 2009)
(citation omitted). An allegation that the trial court failed to consider the
requirements of Section 9771(c) before imposing a sentence of total
confinement raises a substantial question that the sentence imposed was
“inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code.” Id. Moreover,
“a claim that a particular probation revocation sentence is excessive in light
of its underlying technical violations can present a question that we should
review.” Commonwealth v. Malovich, 903 A.2d 1247, 1253 (Pa. Super.
2006) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we proceed to an evaluation of Cherry’s
claim on appeal.
The Sentencing Code provides that, similar to the revocation of a
probationary sentence, when a trial court revokes a county intermediate
punishment sentence, “the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall
be the same as the alternatives available at the time of initial sentencing.” 42
Pa.C.S. § 9773(b). Moreover, Section 9771(c) precludes a trial court from
imposing a sentence of total confinement upon revocation of probation unless
the court finds one or more of the following:
(1) the defendant has been convicted of another crime; or
(2) the conduct of the defendant indicates that it is likely that
[s]he will commit another crime if [s]he is not imprisoned; or
- 14 -
J-S20029-18
(3) such a sentence is essential to vindicate the authority of the
court.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(c).
In explaining Cherry’s sentence, the court stated:
The final issue complained of on Appeal concerns whether
the Court abused its discretion in sentencing [Cherry] for going on
a short vacation without first receiving written permission.
[Cherry] travelled to the Carolinas from July 25-29,2017 without
permission from her probation officer. This violation was one of
many considered by the Court including the violation of Conditions
10 and 11. It would be disingenuous to state that this Court
sentenced [Cherry] to state incarceration for a short vacation
without receiving permission when there was evidence of other
violations before the Court.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/2017, at 5.
We find no abuse of discretion. “Technical violations can support
revocation and a sentence of incarceration when such violations are flagrant
and indicate an inability to reform.” Commonwealth v. Carver, 923 A.2d
495, 498 (Pa. Super. 2007). Cherry’s conduct has repeatedly demonstrated
that a term of imprisonment was essential to vindicate the authority of the
court. While focusing on the incidents that took place in 2017, Cherry
committed multiple, new violations, which broke three conditions of her IP
sentence. Even after Cherry received her fifth warning concerning her
violations, she still violated the terms for a sixth time within a one month
period. It is evident from the record that Cherry was not taking advantage of
the opportunities given to her by the trial court, including inpatient treatment
program, she was not reforming her behavior, and she had a clear disregard
- 15 -
J-S20029-18
for the authority of the court when she left the state without informing her
probation officer. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Cherry to a period of total confinement with regard to her IP
revocation. Therefore, Cherry’s discretionary aspects of sentencing claim
fails.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 08/29/2018
- 16 -