Com. v. Lawton, M.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MATTHEW ALLEN LAWTON :
:
Appellant : No. 1264 WDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 3, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Potter County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-53-CR-0000187-2010
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED: April 28, 2023
Matthew Allen Lawton (“Lawton”) appeals pro se from the order
dismissing his serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”)1 as untimely. We affirm.
In light of our disposition, we need not summarize the facts underlying
Lawton’s convictions. We briefly note that this Court affirmed Lawton’s
judgment of sentence in February 2014, and our Supreme Court denied his
petition for allowance of appeal on August 26, 2014. Lawton subsequently
filed three prior PCRA petitions to no avail. Relevantly, Lawton timely filed a
first PCRA petition, and the court appointed counsel (“first PCRA counsel”),
who filed an amended PCRA petition. The PCRA court denied relief, and this
Court affirmed the order on appeal. In his second PCRA petition, Lawton
asserted that first PCRA counsel was ineffective, and the PCRA court dismissed
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1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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that petition as untimely. This Court affirmed that order on appeal. Most
recently, in July 2021, this Court affirmed the dismissal of Lawton’s third PCRA
petition alleging newly discovered evidence, and our Supreme Court denied
allowance of appeal in January 2022. See Commonwealth v. Lawton, 260
A.3d 147, 305 WDA 2021 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum at 1-
3) (summarizing the procedural history of Lawton’s convictions and prior PCRA
petitions), appeal denied, 270 A.3d 1105 (Pa. 2022).
Lawton filed the instant pro se PCRA petition, his fourth, in May 2022.
Therein, Lawton asserted that our Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v.
Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), recognized a new constitutional right that
applies retroactively for collateral relief. The PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P.
907 notice of intent to dismiss the petition as untimely. Lawton did not
respond, and on October 3, 2022, the court entered an order dismissing
Lawton’s petition. Lawton timely appealed. The PCRA court did not order a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, but filed a statement in lieu of a Rule 1925(a)
opinion.
Lawton raises the following issues for review:
1. Did [Lawton] file his [s]econd PCRA [petition] in the right
juri[s]diction for PCRA ineffectiveness of PCRA Counsel?
2. If [Bradley] is not retroactive[, i]t s[h]ould be for reasons
stated in arguments.
Lawton’s Brief at 2.
Our standard of review is well-settled:
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Our review of a PCRA court’s decision is limited to examining
whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the
record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal
error. We view the record in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party in the PCRA Court. We are bound by any
credibility determinations made by the PCRA court where they are
supported by the record. However, we review the PCRA court's
legal conclusions de novo.
Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 954 (Pa. 2018) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
Lawton’s issues hinge on whether the PCRA court properly dismissed his
instant fourth PCRA petition as untimely, and we address both issues together.
Under the PCRA, any petition “including a second or subsequent petition, shall
be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final[.]” 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence becomes final “at the
conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). The
PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may
not address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely
filed. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).
As noted above, our Supreme Court, on August 26, 2014, denied
allowance of appeal from this Court’s order affirming Lawton’s conviction;
therefore, his judgment of sentence became final after the ninety-day period
for appeal to the United States Supreme Court expired, i.e., November 24,
2014. Accordingly, Lawton had until November 24, 2015, to file a timely PCRA
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petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); see also Commonwealth v.
Bankhead, 217 A.3d 1245, 1247 (Pa. Super. 2019); U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 13.1.
Lawton’s present petition, filed in May 2022, is thus facially untimely.
Pennsylvania courts may nevertheless consider an untimely PCRA
petition if the petitioner can plead and prove one of three exceptions set forth
in section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462,
468 (Pa. Super. 2013) (providing that a PCRA court must dismiss an untimely
petition if no exception is pleaded and proven). Section 9545(b)(1)(iii)
provides an exception to the PCRA's timeliness requirement if the petition
asserts “a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of
the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.”
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).2
Lawton’s arguments are sparse but they suggest that Bradley should
apply retroactively to allow the PCRA court to entertain the merits of his
second PCRA petition in which alleged first PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness.
The PCRA court concluded the timeliness exception at section 9545(b)(1)(iii)
did not apply because while the Bradley Court held that a PCRA petitioner
could raise claims of ineffectiveness at the first opportunity, including on
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2 Further, any PCRA petition invoking one of the timeliness exceptions in
section 9545(b)(1) “shall be filed within one year of the date the claim could
have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Here, Lawton filed the
instant petition within one year of the date our Supreme Court issued its
decision in Bradley.
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appeal, it did not state that its holding applied retroactively. See Rule 1925(a)
Statement in Lieu of Opinion, 11/21/22, at 1-2.
Initially, we note that Lawton’s arguments fail to address any of the
elements of the timeliness exception at section 9545(b)(1)(iii), and we may
affirm on that basis alone. See Albrecht, 994 A.2d at 1094 (noting that the
appellant bears the burden of establishing that a PCRA timeliness exception
applies). In any event, Lawton’s reliance on Bradley as a timeliness
exception is misplaced. The Bradley Court did not recognize a new
constitutional right but addressed the procedures for considering claims of
ineffective assistance of PCRA counsel on appeal in the same PCRA
proceeding, not a subsequent PCRA petition. See Bradley, 261 A.3d at 403-
04 (stating that the Court’s decision did not sanction “extra-statutory serial
petitions”); see also Commonwealth v. Stahl, --- A.3d ---, ---, 2023 WL
1793571 at *4 (Pa. Super. 2023) (concluding that “[n]othing in Bradley
creates a right to file a second PCRA petition outside the PCRA’s one-year time
limit as a method of raising ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel or permits
recognition of such a right”). Thus, the Bradley Court did not recognize a
new constitutional right nor did it hold that its decision would apply
retroactively in the manner Lawton asserts it should. Accordingly, we agree
with the PCRA court that Bradley does not constitute a timeliness exception
under section 9545(b)(1)(iii) and that it lacked jurisdiction to consider
Lawton’s fourth PCRA petition. See Albrecht, 994 A.2d at 1093.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/28/2023
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