Com. v. Diamond, T.

J-A02021-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
TERRY LEE DIAMOND JR. : No. 746 WDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered July 14, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-63-CR-0000437-2020
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: April 28, 2023
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (the Commonwealth) appeals from
the order entered on July 14, 2022, which denied its petition for entry of nolle
prosequi following our prior remand. See Commonwealth v. Diamond, 277
A.3d 1133 (Pa. Super. 2022) (unpublished memorandum). We vacate and
remand for the entry of an order consistent with this memorandum.
We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as
follows.1 On February 15, 2020, the Commonwealth charged Terry Lee
Diamond (the Defendant) with a number of crimes, including rape of a
mentally disabled person pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(a)(5). The
complainant (the Complainant), a 23-year-old female diagnosed with Down
Syndrome, reported to a forensic interviewer that the Defendant took her
____________________________________________
1 We provided a more detailed recitation of the facts of this case in our prior
decision. See Diamond, 277 A.3d 1133, at *1.
J-A02021-23
clothes off and touched her buttocks, hair, arms, and genitals without her
consent. The Complainant further asserted that the Defendant held her down
on the floor of his bedroom, inserted his penis into her vagina, and would not
let her go while he had sex with her without consent. The Commonwealth
filed a criminal information against the Defendant on March 17, 2020.
Citing prosecutorial discretion and the desire of the Complainant and her
mother to discontinue pursuit of criminal charges against the Defendant, in
April 2021, the Commonwealth filed a petition to nolle prosequi all of the
charges in this case. The Commonwealth averred that withdrawing the
charges was in the best interest of the Complainant given the unique
circumstances of this particular criminal case. Moreover, the Defendant
consented to the entry of nolle prosequi.
On April 9, 2021, the trial court held oral argument on the
Commonwealth’s petition to nolle prosequi. The Commonwealth explained
that the Complainant and her mother were no longer willing to participate
because they moved out of state and desired to drop the charges and avoid
re-traumatization of the Complainant. Because the Commonwealth’s
witnesses refused to appear, the Commonwealth filed its petition for nolle
prosequi “knowing [it] was not going to be able to put in any kind of evidence.”
On April 27, 2021, the trial court denied the Commonwealth’s motion for nolle
prosequi. A timely appeal ensued wherein a prior panel of this Court vacated
the order denying the petition for nolle prosequi and remanded the case for
additional proceedings.
-2-
J-A02021-23
Initially, in our prior memorandum decision, we set forth the applicable
legal principles as follows:
A nolle prosequi is a voluntary withdrawal by a prosecuting
attorney of proceedings on a particular criminal bill or information,
which at any time in the future can be lifted upon appropriate
motion in order to permit a revival of the original criminal bill or
information. As our Supreme Court has explained, a district
attorney has a general and widely recognized power to conduct
criminal litigation and prosecutions on behalf of the
Commonwealth, and to decide whether and when to prosecute,
and whether and when to continue or discontinue a case.
Nevertheless, after the filing of the criminal information, the
district attorney is not permitted to enter a nolle prosequi “without
having obtained the approval of the court.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8932.
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 585 further provides:
“[u]pon motion of the attorney for the Commonwealth, the court
may, in open court, order a nolle prosequi of one or more charges
notwithstanding the objection of any person.” Pa.R.Crim.P.
585(A).
The grant or refusal of a petition for nolle pros ... lies within the
sound discretion of the lower court, and its action will not be
reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Regarding the
abuse of discretion standard, our Supreme Court has explained:
The term discretion imports the exercise of judgment,
wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion
within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the
purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion
must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed
to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary
actions. Discretion is abused where the course pursued
represents not merely an error of judgment, but where the
judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not
applied or where the record shows that the action is a result
of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.
Although the trial court is granted discretion in determining
whether to grant or deny the Commonwealth's petition for nolle
prosequi, our Supreme Court has held there are two factors to be
considered when a request for a nolle prosequi is made: (1) is the
reason given by the Commonwealth for requesting the nolle
-3-
J-A02021-23
prosequi valid and reasonable, and (2) does the defendant, at the
time the nolle prosequi is requested, have a valid speedy trial
claim? The parties and the trial court agree that the Defendant's
speedy trial rights are not implicated in this case. Therefore,
under our Supreme Court's precedent, the trial court was
obligated to determine whether the reason given by the
Commonwealth for requesting the nolle prosequi was valid and
reasonable. In considering this factor, the trial court was required
... to consider the reason given by the Commonwealth, not to
intuit or infer a reason to justify the court's action.
Diamond, 277 A.3d 1133, at *4 (internal case citations, quotations, some
brackets, and unnecessary capitalization omitted).
We ultimately determined that “the trial court did not pass upon the
question of whether the Commonwealth's stated reason for requesting the
nolle prosequi was valid and reasonable. Instead, the trial court explained
that it denied the Commonwealth's petition because, it believed, “the
Commonwealth [could] sustain a prima facie case against the Defendant”
even absent the Complainant's testimony at trial. Id. at *3, citing Trial Court
Opinion, 4/27/2021, at 5. As such, this Court respectfully determined that
the basis supplied by the trial court was “contrary to the law and, thus,
constitute[d] an abuse of discretion.” Id. at *5. More specifically,
[w]e note[d] that the reason tendered by the trial court for
denying the Commonwealth's petition turned almost entirely upon
the trial court's view of the evidence, not on an assessment of the
explanation proffered by the prosecutor. The record [was] devoid
of evidence of steps taken by the trial court to ascertain the
desires and objectives of the [C]omplainant and her
guardian/mother, to assess whether those aims align[ed] with the
grounds for withdrawal offered by the Commonwealth, and, if so,
to consider whether those grounds were reasonable under the
circumstances. We[,] therefore, vacate[d] the trial court's order
and remand[ed] this case to the trial court, so that it may
determine, in the first instance, whether the reason given by the
-4-
J-A02021-23
Commonwealth for requesting the nolle prosequi was valid and
reasonable.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). “We further note[d] that the
Commonwealth is not required to prosecute a defendant merely because its
potential evidence could – if viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth – sustain a prima facie case against a defendant. The decision
to go forward with a prosecution will always be influenced by the prosecutor's
evaluation of the strength of the Commonwealth's potential case.” Id. at *5,
n.5 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). As such, in an unpublished
memorandum filed on April 11, 2022, this Court vacated the trial court’s order
denying the Commonwealth’s motion for nolle prosequi, remanded for further
proceedings, and relinquished jurisdiction.
Following our remand, the trial court scheduled a hearing for May 31,
2022 wherein it ordered the Complainant and her mother to be present. On
May 20, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a motion for reconsideration asking
the trial court to consider not requiring the attendance of the Complainant or
her mother. The trial court did not rule on the Commonwealth’s motion for
reconsideration before the hearing held on May 31, 2022. The Complainant
and her mother did not appear.2
____________________________________________
2 There is no notation on the trial court docket, as contained in the certified
record, that the hearing took place or that notes of testimony from that
hearing were ordered or transcribed. However, both the trial court and the
Commonwealth agree that the hearing commenced and that neither witness
attended. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 14; see Trial Court Opinion,
6/17/2022, at 6.
-5-
J-A02021-23
By opinion issued on June 17, 2022, the trial court again denied the
Commonwealth’s request to nolle prosequi the charges against the Defendant.
The trial court stated that “[s]ince mother/guardian has never appeared
before [it], despite being ordered to do so, [the trial c]ourt ha[d] no way to
determine if her concerns about retraumatizing the [Complainant] are
legitimate.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/17/2022, at 5. The trial court determined,
therefore, that it was “unable to discern” the “objectives and desires” of the
Complainant and her mother, as this Court directed upon remand, or
otherwise “to assess whether they align with the Commonwealth’s grounds
for withdrawing the case.” Id. at 6. Instead, the trial court again stated that
“the Commonwealth’s reason for seeking a nolle prosequi was an evidentiary
concern that the Commonwealth masqueraded as a ‘policy’ decision” because
“[c]learly, the Commonwealth’s concern was that without the testimony of the
[Complainant], it would be unable to present its case.” Id. at 11. Accordingly,
the trial court found that the Commonwealth’s proffered reason for nolle
prosequi was not valid or reasonable. Id. In summary, the trial court opined:
[The trial c]ourt [wa]s unconvinced that the Commonwealth’s
withdrawal was for a valid or reasonable purpose, and instead
turned on the Commonwealth’s concerns about the sufficiency of
the evidence and ease of prosecuting the case based on the
availability of evidence. Therefore, because the Commonwealth’s
concerns are evidentiary in nature, the [trial c]ourt reviewed the
evidence and decided that withdrawing the charges was
unnecessary. Furthermore, the Commonwealth can avoid
prosecuting the case without any exercise of judicial discretion
over the decisions of the Commonwealth.
* * *
-6-
J-A02021-23
In the event that the Commonwealth chooses not to call the case
to trial and the [speedy trial] time limit expires [pursuant to
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600], the [trial c]ourt recognize[d] that it would no
longer have any discretion over disposing with the case if [the
D]efendant were to file a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600.
Notably, Rule 600, unlike Rule 585, does not confer discretion
upon the court to decide whether to grant or deny the motion to
dismiss; rather, the court is required to do so if the time period in
Rule 600 has expired.
Next, [the trial c]ourt [] respond[ed] to [this] Court’s suggestion
[in conjunction with remanding the case] that [the trial court]
“ascertain the desires and wishes” of the [Complainant] and her
mother/guardian. Unfortunately, the [Complainant] and her
mother/guardian did not appear at the most recent hearing
scheduled following [] remand. Indeed, nowhere in Rule 585 or
elsewhere in the rules, is a requirement that the [trial c]ourt
summon witnesses for hearings. Regardless, the [trial c]ourt’s
decision was based solely on the evidence before it, not some
contrived vendetta against the [D]efendant or the
Commonwealth. Moreover, despite the [trial c]ourt’s order
directing the [Complainant] and her mother/guardian to appear,
they ignored the order and failed to do so, thus making it
impossible for the [trial c]ourt to ascertain their desires and
objectives.
Id. at 12-13. Additionally, the trial court “note[d] that at the time of the
incident the [D]efendant was the paramour of another of mother/guardian’s
daughters” and, although, “not aware of the current status of the relationship”
the trial court “raise[d] the possibility that mother/guardian may be motivated
by various factors.” Id. at 5. Finally, the trial court summarized and detailed
three, wholly unrelated cases wherein it granted nolle prosequi petitions for
the Commonwealth in order to “illustrate the reasons why [the trial c]ourt
declined to approve the Commonwealth's motion in in this case.” Id. at 13.
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court denied the
-7-
J-A02021-23
Commonwealth’s request to nolle prosequi the charges pending against the
Defendant. This timely appeal resulted.3
On appeal, the Commonwealth presents the following issues for our
review:
1. Did the trial court violate the law of the case doctrine by
relitigating issues decided by the Pennsylvania Superior Court
in a previous appeal of the case sub judice?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by manufacturing an
evidentiary reason for the Commonwealth’s petition for nolle
prosequi and replacing the Commonwealth’s given reason of
prosecutorial discretion based upon the wishes of the victim
with the court’s manufactured reason?
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in failing to address the
validity and reasonableness of the Commonwealth’s given
reason for the nolle prosequi?
____________________________________________
3 The Commonwealth filed a notice of appeal on June 22, 2022. The
Commonwealth certified that the order would terminate or substantially
handicap the prosecution in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). Upon review
of the trial court docket, while there was an opinion filed on June 17, 2022,
there was no accompanying order denying the Commonwealth’s petition for
nolle prosequi. On July 19, 2022, this Court entered an order to show cause
why the appeal should not be quashed. See Pa.R.A.P. 301(a)(1) (“[N]o order
of a court shall be appealable until it has been entered upon the appropriate
docket in the trial court”). The Commonwealth filed a timely response and
attached the order at issue from the trial court dated June 17, 2022, but the
order was not entered on the trial court docket until July 14, 2022. We
conclude that the instant appeal is ripe for review. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5)
(“A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a determination but
before entry of an appealable order shall be treated as filed after such entry
and the day thereof.”); see also Commonwealth v. McGarry, 172 A.3d 60,
63 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2017) (a premature appeal may be perfected by the
subsequent entry of an appealable order). On August 2, 2022, this Court
discharged its rule to show cause order. We have amended the caption and
our Court’s docket to reflect that the order appealed from was entered on July
14, 2022 rather than June 17, 2022.
-8-
J-A02021-23
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by finding the
Commonwealth’s discretionary basis for nolle prosequi invalid
and unreasonable without first finding a gross abuse of
discretion?
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by treating Pennsylvania
Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 as a procedural alternative to
nolle prosequi?
6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in finding the
Commonwealth could sustain a prima facie case against the
defendant without an evidentiary hearing?
7. Did the trial court’s refusal to grant the Commonwealth’s nolle
prosequi violate the separation of powers doctrine by
substituting the trial court’s own discretion for that of the
Commonwealth in the prosecution of a criminal matter?
Commonwealth’s Brief at 8-9 (complete capitalization and suggested answers
omitted).
In all of the issues presented, the Commonwealth contends that the trial
court abused its discretion in denying its petition to nolle prosequi criminal
charges. As set forth above, we review the denial of a request for nolle
prosequi for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs where the
trial court’s judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not
applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will.
In its first issue presented, the Commonwealth argues that the trial
court violated the law of the case doctrine by not following the remand
decision issued by this Court’s prior panel. Id. at 19-23. The Commonwealth
argues that “[t]he trial court simply made the same decision, based off the
same rationale, as in its first denial of the Commonwealth’s [nolle prosequi]
-9-
J-A02021-23
petition, even though that decision and rationale were deemed an abuse of
discretion.” Id. at 22. The Commonwealth posits that this Court already
decided that the trial court “intuited and inferred its own evidentiary reason
to deny” nolle prosequi and, therefore, must review the reason “the
Commonwealth provided” and “not some alternative evidentiary one provided
by the [trial] court itself.” Id. at 21. The Commonwealth assails the trial
court’s determination that the proffered reason for nolle prosequi, the
Complainant’s unwillingness to testify due to trauma and disability, equated
to the inability for the Commonwealth to present its case, arguing:
Of course, without the [Complainant’s] testimony the case
becomes likely impossible to prove, but that is not the reason the
Commonwealth sought its nolle prosequi. The Commonwealth has
decided to accept the [Complainant’s] wishes and not pursue the
case against her will. This is a discretionary decision separate
from the practical evidentiary [e]ffect that her absence creates.
This is a distinction that the [trial] court is either unwilling or
unable to accept.
Id. at 22 n.2.
The Commonwealth’s second, third, and fourth appellate arguments are
interrelated to each other as well as the first issue, so we will examine those
as well. As set forth above with relation to the first issue, and reiterated in its
second issue, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it “manufactured an evidentiary reason for the
Commonwealth’s petition for nolle prosequi and replaced the Commonwealth’s
given reason[.]” Id. at 23. The Commonwealth notes that “never once did
[it] state that the lack of a prima facie case was the basis for its petition to
- 10 -
J-A02021-23
nolle prosequi” and that “[t]he only reason any discussion of prima facie
evidence took place [was] because the trial court was focused on that issue.”
Id. at 29. In its third issue presented, the Commonwealth avers that
“[s]etting aside the [trial] court[’]s erroneous insistence that the
Commonwealth was basing its petition on lack of prima facie evidence and its
irrelevant review of the reasonableness of such a basis, the trial court spent
almost no time evaluating the reasonableness or validity of the
Commonwealth’s given reasons.” Id. at 32. The Commonwealth states that
while it “understands the [trial] court’s frustration” regarding the “continual
absence” of the Complainant and her mother from proceedings, the record
supports its given reasons to nolle prosequi and there is nothing suggesting
that the Complainant’s mother was not acting in her daughter’s best interest.
Id. at 33-34. Furthermore, in its fourth appellate issue, the Commonwealth
argues that the trial court “incorrectly applied a de novo standard [of] review
of the evidence to determine if the Commonwealth could sustain a prima facie
case instead of applying a gross abuse of discretion to determine if its petition
for nolle prosequi was reasonable[.]” Id. at 38. Upon review, we agree with
the Commonwealth’s assessment.
The law of the case doctrine “refers to a family of rules which embody
the concept that a court involved in the later phases of a litigated matter
should not reopen questions decided by another judge of that same court or
by a higher court in the earlier phases of the matter.” Commonwealth v
Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995). “Among the related but distinct rules
- 11 -
J-A02021-23
which make up the law of the case doctrine are that: ... (2) upon a second
appeal, an appellate court may not alter the resolution of a legal question
previously decided by the same appellate court....” Id. Moreover, “where a
case is remanded to resolve a limited issue, only matters related to the issue
on remand may be appealed.” Commonwealth v. Lawson, 789 A.2d 252,
252 (Pa. Super. 2001).
Here, following our remand, the trial court essentially republished the
same decision that it originally issued. As conceded by the trial court, there
was no additional record evidence taken following our remand. Therefore, the
trial court was “unable to discern” the “objectives and desires” of the
Complainant and her mother and concluded that it was “unconvinced that the
Commonwealth’s withdrawal was for a valid or reasonable purpose, and
instead turned on the Commonwealth’s concerns about the sufficiency of the
evidence and ease of prosecuting the case based on the availability of
evidence.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/17/2022, at 12. The prior panel previously
determined that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the Commonwealth’s
request to nolle prosequi based upon the trial court's view of the evidence,
not on an assessment of the explanation proffered by the prosecutor. As such,
a prior panel of this Court specifically directed the trial court to examine
whether the reason given by the Commonwealth for requesting nolle prosequi
was valid and reasonable upon remand. See Diamond, 277 A.3d 1133, at
*4 (unpaginated). Remand was limited to making that determination and the
trial court stated it was still unable to reach a conclusion. Hence, bound by
- 12 -
J-A02021-23
the prior panel’s decision, we find the trial court’s actions still amount to an
abuse of discretion. Additionally, we note that the trial court erred by
comparing this case with other cases pending before it. The trial court was
specifically directed to examine the reason given by the Commonwealth in
this matter only. Finally, a prior panel of this Court previously determined
that the Commonwealth has a valid and reasonable basis for nolle prosequi if
a key witness fails to appear for trial. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 262
A.3d 553, at *15 (Pa. Super. 2021) (unpublished memorandum)4 (“The
prosecutor had a valid and reasonable basis to request [] nolle prosequi, as
the Commonwealth’s key witness failed to appear for [Harris’] pending trial,
and a bench warrant was issued for the witness.”). Accordingly, we find the
Commonwealth is entitled to relief.
Next, we briefly address the Commonwealth’s fifth issue presented on
appeal, wherein the Commonwealth asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion by “treating Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 as an
equivalent procedural alternative to nolle prosequi.” Commonwealth’s Brief
at 42. The Commonwealth faults the trial court’s proposal that it was not
demanding or suggesting that the case be brought to trial, because a denial
of nolle prosequi “is an order from the court to continue prosecution.” Id. at
43. Whereas, “Rule 600 is a procedural safeguard used by the defendant to
____________________________________________
4 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (unpublished non-precedential decisions of the
Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive
value).
- 13 -
J-A02021-23
preclude the Commonwealth from continuing a prosecution.” Id. at 44. The
Commonwealth contends that it “can lift a nolle prosequi and continue the
prosecution of the case so long as it is within the statute of limitations, which
is not possible if the case is dismissed via Rule 600.” Id. (citation omitted).
We conclude that the trial court erred as a matter of law in deciding to
deny nolle prosequi because the Commonwealth could forego prosecution and
permit the Defendant to file a motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.
Rule 600 governs prompt trials. Our Supreme Court has determined that
although Rule 600 “is a rule-based right … rather than the distinct
constitutional right to a speedy trial, [appellate courts are to] remain
conscious of the essential purpose of Rule 600 and the important constitutional
interest that it safeguards—an interest which underlies all [] Rule 600
jurisprudence.” Commonwealth v. Barbour, 189 A.3d 944, 954 (Pa. 2018).
Our Supreme Court stated:
[the Supreme Court] promulgated Rule 600, as well as its
predecessor Rule 1100, in response to the Supreme Court of the
United States' decision in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972),
in order to provide a concrete standard for effectuating and
protecting a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
The right to a speedy, public trial is one of the most basic rights
preserved by our Constitution. Because the exercise of the
government's power to detain an individual pending a criminal
prosecution places a heavy burden upon the accused, the speedy
trial guarantee is an important safeguard to prevent undue and
oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and
concern accompanying public accusation and to limit the
possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to
defend himself. For a person subject to pre-trial incarceration:
- 14 -
J-A02021-23
The time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact
on the individual. It often means loss of a job; it disrupts
family life; and it enforces idleness. Most jails offer little or
no recreational or rehabilitative programs. The time spent
in jail is simply dead time. Moreover, if a defendant is locked
up, he is hindered in his ability to gather evidence, contact
witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense. Imposing
those consequences on anyone who has not yet been
convicted is serious. It is especially unfortunate to impose
them on those persons who are ultimately found to be
innocent.
Moreover, even for an individual who secures his release on bail
and will await trial outside of a jail cell, the foreboding promise of
an impending prosecution is a heavy weight to carry. Even if an
accused is not incarcerated prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged
by restraints on his liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety,
suspicion, and often hostility. Because the power to deprive one
of his liberty is of such consequence, because the attendant
disturbance to one's life is so momentous, the right to a speedy,
public trial is a core component of the procedural rights afforded
to the accused under the Constitution, as fundamental as any of
the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment.
Id. at 954–955 (internal quotations, footnotes, and most citations omitted).
“[D]ismissal of the indictment ‘is the only possible remedy’ for deprivation of
the right to speedy trial.” Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 359 A.2d 174, 176
(Pa. 1976), citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 522.
Whereas,
[a] nolle prosequi is a voluntary withdrawal by a prosecuting
attorney of proceedings on a particular criminal bill or information,
which at anytime in the future can be lifted upon appropriate
motion in order to permit a revival of the original criminal bill or
information. Since a nolle prosequi acts neither as an acquittal
nor a conviction, double jeopardy does not attach to the original
criminal bill or information.
- 15 -
J-A02021-23
Commonwealth v. Ahearn, 670 A.2d 133, 135 (Pa. 1996) (citations
omitted).
In this case, the trial court erred by contemplating that Rule 600 was a
procedural mechanism for the Commonwealth to achieve the same result as
nolle prosequi. As caselaw examining Rule 600 makes clear, the Rule is
intended to preserve the fundamental right to a speedy trial, safeguard undue
and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, minimize anxiety and concern
accompanying public accusation, and to limit the possibilities that long delay
will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself. This is because the
exercise of the government's power to detain an individual pending a criminal
prosecution places a heavy burden upon the accused. We cannot condone
continued restraints upon the Defendant’s liberty where the Commonwealth
has no desire to proceed, has offered a reasonable basis for nolle prosequi,
and the Defendant would essentially be forced to file his own motion to dismiss
pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. Furthermore, Rule 600 requires dismissal of
the indictment and bars future prosecution, whereas nolle prosequi is a
voluntary withdrawal which may be retracted to permit the revival of the
proceedings on the original bill or information so long as the statute of
limitations has not expired. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion by suggesting that Rule 600 was an alternative avenue
for Commonwealth relief.
In its final two appellate arguments, the Commonwealth contends that
the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the Commonwealth could
- 16 -
J-A02021-23
sustain a prima facie case against the Defendant without having an evidentiary
hearing and that the trial court violated the separation of powers doctrine.
See Commonwealth’s Brief at 45-50; id. at 50-57. Having already determined
that the Commonwealth is entitled to relief, however, we need not address
these additional contentions.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
the Commonwealth’s motion to nolle prosequi criminal charges against the
Defendant. As such, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for the
entry of an order granting the Commonwealth’s motion for nolle prosequi and
dismissing the pending criminal charges in this matter.
Order vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/28/2023
- 17 -