Com. v. Law, S.

J-S23004-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
STEPHEN E. LAW
Appellant No. 1333 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 6, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): MC-51-CR-0005716-2011
BEFORE: OLSON, SOLANO and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, JJ.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2017
Appellant, Stephen E. Law, appeals from the order entered on April 6,
2016, which denied Appellant’s petition for a writ of certiorari. We affirm.
The trial court ably explained the underlying facts and procedural
posture of this case:
On February 9, 2011, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Officer
[Confesor] Nieves and his partner, Officer Palmiero, were
patrolling in full uniform and marked vehicles in the 12 th
District [of Philadelphia]. Officer Nieves observed Appellant
driving a Dodge Neon, leaning down in the driver seat and
reaching over to the passenger seat of the vehicle while
drifting into the adjacent right lane. [The] officers initiated
a traffic stop and Appellant stopped on signal. The officers
observed that Appellant’s eyes were watery and bloodshot
and that his movements were very quick.
When the officers returned to the patrol car to conduct their
investigation, they observed Appellant continue to lean into
the passenger seat. Based upon Appellant’s actions and
prior record, the officers suspected that he might be armed.
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The officers asked Appellant to step out of the car and
observed him throw something into the dashboard. Officers
patted Appellant down for weapons with negative results,
and placed him in the back of the patrol car. Officers then
searched a compartment in Appellant’s dashboard and
recovered a Marlboro cigarette package containing two and
a half white pills, half a blue pill[,] and a small plastic bag
containing a green leafy substance.
At some time during the investigation but before Appellant
was handcuffed, Appellant stated that he smoked marijuana
two days earlier and had taken Xanax hours earlier.
Appellant was subsequently arrested on the scene.
...
[The Commonwealth] charged [Appellant] with [driving
under the influence (“DUI”), possession of a controlled
substance, and possession of a small amount of
marijuana.1] Appellant was also charged with a summary
traffic offense: careless driving pursuant to [75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 6308(a)]. . . .
On April 13, 2011, Appellant [pleaded guilty to the
summary traffic offense of careless driving in the
Philadelphia Traffic Court]; the other charges were not
adjudicated on that date. On October 19, 2015, Appellant
moved to dismiss the three remaining misdemeanors . . . ,
arguing that the Commonwealth was barred from
prosecuting him under the compulsory joinder provision of
[18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110(1)(ii)] because he had been previously
convicted of a traffic violation in the Traffic Division. [The
trial court] denied Appellant’s motion. . . .
On December 3, 2015, Appellant was found guilty[, in the
Municipal Court of Philadelphia,] of DUI, possession of a
controlled substance, and possession of a small amount of
marijuana and, on February 3, 2016[,] he was sentenced to
three days to six months [in jail] and a concurrent period of
[12 months of probation]. On April 6, 2016, [the
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1
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802 and 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16) and (31), respectively.
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Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas denied Appellant’s
petition for writ of certiorari and,] on April 26, 2016,
Appellant[] filed a timely notice of appeal. . . .
Trial Court Opinion, 7/26/16, at 1-3 (internal citations and some internal
capitalization omitted).
Appellant raises one claim on appeal:
Did not the lower court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion
to dismiss pursuant to [18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110(1)(ii)] where
[Appellant] had previously been convicted of an offense
which arose from the same criminal episode in the same
judicial district as the offense in the instant case?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
In interpreting 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110, also known as the compulsory
joinder statute, “our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review
is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66, 71 (Pa. 2008).
Penal statutes are to be strictly construed. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(1).
Further, we note that the following principles govern our interpretation of a
statute:
When construing provisions utilized by the General
Assembly in a statute, our primary goal is to ascertain and
effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every
statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its
provisions. However, when the words of a statute are clear
and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Words
and phrases shall be construed according to the rules of
grammar and according to their common and approved
usage. In other words, if a term is clear and unambiguous,
we are prohibited from assigning a meaning to that term
that differs from its common everyday usage for the
purpose of effectuating the legislature's intent. Additionally,
we must remain mindful that the General Assembly does
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not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or
unreasonable.
It is axiomatic that the plain language of a statute is the
best indication of the legislative intent that gave rise to the
statute.
Words and phrases shall be construed according to the rules
of grammar and according to their common and approved
usage; but technical words and phrases and such others as
have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning or are
defined in this part, shall be construed according to such
peculiar and appropriate meaning or definition.
Commonwealth v. Giordano, 121 A.3d 998, 1003-1104 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(internal citations, quotations and brackets omitted).
“The compulsory joinder statute is a legislative mandate that a
subsequent prosecution for a violation of a provision of a statute that is
different from a former prosecution, or is based on different facts, will be
barred in certain circumstances.” Id., citing 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110. As
amended in 2002, and relevant here, section 110 states:
§ 110. When prosecution barred by former
prosecution for different offense
Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different
provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is
based on different facts, it is barred by such former
prosecution under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a
conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to
when prosecution barred by former prosecution for same
offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:
(i) any offense of which the defendant could have been
convicted on the first prosecution;
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(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising
from the same criminal episode, if such offense was
known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time
of the commencement of the first trial and occurred
within the same judicial district as the former
prosecution unless the court ordered a separate trial of
the charge of such offense[.]
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110.
Thus, section 110(1)(ii) contains four requirements that, if met,
preclude a subsequent prosecution for a different offense:
(1) the former prosecution must have resulted in an
acquittal or conviction;
(2) the current prosecution is based upon the same criminal
conduct or arose from the same criminal episode as the
former prosecution;
(3) the prosecutor was aware of the instant charges before
the commencement of the trial on the former charges; and
(4) the current offense occurred within the same judicial
district as the former prosecution.
Fithian, 961 A.2d at 71-72.
Also relevant to the case at bar is 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 1302. Section 1302
governs the jurisdiction and venue of traffic courts. As this Court has held,
“[i]n judicial districts with a designated and open traffic court. . . [Section]
1302. . . effectively carves out an exception to the normal operation of the
compulsory joinder rule.” Commonwealth v. Perfetto, ___ A.3d ___,
2017 PA Super 281, at *13 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc). In relevant part,
Section 1302 provides:
§ 1302. Jurisdiction and venue
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(a) General rule.--Except as set forth in subsection (a.1)
or as otherwise prescribed by any general rule adopted
pursuant to section 503 (relating to reassignment of
matters), each traffic court shall have jurisdiction of all
prosecutions for summary offenses arising under:
(1) Title 75 (relating to vehicles).
(2) Any ordinance of any political subdivision enacted
pursuant to Title 75.
(a.1) Traffic Court of Philadelphia.--
(1) Except as otherwise prescribed by any general rule
adopted pursuant to section 503, each traffic court under
Subchapter B (relating to Traffic Court of Philadelphia) shall,
at the direction of the President Judge of the Philadelphia
Municipal Court, have jurisdiction of all prosecutions for
summary offenses arising under:
(i) Title 75.
(ii) Any ordinance of any political subdivision enacted
pursuant to Title 75.
...
(b) Concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction.--The
jurisdiction of a traffic court under this section shall be
exclusive of the courts of common pleas and magisterial
district judges, except that such jurisdiction shall be
concurrent with the magisterial district judges whenever the
traffic court is closed.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 1302 (internal footnote omitted).
Appellant pleaded guilty to his summary traffic violation in 2011, in the
Philadelphia Traffic Court; and, in 2011, Philadelphia had a “designated and
open traffic court” that had exclusive jurisdiction over Appellant’s summary
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traffic offense.2 Perfetto, 2017 PA Super 281, at *13; 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1302(a.1)(1)(i) and (b). As this Court recently held in Perfetto:
Section 1302 carves out an exception to compulsory joinder
and directs that the summary traffic offense is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the traffic court. A prior disposition
of a summary traffic offense in a traffic court does not bar
the later prosecution of other criminal charges that arose in
the same judicial district and at the same time as the
summary traffic offense.
Perfetto, 2017 PA Super 281, at **20-21.
The case at bar is controlled by Perfetto. Simply stated, since
Appellant was charged with and pleaded guilty to the summary traffic
offense of careless driving in the Philadelphia Traffic Court – and, since the
Philadelphia Traffic Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the summary traffic
offense pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 1302 – Appellant’s guilty plea to the
traffic offense did “not bar the later prosecution of [the] other criminal
charges that arose in the same judicial district and at the same time as the
summary traffic offense.” Perfetto, 2017 PA Super 281, at *21.
Appellant’s claim on appeal thus fails.
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2
We note that, in 2013, “[t]he Traffic Court of Philadelphia was subsumed
by [the] Traffic Division of the Philadelphia Municipal Court[.]” Perfetto,
2017 PA Super 281, at *15n.14. However, since Appellant pleaded guilty to
the summary traffic violation in the Philadelphia Traffic Court in 2011, the
2013 restructuring of the Philadelphia traffic court does not have any
bearing on the current appeal. Regardless, as this Court held in Perfetto,
the 2013 restructuring did not alter the fact that Philadelphia still possesses
“a designated and open traffic court” and that, in accordance with 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 1302, this traffic court still has exclusive jurisdiction over
summary traffic offenses. See Perfetto, 2017 PA Super 281, at *13-21.
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Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/15/2017
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