Com. v. Hudson, J.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JAI-MICHAEL HUDSON :
:
Appellant : No. 898 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 20, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-CR-0004098-2020
BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: MAY 4, 2023
Appellant Jai-Michael Hudson appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed after a jury convicted him of strangulation and simple assault.1
Appellant claims that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the
elements of strangulation. Appellant also challenges sufficiency and the
weight of the evidence. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
The Commonwealth presented the testimony of Officer Stephen
Staats, who was working as a patrol officer for the Lower Paxton
Township police department on August 29, 2020. He was
dispatched to 31 Beacon Drive at 10:03 p.m. on that date after a
911 call was made regarding a domestic dispute. Officer Staats
testified that when he arrived at the home, the victim, Pamelita
Roberts, opened the door. He noticed that she was visibly upset
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2718(a)(1) and 2701(a)(1), respectively.
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and crying, and he observed a scratch on her cheek that was
bleeding. Upon entering the home, he observed the victim’s
young son in the living room. The young boy was visibly scared,
and it appeared that he had been crying.
The victim relayed to Officer Staats that earlier in the day she had
ended her relationship with Appellant. She further explained that
the two shared a joint banking account and she left a check for
Appellant under the door mat of the house for $3,500.00. The
victim was under the impression Appellant had already retrieved
the check when she was awoken by her son, their barking dog and
knocking on the front door of the home. She told Officer Staats
that upon answering the door, Appellant put his hands around her
neck and threw her to the ground. Once on the ground, Appellant
put his hands around the victim’s neck for approximately 60
seconds and she was unable to breathe. During the interview, the
victim told Officer Staats she thought she was going to die multiple
times. Officer Staats also [audio-]recorded the victim’s statement
regarding the events of the incident.
[At trial, t]he Commonwealth called [the victim,] who stated that
she was intoxicated at the time of the incident. Under questioning
by the [Commonwealth], she admitted that she told the police
that the Appellant strangled her shortly after the incident. [The
victim also testified that her statements to the police were not
accurate because she was intoxicated at the time, and she denied
that Appellant had strangled her. Further, she stated that she
instructed her son to call the police because she was upset that
Appellant was leaving her.]
The Commonwealth also presented the testimony of Roxanne
Snider, a detective with the Dauphin County criminal investigation
division. Detective Snider testified that she spoke to a witness in
this matter, Zhaunte Crenshaw, who indicated that the victim and
Appellant were still involved in a relationship. Ms. Crenshaw
further relayed to Detective Snider that she was unsure how often
the two were seeing each other while the case was going through
the court system.
Finally, the Commonwealth also introduced the recording of the
911 call made by the victim’s 10-year-old son[, during which the
victim also spoke to the 911 dispatcher at the time of] the August
29, 2020 incident and pictures taken of the victim shortly after
the incident.
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Trial Ct. Op., 8/24/22, at 3-5 (unpaginated) (citations omitted and formatting
altered).
We note that on the second day of trial, the trial court held a brief
conference with counsel. Thereafter, the trial court indicated it would adopt
the Commonwealth’s proposed jury instruction regarding the strangulation
count and Appellant did not object. N.T. Trial, 2/1/22, at 80. The trial court
then instructed the jury that physical injury is not an element of strangulation,
and that the lack of physical injury is not a defense to the offense of
strangulation. N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 100-01.2 Appellant did not object after
the trial court completed its jury instructions. Id. at 107.
During its deliberations, the jury submitted a request for the trial court
to instruct the jury again on the applicable law. Id. at 108-09. The trial court
provided supplemental instructions and referenced the intent necessary to
commit murder when explaining mens rea. Id. at 110. Additionally, the trial
court repeated its previous instructions regarding the offense of strangulation
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2 We note that the trial notes of testimony from February 2, 2022 are not
included as part of the certified record, but they are included as part of
Appellant’s reproduced record. The Commonwealth did not object to the
accuracy of these notes of testimony. Because “their veracity is not in dispute,
we rely on the copy contained within the reproduced record.” See C.L. v.
M.P., 255 A.3d 514, 518 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc); see also
Commonwealth v. Brown, 52 A.3d 1139, 1145 n.4 (Pa. 2012) (holding that
an appellate court can consider a document that only appears in the
reproduced record when “the accuracy of the reproduction has not been
disputed” (citation omitted)).
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and physical injury, or the lack thereof. Id. at 111. Appellant did not object
to any portion of the trial court’s instructions. Id. at 119.
Ultimately, the jury found Appellant guilty of strangulation and simple
assault. The trial court deferred sentencing for the preparation of a pre-
sentence investigation (PSI) report. Id. at 123. On April 20, 2022, the trial
court sentenced Appellant to a mandatory minimum sentence of ten to twenty
years’ incarceration for strangulation as a second-strike offender3 and
imposed no further penalty for simple assault. See N.T. Sentencing Hr’g,
4/20/22, at 10-11. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion challenging
the weight of the evidence, which the trial court denied.
Appellant subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal.4 Both Appellant
and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues for our review, which
we reorder as follows:
1. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding
the lack of physical injury, which was confusing and prejudicial.
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3 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(1), (a.1).
4 In his notice of appeal, Appellant purports to appeal from “the conviction of
February 2, 2022, judg[]ment of sentence[] entered on April 20, 2022, and
the order denying post-sentence motion entered in this matter on . . . May
23, 2022.” Notice of Appeal, 6/20/22 (some formatting altered). It is well-
established that “in criminal cases appeals lie from judgment of sentence
rather than from the verdict of guilt, . . .” Commonwealth v. O’Neill, 578
A.2d 1334, 1335 (Pa. Super. 1990) (citations omitted). Therefore, we have
amended the caption accordingly. See Commonwealth v. Shamberger,
788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001) (en banc).
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2. Whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by
instructing the jury on the elements of murder in the closing
charge, which was confusing and prejudicial.
3. Whether the trial court erred in accepting the jury’s verdict
where the evidence presented was insufficient to establish the
elements of strangulation.
4. Whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in
accepting the jury’s verdict which was so contrary to the weight
of the evidence which established the [victim] was intoxicated
when she spoke with the police and recanted her initial
allegation.
Appellant’s Brief at 4.5
Jury Instructions
We address Appellant’s first two issues regarding the jury instructions
together. First, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the
jury that it is not a defense to the charge of strangulation that the victim was
not physically injured. Id. at 14-15. Appellant contends that this instruction
was prejudicial because it created confusion regarding whether the jury could
consider the victim’s lack of physical injuries when assessing her credibility.
Id. at 16-17.
Second, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by using murder as
an example when defining mens rea after the jury requested supplemental
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5 We note that in his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant also argued that the
evidence was insufficient to convict him of simple assault. See Rule 1925(b)
Statement, 7/19/22, at 2 (unpaginated). Appellant has not raised this claim
in his appellate brief; therefore, Appellant has abandoned this issue on appeal.
See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), 2119(a); see also Commonwealth v. McGill, 832
A.2d 1014, 1018 n.6 (Pa. 2003) (finding waiver where the appellant
abandoned claim on appeal).
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instructions. Id. at 11-13. Appellant contends that this instruction
referencing murder was prejudicial because Appellant had been charged with
assault-related offenses. Id. at 13-14. Appellant also claims that this
instruction was confusing as it only defined the mens rea of intentionally and
not knowingly. Id. at 13.
Before we address the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must determine
whether he has preserved them for appeal. This Court may raise this issue of
waiver sua sponte. See Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 903 A.2d 1178, 1184
(Pa. 2006). “[T]he applicability of waiver principles . . . is a question of law,
over which our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
plenary.” Commonwealth v. Barbour, 189 A.3d 944, 954 (Pa. 2018)
(citations omitted).
“Issues not raised before the trial court are waived and cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). It is well-established that “[a]
specific and timely objection must be made to preserve a challenge to a
particular jury instruction. Failure to do so results in waiver.”
Commonwealth v. Olsen, 82 A.3d 1041, 1050 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted).
Here, the record reflects that Appellant did not object to the jury
instructions that he seeks to challenge on appeal. Indeed, Appellant did not
raise any objections at the charging conference, during or after the trial court’s
initial jury instructions, nor when the trial court provided supplemental
instructions to the jury during deliberations. See N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 107,
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119. Therefore, Appellant has waived his challenges to the jury instructions
on appeal. See Olsen, 82 A.3d at 1050; Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Accordingly, no
relief is due.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish the
elements of strangulation. Appellant’s Brief at 19-21. Appellant contends that
there was no physical evidence of any strangulation and that the victim
testified that Appellant did not place his hand on her throat, nor did he impede
her ability to breathe. Id. at 20-21 (citing N.T. Trial, 2/1/22, at 49).
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard
of review is as follows:
The standard we apply when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in
the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient
evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we
may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the
fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt
may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced
is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.
Furthermore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we do
not review a diminished record. Rather, the law is clear that we
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are required to consider all evidence that was actually received,
without consideration as to the admissibility of that evidence or
whether the trial court’s evidentiary rulings are correct.
Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 567 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations
omitted and formatting altered)); see also Commonwealth v. Mikitiuk, 213
A.3d 290, 300 (Pa. Super. 2019) (stating that “[a] successful sufficiency-of-
the-evidence claim requires discharge” (citation omitted)).
Further, “the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient
to sustain a conviction for a criminal offense, so long as that testimony can
address and, in fact, addresses, every element of the charged crime.”
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 481 (Pa. Super. 2018).
Additionally, the prior inconsistent statements of a witness who testifies at
trial, are sufficient to sustain a conviction “as long as the prior inconsistent
statements, taken as a whole, establish every element of the offense charged
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the finder-of-fact could reasonably have
relied upon them in arriving at its decision.” Brown, 52 A.3d at 1171.
Lastly, any challenge to the credibility or reliability of the witnesses goes
to the weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence. See Commonwealth v.
Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2014) (explaining that a claim that
the Commonwealth’s evidence lacked credibility “attacks the weight, rather
than the sufficiency, of the evidence” (citation omitted)).
The Crimes Code defines strangulation, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) Offense defined.—A person commits the offense of
strangulation if the person knowingly or intentionally impedes the
breathing or circulation of the blood of another person by:
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(1) applying pressure to the throat or neck . . .
* * *
(b) Physical injury.—Infliction of a physical injury to a victim
shall not be an element of the offense. The lack of physical injury
to a victim shall not be a defense in a prosecution under this
section.
* * *
(d) Grading.—
* * *
(2) A violation of this section shall constitute a felony of the
second degree if committed:
(i) against a family or household member as defined in 23
Pa.C.S. § 6102 (relating to definitions)[.6]
18 Pa.C.S. § 2718(a)(1), (b), (d)(2)(i).
Here, at trial, the Commonwealth played a recording of the 911 call that
the victim’s son made on the night the incident occurred. See N.T. Trial,
2/1/22, at 32-33; Commonwealth’s Ex. 1. During the call, the victim told the
dispatcher that her boyfriend, Appellant, had beaten her up and almost choked
her to death. See id. Officer Staats testified that he arrived at the victim’s
apartment minutes after the 911 call and made an audio recording of the
victim’s statement. See N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 5-7, 11-12; Commonwealth’s
Ex. 2. At that time, the victim explained that after she opened the door for
Appellant, he placed his hands around the victim’s neck and threw her to the
floor. See Commonwealth’s Ex. 2; see also N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 10. The
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6The term “family or household members” includes, among others, “current
or former sexual or intimate partners . . . .” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a).
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victim also said that Appellant had his hands around her neck for around sixty
seconds, and during that time, she could not breathe. See Commonwealth’s
Ex. 2; see also N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 10. The victim repeatedly said that she
believed she was going to die when Appellant was choking her. See
Commonwealth’s Ex. 2; see also N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 10-11.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court addressed Appellant’s
sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim as follows:
Officer Staats credibly testified that the victim stated that
Appellant placed his hands around her throat, and she was unable
to breathe for approximately 60 seconds. Officer Staats also
observed injuries to the victim, which were also preserved in
photographs. The 911 call by the victim’s son strongly indicated
the Appellant assaulted [the victim]. Accordingly, there was
sufficient evidence to satisfy the elements of strangulation . . . .
Trial Ct. Op. at 6 (unpaginated).
Based on our review of the record, and viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, we agree with the
trial court that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s conviction for
strangulation. See Gray, 867 A.2d at 567.
At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of the victim’s initial
statements in which she described how Appellant had placed his hands around
her throat, forced her to the floor, and that she was unable to breathe during
that time. Although the victim recanted her prior statements at trial, the jury
was free to believe, all, part, or none of the evidence. See Brown, 52 A.3d
at 1171; Gray, 867 A.2d at 567. Therefore, in light of the totality of all the
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evidence presented by the Commonwealth, as verdict winner, we agree with
the trial court that there was sufficient evidence to sustain Appellant’s
conviction for strangulation. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2718; see also Brown, 52
A.3d at 1171 (holding that a witness’s prior inconsistent statements are
sufficient to sustain a conviction so long as the statements “taken as a whole,
establish every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt”).
Further, because physical injury is not an element of strangulation, the
presence or absence of physical injuries on the victim does not affect our
conclusion. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2718(b).7 Therefore, Appellant is not entitled
to relief on this claim.
Weight of the Evidence
In his last issue, Appellant argues that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 17-19. Specifically, Appellant
notes that at trial, the victim testified that Appellant did not strangle her. Id.
at 18 (citing N.T. Trial, 2/1/22, at 49, 54). Additionally, the victim testified
that she was intoxicated on the night of August 29, 2020, and that she
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7 Nevertheless, we note that the record belies Appellant’s claim that the victim
did not have physical injuries. The victim did not have any marks or bruises
on her throat. See N.T. Trial, 2/1/22, at 56-57, 74; N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 23.
However, the victim had scrapes on both of her knees and a scratch on her
face. See N.T. Trial, 2/1/22, at 58-59; N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 13-16;
Commonwealth’s Ex. 3, 4. Further, the victim told the 911 dispatcher that
she was injured but that she could handle her injuries at home. See
Commonwealth’s Ex. 1; see also N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 9, 23-24 (Officer
Staats testified that the victim declined aid from paramedics because she is a
nurse and could treat her own injuries).
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instructed her son to call the police because she was angry at Appellant for
leaving her. Id. (citing N.T. Trial, 2/1/22, at 42, 49). Appellant also refers to
Crenshaw’s testimony that the victim becomes belligerent when she drinks
excessively, and the victim had been drinking heavily earlier on the day of the
incident. Id. (citing N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at 42). Lastly, Appellant asserts that
the victim did not have any physical injuries. Id. (citing N.T. Trial, 2/2/22, at
23). Therefore, Appellant concludes that the verdict shocks one’s sense of
justice. Id. at 19.
In reviewing a weight claim, this Court has explained:
The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder
of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence
and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is
not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and
must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the
credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to
determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so
clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal
weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is confined to
whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the jury
verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a
weight claim consists of a review of the trial court’s exercise of
discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence. An appellate court
may not reverse a verdict unless it is so contrary to the evidence
as to shock one’s sense of justice.
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v.
Cousar, 928 A.2d 1025, 1036 (Pa. 2007) (holding that an appellate court
reviews a trial court’s denial of a weight of the evidence claim for an abuse of
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discretion and stating that “the trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial
based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings”
(citation omitted)).
When a weight claim “is predicated on the credibility of trial testimony,
our review of the trial court’s decision is extremely limited. Generally, unless
the evidence is so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any verdict
based thereon pure conjecture, these types of claims are not cognizable on
appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 282 (Pa. Super.
2009) (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s weight-of-the-evidence claim
as follows:
[T]he jury’s guilty verdicts were not against the weight of the
evidence. Officer Staats credibly testified that moments after the
August 29, 2020 incident, the victim stated that Appellant placed
his hands around her neck for approximately 60 seconds and she
was unable to breathe. The victim also told Officer Staats multiple
times during his interview of her, that she thought she was going
to die. Finally, Officer Staats observed visible injuries to the
victim’s face. The jury also viewed pictures of the victim’s injuries
and listened to the 911 recording from the night of the incident.
The 911 call made by the young boy was stunningly compelling as
he related to the dispatcher what Appellant did to his mother.
While [the victim] offered testimony during the trial that she was
drunk during the incident and she did not recall what happened,
the observations Officer Staat[s] made shortly after the incident
were credible and reliable. The victim’s testimony was not
credible, especially in light of the fact that testimony was offered
suggesting that the victim and Appellant were still romantically
involved. Because the fact finder found the victim’s testimony at
trial to be not credible, and the verdicts were supported by the
credible evidence of record, we reject Appellant’s argument.
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Trial Ct. Op. at 5 (unpaginated).
Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the trial court in rejecting Appellant’s weight claim. See Gonzalez, 109 A.3d
at 723. The jury, as fact-finder, was entitled to make credibility
determinations concerning the victim’s trial testimony and her prior
statements, and was free to believe all or part or none of the witness
testimony, in addition to deciding which evidence presented at trial has
greater weight. See id.; see also Gibbs, 981 A.2d at 282. Accordingly,
Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. For these reasons, we affirm.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/04/2023
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